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Abstract
In 2009, the Pakistani Supreme Court began granting rights to gender ambiguous people who are
locally known as khwaja siras. The Court organized this population into taxonomic groups and
ordered the government to ‘mainstream’ them. These actions were based on certain cultural
assumptions and occurred amid uncertainties about who khwaja siras really were. Meanwhile,
khwaja siras began to mobilize in an effort to control their public image. Based on fourteen
months of ethnographic fieldwork on the identity politics of khwaja siras in Karachi, this
dissertation seeks to understand the ways in which gender ambiguous people constructed,
negotiated and represented themselves both within their social networks and in the wider society,
as well as the factors underpinning their public portrayals. I conceive khwaja sira politics as a
‘game’, that is, as the art of manipulation and concealment. I argue that the games of secrecy and
deception in which this minority population engaged were responses to the stigma they
experienced in everyday life.
Khwaja sira relationships with the general public were strategic game-like interactions
that were meant to conceal knowledge, misrepresent gender variant people, and confuse
opponents. They allowed khwaja siras to maintain ambiguity about their corporeality, conceal
their sexualized lifestyle, and seek inclusion into mainstream society. These everyday forms of
agency and deceit emerged on a larger scale and in far more sophisticated ways in the realm of
activism. However, social stigma was so pervasive that it permeated into the khwaja sira cultural
system, impacting the self-esteem of its members and triggering identity wars between them.
These fissures were replicated within activist spaces where they often stifled efforts to empower
khwaja siras. The games of secrecy and deception that gender variant people played both
facilitated and undermined their movement. These empowering and conscious acts of self-

preservation enhanced their security within an oppressive social environment. However, khwaja
sira politics did not promote understanding of gender and sexual difference. These provisional
solutions perpetuated ambiguity about khwaja siras, temporarily grazing the surface of their
struggles without promoting long-term stigma reduction.
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Note On Transliteration
I have used an Urdu transliteration system for all non-English words in the text. This
system has also been applied to all non-Urdu words that are either considered to be a part of the
Urdu language (e.g., Arabic) or were spoken in tandem with Urdu. I have italicized these words
only the first time they appear in the text. For the ease of reading, the names of people, places
and organizations are presented using their common English spellings.

	
  

	
  

ix	
  

PART ONE:
Setting the Scene
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nadia took out another Capstan, lit it with a matchstick, and took a deep puff. Seconds later she
exhaled thick cigarette smoke. “They lie so much!” she said with a hint of disdain. Nadia sat
before me in a low-neck women’s shalvār qamīz, revealing a little day-old chest stubble.
“Why?” I asked as I wiped the sweat trickling down my forehead with a frayed tissue paper.
“They don’t open up to strangers,” she said between puffs. I took a sip of bottled water to cool
down from the mid-afternoon heat. I was at Nadia’s house near Karachi Cantt Station, sitting on
her soiled floor mattress, my back against the uncemented brick wall. I had recently hired Nadia
as my research assistant, and she was alerting me to the possible situations that might occur
during my interactions with khwaja siras, who I momentarily describe as gender ambiguous
people, that is, as a category of non-normative individuals whose gendered desires and practices
diverged from those of their assigned male sex. Nadia, herself a khwaja sira, twisted and draped
her long ponytail across her left shoulder and said, “They won’t tell you the real things about
their life…They’ll get really confused and begin wondering who you are and what you want.”
This was not the first or the last time I heard something of this sort. Informants frequently
talked about khwaja siras who routinely obscured “the real things.” Indeed, many engaged in the
practice of concealment during interactions with me. What I did not realize that afternoon at
Nadia’s house was that such exchanges between khwaja siras and outsiders like myself would
become one of the central foci of my study. But what did these gender ambiguous people conceal
from mainstream society and why? It was hard to get a straightforward response to this question
from interlocutors, and arriving at a conclusion became a journey in itself. This question stayed
with me as I ventured out to discover truths about khwaja siras.
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This dissertation reflects my journey of uncovering answers to these questions.
Specifically, it is about khwaja sira identity politics, of which the practice described by Nadia is
a part. By focusing on various aspects of the culture and activism of khwaja siras, I reconceive
their politics as a “game,” that is, as the art of obfuscation and deception that required dexterity
and often entailed a personal sense of challenge. Here, game must not be presumed to be a level
playing field, but, as is often the case, be viewed as manipulative performances in which some
participants were altogether oblivious to being pawns in someone else’s game. These games or
forms of “play” were learned behaviors with a ritualistic quality since they were largely framed,
intentional and rehearsed (Basso 1979, 4), but also potentially experimental. Against this
understanding of the term, I develop and apply the notion of “game” to various aspects of the
lives of gender ambiguous people, particularly to the inner workings of khwaja sira social and
activist networks as well as the exchanges between ordinary and activist khwaja siras and the
outside world. I argue that the games they played were responses to oppressive social norms and
to the stigma they experienced in everyday life. They were also a means of accessing rights,
justice and equal citizenship.
Khwaja sira relationships with mainstream society were strategic game-like interactions
that were meant to conceal knowledge, deceive opponents, and perpetuate ambiguity about the
corporeality and sexuality of gender ambiguous people. These tactics allowed khwaja siras to
misrepresent themselves, reinforce beneficial stereotypes, shatter damaging ones, seek inclusion
into the mainstream, and potentially expand its boundaries. Far from being radical, the self and
group representations of khwaja siras mostly complied with and only occasionally attempted to
expand cultural norms instead of problematizing them. Hence, khwaja sira identity politics were
not liberationist or overtly transformational in nature, but a combination of assimilationist

	
  

3	
  

technologies that worked within the existing sociopolitical structure, and expansionist
approaches that cautiously aimed to extend normative boundaries. I contend that khwaja sira
politics of representation were rational, conscious and generative games of self-preservation.
Further, the public portrayals of khwaja siras deviated from their personal understandings
of individual and group identities. This dissonance between projected and felt subjectivity often
incited conflict within khwaja sira communities. In addition to impacting their self-esteem, social
stigma permeated into the khwaja sira cultural system where it triggered identity wars between
them. Structural violence was so pervasive that it impelled them to discriminate against one
another on the basis of mainstream cultural and religious beliefs pertaining to anatomy, sexual
identity and practice, class and ethnicity. Cultural norms and khwaja sira identity politics were
inextricably linked since the former had a direct influence on both internally experienced and
externally projected identities. Importantly, the fissures within their social networks were
replicated in the domain of khwaja sira activism where they stifled efforts to empower gender
ambiguous people.
I suggest that khwaja sira identity politics both undermined and facilitated the khwaja sira
movement. They assisted gender variant Pakistanis in short-term interactions with opponents,
allowing them to settle disputes, win arguments, deflect negative attention, and positively
represent themselves. These games helped to enhance their security within an oppressive
sociocultural environment. However, they did not promote understanding and acceptance of
gender and sexual variance. Instead, these provisional, band-aid solutions concealed as much as
they revealed, confused the general public, and left them in a state of doubt about who khwaja
siras really were while impeding the state’s efforts to rehabilitate them. At best, this kind of
politics temporarily grazed the surface of the problems faced by khwaja siras without resulting in
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long-term stigma reduction. Even as they served transient functions, khwaja sira “identity
politics constitute[d] narrow legal/political activism that fail[ed] to address cultural sources of
oppression” (Bernstein 2005, 57). In what follows, I lay out my theoretical framework for the
study of khwaja siras. The following sections focus on terminological and methodological issues,
the significance of this project, and an overview of chapters.

Theorizing Khwaja Sira Politics
The themes central to this dissertation are secrecy, deception, and ambiguity, as well as issues of
identity, stigma and marginalization. I illustrate the relationality between these topics and khwaja
sira politics by weaving together perspectives on the production and management of dominant
discourse, theories of identity presentation and management among stigmatized people, and
social movement theories on identity. This theoretical armamentarium enables an investigation
of khwaja sira practices within two overlapping cultural systems: the khwaja sira universe and
mainstream society.
These perspectives demonstrate how dominant beliefs influenced khwaja sira personhood
and lived experience, shaped the way they saw and treated one another, impacted how they
thought they were perceived by the wider society, and affected their interactions with the public.
Khwaja sira identity politics revolved around three central questions: Who am I/Who are we?
How do others see me/us? How do I/we want others to see me/us? Accordingly, the games of
deception that khwaja siras played both informed and were informed by personal experience and
public discourse.
Everyday resistance to norms has been an important topic of anthropological focus,
particularly in the study of gender in South Asia and the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 1990;
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Ahearn 2001; Lamb 2000; Mahmood 2001; Raheja and Gold 1994). However gestures of
defiance are but one kind of reaction to marginalization. In agreement with Christine Pelzer
White, I find just as crucial explorations of “everyday forms of collaboration” with the norm
(1986, 56), and what Susan Seizer refers to as everyday “expansions” of the norm (2000, 218).
Although I pay attention to all three types of practices, gestures of compliance were most
prevalent in the interactions between khwaja siras and the general public, particularly since they
were vital to their survival in Pakistan’s oppressive heteronormative environment. I, therefore,
draw on perspectives that enable a close examination of how khwaja siras claimed inclusion in
mainstream society.

The Production and Management of Dominant Culture
National culture and the public sphere are aspects of the dominant society that elucidate the
relationship between khwaja sira identity politics and social norms. Stuart Hall writes that
national culture is a discourse, a construction that influences and organizes people’s behavior and
self-conceptions (1997, 612-3), but despite the appearance of unity, it does not erase differences
between the citizenry, which is fraught with internal contradictions and divisions (1997, 618).
How do nations view and treat those who threaten to disrupt the narrative of the nation, and what
remedial action is taken by those who do not fit neatly into this meta-narrative? I demonstrate
that khwaja siras aimed to strategically insert themselves into Pakistani national culture by
identifying points of intersection linking them to the grand narrative of the nation-state without
posing an ideological threat to it.
Despite their best efforts, however, the Pakistani state increased its regulation of khwaja
siras. Foucault argued that the modern discourse on sexuality gradually emerged in mainstream
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Western societies through the technologies of power and bodily discipline that involved such
controls as confession, medical intervention, state regimentation, and public moral policing
(1977; 1979). This surveillance of sexuality intensified in the twentieth century, when secrecy
became “a constant threat to the perceived moral legitimacy of the State” (Herdt 2003, 59).
Khwaja siras, a segment of the Pakistani population that had been categorically ignored by the
state, came under scrutiny for the first time since independence as a result of the rights granted to
them in 2009. The downside of legal recognition is increased regimentation. While the state
aimed to understand, define, and organize khwaja siras in line with religious and cultural norms,
gender ambiguous Pakistanis engaged in the politics and praxis of strategic assimilation.
Further, the public sphere in Pakistan, as a reflection of dominant thought, is suggestive
of mainstream understandings of khwaja siras. The Pakistani public is a discursive imaginary
(re)produced through media, rhetoric, political organizing, religion, the circulation of written and
oral texts, performances, history and so on. This public is ephemeral rather than spatial, that is, it
emerges in and through discursive and transient moments. For instance, it surfaced during the
encounters of khwaja siras with their neighbors and with media outlets. Importantly, the
Pakistani public is diverse, comprised of both polarized and overlapping points of view. That
khwaja siras concomitantly experienced acceptance, social distancing, outright rejection and
violence is evidence of the uneasy coexistence of multiple publics in Pakistan. By drawing upon
the above understanding of the Pakistani public, and then extrapolating it through a Foucauldian
discourse analysis, I examine what “khwaja sira” meant to the sociopolitical imaginary and how
these meanings informed the game-like maneuvers of gender ambiguous people.

Stigma, Identity and Deception
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Secrecy has historically been a necessary protective device for certain groups of people in their
attempts to avoid oppression (Simmel 1960, Foucault 1980), particularly to those who are
stigmatized, such as sexual minorities (Herdt 1997). In his essay, “The Secret and the Secret
Society,” (1950) Georg Simmel offers that secrecy is indicative of a divided society, one that is
fraught with social conflict and the subjugation of those who maintain secrecy. However, since
secrets carry the threat of discovery, khwaja siras maintained them through a variety of tactical
maneuvers. Over time, khwaja siras had developed this art of secrecy through which they
concealed information and escaped discrimination.
Stigma theories shed light on the games that khwaja siras had devised to cope with their
marginal status. In his discussion on the identity management of stigmatized persons, Erving
Goffman states that stigma arises from the perception of “an undesired differentness” from the
norm (1963, 5). Stigmatized people absorb normative values from society, and are acutely aware
of what others see as their inadequacies (1963, 7). Goffman found in such people the desire to
assimilate through such methods as passing, “covering,” and the concealment of stigma symbols
(1963, 44, 92). The strategic management of information through the use of such techniques can
be likened to a game. In Strategic Interaction (1969), Goffman suggests that many face-to-face
interactions involving the control and management of information have a “gamelike” (10)
quality. In these exchanges, participants are engaged in strategic maneuvers, such as “varying
degrees of disclosure” (7), “verbal reticence” (13), and “misrepresentation” (14). Through these
strategies, stigmatized persons manage information about their shortcomings and fashion virtual
identities that are distinct from their actual personhood (1963, 41). As stigmatized persons,
khwaja siras too upheld social norms and were cognizant of their divergence from them.
Likewise, they engaged in game-like identity presentation and management techniques to control
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information and manage perception, particularly in exchanges with relatives, neighbors, media
outlets, government officials, NGO workers, and other members of mainstream society. These
techniques enabled them to maintain multiple, fluid, situated and imbricated identities.
In order to avoid theorizing stigma in “overly individualistic, psychological ways ” (Van
Hollen 2013, 97), Parker and Aggleton (2003) suggest reading Goffman’s insights alongside
Foucault’s theories on power and Bourdieu’s concern with social reproduction. Foucault
highlights how power and social control are increasingly exercised not through physical force
but through “the production of conforming subjects and docile bodies” (17). Likewise, Bourdieu
indicates that hierarchies are reproduced within social systems, often without much conscious
recognition or resistance from dominated subjects (18). Joining together the insights of Goffman,
Foucault and Bourdieu, “it becomes possible to understand stigma and stigmatization not merely
as isolated phenomenon, or expressions of individual attitudes or of cultural values, but as central
to the constitution of the social order” (17).
Deception was a key identity presentation and management strategy used by khwaja
siras. According to Lieberman, “[d]eception appears to serve two primary functions…it enables
people to avoid the unpleasant or unacceptable personal situations that would arise if one always
told the truth, but more importantly it serves as a useful and necessary tool to advance one's selfinterest” (1977, 79). Further, according to Lieberman, Machiavelli’s analysis of political
collective action emphasized the utility for rulers in outwardly appearing to possess positive
character traits (e.g., merciful, faithful, humane, religious) (Lieberman 1977, 66). Unlike
Machiavelli’s ruler-centered approach, I recast the use of duplicity by those in power to those
who are powerless. Khwaja siras maintained a deceptive public appearance of possessing noble
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qualities not only for personal benefit but also to prevent the citizenry from thinking that the
rights granted to them threatened the moral balance of the country.
Simmel argues that the act of deceiving not only depends upon the deceived’s lack of
information, but it is also meant to further restrict his/her knowledge (Lieberman 1977, 67).
Similarly, the relationships of khwaja siras with ordinary people relied on the latter’s limited and
distorted understanding of the former. Khwaja siras’ ability to deceive outsiders was grounded in
the partial and often erroneous knowledge—comprised primarily of myths and stereotypes— that
the general public had of them. However, unlike Simmel, I do not make value judgments
concerning the use of deception. This enables an examination of both the drawbacks and the
benefits of deception in the everyday and activist lives of khwaja siras.
Goffman too discussed the deployment of deceptive behavior in social interactions. In
Stigma (1963), he examined how persons with defects managed information about their failings,
and in Asylums (1961) he noted the strategies mentally disturbed individuals employed to “pass
off” or “get by” (Lieberman 1977, 70). “Those who choose to pass…[tend] to do so under a
complex system of pressures, often to escape…unjust restraints on personal freedom, or to
access greater levels of opportunity or power…” (Harrison 2013, 1). Such deceptive acts enabled
gender variant Pakistanis to misrepresent themselves as respectable and moral. However, in my
analysis, I reject Goffman’s view that social actors lack a situational understanding of their
deceptive performances, which is an underestimation of actor self-awareness. I suggest that
khwaja sira performances of deception were learned behaviors (a point that Goffman marginally
alludes to [1959]), that is, they were rehearsed and tested cultural scripts of deception, acquired
by observing the interactions of senior khwaja siras and their opponents.
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Importantly, khwaja sira games of deception did not merely block knowledge but
distorted it. In interactions with outsiders, khwaja siras employed such techniques as polysemy,
prevarication, vagueness, and inconsistency to the effect that their listeners were left in a state of
confusion and uncertainty about the precise meaning of their speech. The ambiguous speech of
khwaja siras warped mainstream understandings of the contemporary forms of diverse gender
experiences in Pakistan. Such speech perpetuated obscurity about khwaja sira anatomy and
sexuality, while situating gender ambiguous people within the domain of the acceptable.
Mimesis is yet another identity presentation technique used by khwaja siras as a means of
integrating into the national framework. Here, “mimesis does not mean the duplication of reality;
mimesis is…construction, creation” (Adams 1996, 18). Diana Taylor states that “[i]ndividual and
state formation take place, in part, in the visual sphere through a complicated play of looks:
looking, being looked at, identification, recognition, mimicry” (1997, 30). Similarly, in detailing
a social history of India, Partha Chatterjee notes that Indian women’s internalization of the image
of the ideal Indian woman played an important role in building a new Indian nation (1993, 1301). By assuming the model of “virtuous domesticity,” middle class Indian women managed to
preserve respectability while participating in the public sphere. This human ability to internalize
and mimic culturally celebrated frames also enabled gender ambiguous people to produce the
archetype of the socially respectable, responsible and acceptable khwaja sira. This ideal image
was meant to counter and suppress the stereotype of immorality, sexuality, and inauthenticity
attached to gender nonconforming persons. Through bodily discipline and self-policing in
ordinary and activist contexts, gender ambiguous people aimed to create a moral social
imaginary regarding khwaja siras. This is not to say that they aimed for a complete erasure of
sexuality since being perceived as objects of desire was essential to their livelihood as dancers
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and sex workers. However, they did not wish to be viewed in sexual terms by “decent” members
of society, a concern with personal respectability that was shared by the hijras in Reddy’s study
(2005). Accordingly, khwaja siras managed the split between their public and private lives, that
is, between their virtual and actual identities.
The concept of the Lacanian gaze complicates an easy reading of the process of mimicry.
Lacan suggests that we are all objects of the gaze of the other, where the act of gazing consists of
the “image” or object, and the “screen” or the viewer’s veneer of interpretation (1988, 91).
Marianne Hirsch (1997) furthers Lacan’s ideas in stating that the gaze is historically situated and
culturally mediated. Moreover, additional veneers of cultural difference, such as ethnicity, class,
age, gender, sexuality, and so on also color our interpretation of images. The Lacanian gaze
suggests that khwaja sira compliance with norms, forged through looking and mimicking, not
only produced images of the good citizen, but also created possibilities for the expansion of
norms. Khwaja siras were not a monolithic group and the sociocultural differences among them
produced differences in the interpretation of what it meant to be a good khwaja sira.
Cryptography was another technique of information control used by khwaja siras.
Cryptography refers to the implementation of techniques of secure or secret communication
(Singh 2000, xiv-xv) in the presence of third parties, especially one’s adversaries. For instance,
khwaja siras used their secret code, Farsi1, in the company of other gender ambiguous people,
particularly in the presence of outsiders. Not only was Farsi a marker of khwaja sira identity and
insider status, but it also blocked communication with ordinary people. This tool was an
important ingredient of the khwaja sira repertoire of secrecy games.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
The Farsi spoken by khwaja siras was not the Persian language but a secret vocabulary
developed within hijra and zennana communities. Farsi words were incorporated into other local
languages and dialects in everyday speech.
2
I intentionally say “khwaja sira communities” in plural form rather than “the khwaja sira
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Thus far, I have focused on theoretical perspectives that illustrate how khwaja siras
produced virtual identities through interactions with the general public. I now turn to their actual
identities, which subsisted within their social world. These identities both converged with and
diverged from virtual ones. Simmel saw secret formations as covert establishments within the
manifest world (1950, 330), wherein secrets produce a feeling of unity among group members
(Ritzer and Goodman 2003). Khwaja sira networks were not secret societies since they were
visibly present in the Pakistani public landscape. However, secrecy was an important aspect of
their culture, one that promoted internal cohesion and the security of its members. I, therefore,
view khwaja sira networks as visible subcultures that were relegated to the margins of dominant
society, but were nonetheless chock full of clandestine practices. However, I complicate an easy
reading of cohesion within secret formations to argue that this demi-world was not a unified
social structure but an unstable one made up of multiple, overlapping and contradictory subject
positions and identities. These internal differences produced conflict within and between khwaja
sira communities and organizations.
Moreover, stigma impacted the social relationships among gender ambiguous people.
Goffman wrote that the beliefs of mainstream society instruct the stigmatized person on how to
feel about and treat those who diverge from the norm (1963, 111). Consequently, the stigmatized
might be repelled at the sight of their own kind displaying their failings (1963, 108). Goffman
also suggested that “it is often the stigmatized person who internalizes the stigma with the most
vigor, leading to feelings of shame, self-hate and self-derogation” (Van Hollen 2010, 644). As
stigmatized people, khwaja siras regularly discriminated against various gender and sexual
minority groups on the basis of the mainstream beliefs they endorsed. Their internal identity
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politics reveal the impact of low self-esteem and internalized stigma on the everyday and activist
lives of khwaja siras.

Activism and Identity Politics
Social movement perspectives deepen understandings of the processes of identity presentation
within the realm of activism. Akin to Goffman’s insights about actual and virtual identities,
social movement scholars Bernstein (2005) and Tilly (2002) suggest making a distinction
between externally deployed identities that are strategically appropriated (i.e., detached
identities), and internally experienced ones that are invoked in everyday practice (i.e., embedded
identities). Bernstein cautions researchers to not take at face value the public claims about
identity made by social movements since they may not be experienced in everyday life (2005,
67). The concept of identity deployment explains the strategic processes through which activists
project certain identities to achieve their objectives (Bernstein 1997). This “requires the
projection of ‘sameness’ to outsiders…[and the identities deployed] must stem from a coherent
social location understandable to those who are the audience for them…” (Stephen 2001, 54).
Similarly, khwaja sira activists projected a fairly homogenized khwaja sira identity to
mainstream society, one that presented gender ambiguous Pakistanis as a unified and culturally
acceptable populace.
Even though identities are historically and culturally constructed, social movements tend
to solidify and essentialize them. Often these essentialisms are strategic, particularly when they
are collectively deployed as a political scheme (Bernstein 2005, 59). Essentialist identities tend
to be primordial, especially when they employ “histories which go back well before the birth of
those being identified” (Unnithan and Thin 1989, 22). Khwaja sira activists deployed strategic
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essentialisms that reified, hardened, narrowed down and often misrepresented what it meant to
be a khwaja sira. In addition, they drew upon histories that helped them establish legitimacy and
authenticity. Khwaja sira politics suggest that culturally grounded strategic essentialisms have
greater potential for acceptance in mainstream Pakistani society compared to foreign identity
constructs. Instead of juxtaposing essentialisms with constructions, I suggest that the former
were also socially constructed and tactically appropriated by khwaja siras.
Moreover, the external misrepresentations of khwaja sira activists were transnormative.
In writing about the LGBT movement in the United States, Lisa Duggan describes
homonormativity as “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and
institutions, but upholds and sustains them” (2002, 179). For instance, the drive to legalize samesex marriage is a strategy aimed at normalizing queer people through monogamy, one that
overrides other forms of intimate relationships. Equally, the identity politics of khwaja siras was
“queer” normative in that it was either in compliance with or it presented acceptable versions of
social norms that did not seek to complicate heteronormativity.
Having discussed social movement perspectives on external identities, I now turn to the
internal politics of activist domains. “Identity work” is a term coined by Snow and Anderson to
refer to “the range of activities individuals engage in to create…and sustain…identities that are
congruent with…the self concept” (1987, 1348). Identity work describes how members of a
movement view themselves as a collective whole (2000, 42). “Constructing and maintaining
identity…requires a great deal of work” (Einwoher, Reger, and Myers 2008, 2), such as the
creation and maintenance of meanings that sustain movements (Glass 2009, 526). The identity
work carried out by khwaja sira activists aimed to create strands of commonality among various
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categories of khwaja siras. However, because this type of work was lacking, it led to an internal
crisis of representation within activist domains.
This crisis was exacerbated by the fact that externally deployed or detached identities
were often devoid of the ground realities of ordinary khwaja siras. The essentialized,
homogenous, and normalized identities externally projected by khwaja sira activists did not
always harmonize with the lived subjectivities of khwaja siras. In fact, detached identities
produced dissonance within activist organizations when they excluded certain gender ambiguous
constituents. Norget offers that “[o]ften…‘outside’ perspectives…exert a significant influence on
the internal dynamics of a movement and the course of its development” (2010, 120). Similarly,
dominant beliefs shaped both the internal and the external politics of the khwaja sira movement.
Ironically, the identities that were externally deployed to reduce the effects of stigma often
became a source of internal conflict within khwaja sira organizations.

Terminological Concerns
There are many ways to define khwaja sira, but no one definition is complete in and of itself
partly due to the absence of fitting vocabulary that literally translates the term from Urdu to
English. Moreover, khwaja sira is historically and culturally situated within the South Asian
context, and has distinct trajectories of use in contemporary Pakistan. One task in this
dissertation is to unpack what khwaja sira has meant at various points in time to different groups
of people. From a Euro-American point of view, they may appear to be male-to-female
transgender individuals, but such an imperialist understanding does not do justice to the
contemporary khwaja sira experience in Pakistan because it conceals the following: that being a
khwaja sira entails being a part of a vast social network that is guided by its own culture and
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traditions; the fact that many types of sexual minorities are included in the khwaja sira identity
category; and that the term khwaja sira is a product of the confluence of history, activism, legal
change, and media intervention.
Khwaja siras are commonly known as hijras in many parts of South Asia. In Pakistan, the
term regained currency around the mid-2000s owing partly to the efforts of activists who
appropriated it as a politically correct identity label to replace “hijra,” which they believed
carried negative connotations among the general public. However, hijra was still very much in
use within khwaja sira communities2 in Karachi along with a spate of other terms.
Khwaja sira is a highly contested term, and yet I have used it as the primary identity label
to describe those who are the focus of this investigation. There are several reasons why I employ
it in my writing. First, khwaja sira was the term of choice that gender ambiguous people wanted
outsiders to use while addressing them. Second, informants viewed khwaja sira as an umbrella
category under which other genderqueer groups were subsumed. Third, understanding the use of
the term “khwaja sira” is important to a study centered on activism and on the relationship
between gender ambiguous people and the wider society. Alternatively, “hijra” may have figured
prominently in my writing had I limited my focus to the culture and everyday life of ordinary
khwaja siras. Fourth, it would be inappropriate for an anthropological study focused on khwaja
siras to employ politically incorrect identity labels for those being studied. My use of khwaja sira
is not meant to undermine the importance of other identity labels. In fact, one of the goals of this
study is to illustrate the interrelationship between them.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2
I intentionally say “khwaja sira communities” in plural form rather than “the khwaja sira
community” in singular in order to highlight the fact that this cultural system was a discursive
social network consisting of distinct yet intersecting sets of lineages, classes, households,
extended families and identity circles. Rather than being place-bound, this network was spread
across an expansive geography characterized by social and ideological linkages and ruptures.
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Among English language terms, I use “transgender” in the broadest sense to refer to those
whose gender identity differed from their assigned sex, such as a person who is born physically
male but does not identify as a man3. In the years leading up to my research, transgender and its
abbreviated forms, “TG” and “trans,” had gained currency among some groups of khwaja siras,
including activists and employees and patrons of sexual health NGOs. However, I limit my use
of transgender to individuals who identified as such, especially those who resisted khwaja sira
and other local terms as identity labels. The English terms that I use most frequently and
interchangeably with khwaja sira, though still with caution, are “gender ambiguous” and “gender
variant” individuals, not only to add terminological variety to my text but also because I find
them to be less laden with Euro-American connotations. However, none of these terms were used
by khwaja siras as self-identifiers. I acknowledge that in employing English words to reference
the subjects of my study, I risk making an imperialist move since these terms may not precisely
index the embodied subjectivities of local gender/sexual minorities. Paradoxically, I use
“transgender” in the title of this dissertation because I want this study to be easily accessible to
those seeking information on the global diversity of nonnormative gender and sexuality.
Employing an instituted term, such as transgender, serves to make this study identifiable to a
broader audience even as it aims to critique it.
Another term that appears in this text is “queer,” which I do not employ as an identity
label but as an adjective to describe those whose gendered and sexual desires and practices did
not conform to heteronormativity. With the exception of certain elite LGBT activists, khwaja
siras and most other gender/sexual minorities did not use this word as a self-descriptor. In
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3
Taking a lead from Valentine (2007), I avoid using the term “transgendered” since it may carry
negative connotations among some audiences. Instead, I use “transgender” both as a noun and an
adjective (25).
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opposition to khwaja sira and gender ambiguous people, I alternate between “ordinary people”
(‘ām log), a term used by informants, and “non-khwaja siras” to refer to those who whose
gendered desires and practice matched the norms of their birth sex and/or those who did not
belong to khwaja sira communities.

Methods and Challenges
The Field
When the time came to select a field site in Pakistan, Karachi was the obvious choice for both
practical and research purposes. I wanted to focus my research in an urban center since they tend
to be hotbeds for activism. Moreover, since I was born and raised in Karachi, I had a certain
familiarity with the cityscape, a relationship I did not have with other major Pakistani cities.
My research gave me the chance to reconnect with Karachi in ways I had not known it before.
Beyond the main streets, tucked away from plain sight behind the residential and commercial
neighborhoods are enclaves where the city’s poor live. Growing up in Karachi, I had never
stepped foot in these settlements, but during fieldwork I learned to see and navigate through
them from the perspective of my informants, traveling with them in rickshaws from colony to
colony through winding inner streets lined with open sewage streams and heaps of garbage. This
was a different Karachi, a whole new city within the city that I knew.
Before fieldwork, I was unfamiliar with the ground situation of khwaja sira activism in
Pakistan4. All I knew was that gender ambiguous people had started engaging in activism in

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4
I did not get the opportunity to conduct preliminary fieldwork because I spent my pre-fieldwork
academic career preparing for dissertation research on queer activism in Kolkata, India.
Unfortunately, being of Pakistani origin worked against me, and ultimately visa constraints
prevented me from pursuing my intended research. As I recovered from my post-visa misfortune,
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recent years, and that they had won a kind of public recognition that other sexual minorities
could barely imagine. Studying khwaja sira activism was timely not only because gender variant
people had gained legal legitimacy in 2009 when the Supreme Court granted them rights, but
also their activism had propelled forward in the wake of the Court’s decision in their favor. Over
the year prior to fieldwork, I had managed to closely follow one Karachi-based khwaja sira
group named “Gender Solidarity Society” (GSS) (pseudonym) through its Facebook page and
website. Unlike other groups, GSS appeared to be an active organization that posted regular
status updates of its activities, shared journalistic and educational material, and made demands
on matters of public policy concerning khwaja siras. I was drawn to GSS’s activism, and in light
of the constraints I was facing at the time, the organization provided a much-welcomed avenue
for research.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
I was advised by my dissertation committee to consider Pakistan as an alternative country for
fieldwork.
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As a field site, Karachi was unique in that it was composed of a heterogeneous population
of khwaja siras. Post-colonial Karachi, the largest city and financial hub of Pakistan, has been a
city of migrants since the partition of the South Asian subcontinent in 1947. The influx of people
into Karachi during the various phases of migration coincided with an increase in squatter
settlements, land mafia, ethnic violence, party politics, congestion, and poor housing and
sanitation (Gayer 2007; Nichola 2010; Verkaaik 2009). Karachi was the chosen destination of
khwaja siras who come to this city from across Pakistan in search of work. As a result, the
khwaja sira communities of Karachi, representing a diverse ethnic and linguistic mix, were less
homogenous than those residing in other parts of the country. These khwaja siras settled down in
shantytowns like other poor migrant workers.

Research Process
Ethnography can reveal both the points of convergence and divergence between local cultural
practices and the political positions of a movement’s constituencies (Burdick 1995, 362). I drew
upon this insight to investigate the interrelationship between the culture of khwaja siras and the
cultural dimensions of khwaja sira activism between January 2011 and January 2012, and from
December 2012 to March 2013. Focusing on both categories helped to shed light on the
consistencies and inconsistencies within and between ideology and practice, public and private,
image and reality, the mundane and the extraordinary, the everyday of Mohallahs
(neighborhoods) and the everyday of activist spaces, and between official positions and internal
dynamics. In studying khwaja sira culture, I considered the general khwaja sira population
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spread across the city’s slums. This cluster of the city’s inhabitants included both native
Karachites as well as long-term and seasonal migrants5.
The other component of my investigation was khwaja sira activism. During fieldwork, I
met with several prominent khwaja sira activist leaders but my research centered primarily on
GSS6. Founded by Payal (pseudonym), a khwaja sira in her late forties, GSS was the first
community run organization in the province of Sindh to get registered, and in 2011 it was among
the few registered khwaja sira groups in the country. It had been in operation in Karachi since
2009, and it functioned primarily as an advocacy group which spoke on behalf of khwaja siras. I
investigated GSS’s activism and its daily activities, the social relationships among its members,
and its ties with khwaja sira communities and allies (e.g., other sexual minority groups, NGOs,
media outlets, etc.). By examining these relationships and accompanying the organization’s
members to both activist and non-activist events, I learned how the culture of khwaja siras
factored into their activism, and the extent to which it held back and facilitated their efforts.
I interviewed over 100 khwaja siras residing in various parts of Karachi. The interviewees
included a mix of Karachi residents and migrant khwaja siras, and the interviews were conducted
in the homes of khwaja siras living in various parts of the city. I conducted the initial round of
interviews with key members of GSS. However, about three months into fieldwork, having
exhausted my contacts and facing increasing resistance from potential interviewees, I decided to
enlist the help of a khwaja sira, Nadia (pseudonym), who I hired as my research assistant. Nadia
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I am unable to estimate the khwaja sira population of Karachi in the absence of reliable census
data. However, in 2010 the Social Welfare Department of the Government of Sindh registered a
mere 2500 khwaja siras, an indisputable underestimation of the khwaja sira population in a city
of an estimated 21 million people.
6
My first point of contact with GSS was through Facebook where I introduced myself to the
organization’s representatives, informed them about the nature of my work, and set up tentative
meetings before my arrival in Karachi.
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took me to the homes of gender ambiguous people across Karachi, introduced me to them, and
was instrumental in facilitating the interview process.
In addition to being my research assistant, Nadia also became a key informant. I quickly
realized that Nadia was a marginal figure within her social network, an “inside-outsider” of sorts.
As an immigrant khwaja sira but long-time resident of Karachi, an active though often
discounted member of GSS, and as Payal’s celā (student initiate), Nadia had intimate knowledge
not only of khwaja sira affairs but also of GSS and her guru’s (mentor) extended family.
Moreover, she was well connected to a vast network of both migrant and local khwaja siras.
Though initially guarded and secretive as most khwaja siras were with strangers, Nadia quickly
opened up to me about the history and inner workings of GSS and khwaja sira communities.
Needless to say, our relationship was mutually beneficial, and in addition to an employer, Nadia
found in me a confidant.
When I first met GSS’s president, Payal, in February of 2011, the organization was on the
brink of termination due to lack of resources, such as the funding and skills required to keep it
afloat. Payal, a poor, illiterate khwaja sira who was desperate for help, asked me to assist her in
revitalizing GSS. Although I was initially reluctant to work for an organization I wanted to
study, I eventually agreed to volunteer my time and services to GSS. Volunteering became a
valuable participant observation technique that gave me daily access to the organization and to
those affiliated with it7. The tasks that I performed for GSS gave me the opportunity not only to
assist khwaja sira activists, but also to gain a deep understanding of the organization’s activist
ideology and practice. Moreover, I was made the official photographer of GSS since I was the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7
My duties included a host of administrative tasks, such as handling GSS’s online
communication and content, drafting letters and documents, visually documenting organizational
activities, and accompanying GSS’s executive committee to official meetings and events.
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only one in the organization who owned a digital camera, which in turn ensured my admission
into khwaja sira activist and cultural events8. Hence, the human and technological resources that
I was able to offer gave me front seat access to rich first-hand information.
I had to maintain a cautious balance between my researcher and volunteer roles. As an
anthropologist, my goal was to learn about GSS’s activism through direct involvement in its
everyday affairs, and as an administrative aide, my job was to perform the tasks asked of me by
GSS’s governing committee without interfering much in their process. This is not to say that my
intervention had no impact on the organization since I undoubtedly played a role in streamlining
certain administrative tasks, but I refrained from imposing my own views on GSS’s leadership
(except when asked) because I was in the process of understanding the organization’s activism.
My daily schedule varied, and there were days when I had to stay out all night at khwaja
sira social events. I often slept over at GSS’s office which also doubled as Payal’s residence.
Whenever possible, I helped in the preparation of various events, and engaged in khwaja sira
rituals of reciprocity. In addition, I travelled with GSS members on official and social visits to
other cities, including Lahore, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Sehwan, and Kasur. I
supplemented my 12-month fieldwork in Karachi with two months of research on “Association
of Khwaja Siras” (AKS) (pseudonym), a community based organization (CBO) in Lahore.
During my time in Lahore, I made daily visits to AKS where I gathered data through formal
interviews, casual conversations, through participant observation in the organization’s activities,
and by shadowing activists to khwaja sira cultural events. This fieldwork experience was

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8
GSS’s activist events included public protests, meetings with stakeholders, trainings and
workshops, television and documentary film shoots, etc. Khwaja sira cultural activities included
rituals (e.g., initiation ceremonies, death rituals, rituals of reciprocity), birthday parties and social
gatherings, conflict resolution meetings, etc.
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particularly valuable for it shed light on regional cultural differences among khwaja sira
communities.

Toils of the Field
During the first couple of months of fieldwork, I was frustrated with my research and I often
wondered what I had gotten myself into. However, I gradually managed to deal with, and in
some cases, resolve the problems I was facing. I now turn to the slew of challenges I faced
during data collection. I present a lengthier than usual account of the methodological problems I
encountered because they shed light on my theoretical positions while serving as supporting
evidence for my key arguments about khwaja sira identity politics.
Recruiting potential informants is a trying process for any anthropologist, and getting
khwaja siras to partake in my study was no exception. Recruitment was most problematic at the
onset of my research when I was interviewing independently, but it became easier after I hired
Nadia. Khwaja siras were reluctant to being interviewed because they did not wish to reveal the
clandestine aspects of their lives to ordinary people. What impeded the recruitment process
further was the presumption of khwaja siras that I was affiliated with a local television channel.
The word “media,” which popularly refers to television media in Pakistan, had gained currency
due to the explosion of local and foreign television channels. Khwaja siras assumed that I must
be a “media vālā” since people from television channels were among the few outsiders who had
shown an interest in interviewing khwaja siras in recent years9. For instance, Kajal seemed a bit
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9
Although I do not deny the superficial parallels between my scholarly enterprise and the work
of media outlets that sought to cover stories on khwaja siras, I view the latter to be primarily in
the business of entertainment geared for the consumption of mass television audiences. In
contrast, my fieldwork was not meant to expose or to sensationalize the lives of this marginalized
population, but to gain through long-term empirical research a deep and empathetic
	
  

25	
  

alarmed when I called her to set a time for an interview. She said, “Interview? Oh No! The last
time I did an interview, they took my photograph and published it next to the picture of a naked
girl. Will you bring a cameraman as well?” “No,” I said, “I will come alone and I will only
record your voice if you give me permission.” Kajal asked me to call her back in five minutes,
which I did, but by then she had conveniently switched off her phone. These challenges
eventually lead me to hire Nadia, who took me to the homes of khwaja siras in various parts of
Karachi, many of whom she personally knew, and encouraged them to participate in my study.
Tina’s statement below sums up Nadia’s significance to the recruitment process.
One day someone like you came to interview us. All the good things we told them, they
didn’t show any of that…we get scared because the media shoots one thing with us, but
then shows something different on TV. I opened up to you because this sister who came
with you gave me the confidence to do so...otherwise, I would have lied to you.
Recruitment became easier through Nadia’s assistance, but many khwaja siras continued to
express their fear of being interviewed. Hereafter, Nadia and I decided to replace the term
“interview” with “conversation” (guftagū /bāt cīt) when recruiting potential informants, which
seemed to work better since it was as a less threatening alternative. I do not find my deployment
of this term misleading but expedient and necessary since “interview” had very specific
connotations for khwaja siras, relating largely to the harmful impacts of sensational television
reporting and mass-circulated images (as opposed to scholarly text) that threatened the wellbeing of khwaja siras (see The Question of Positionality and Ethics for more information).
Another problem I faced during the interview process was getting respondents to clearly
and honestly answer questions about sex and sexuality. With respect to these topics, I noticed a
stark difference between interview narratives and casual conversations, that is, between what was
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
understanding of the multiple processes that accounted for their difference and promoted their
disenfranchisement.
	
  

26	
  

revealed on and off record, and between what interviewees said about themselves and what I
heard about them from others. The incongruences between what people say or think they do and
what they actually do is not new to anthropologists. But sometimes research participants
deliberately try to deceive the ethnographer. Deceptions are meaningless in the absence of the
truths they aim to conceal. Hence, the researcher must not only analyze practices of deception
but also sift through them in order to discover what is being hidden and why. Nadia and Nazo for
instance, blatantly lied to me about certain aspects of their lives, but when I turned off the
recorder, they admitted to being dishonest and then proceeded to reveal the truth. However,
despite my probing, some were deliberately vague in discussing sensitive topics both on and off
record. I see four intertwined reasons for informant deception and their narrative contradictions.
First, many of the methodological challenges I faced during fieldwork had to do with the
fact that I was studying a sexual minority group, and sex and sexuality tend to invite judgment.
Open discussions about sex can be tricky in any context, and significantly more so in
conservative cultures. Dominant beliefs pertaining to sexuality in Pakistan (and elsewhere) stem
from a combination of religious and cultural beliefs that influence the views of the general public
and of khwaja siras. People’s sexual practices are often used as a moral compass to determine
their level of respectability and credibility, particularly in contexts where sex is a taboo subject.
Hence, informants are typically uncomfortable discussing the nature of their private sexual
desires and behavior with outsiders in fear of being adversely judged. These factors contributed
to informant secrecy and deception during interviews and generated contradictions between
interview and non-interview narratives.
Second, the fear among khwaja siras that I was affiliated with a media outlet not only
surfaced during recruitment, but also during interviews. As mentioned earlier, many khwaja siras
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feared that their reputations and safety might be compromised in the event that their interview is
leaked to media outlets. Consequently, they lied to me about aspects of their lives that posed
potential risks. Third, the contradictions between interview and non-interview narratives had
much to do with how respondents wanted to be represented in interviews. Image management is
a technique that informants commonly employ in order to make a good impression with the
interviewer, and often their responses are guided by the kind of information they believe the
interviewer is seeking. However, in the case of khwaja siras, I do not consider image
management merely as isolated acts among individual informants but as collective praxes among
khwaja siras who had much at stake in positively representing themselves and their communities.
Fourth, studying an organization or a hierarchically structured social system can be complicated
since informants may fear how they will be affected if they reveal sensitive information to the
researcher. Disclosing confidential information can negatively impact their social relationships
with others within the group, especially with their superiors. For instance, Nadia was afraid that
she would get into trouble with her guru, Payal, if she divulged covert information to me.
However, she was surprisingly candid when I was not recording her voice, that is, she was
forthcoming in the absence of incriminating evidence linking her to the leaked information.
Despite the aforementioned complications in interviewing, khwaja siras gradually opened
up to me. According to Lieberman, “the more intimate the personal relationship, the less
[meaningful the]…deception” (1977, 67), and Murray suggests that “secrecy (and privacy) are
not absolutes, but correlatives depending upon the relationship of actor to audiences” (1977,
324). Similarly, the level of trust between my research consultants and I grew over the duration
of fieldwork, and deceiving me became increasingly less purposeful to them. Moreover, it
became progressively difficult for informants to maintain the ruse in my continued presence in
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their everyday lives. By my sixth month into fieldwork, my research participants and I felt fairly
comfortable in each other’s company, be it at GSS’s office or at a khwaja sira’s house, at an
activist event or a ritual, or even out in a crowded bazaar. The information I managed to obtain
over time about their corporeality and sexuality was possible only through long-term fieldwork.
Research on khwaja siras that relies solely on interviews or is conducted over a short duration is
likely to produce skewed data. However, ethnographic fieldwork allows the anthropologist to
identify and make sense of the contradictions between various sources of data, and to separate
fact from fiction. Importantly, in the process of making sense of these discrepancies, I gained a
better understanding of the type of information khwaja siras concealed from outsiders. Seeking
the truth about different aspects of the lives of informants was just as important as understanding
what was kept secret and why.
Given that I, like other outsiders, was a victim of khwaja sira duplicity, I find it expedient
to describe the process through which I came to understand the realities underlying the façade of
deception. One of the ways in which I gained access to truths about khwaja siras was through my
research assistant. Nadia not only helped me recruit khwaja siras for my study but was also
present during interviews. Interviews immediately followed recruitment since respondents had
the tendency of agreeing to speak with me only to later avoid committing to an interview
appointment. This meant that Nadia had to be present during many of the interviews, not only
because some interlocutors were uncomfortable speaking to me in her absence, but also because
the homes of many khwaja siras were single-room spaces and there was no place for Nadia to go.
Her presence during interviews had its pros and cons. For instance, in situations where she
personally knew informants, Nadia revealed intimate details about their lives before I conducted
the interviews, and pointed out who had lied to me about what afterwards. I was not entirely
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opposed to Nadia gossiping to me about her friends because it improved my understanding of the
kind of information khwaja siras hid from and how they wished to represent themselves to
strangers.
Studying an organization comes with its own set of challenges for the researcher working
under institutional constraints. In formal working environments, researchers are often subjected
to gatekeeping, a process whereby access to information and events to outsiders is controlled
(Armitage 2008, 167). While the working atmosphere at GSS was fairly informal and I was
granted admission into most organizational activities, there were nonetheless times when I was
excluded. Language is often used as an exclusionary tactic. During fieldwork, I often found
myself left out, sometimes deliberately, from conversations between khwaja siras. Initially, they
used Farsi, their secret vernacular, to have private conversations in my presence. Eventually, I
learned Farsi through Nadia who helped me to create a dictionary of Farsi terms. However, my
lack of proficiency in any Pakistani language other than Urdu continued to prevent me from
following valuable discussions that were intentionally articulated in other local languages.

The Question of Positionality and Ethics
My fieldwork experience and findings were tinged by my positionality as a non-khwaja
sira, a man, and as an insider-outsider of sorts. Alternatively, my fieldwork encounters would
have been very different had I been a gender ambiguous person. Interlocutors would have been
more forthcoming with me about their clandestine lifestyle if I were a khwaja sira, in which case
they would not have engaged in the representational strategies they employed. As an insider of
sorts, my research findings may not have been so heavily focused on the themes of identity
politics and representation. For instance, one day, Nadia suggested that I pose as a khwaja sira
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during interviews: “I will teach you how to dance like us and speak Farsi, so when khwaja siras
see you dance they will become happy and be at ease with you…Then they will tell you
everything about their life.” Although I refused to partake in Nadia’s recommended unethical
practice, her comments nonetheless suggest that I would have not only had a different
relationship with informants, but also I would have obtained very different data had I been a
khwaja sira.
An ethical concern raised by this project relates to my complicity in revealing the
particulars of the lives of khwaja siras. Informants feared that exposing sensitive information
about gender ambiguous people would pose potential risks and damage their reputation in
mainstream society. Even though I received permission from research participants, I have had to
mull over the potential ramifications of disclosing certain aspects their lives. To what extent am I
doing them a disservice by exposing facets of their lived experience that they attempted to
conceal? Below, I address the unique ethical dilemmas linked to my project since the relevant
literature and the American Anthropological Association’s “Code of Ethics” (2009) and
statement on “Principles of Professional Responsibility” (2012) do not offer specific guidelines
on how to manage secret knowledge.
First, I use pseudonyms for informants and organizations so as to protect their privacy. In
order to maintain anonymity, I have refrained from identifying key research participants with
associated pseudonyms in the photographs that appear in this dissertation. Second, there was a
lack of consensus, especially between the older and younger generation of activists, about how
best to represent khwaja siras. Younger activists were beginning to take carefully measured steps
through advocacy to shatter myths about their bodies and sexuality within mainstream discourse.
However, their progress was hindered by pressures from khwaja sira elders and by fears that the
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rights granted to them would be rescinded if the government discovered these realities.
Nonetheless, not all khwaja siras were opposed to baring the truth. Third, gender ambiguous
people tended to voluntarily expose clandestine information about khwaja siras in conflict
situations (see chapters 4 and 6). Far from being well-guarded, the secrets of khwaja siras were
regularly exposed by elements internal to their social system.
Fourth, my writing addresses an English-speaking academic audience and it will be less
accessible to a large majority of the Pakistani public that privileges image over text. Fifth,
numerous academic and journalistic accounts as well as documentaries and television shows
have already highlighted facts about the physical characteristics and sexual behaviors of khwaja
siras. Hence, my publications will not be the first to divulge explicit details about them, and if
their practices were not already known, I would have reached different decisions about reporting
them. Sixth, reliable accounts about gender ambiguous people are not only few and far between
but they also compete with a plethora of unreliable narratives and cultural assumptions. Such
mythical discourse circulates through khwaja sira media advocacy, by word of mouth, and
through texts and images that reify fictions about khwaja siras. In effect, these disparate reports
perpetuate a sense of vagueness about gender ambiguous people in mainstream society and help
to maintain their personal and communal safety. Finally, at the time of fieldwork, most gender
ambiguous people were oblivious about the state’s stance regarding many aspects of their lives,
which factored into their desire to maintain secrecy. I take comfort in apprehending the precise
legal protections granted to khwaja siras, the excavation of which was a result of this research
(see Chapter 7). However, had these legal stipulations not existed, I would have reconsidered my
decision to write about certain sensitive issues.
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Although the AAA’s ethical guidelines “articulate the primacy of the interests of research
subjects…they also recognize that the researcher’s own judgment is necessary, and that this
should include regard to the potential outcome, which is situational ethics” (Barber 2003, 139).
My purpose is not to reveal secrets or merely to bust myths about khwaja sira culture and
lifestyle since existing investigations have already, to a more or lesser degree and with varying
levels of accuracy, delved into the details of their lives. Rather, my objective is to provide a
detailed and reliable account, from my own informed perspective, of the subjective experiences
of this stigmatized group in order to demonstrate how secrets were maintained, how khwaja siras
outwardly projected themselves to mainstream society, and to explain the larger structural
processes at work that impelled them to engage in the games of secrecy, deception and collective
misrepresentation. Beyond intellectual curiosity and adding to the knowledge reserve, the aim
here is also to set the groundwork for activists, NGOs and policy-makers to take the necessary
steps towards ameliorating the lives of khwaja siras.

Scope of Study
This dissertation contributes to several dynamic modes of scholarly inquiry. First, it revisits the
relationship between stigma and sexuality by recasting it in the context of political action, and
illustrating how the link between the two informs khwaja sira subjectivity, identity and activism.
It also highlights that sexuality and sexual deceit are products of class, colonialism, nationalism,
transnationalism, legal reform, and popular religion. Second, this project locates the significance
of culture and ethnography in social movement, queer and transgender studies. It is particularly
valuable since contemporary anthropological research on trans and gender variant people in nonEuro-American contexts has been few and far between (Blackwood 2010; Johnson 1997; Kulick
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1998; Nanda 1990; Prieur 1998; Reddy 2005; Sinnott 2004)10.
Third, it makes a necessary and timely empirical contribution to the sparsely explored
territory of sexual and gender diversity in Pakistan, while reflecting contemporary trends in
queer social justice in Islamic contexts (Boellstorff 2005; Davies 2010; Gaudio 2009; Kugle
2010, 2013; Najmabadi 2014). Although there is a substantial volume of anthropological
research on queer communities in India (Boyce 2006, 2007; Dave 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b,
2012; Reddy 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007; Hall 1997, 2005; Hall and Donovan 1996; Nanda 1990,
1993, 2002; Cohen 1995a, 1995b, 2002, 2005, 2012), comparable research in Pakistan is
practically non-existent. The majority of the studies on sexual minorities in Pakistan have been
conducted either by NGOs that rely largely on survey data or by health professionals and
students who focus primarily on biomedical or psychological approaches to sexuality (Altaf
2008; Baloch 2009; Baqi et al. 2006; Collumbien 2009a, 2009b; Haider 2008a, 2008b; Haider
and Bano 2006; Jami 2005, Khan and Khilji 2002; Khannani 2008; Khilji 2003, 2008; Rehan et
al. 2009; Saleem et al. 2011; Sindhi 2011; Wijngaarden et al. 2011, 2013). The little scholarly
literature that exists is either non-ethnographic (Awan and Sheeraz 2011; Hahm 2010; Junejo,
1994; Mithani and Burfat 2003; Pamment 2010; Shaheen 2009; Toor 2011) or based on shortterm studies (Afzal 2005; Mohyuddin and Ali 2013; Naqvi and Mujtaba 1997; Redding 2014).
Fourth, this investigation is a form of engaged scholarship that is responsive to publiclyoriented interests. Leap and Lewin define publicly engaged queer anthropology as one that is
“concerned with the processes through which private…persons come together to form a
public…[to] deal with…processes that work against the emergence of such formations” (2009,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
10
Although early “salvage anthropology” type studies routinely focused on indigenous nonnormative gender/sexual minorities, they presented a limited picture of them as Noble Savages
living in societies that offered “an honored place for at least some forms of transgendering or
same-sex sexual activity (Weston 1993, 344-5).
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2). This project is as much about “questions of desire, personal identity and erotic interest” as it
is about “sexual citizenship, belonging, public morality, and social justice” (2009, 2).
Consequently, the content herein will, in addition to scholars, be valuable to trans organizations,
NGOs and policy-makers.

Dissertation Chapters
Drawing on religious, colonial, and legal sources, Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the history
of gender and sexual ambiguity in Islam and Pakistan. It also provides an overview of the
present-day circumstances of gender ambiguous people. The content of this chapter serves to
illuminate throughout the dissertation that popular understandings of gender/sexual
nonnormativity did not always match scholarly history and theology.
Part two of the dissertation focuses on the culture and subjectivity of ordinary gender
ambiguous people. Chapter 3 offers a look into the world of khwaja siras, including a discussion
of khwaja sira identities, the gender and sexuality of gender ambiguous people, and their social
structure. It describes the structuring of identities and practices from their vantage point, which,
later chapters demonstrate, diverged from mainstream constructions of “khwaja sira.” In Chapter
4, I focus on stigma and its impact of the relationships among gender ambiguous people. I
identify the sources of stigma by discussing the religious beliefs of khwaja siras and by
describing popular conceptions and portrayals of gender ambiguous people. I argue that religious
and social stigma produced states of incertitude within and conflict among khwaja siras. Chapter
5 describes the cultural and structural violence experienced by khwaja siras in everyday life, and
the games of secrecy and deception they played in response to their hostile environments. This
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chapter covers khwaja sira livelihood practices and their social relationships with biological kin,
partners and neighbors.
Part three centers of khwaja sira activism. In Chapter 6, I discuss the internal politics of
khwaja sira organizations. I demonstrate that the sociocultural problems of khwaja sira
communities trickled into activist spaces, where internalized stigma among community leaders
produced dissonance within and between their organizations. Chapter 7 highlights the confusions
stemming from differences in understandings of “khwaja sira” among key stakeholders.
Although the virtual identities deployed by khwaja sira activists were marginally beneficial to
gender ambiguous people, they impeded the state’s efforts to “mainstream” khwaja siras.
Chapter 8 centers on the deceptive external identity politics of activist leaders. It illustrates how
khwaja sira leaders aimed to normalize gender ambiguous people in the public consciousness,
and sheds light on the game-like strategies they deployed in interactions with adversaries. I
conclude the dissertation with Chapter 9, which contains an assessment of the impact of khwaja
sira politics on government policies aimed at rehabilitating gender ambiguous people, reflections
on the future of khwaja sira rights and activism, and suggestions for potential directions in
countering the problems associated with identity, stigma and marginalization.
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Chapter 2:
Gender Ambiguity in Islam, South Asia and Contemporary Pakistan
The treatment of sex/gender nonnormativity in Islam is as diverse as Islam itself. Historical and
scholarly sources reveal theological differences in constructions of sex, gender and sexuality.
Meanwhile, the history of the Indian subcontinent indicates that individuals with gender and
genital ambiguities went from having important social functions to being criminalized. However,
in present-day Pakistan, the laws related to khwaja siras have both constrained and empowered
gender ambiguous people, but these policies diverge from similar laws in other Islamic nationstates. Despite the rights granted to them, khwaja siras continue to suffer from stigma and
marginalization in mainstream society. Their oppression and exclusion became the impetus for
khwaja sira activism and NGO and state intervention. This chapter explores sex/gender
ambiguity in Islam, a brief history of third sex/gender in South Asia, and a description of
Pakistani laws related to non-normative sex and sexuality. The information that I provide here
will serve to illuminate throughout this dissertation that the identity politics of khwaja siras was
both informed by but also departed from religious and scholarly understandings of sex/gender
ambiguity in Islam and in South Asian antiquity. This is because popular understandings of this
topic in Pakistan did not always match religious history and theology, which in itself lacks
consensus.

Islam, Geography and Law
Islamic Approaches to Sexual and Gender Ambiguity
Among the various forms of sex/gender nonnormativity, contemporary Islamic law accepts most
unequivocally the condition of intersexuality, where individuals are born with a mixture of both
male and female hormonal, chromosomal and/or genital features. Medieval Muslim jurists

	
  

37	
  

addressed the issue of intersexuality because it presented a predicament for the Islamic
worldview’s strict gendered and sexed boundaries (Bucar 2010, 604). Although they were a
biological reality, without a precise gender/sex, intersexuals had no point of entry into the social
world (Sanders 1991, 88). As a solution, jurists advocated assigning a gender role to intersexuals,
and later, when the technology became available, some thinkers supported corporeal
modifications to make the intersexual’s sex more distinct (Bucar 2010, 604).
Today Islamic jurists make a distinction between “ambiguous” and “non-ambiguous”
intersexuals. The latter category includes either “males with some extra elements or females with
some extra elements” (Cilardo 1986, 129). According to most interpretations of shariáh (Islamic
law), the sex of intersexuals with unambiguous genitalia can be determined at birth. The
“ambiguous” category (khunthā /khunsā mushkil) consists of those whose physiological features
do not allow us to determine their prevailing sex (Cilardo 1986, 129). The opinions of the
various sects and schools of Islam differ on ways of determining or assigning an ambiguous
intersexual’s sex/gender. While some advocate assigning a sex at birth, most agree that the sex of
ambiguous intersexuals should be determined at puberty when they develop either male or
female physical characteristics (e.g., signs of facial hair, nocturnal spermatic emissions, or a flat
chest in the case of men) (Cilardo 1986, 132-3). Some schools accept an individual’s personal
declaration about their physiology as confirmation of their sex/gender, but this testimony can be
rejected if the person’s sexual organs are known to be ambiguous (Cilardo 1986, 133-4). Finally,
those ambiguous intersexuals who do not develop distinctive markings of sex at puberty are
subjected to and granted special rules and rights, which relate to such practices as circumcision,
prayer, pilgrimage, marriage, witnessing, punishment, inheritance, death, and so on (Cilardo
1986, 135-50).
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Islamic approaches to intersexuality demonstrate that Muslim jurists focused on external
physical characteristics as determinants of an individual’s sex/gender. The body is given
credence as the key marker of gender. However, I later demonstrate that crucial differences exist
among Islamic sects, especially between Sunni and Shia theology, with regard to prioritizing and
determining sex and gender.
But how does Islam approach those who are not intersexual but present signs of gender
ambiguity (i.e., in terms of embodiment and role) beginning in early childhood? In his
examination of the Quran’s use of gendered terms and images, religious historian, Scott Siraj alHaqq Kugle, representing a less common viewpoint, argues that the Quran simultaneously
invokes gender difference (i.e., between male and female) and ambiguity (2010). However, neotraditionalists typically maintain that God arranged not only humanity but the entire cosmos into
distinct and unambiguous gendered pairs (Kugle 2010, 245). Such orthodox interpretations
contradict contemporary biology’s discovery of complex gendered behaviors in animal species,
and ignore modern physics’ long abandoned simplistic dichotomies (Kugle 2010, 246). Kugle
contends that scientific breakthroughs should deepen Quranic interpretations and enable a break
from patriarchal predeterminations (Kugle 2010, 246). For instance, Quranic verses that describe
human diversity in terms of shades of colors are often taken literally as referring to racial
difference while overlooking other forms of human variance as evidenced by modern science
and human experience (Kugle 2010, 247-8).
In addition to the Quran, Sufism, the mystical dimension of Islam, provides key
philosophical concepts that relate to gender ambiguity. According to Sufi thought, the heart is
perceived as the seat of the soul, where the soul is understood to be an ambiguous force, a
consciousness, which connects the spirit and the body (Kugle 2010, 236-7). “The
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soul…perceives itself to be female or male, or possibly both-male-and-female or neither-malenor-female” (Kugle 2010, 237). Sufi thinkers locate the soul as being immersed in gender
duality. Importantly, khwaja siras in present-day Pakistan attributed their gender difference to a
feminine heart/soul, which they claimed to possess.
The hadīth11 and oral narratives about Prophet Muhammad provide evidence that he
interacted with gender ambiguous individuals known as mukhannath (effeminate men or
sometimes transvestite men) and eunuchs during his lifetime in Medina (Babayan and Najmabadi
2008, 163; Kugle 2010, 249). Kugle’s analysis of early Islamic texts and hadith reveals that
mukhannaths (pl. mukhannathun) were defined by their gender performance (i.e., mannerisms,
speech and attire) rather than sexual behavior and desire, and their gender ambiguity was seen as
an innate disposition (Kugle 2010, 253).12 Gender crossing was considered blameworthy only for
those who were not effeminate by nature and adopted such behavior purely for ulterior motives
(takallufi) (Kugle 2010, 253-4). Kugle contends that Prophet Muhammad’s condemnation that
“God cursed the males who appear like females and the females who appear like males,” only
applies to takallufi mukhannaths, a belief that diverged from dominant interpretations of this
hadīth in Pakistan. Many scholars claim that the Islamic tradition accepts mukhannaths contrary
to the popular belief that Prophet Muhammad condemned them. The Prophet’s wives were
regularly visited by mukhannaths inside their rooms (Kugle 2010, 250). According to several
hadīth, the Prophet banished a mukhannath who frequented his house, not due to his gender
difference but because he overstepped ethical norms by using his knowledge of women’s affairs
to rouse men to be intimate with women out of wedlock (Kugle 2010, 23).
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Sayings and teachings ascribed to Prophet Mohammad.
12
Islamic holy literature suggests that there were also “some women who ‘assume[d] the manner
of men,’ who were known as mutarajjulat” (Bolich 2007, 124).
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Mukhannath had special functions in early Islamic society as entertainers, singers and
comedians, and as intermediaries who had access both to the private domain of women as well as
the public sphere of men (Kugle 2010, 254). However, sources rarely mention the mukhannath
following their persecution in the eight-century by an Umayyad governor of Medina who
ordered such individuals to be castrated (Kugle 2010, 255). They later reappeared in Baghdad
during the Abbasid Empire, but by then the Islamic discourse on gender ambiguity had been
replaced with a focus on homosexuality, which viewed the mukhannath as men who played the
passive role during same-sex anal intercourse (Kugle 2010, 255-6; Rowson 1991, 693).
Today, many Islamic jurists variously define mukhannath with respect to gender
ambiguity, a lack of sexual desire (Haneef 2011, 101), and/or sexual incapacity (e.g., the
inability to sustain an erection) (Bolich 2007, 124). They condemn “artificial” mukhannaths or
those who “deliberately deviate from the norm of their gender,” but generally accept those “who
innately suffer from some kind of behavioral abnormality,” so long as they do not do not engage
in illegitimate sexual behavior (Haneef 2011, 101 and 106). Some of the shariáh laws pertaining
to erotically inclined mukhannaths include punishments for committing sodomy, prohibition
from mingling with and marrying women, and restrictions against providing testimony in court
on the grounds that they lack moral rectitude and cannot be considered credible witnesses
(Haneef 2011, 101). Hence, juridical logic expects mukhannaths to be either asexual or unable to
engage in sexual behavior. In contrast, in contemporary Pakistan, the term mukhannath was
largely believed to be applicable to someone with genital ambiguities.
In addition to mukhannaths, the second category of gender ambiguous individuals present
during the Prophet’s time was the eunuch. The Prophet’s first documented encounter with a
eunuch was when a woman named Marya, presented to him as a gift by an Egyptian governor,
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was escorted to Medina by her castrated servant (Kugle 2010, 250). The eunuch was allowed to
live with Marya as her servant once it was established that he did not have sexual access to her
(Kugle 2010, 251). The decision validated the value and social role of eunuchs in Islamic
society. The Prophet spoke against the practice of castrating slaves, but those castrated elsewhere
by non-Muslims were accepted into the Islamic empire where they served as household servants
(Kugle 2010, 250). The gender ambiguity of eunuchs differed from that of the mukhannaths in
that it was socially imposed rather than being an intrinsic trait, and yet, what enhanced this
ambiguity was the deficiency of “testes-produced hormones” in eunuchs following the removal
of their sexual organs (Kugle 2010, 253). Due to their ambiguity, eunuchs came to be seen as
neither men nor women and therefore, able to mix freely with both (Kugle 2010, 252). Their
gender status enabled them to serve as a “human veil” during communal prayer where they were
instructed to stand in a row behind men but before women (Kugle 2010, 252).
By the turn of the twentieth century, eunuchs were serving this and a number of other
important functions at the Ka’ba, the sacred site of pilgrimage for Muslims in Makkah (i.e.,
Mecca), and at Al-Masjid an-Nabawi (the Mosque of Prophet Mohammad) in Medina, where
they were employed (Burton 1857; Young 1993). Originally purchased as slaves by the Ottoman
administration from Ethiopia and Sudan, these eunuchs were responsible for cleaning both holy
sites, and for keeping men and women apart during pilgrimage at the Ka’ba (Young 1993, 290).
In actual practice the aghawat could not physically divide the crowd by sex, but they could
stand for a neutral category, separating and coordinating the categories of men and women.
Their castrated state made it possible for them to touch women without breaking their ritual
purity (wudu). (Young 1993, 291-2)
Tawashi was the generic name of the eunuchs of the holy mosques (Burton 1857, 418), but the
title given to them was aghawat (or agha in short), which means elder, elder sibling, chief or
master in Turkish (Young 1993, 290). The term denoted respect for these black eunuchs of high
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stature. Some sources claim that eunuchs still serve the mosque in Makkah, but they are fewer in
number today than in the early 1900s (Young 1993, 298). Khwaja sira informants often
mentioned these individuals and saw them as their ancestors. However, they knew little about
these eunuchs other than the role they played in the ritual purification of the holy sites of
Makkah and Medina.
Religious history and holy literature indicate that Islam recognizes four distinct types of
beings: men/males, women/females, ambiguous intersexuals (khunsā mushkil), and gender
ambiguous persons (mukhannath) (Bolich 2007, 124). In addition, Islam created space for
another nonnormative figure: the eunuch. Though not a separate sex/gender, they could be seen
as sexed/gendered owing to their castration-induced hormone deficiency and subsequent
development of female physical characteristic (e.g., breast formation and loss of body hair).
Importantly, Islamic jurists did not clearly define the demarcation between the categories of sex
and gender.

Third Sex/Gender in South Asia
South Asia has a rich history of gender ambiguity, one that Gayatri Reddy (2005) broadly
divides into four chronological time periods: ancient, medieval, colonial and contemporary.
Evidence of third-sex/gender figures appears foremost in ancient Indian texts from the Hindu,
Buddhist and Jain traditions where they are referred to as kliba, pandaka, trtiyapraktri and
napumsaka (2005, 19). The meanings of these terms variously included unmales, third sex, third
nature, eunuch, “someone ‘who was sterile, impotent, castrated, a transvestite, a man who had
oral sex with other men, a man who had anal sex, a man with mutilated or defective sexual
organs, a hermaphrodite, or finally, a man who produced only female children’” (2005, 21). This
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suggests that anyone who did not fit into the binary gender system was clumped into this diverse
range of states and practices.
The historical record of the medieval period focuses on eunuchs or castrated men of the
royal Mughal courts. The eunuchs of the medieval era are particularly relevant to this project
since the term khwaja sira, which become popular in Pakistan in the first decade of the twentyfirst century, emerges from this era of South Asian antiquity, from where it can be traced as far
back to the eunuch slave trade that existed during the time of Prophet Muhammad. The practice
of appointing eunuchs in the royal courts thrived during the Roman and Ottoman Empires.
The procedures by which males became eunuchs…involved removal of the testes or both
testes and penis [of young boys]. Because…Islam prohibited the practice of castration but
not the use of castrated slaves...[the operation]…was performed by Christians (and
perhaps Jews) in…Ethiopia, and in other locations… (Gomez 2005, 37-8)
In the case of the Ottoman Empire, it was the African eunuch who appears to have been
preferred. The practice of appointing eunuchs in the royal courts is known to have existed in
other Islamic empires, including the Mamluk (1250-1517) and Safavid (1501-1736) dynasties,
and eventually the Mughals (1526-1857) also adopted it.
The title given to the chief eunuch of the Mughal court was khwaja sira (Manucci 1906,
350), an Urdu term borrowed directly from Persian/Farsi. Eunuchs were typically organized
hierarchically with the senior or chief eunuch directing junior eunuchs below him. Chief eunuchs
served as army generals, harem guards and advisors to the emperors. Some even supervised the
education of princes. Eunuchs ensured that no unauthorized person entered the seraglio; they
were considered ideal for the protection of the harem women due to their inability to reproduce
and because they were perceived to be sexually non-threatening. Manucci states that the chief
eunuch of the seraglio had several other important duties.
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He has a large allowance, has charge of the treasury, is master of the wardrobe, decides
on the details and the pattern of Sarapas (robes) to be prepared; in short, it is he who has
charge of all the Mughal expenditure of the clothes…and the precious stones, of the
jewelry, of everything that goes into or comes out of the palace. (Manucci 1906, 350-1)
Lower ranking eunuchs performed the duties of messenger and watchmen. Though emasculated,
they were physically strong and highly valued for their strength, which enabled them to perform
physically taxing duties.
Privy to the inner workings of royal households, eunuchs wielded significant influence
and often attained high-status both in the court and in society (Gomez 2005, 37). In fact, Islamic
history has witnessed a number of renowned imperial eunuchs. For instance, El-Hajj Beshir
Agha (ca. 1657-1746), the most powerful chief eunuch in the history of the Ottoman Empire,
was known to have shaped and propagated the official Ottoman brand of Sunni Islam (Hathaway
2006). Likewise, some of the greatest nobles in the Mughal Empire were eunuchs.
Imaduddin Rayhan, the chief minister under Sultan Balban, Kafur Hazardinari, the army
commander and vice-regent of Alauddin Khalji, and Khurau Shah the favorite of
Qutbuddin Mubarak Khalji who rose to be king, were all eunuchs…Under the Mughals
many important eunuchs…rose to the position of…commanders of armies and
governors...The chief Nazirs or Khwaja Saras generally enjoyed the title of Aitmad Khan
or Aitbar Khan (the Trusted Lord). (Lal 1994)
Through their service to royalty, eunuchs also managed to amass large amounts of wealth (Lal
1994). They were entitled to public revenue, received grants in the form of cash and land, and
even had the official right to beg (Preston 1987, 372). As a result of the number of high-paying
job openings available to eunuchs in the Mughal Empire, it had become common amongst poor
families to convert some of their sons into eunuchs and have them work in the palaces to create a
steady source of revenue for the family (Beveridge 1909, 150-1). Jahangir abolished castration
but the practice persisted because eunuch slaves had become a profitable commercial
commodity. In 1668, Aurangzeb also banned the practice throughout the Empire. However, the
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custom continued and Jahangir and his successors went on accepting eunuchs as gifts for duties
in the harem (Beveridge 1909, 247). Historians speculate that the role of eunuchs as court
officials diminished under the collapse of the Mughal rule (Kidwai 1985, 93), and their
subsequent criminalization by the British (Pamment 2010, 34). What became of royal eunuchs
upon the downfall of the Mughals is uncertain, though khwaja sira oral history suggests that they
either went on to establish hijra networks or were integrated into them. What is evident,
however, is the vast difference between medieval and contemporary khwaja siras, a disparity that
will become obvious in the following chapter.
Colonial accounts of Indian history focus on “eunuchs” and “hijras” who British rulers
identified as a criminal caste, a classification under which they could be subjected to surveillance
and arrest. Hijras were registered under the Criminal Tribes Acts of 1871, which called for the
arrest of individuals involved in kidnapping or castrating children, in committing offences under
section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, those seen publically dressed like women, and those who
danced or played music (Reddy 2005, 27). The British variously viewed hijras as naturally
impotent men, those born with congenital malformations, and those who voluntarily mutilated
themselves (Reddy 2005, 28).

Khwaja Siras and Pakistani Laws
A mixture of secular and Islamic laws governs present-day Pakistan. Islamization policies in the
country stem from the Objectives Resolution passed in 1949 which forms the basis of Pakistan’s
constitution (Haines 2012, 5). This resolution simultaneously promised a Pakistan that would be
a democratic state where minority rights would be protected, as well as where Muslims would be
able to live in accordance with Islamic injunctions (Rouse 2004, 26). The resolution sowed the
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seeds for a struggle, not so much between modernist and religious forces, but one between
democratic and anti-democratic ones (Rouse 2004, 28). However, the most drastic changes in the
country’s legal structure occurred in the 1980s under the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, who sought
to introduce an Islamic system of justice. During his tenure, the government introduced its
interpretation of Islamic law (Ahmad 33-4) and created Shariat courts. Although these
transformations weakened the secular basis of the state, they did not replace the existing judicial
system (Toor 2011). The constitution states that shariáh may be applied to situations perceived to
be in contradiction to the Quran (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan).
However, secular law typically governs citizens and Islam is selectively invoked (Toor 2011). As
yet, the Pakistani state remains unclear about the role of Islam in its operation and as a marker of
national identity, and the country remains plagued by contradictions and anxieties surrounding
Islam and it’s location within the nationalist framework (Haines 2012, 5-6). In turn, this
indeterminacy has consequences for the state’s treatment of issues pertaining to gender and
sexuality.
Cases involving same-sex sexual behavior, for instance, may be subject to both secular
and religious law. Sodomy is illegal under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of
1860), an injunction that was inherited from British colonial rulers. Same-sex sexual behavior,
which falls under the code’s exegesis of “unnatural offences” and “carnal intercourse against the
order of nature,” is punishable with a fine and between two to ten years in prison (Pakistan Penal
Code). Islamic law, also enforceable in such situations, prescribes corporal punishment of lashes
and stoning for same-sex sexual activity (RRT Research Response). However, the laws
pertaining to homosexual acts are rarely invoked and arrests and trials hardly ever occur.
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Nonetheless, the existence of the injunction makes gendered and sexual minorities vulnerable to
blackmail, extortion and sexual exploitation, often at the hands of law enforcement officials.
With 377 intact, the Supreme Court granted rights to khwaja siras in a series of historic
rulings starting in June 2009 after decades of no legal recognition and protection. Aslam Khaki, a
Supreme Court (SC) advocate and human rights lawyer, filed a court petition in February 2009
following a police raid on a khwaja sira event in Rawalpindi, and a subsequent protest by gender
ambiguous people outside the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police (Redding 2014).
“[T]he Chief Justice put in a personal interest and effort into this case,” said Khaki. “I didn’t
have to do much research or lawyering, [and] he passed order after order on this issue.”
The Court ordered the government to issue national identity cards to khwaja siras
indicating their third sex/gender status. Pakistan began recognizing “khwaja sira” as a distinct
sex/gender in addition to male and female. Khwaja siras were given the choice of listing their
sex/gender on their national identity cards as male (khwaja sira), female (khwaja sira), or
khunsā-e-mushkil13. While the SC was unclear about how it defined these khwaja sira
subcategories, they bore close resemblance to the three Islamic classifications of intersexuality,
that is, those who possessed male-like, female-like or indeterminable genitalia. In the subsequent
hearings that took place between 2009-2012, the Court ordered the provision of security,
inheritance and voting rights, the right to take public office, educational and job opportunities,
and access to government sponsored welfare programs for khwaja siras. The respective
government departments, in consultation with select khwaja sira leaders, devised many of the
policies based on these issues. Moreover, in efforts to “mainstream” khwaja siras, the Chief
Justice ordered various departments to integrate gender ambiguous people into their programs.
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As mentioned earlier, khunsā-e-mushkil refers to intersexual people whose genitals are not
suitable indicators of sex.
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Subsequently, a number of government units attempted to involve khwaja siras in their work
(e.g., the World Food Program proposed to train khwaja siras to educate women about disease
prevention and nutrition). However, enrollment in these government programs among khwaja
siras, particularly registration for new identity cards, remained deplorably low (I discuss this
problem at length in chapter 9).
Though unexpected, the Pakistani state’s action coincided with similar developments in
other parts of South Asia. India allowed “transgender” citizens to register for passports in 2005,
added an “O” for Other sex/gender category to the country’s voter registration process in 2009
(Van Hollen 2013, 44), included transgender people to the country’s census and citizen
identification system in 2011, and recognized hijras/transgender people as a third gender in 2014;
Nepal created a third gender category in 2007 and included transgender people in its census in
2011; and Bangladesh allowed hijras to register to vote in 2008 (Bochenek and Knight) and
created a distinct third gender category in 2013. To date, only seven countries in the world
legally recognize non-binary sexes/genders, four of which happen to be the aforementioned
South Asian nation-states. Germany, New Zealand and Australia are the other three countries
that accept third sex/gender categories other than male and female (Pasquesoone 2014). In the
US, several states prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, but the US government has a
binary gender system that does not allow for additional classifications on legal documents
(Pasquesoone 2014).
Even though khwaja siras were granted rights and privileges, a number of aspects of their
lives continued to be criminalized. For instance, Pakistani laws related to marriage infer that it is
a union between a man and a woman, making marriages between individuals of the same-sex and
those involving gender ambiguous people illegal by implication. In 2006, in a case involving a
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woman, Shahzina, and her transsexual partner, Shamail14, the Supreme Court upheld the rights of
the couple to live together without entering into a marriage (Toor 2011) when the former’s
family charged the latter with abduction. However, the two could not be tried under 377 since the
code applies specifically to penetrative sexual acts15 (Toor 2011). In 2010, a gender ambiguous
person and a man were arrested in Peshawar on charges of attempted marriage. Though the
couple denied the charges, the police, who raided the event and arrested 40 or so guests, claimed
otherwise. The police declared the event to be against shariáh and accused the couple of
“unnatural sexual offence” (Eunuch Wedding Raided in Pakistan). The court initially had the
accused incarcerated but eventually acquitted them because the prosecution failed to prove the
charges against the couple (Amin, “Court Acquits Man, Eunuch in Marriage Case”). The
defendants would have been imprisoned under section 377 had the plaintiff managed to provide
substantial evidence. Hence, even though non-heteronormative marriages were not legally
recognized, the courts either granted couples the right to cohabitate, or exonerated them in the
absence of proof demonstrating their violation of the penal code.
In addition, section 371 of the aforementioned code pronounces sex work illegal and
liable to a fine and imprisonment of up to twenty-five years (Pakistan Penal Code). Under
section 294, the performance and singing of obscene acts and songs in public places is illegal and
punishable with imprisonment of up to three months and/or a fine (Pakistan Penal Code). This
ruling applied to khwaja siras since most danced for a living, and their performances oftentimes
involved sexually suggestive lyrics and gestures. These charges have been raised against khwaja
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14
Shamail had undergone a mastectomy and hysterectomy (Toor 2011).
15
Although this foundational case centered on gender ambiguity and preceded the SC ruling on
khwaja siras by several years, it did not pave the way for the latter. The historical trajectory of
the khwaja sira case is rooted in a specific event (i.e., a police raid that took place at a khwaja
sira’s party in Rawalpindi), which motivated Aslam Khaki to file a petition in the SC on behalf
of gender ambiguous people.
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siras in several documented cases, including the “Eunuch Wedding” case mentioned above.
Further, begging is illegal in Pakistan according to the West Pakistan Vagrancy Ordinance, 1958,
which makes khwaja siras, many of whom beg for a living, vulnerable to arrest and police
harassment.
Another key issue pertinent to gender ambiguous people that the Supreme Court did not
address in its rulings was sex change. Although sex-change operations are not illegal in Pakistan
given the absence of secular laws prohibiting such procedures, it is believed to be against
Shariah, and in 2013, was deemed un-Islamic by the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a
constitutional body responsible for giving legal advice on religious matters to the Pakistani
Government. However, those seeking to undergo sex-reassignment surgery may seek court
permission under certain circumstances. Pakistani courts have in a few documented cases
authorized the procedure as treatment for gender dysphoria, that is, the condition in which
persons experience a mismatch between their biological sex and their gender identity. In order to
be granted permission, petitioners have had to undergo extensive counseling prior to surgery, and
make a strong case, endorsed by medical professionals, in favor of the operation16.
In 2008, a woman in Islamabad was granted court permission for sex-reassignment to
become a man (Thaindian News), and in 2010 a man from Rawalpindi was approved for the
same to become a woman (NDTV). In both cases, doctors diagnosed the patients with “gender
identity disorder” (GID), but refused to perform the procedure until the patients received court
approval. Importantly, these court orders are not a legal requirement and some doctors perform
SRS without them. To date, no policies have been instituted to regulate sex change surgeries and
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
16
Importantly, most khwaja siras were unaware of the option of acquiring a court approval for
sex change, and the few who were privy to it were unclear about the exact process. Moreover,
despite the increasing popularity of corporeal modifications, many khwaja siras did not have the
resources to undergo expensive surgery let alone make a case for sex change in court.
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the subsequent change of sex on identification documents, even though models for the provision
of SRS exist in some Muslim countries, including Iran and Turkey.

Transsexuality in Iran
While medieval jurists recognized gender ambiguity, they were fixated on developing laws
pertaining to genital irregularities and did not advance a concept of gender identity (Kugle 2010,
256). This emphasis on anatomy is prevalent in most Islamic republics and majority Muslim
countries and is evident in their silence or condemnation of sex reassignment. In Malaysia, SRS
is not illegal but a person’s sex change is not officially recognized, which means that those who
undergo such surgeries have to retain their birth-assigned sex on identification documents
(APCOM; Haneef 2011, 105). In Egypt, for instance, sex-realignment is obligatory in the case of
genital ambiguity, but forbidden for males and females who claim to feel trapped in the wrong
body (Kugle 2010, 261). Egyptian religious authorities believe that those without physiological
ambiguities wishing to change their birth sex are merely given to whim and lust (Kugle 2010,
261). Hence, laws in most Muslim countries are dominated by an intersex model of ambiguity
that fails to address the needs of those who experience gender variance.
However, in the contemporary period, Muslim jurists, faced with scientific evidence of the
psychological reality behind gender and the availability of sex-reassignment technology, have
had to confront the issue of gender identity. Turkey, for instance, legalized sex-reassignment
surgery as a treatment for gender dysphoria in 1988 (Yuksel et al., 2000; Kurtoglu 2009).
Indonesia too permits SRS and a subsequent change of sex on legal documents (APCOM).
Importantly though, SRS is legal in Turkey and Indonesia under civil law but not on religious
grounds. A notable exception is the Islamic Republic of Iran, where Ayatollah Khomeini issued a
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Fatvā (an Islamic injunction) in 1983 that legalized sex change surgeries for individuals
experiencing gender dysphoria. Iran views the condition as a physical illness for which it
prescribes surgery. The procedure can only be performed after a patient is diagnosed with “GID”
by a panel of three physicians and a permit is obtained (Bucar 2010, 607). The government
covers up to half the cost of surgery for trans-men and -women in need of financial assistance.
Upon the completion of the procedure, an individual can apply for new identification documents
(e.g., birth certificate, driver’s license, national ID card) reflecting their “true sex” (Bucar 2010,
607).
Sex-reassignment is sanctioned by Iranian Shia clerics based on an interpretation of shariáh
that views the practice as essential in revealing a person’s true gender (Bucar 2010, 602).
Khomeini expressed these ideas in his book on legal opinions.
If knowledge proves, before the operation, that inside he is the opposite sex, and
therefore the operation does not change one sex for the other, but rather uncovers what
was hidden, then there is no doubt concerning the necessity of putting into proper order
the true sex and getting rid of the traces of the visual sex. (Khomeini 2000, 596-7)
In effect, sex change uncovers a person’s true hidden sex rather than constructing a new one. In
such cases, a sex change is necessary for those whose physical bodies do not match their internal
gender in order to ensure that they abide by their appropriate moral duties.
In contrast, voluntarily altering the God-given body, which is considered tampering with
the socio-sexual role designated by God, is unacceptable according to dominant Sunni Islam
(Haneef 2011, 102). Alternatively, Shia clerics argue that sex-reassignment is not tantamount to
interfering with nature because a gender ambiguous individual’s “psychic-pathological
condition” is itself a biological given, a kind of innate birth “defect” (Haneef 2011, 103). And
just the way surgical modifications are permissible for those with genital irregularities, SRS is
approved for those with psycho-somatic incongruities since both are natural conditions.
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Bucar’s analysis of the Islamic ethics of sex change in Iran suggests that for Shia clerics
internal gender can be ontologically prior to external sex (2010, 610). In contrast, the Sunni
perspective, dominant in Pakistan, appears to prioritize physical sex upon which gender roles are
imposed. This arrangement presumes that body markings cannot contradict the truth about a
person. In the Sunni system, the notion of an internal gender does not seem to exist. Moreover,
physical sex seems to gain its importance partly from its procreative potential, whereas sex
change terminates one’s ability to reproduce. If Sunni Islam understands reproduction as a
primary function of sex, then tampering with it inevitably becomes a moral issue.
Iran and Pakistan present two contrasting though imbricated Islamic and legal points of
view regarding sex change, as a consequence of which the procedure is permissible in the former
but unrecognized in the latter. Evidently, this divergence in interpretation is rooted in the
differing positions of Shia and Sunni Islam. Despite the differences, however, there is some
overlap between the two countries in that Pakistan offers the option of sex change in special
circumstances, and the route whereby court permission for the procedure is granted resembles
the Iranian process. Nonetheless, the consequence of the legal disparity between the two Islamic
republics is that it has made Iran one of the sex change capitals of the world, while in Pakistan
legally sanctioned sex-reassignment surgeries (SRS) are not only rare but the fact that a legal
option even exists is general unknown to citizens. Yet, these constraints do not prevent
underground sex change and physical emasculation surgeries from taking place in Pakistan.
On a cautionary note, the legalization of SRS may be as limiting as it is enabling. SRS can
be perceived as a modern-day remedy to and outlet for the sexual needs of gender ambiguous
individuals. The proponents of SRS see it as a solution that not only helps to maintain the Islamic
ordering of people as male and female, but also enables genderqueer people to abide by the
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moral duties of the category to which they correctly belong. Indeed, some proponents of sexreassignment view the procedure as a way of preventing gender variant (i.e., mukhannath-like)
people from resorting to the “vice” of sodomy by creating for them the option of vaginal
intercourse, and thereby also eradicating homosexuality from society (Haneef 2011, 105). While
these laws have created a new avenue for gender ambiguous Muslims and have made certain
Islamic countries appear “progressive,” critics have noted that they reinforce patriarchy and
normative gender dichotomies that limit gender ambiguous people to sex-reassignment, enforce a
strict adherence to binary gender by brute force, and exclude, marginalize and even criminalize
those who do not wish to take the surgical route.

On Being a Khwaja Sira in Pakistan: A Brief Overview
The 2009 judicial decision to grant rights to khwaja siras was hailed by civil society groups as a
crucial step to rehabilitate gender ambiguous people. Their legal recognition created a public
discourse around khwaja sira rights in Pakistan and provided certain protections to khwaja siras,
particularly with respect to their treatment by law enforcement personnel.
In light of these recent activities, I arrived in Karachi for fieldwork expecting a greater
public receptiveness towards khwaja siras in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision. I was not
anticipating radical change since the transformation of social norms is always a protracted
process. However, my sense of optimism deflated even before I stepped into the discursive space
we call the field. My first sense of the prevailing social attitudes towards khwaja siras came from
my own parent’s initial discomfort with my research topic. The difficulties that gender
ambiguous people faced in everyday life will not be new to many audiences. In fact, these
recurring points will read like tropes of the South Asian queer experience. Yet, I summarize
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them here at the risk of my own complicity in perpetuating stale images if for no other reason
than to convey some of the key afflictions of research participants.
Khwaja siras were among the most stigmatized and marginalized citizens in
contemporary Pakistan. They were viewed with ambivalence not only due to their ambiguous
physical features but also because they were believed to possess the power to bless and curse.
They simultaneously invoked a sense of sympathy, curiosity, fear and disgust among the general
public, and their non-normativity led to their exclusion from mainstream society. Faced with
ridicule and violence from family and friends, many left their homes at an early age to find
refuge among other gender ambiguous people.
Khwaja siras have a centuries-old system of social organization through which they forge
alliances with one another. This social structure is based on the master-disciple (guru-celā)
relationship in which a mentor takes on a student through ritual initiation. By forging
relationships, gender ambiguous people were enmeshed in a vast network consisting of
households, classes, and lineages.
Khwaja siras were generally from lower class backgrounds, though a small number of
individuals from lower middle class families had also joined khwaja siras communities. Most
khwaja siras received very little formal education, and employers were typically unwilling to hire
them due to their gender differences. A large number of khwaja siras dressed in women’s attire,
and those who did not were unable to mask their effeminacy. The few who managed to find
employment emphasized the difficulty in retaining jobs on account of routine harassment from
coworkers. Consequently, most earned a living through begging, singing and dancing, and
blessing newborns and newly married couples. The majority of khwaja siras also engaged in sex
work, which increased their susceptibility to sexually transmitted diseases.
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Moreover, their inferior social status made them vulnerable to physical violence and to
emotional and sexual abuse. Khwaja siras were routinely harassed by a variety of people
including law enforcement personnel, though police harassment had declined substantially since
the 2009 Supreme Court order. The illegality of and/or religious prohibitions against sex work,
sex-reassignment, non-normative marriage, and “obscene” acts and songs put khwaja siras at risk
of legal action as well as blackmail and extortion.
While the judicial move to grant civil liberties to khwaja siras was momentous in its own
right, it did little to positively impact various facets of the lives of ordinary khwaja siras who
continued to face cultural and structural violence. The mixed public perception towards them
necessitated that they played games of secrecy and deception with ordinary people as a means of
assuaging daily suffering. The gaping void between legal and social change was partly filled by
khwaja sira organizations and NGOs that were involved in the rights activism and the social
development of gender ambiguous minorities.

Conclusion
This chapter has described religious, historical and legal information pertaining to sex, gender
and ambiguity. The following chapters will elucidate that the ideas presented herein both
overlapped with and diverged from popular understandings of sex/gender variance in Pakistan.
For instance, the khwaja siras of the medieval period, though vaguely similar, were not the same
as those who had appropriated the term in contemporary Pakistan. It will become clear that
khwaja sira identity politics took a lead from localized religious and cultural beliefs that,
although diverse, provided either a parochial or an ambivalent outlook on non-normative genders
and sexualities.
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PART TWO:
Culture and Subjectivity
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Chapter 3: The Khwaja Sira Universe
Akin to use of the word “line” among queer individuals in Kolkata, India (Boyce 2007, 407),
khwaja siras used the English term “field” to describe their social world and line of work. The
field was a porous space that characterized the realm of khwaja siras, an unbounded domain that
could be entered into and exited, where gender ambiguous people could be themselves, and
where they could forge social ties with other khwaja siras. It was a support system that catered to
their material and emotional needs, provided safe communal spaces, and livelihood
opportunities. The field, then, referred to the khwaja sira sociocultural system, which was
peripheral and juxtaposed to the dominant cultural system from which gender ambiguous people
were largely excluded. Like any cultural system, the field was a construction that influenced and
organized the behavior and self-conceptions of khwaja siras. It shaped the identities of those
within it, and despite its appearance of unity, these identities were diverse and complex. In this
chapter, I discuss key features of the field, including the multiple identities that formed its core,
the gendered and sexual desires and practices of gender ambiguous people, and the khwaja sira
social structure. I describe the structuring of identities and behaviors from the point of view of
gender ambiguous people, which, I demonstrate in later chapters, diverged from mainstream
understandings of “khwaja sira.”
Much of content of this chapter reiterates material discussed in anthropological studies of
hijras in India (Nanda 1990; Reddy 2005). However, it also diverges from these investigations by
bringing into sharp focus the lives of gender ambiguous people in Pakistan who have previously
not been the subjects of long-term ethnographic research. In addition to regional variations, this
chapter highlights the emergence and understandings of new identity categories that are products
of sociocultural, religious and legal transformations that are unique to Pakistan. It also highlights
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key identity markers (i.e., hijarpan) and cultural practices (i.e., performances associated with
hijarpan, certain wedding rituals) that do not appear in earlier studies.

Rūh: The Soul Within
Gender ambiguous people attributed their gender difference to their soul (rūh), which they
believed was feminine relative to their bodies. In other words, they experienced incongruity
between sex/body and gender identity. In some sense this is similar to the diagnosis developed
by psychologists and physicians for transgender people in Euro-American contexts17. But I do
not emphasize this too much since khwaja siras generally did not view their feminine soul as a
pathological condition. They did, however, appropriate a vocabulary that expressed their
condition in terms of internal feelings and desires, regardless of physical traits. “Being a khwaja
sira has to do with your soul, about how you feel from within,” said Mano. “It does not matter
whether or not you have a penis.”
Khwaja siras believed that their soul instilled in them feminine desires, and drove them to
be feminine in gender role and embodiment. Importantly, khwaja siras asserted that they were
not women and that they could never be women. “If someone calls us women, momentarily we’ll
be happy, but we’re not women,” said Payal. “If someone calls us men, we get irritated. Our
personalities are that of khwaja siras.” The incongruence between soul and body rendered them
“neither men nor women” (Nanda 1999, 23) but khwaja sira. However, some gender variant
youth from lower-middle class backgrounds viewed themselves as women and rejected this
indigenous gender cartography.
Interlocutors recalled experiencing the influence of the soul from an early age. “Growing
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
17
Formerly known as gender identity disorder (GID), gender dysphoria refers to a person’s state
of discontent with the sex assigned to them at birth and the gender roles associated with it.
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up, I was very feminine,” said Shani. “I would sometimes pick up my mother’s nail polish and
scarf when no one would be at home,” said Shani. “I would hang out with girls, sing and dance,
get our dolls married. I never liked cricket or boys’ games.” Likewise, others described an
interest in domestic work, such as cooking and cleaning, and some enjoyed observing and
mimicking khwaja siras. Highlighting the prevalence of khwaja siras in the public social
landscape, Naima claimed that she “would follow khwaja siras around [in her childhood]… and
strut like them.”
Gender ambiguous people generally believed their soul to be innate and God-given.
Nargis highlighted the enduring attachment of the soul to the living body. “This soul will only
leave me when I die. It cannot leave me while I’m still alive.” This statement was meant to
suggest that God’s will could not be negated by human intervention.
The khwaja sira understanding of the soul corresponds with the Islamic concept of soul or
self. According to Murata and Chittick (1994), scholars of Islamic law and philosophy
(respectively), the soul is believed to be positioned half-way between the spirit, which is made of
light, and the body, which is made of clay (94-101). The soul is an ambiguous reality (218-9)
since it embodies both the qualities of the spirit (i.e., life, knowledge, desire and power) and of
the body (i.e., darkness, ignorance and death) (100-1). The soul is constantly evolving and
limitless in that it can acquire any combination of the qualities of the spirit or the body over the
course of a person’s life, thus having important consequences for human becoming (103). On the
Day of Judgment or reckoning, the soul passes either into the heavens as a reward or into hell as
punishment depending upon its degree of actualization during life in this world (231). Hence, the
Islamic understanding of soul could have important implications for gender variance; as an
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ambiguous phenomenon it can develop in divergence from the qualities of the body, including its
biological limitations, thus, producing non-binary genders.

Identities
The identities that subsisted within the khwaja sira structure both overlapped with and
contradicted the dominant perceptions about khwaja siras. Importantly, khwaja sira was not as
monolithic a category as it was often portrayed to be, and there was a lack of consensus among
gender ambiguous people about who should be included within the khwaja sira framework. In
other words, the constitution of identities within the khwaja sira universe fluctuated depending
on who one asked, who did the asking, and in what context. I describe the khwaja sira identity
structure while highlighting the dissenting voices within the field.

Khwaja Sira
Khwaja sira was a highly contested and often confusing term. It was a historic word from the
Mughal era, one that was conferred as a title of honor upon the eunuchs who served in the royal
courts. The term lost currency when khwaja siras lost their imperial functions upon the downfall
of the Mughal Empire, but it reemerged in the first decade of the new millennium, owing partly
to the efforts of khwaja sira activists and to the Supreme Count rulings in favor of gender
ambiguous people. Many favored “khwaja sira” not only as a term denoting respect but also as
one that was devoid of the negative connotations entailed by words like hijra18, khusrah19, and
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
18
Puri notes similar changes in parts of India where the derogatory use of hijra has led to the
circulation of regional terms, such as aravani in South India and kinnar in North India (Puri
2010, 40).
19
The Punjabi word for hijra, khusra, was commonly used by Urdu speakers as a substitute for
hijra in everyday speech.
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khadṛa20. Respondents admitted to hearing the term either through televised khwaja sira media
advocacy, or through their personal connections with activist leaders. While most were familiar
with the term, a few informants did not fully understand it or admitted to never having heard it.
Despite its relative newness, many informants had appropriated khwaja sira even though
they disagreed over its precise meaning. To some, khwaja sira meant as intersexual person or
someone with congenital ambiguities. However, to most others it described an individual who
possessed a feminine soul regardless of corporeality. Hence, khwaja sira was generally
understood as an umbrella construct consisting of several distinct yet imbricated identities.
Although there was no firm consensus about who should be enumerated under the broad khwaja
sira category, gender ambiguous people typically acknowledged that khunsa, zennana and hijra
were the three main khwaja sira subcategories, followed by several other terminological and
linguistic varieties that I discuss in the following sections. What united these categories was the
feminine soul, which all khwaja siras claimed to possess.

Khunsa
Khunsa referred to those who were intersex, that is, someone born with a mixture of both male
and female hormonal/chromosomal and/or genital features. However, intersexual khwaja siras
were few in number and they rarely if ever join khwaja sira social networks. Indeed, I did not
meet a single intersexual khwaja sira during fieldwork. Even though a number of informants
initially claimed to be khunsa, I typically discovered their true corporeal status through their
khwaja sira family and friends. Further, many informants admitted that they knew of no
intersexuals who had been inducted into the khwaja sira cultural system. “I have come across
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Someone who is impotent or sterile.
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many khwaja siras in my life, but up till now I have not seen a khwaja sira that society talks
about,” said Deeba. “I mean, I have not met someone who is a khwaja sira by birth.” Deeba
addresses the popular social belief that khwaja siras were hermaphrodites. Similarly, Naima
likened them to an extinct species. “The khwaja siras of old times are no more to be found. They
are extinct like that animal…what was it? I saw it on TV. (Dinosaur?). Yes, they are gone like
them.” Naima believed that the myth of intersexuality was a relic of the khwaja sira communities
of the past. Moreover, Moti asserted that the dominant belief that khwaja siras either forcibly
procured hermaphroditic children or that parents gave away such children to gender ambiguous
people was either untrue or no longer practiced.
The only individual who claimed that she personally knew of a few intersexuals who had
joined khwaja sira networks was my trusted assistant, Nadia.
There is a by-birth khwaja sira in my village and his penis is the size of a grain of rice
and his testicles are as small as lentil grains. He is completely hairless. My mother is a
mid-wife in our village. She told me that she once helped deliver a by-birth khwaja sira.
The following day when she went to inquire about the health of the child, he had died.
Perhaps the members of the household strangled him. Once I saw a khunsa in my village
who had joined khwaja siras, but I don’t think he had a feminine soul. He was wearing
women’s clothes but he was walking like a man. Even his voice was heavy. I have heard
of three khunsas who have become celās of hijras. Also, in my village there is a woman
who does not menstruate and she does not have breasts, but she has a vagina. There are
many cases like this but we never see them because they stay with their families.
Nadia highlights several factors contributing to the invisibility of intersexual people. First, she
suggests a potentially a high rate of infanticide of intersexual newborns. Second, khunsas most
likely had little motivation to join the field since they lacked a feminine soul. Third, intersexual
women were barely visible since they lacked the mobility enjoyed by intersexual men.

Zennana
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The majority of the khwaja sira population consisted of zennanas. The state of possessing a
feminine soul and male sexual organs was called akvā in Farsi vernacular, and the identity term
attached to this condition was zennana. Hence, a zennana was someone who was born physically
male, that is, with male sexual organs, but was believed to have a feminine soul and traits21.
Zennanas situationally adopted either the sartorial appearance of men or women; they either
wore men’s clothes (khoṭki), kept short hair, and sported beards and mustaches, or they dressed
in women’s clothes (fīrqā), wore makeup, and grew out their hair or used wigs. However,
zennanas were unable to conceal their femininity even when they were dressed as men. I met
Soni during my second month into fieldwork. Payal and I were waiting for her outside a busy
intersection when a man pulled up on a motorcycle. He was dressed in jeans, a blue t-shirt and a
baseball hat. “She’s here!” said Payal, waving at the man on the motorcycle. “That’s Soni?” I
asked in amazement. It was not until Soni got off her motorcycle and walked over to shake my
hand that I noticed her feminine gait. Later at her house, Soni removed her hat and bared her
long locks of hair. I learned that she typically dressed in men’s clothes and adopted a feminine
appearance only for khwaja sira parties and dance events.
Zennanas transitioned back and forth between looking and behaving like men and khwaja
siras due to both personal desire and familial pressure. Their fluid and situated identities allowed
them to manage the split between their familial and khwaja sira lives. Some zennanas dressed up
as khwaja siras occasionally while others almost full-time. Among those who adopted a semipermanent khwaja sira persona were migrant zennanas who lived and worked in Karachi, and
transformed into men only during home-visits to their natal villages. Most migrant khwaja siras
were married to women and had children. In Karachi, these zennanas had the freedom to live like
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Some zennanas retained male genitals but feminized their bodies through breasts implants
and/or hormone treatment.
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khwaja siras given the sheer distance between Karachi and their distant hometowns and the
unlikelihood of their familial and khwaja sira worlds colliding. A very small number of zennanas
lived permanently like khwaja siras, particularly those who managed to avoid the pressure of
heteronormative marriage. For instance, Noor’s family did not coerce her into marriage since her
ties with them were weak. Such zennanas avoided emasculation, which they believed was
forbidden in Islam.
In contrast, khoṭkī zennanas, that is, those who spent most of their time in men’s clothes,
and adopt a khwaja sira appearance only when visiting other khwaja siras or when attending
khwaja sira cultural events, tended to live in their familial homes. The diversity among khoṭkī
zennanas became clear to me when I spent a day at Hajra’s house. Her students demonstrate that
familial ties and livelihood practices influenced the embodied practices of khoṭkī zennanas.
Nadia and I had spent the afternoon at Hajra’s house, and by evening her disciples began to drop
in for a visit. Gul and Khan were the first to arrive. Both were effeminate but dressed in men’s
clothes since they lived with their biological kin. Gul wore men’s shalvār qamīz, his face was
bearded, and his hair was henna-dyed orange. Khan wore a t-shirt and pants, and sported a
trimmed mustache. Gul and Khan immediately busied themselves with dinner preparations in the
kitchen. Next, Hajra’s grand-celā (i.e., her disciple’s student), Mina, walked in. She had shoulder
length hair and wore a short kurti with jeans. I learned that Mina was a married khwaja sira who
lived with her extended family. She worked as a peon at a commercial office building where she
dressed in men’s uniform during work hours. The only time Mina was able to express herself as
a khwaja sira was during visits to her grand guru’s house. Then Hajra’s celā, Chini, arrived after
a hectic day of begging the streets. She wore makeup and women’s clothes, but later in the
evening, she removed her makeup and changed into a men’s button down shirt and jeans because
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she was headed back to her parental home where she lived with her aging father. I learned that
Chini came to her guru’s house everyday to change her “getup” before and after her daily
begging routine.
Khoṭkī zennanas found it harder to manage the split between their khwaja sira and male
personas since the boundary between the social worlds they inhabited was imbricated and
perforated. For instance, my routine presence was initially disconcerting for some khoṭkī
zennanas in Payal’s extended family. Despite my assurances to the contrary, they were
convinced that I was affiliated with a local news channel, and were afraid of being exposed on
television. The sight of my camera made them nervous and they dared not speak to me. By our
fourth meeting, however, some felt slightly comfortable in my presence. Tina admitted her fear
of being ridiculed by neighbors and relatives if her photos were leaked to the press. Social stigma
necessitated khoṭkī zennanas to successfully manage a dual identity in order to maintain familial
respect and to avoid persecution.

Hijra
The state of having undergone genital excision, which involved the removal of both the penis
and testicles, was called nirbān in Farsi, and the identity term attached to this physical condition
was hijra. The identity of an individual changed from zennana to hijra after the removal of the
genitals. Emasculation was desirable not only because it enhanced femininity but also it
improved one’s status among khwaja siras. In spite of this, a relatively small number of zennanas
choose to get an operation since it was believed to be prohibited in Islam. Hijras dressed in
women’s clothes almost fulltime and permanently grew out their hair.
What unified zennanas and hijras was their defining characteristic, the feminine soul or
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rūh, which all khwaja siras were believed to possess from the time of birth. Zennanas and hijras
mostly employed feminine pronouns for themselves and for other khwaja siras in everyday
speech. Like zennanas, hijras had their own social networks that were open for admission to both
those who were and were not emasculated. Even though the formal definition of hijra hinged on
becoming nirbān, colloquially, zennanas who were initiated into hijra networks and dressed
mostly in women’s attire were also called hijras.

Figure 2. The above diagram illustrates that like zennanas, all hijras
were genitally male at birth, and they necessarily went through the
zennana/akvā phase prior to surgical emasculation. Hence, hijra/
nirbān was an offshoot of the zennana category. Although a
relatively small number of zennanas became hijras through
emasculation, many were considered hijras by way of induction into
hijra households.

Referring to a hijra as a transsexual woman—perhaps its closest English language
equivalent in Euro-American contexts—is misleading because it captures neither the
sociocultural nor the corporeal disparities between hijras and those who identify as transsexual in
the United States. For instance, a transsexual woman is someone who has undergone sex
reassignment to align her male sex/body with her gender identity. This process involves hormone
treatment, breast implants, vaginoplasty and counseling. In contrast, hijras underwent a culturally
prescribed and ritually mediated emasculation operation that involved the excision of the penis
and testicles (i.e., nirbān) but not the construction of a vagina. Those who surgically acquired
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vaginas were perceived as women (nehāro), and by definition, could not belong to the hijra
classificatory regime.

Murat
In Farsi, murat generally referred to young individuals who were relatively new to the field or to
khwaja siras who were physically attractive. Incidentally, murat is also an Urdu word meaning
statue or image. This secondary meaning was pertinent to the lived reality of khwaja siras since
they appropriated the feminine image or persona in everyday life. Most murats were nonemasculated since every young newcomer who joined the khwaja sira social system necessarily
went through the zennana/akvā phase for many years before she could even consider becoming a
hijra/nirbān22. However, there were a few exceptions since some murats became emasculated
early on in their careers as khwaja siras. The term murat became less applicable to khwaja siras
as they aged. In everyday speech, murat was an extensively used term that could be used to
identify a variety of gender ambiguous people since it traversed corporeal boundaries and
communal affiliation.

Transgender and Shemale
Between 2011-13, the term “transgender” had gained currency among a small group of activist
and lower middle-class gender variant Karachiites. Access to an English language education, to
the Internet, and to NGOs provided these individuals the resources that enabled a selfidentification with the transgender category. Those who identified as transgender were from
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
22
Farah explained the logic behind the term by breaking it into syllables: “The ‘m’ in murat
comes from mard (man), and the remaining letters, ‘urat’ come from ‘aorat (woman). That’s
25% man, and 75% woman.” Farah’s explanation of murat was cogent even though she was the
only individual who explained the term phonetically.
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middle-class homes, they dressed in both Western and Pakistani attire, and many lived with other
gender ambiguous people in flats located in nicer neighborhoods instead of shantytowns where
most khwaja siras lived. Most were sex workers who catered to a middle-class and partially
Internet-based clientele. Despite their differences, the transgender-identifying individuals I knew
had been inducted into the guru-celā system.
In addition, they were socially connected to lower-middle class “gay” men. During
adolescence, before she knew she was “transgender,” Sarah heard the term gay through Internet
chartrooms and pornography, which led her to misidentify as gay.
At that time, I knew what gay meant, but I thought that hijra was something else. I knew
that I wasn’t gay, but I started calling myself gay because that was the only thing I found
that I could relate to. I was comfortable calling myself gay because gays are more literate,
so I got along with them.
Conversely, she resisted the hijra identity category since it denoted not only an inferior class
status but was also laden with social stigma. Others believed that hijras were hermaphrodites.
Owing to these factors, the identities of these individuals were initially shaped by their
experiences within gay social circles. However, through the gay network they discovered others
who like them experienced gender dysphoria. When khwaja sira activism picked up in 2009, a
host of other identity labels became available to genderqueer Pakistanis. Activists, NGOs, media
outlets and government departments began using a variety of English terms, such as transgender,
TG, transsexual, eunuch and shemale alongside with a host of local words. “Transgender”
resonated with these formerly gay-identifying individuals, who used their English language and
Internet skills to grasp the meaning of these unfamiliar words to better classify themselves as
“women” trapped in male bodies. In contrast, gender ambiguous people from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds did not consider themselves women, and instead asserted a khwaja
sira identity that was distinct from the two normative genders. Although they were generally not
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fond of the identity label, khwaja sira, transgender people appropriated it when convenient and
beneficial.
“Shemale” was even more popular among a much broader cross-section of khwaja siras
in Karachi. Unlike transgender, it resonated with and was more easily articulated by gender
ambiguous people from lower-class backgrounds even if they did not have access to the English
language. The two-syllable term consisting of the basic English words “she” and “male” was
comprehensible to a wider cross-section of khwaja siras for whom transgender was both difficult
to pronounce and understand. “Shemale” gained popularity when Noor Vicky, a khwaja sira
activist who had gained celebrity status and frequently appeared on television, named her
organization “Shemale Coalition of Pakistan” and promoted the term through her media
advocacy. Henceforth, gender ambiguous people across the country appropriated shemale as a
synonym for khwaja sira. Unlike the United States, where many consider it to be a transphobic
slur, the term “shemale” was not regarded as slanderous in the Pakistani context.

Zānkhā
Some zennana-identified individuals who joined khwaja sira networks were homosexual men
(zānkhā, bānṭhā and in Farsi, guptī). These individuals were sexually attracted to other men but
were less feminine and more comfortable in men’s clothes, and they rarely if ever cross-dressed.
Sarmad, for instance, dressed in men’s shalvār qamīz and was mildly effeminate. He admitted to
dressing in women’s clothes just twice since his initiation into a zennana family almost a decade
ago. Sarmad was attracted to men and only enjoyed being penetrated even though many zānkhās
were sexually versatile. He had maintained several long-term relationships and occasionally
engaged in sex-work. Similarly, Guru Basheer was only slightly effeminate and dressed
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exclusively in men’s shalvār qamīz. He had no desire to wear women’s clothes and the only
makeup he wore was light foundation and kohl. Both Sarmad and Guru Basheer wished to be
addressed with masculine pronouns and by their birth names. Both demonstrated either an
absence of or having a very weak feminine soul. Their gendered/sexual desires and behavior
suggest a greater correlation with homosexuality than gender ambiguity. Had these individuals
been born into upper or middle class families, they would in all likelihood, have identified as
gay. Many, though not all, lower-class homosexual men joined khwaja sira households due to the
widespread invisibility of alternative queer scripts in South Asian cultures.

Other Queer Categories
In addition to zānkhās, another queer group with whom khwaja siras had social relationships
were lower-middle class gay men. Much like gay men in the United States, the identity of these
gay individuals was premised on a sexual attraction for men, where they were either the
penetrating or penetrated partner or sexually versatile. However, their subjective experiences
diverged from Euro-American gay identities since they were shaped by a number of local
influences, including the powerful and pervasive khwaja sira culture. Most discovered through
the Internet not only the word “gay” but also an underground network of parties, hangouts and
hookups. Some entered into long-term relationships with men, while others engaged in sex with
multiple partners. Those of marriageable age were married to women, but continued to engage in
extra-marital sex with men.
Despite their identity and class differences from khwaja siras, the desires and experiences
of these gay men overlapped with certain khwaja sira practices. For instance, I knew numerous
gay men who had learned Farsi and the distinctive hijra clap from their khwaja sira contacts,
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which they employed in interactions with their gay and gender variant friends. Some
appropriated the term murat to refer to the effeminate and/or passive partner in a same-sex
relationship. Though not a strict rule, sexual pairing among lower middle class gay men often
occurred along gendered lines, where masculine gay men tended to have sex with both gender
ambiguous and effeminate gay individuals. Feminine gay men occasionally enjoyed crossdressing, and it was not uncommon to see them dressed in women’s clothes at khwaja sira and
gay parties. Those who were sex workers wore light makeup to attract potential street clients.
Others had been inducted into hijra and zennana networks. Typically, a gay person’s
mutual interests with khwaja siras led to his initiation into a khwaja sira household. These
included the desire to occasionally cross-dress and be involved in sex work, especially since
gurus can provide the resources for both activities (i.e., feminine attire and safe sexual space). In
addition, gurus provided refuge to gay men ensnared in familial rifts. Gay initiates were also
permitted to attend and perform at khwaja siras parties where they could safely express their
femininity. These men situationally asserted either a khwaja sira or a gay identity depending on
which category was contextually safer, beneficial or convenient. For many, entry into khwaja
sira circles was gained through their transgender-identifying friends who belonged to the same
class background as them but were members of khwaja sira networks23. Some gay boys were
masculine before they started mingling with gender ambiguous people, but later discovered
through their interactions with khwaja siras that they had suppressed feminine desires. The
gendered and sexual preferences and practices of these gay men demonstrate that their identities
cannot be divided sharply “between Western and non-Western experiences of sexuality” (Altman
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As mentioned earlier, many of these transgender individuals formerly identified as ‘gay’.
Conversely, many homosexual men misidentified as zennana and hijra and entered khwaja sira
networks only to later realize that they were not khwaja siras. Class affiliation and lack of
exposure to alternative queer scripts led many queer Pakistanis to wrongly self-classify.
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1996, 91) or “traditional” and “modern” categorizations (Reddy 2004, 163). Such dichotomies
conceal the complexity and constant evolution of sexual subjectivity, and hide the blurred
boundaries between various queer identity groups. Importantly, the above description of gay men
is not representative of all lower middle class gay men but primarily those who had direct social
ties with khwaja siras and an interest in their cultural activities.
Another queer category that was excluded from the khwaja sira framework was behrupīa,
a man who mimicked the appearance of khwaja siras either to earn a livelihood the khwaja sira
way (i.e., through begging, singing, dancing and sex work) or to attract and engage in sexual
conduct with men. Such a person could be heterosexual or homosexual, did not possess a
feminine soul, did not join the guru-celā system, and occasionally dressed up like a khwaja sira.
“They try to mimic our mannerisms but it doesn’t come from within them. It is an act,” said
Noor. Similarly, Naima stated that, “they have no desire to walk like us, or to wear lipstick or
wear women’s clothes.” Gender ambiguous people despised such men because they encroached
upon their livelihood. Moreover, khwaja siras people claimed that the growing population of
such individuals who roamed the streets in search of clients negatively impacted the reputation of
authentic khwaja siras. This was not to say that khwaja siras did not engage in street-based sex
work, but that some among them were believed to be behrupīas. In Chapter 8, I discuss the
significance of behrupīas in khwaja sira media advocacy where they served as the metaphorical
scapegoats for all social ills ascribed to khwaja siras by the general public.

Identity Potpourri
Queer and khwaja sira identity categories in Pakistan were distinct but also imbricated, fluid,
situated and perceived. Zennanas, for instance, inhabited two social worlds, the dominant society
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where they were men, and the khwaja sira cultural system, where they were neither men nor
women. Similarly, many lower middle class gay and transgender-identifying individuals who
were inducted into khwaja sira households had three situated identities: man, gay, murat. Maria,
for instance, had different names, one for each of the three overlapping domains of which she
was a part. Zeeshan was her legal name, Vicky was the name by which she was known within
her gay circle, and Maria was her feminine name in the khwaja sira social world. Each name
encapsulated a different facet of her personality and lived experience. Maria started to identify as
gay in her late teens when she discovered the underground gay social scene. However, she was
unable to come into her own until she met a khwaja sira named Shani, who introduced her to
gender ambiguous people with whom she was able to better identify. Maria retained ties with her
gay friends’ circle after her initiation into the khwaja sira social system. Gender/sexual
minorities in Pakistan switched identities by emphasizing personal traits that were situationally
appropriate.
Queer identities tended to overlap because they were somewhat ill-defined. As mentioned
earlier, the understanding of khwaja sira differed across the various genderqueer identity groups.
Categories were blurred further when identity terms were translated from English to Urdu. For
example, some gender ambiguous youth self-identified as gay because they assumed it was the
English equivalent of khwaja sira/murat. One NGO official pointed out that, “[t]he whole hijra
and zennana thing in Pakistan is not defined. And now the MSM are also getting into the gurucelā system and they are speaking Farsi. So it’s getting really messed up.” Crucially, identities
were perception-based in that individuals belonging to one identity group often misunderstood
others because they categorized them through their own cultural lens. For instance, zennanas
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were fundamentally homosexual men from the perspective of many upper and middle-class gay
men because many zennanas did not cross-dress in everyday life.

Sex, Gender and Sexuality
Embodiment
Physical constitution was a vital aspect of the subjective experiences of khwaja siras since it
provided visual cues to onlookers, both gender ambiguous and ordinary people, and enabled
them to classify the queer subject and manage their interactions with them. Importantly, bodily
features were indicative of a khwaja sira’s desires, identity, and lifestyle choices. The
devaluation of emasculation among khwaja siras augmented the significance of other types of
somatic transformations. The importance of physical attractiveness increased the demand of
beauty enhancing products and services among them. In addition to effeminate mannerisms (i.e.,
a feminine and often exaggerated style of walking and talking), khwaja siras enhanced their
femininity in a number of other ways, including women’s attire. They spent much time and
money on clothing, particularly on outfits designed for special occasions, such as birthday parties
and initiations. Most khwaja siras dressed in ordinary women’s wear (i.e., shalvār qamīz) in
everyday life, while preferring elaborate Eastern and Western inspired attire (e.g., evening
gowns, cocktail dresses, embroidered saris, etc.) for special events. Clothes were accessorized
with wigs, jewelry, makeup, etc.
Khwaja siras had a distinct appearance that set them apart from both men and women. In
the public sphere, they stood out because of their ambiguous appearance (i.e., facial features and
body structure). In addition, they drew attention to themselves through certain identity markers,
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such as the distinctly hollow khwaja sira clap24, their flamboyant swagger, a high-pitched voice,
and heavy makeup. It was not uncommon to see the faces of khwaja sira beggars layered with
thick coats of homemade foundation and bright lipstick. Although many still wore gaudy outfits
and makeup, in recent years there had been a marked shift in taste among urban gender
ambiguous people who aspired to appear more like women and less like khwaja siras. Storebought makeup was significantly lighter, and was associated with femininity, modernity and
style. This contemporary urban look sharply contrasted with the sartoriality of rural khwaja siras.
In addition, khwaja siras invested time and energy in products that concealed masculine traits,
such as waxing and bleaching arm, leg and chest hair, plucking facial hair, and eyebrow and
upper lip threading. Laser hair removal had also become common practice among those who
could afford it, and skin-lightening creams were popular since fair complexion is associated with
beauty in South Asia.

Figure 3. Khwaja siras beautifying themselves for a dance event. Salma threads her
girlfriend’s eyebrows (above, right).

Additionally, khwaja siras used a number of indigenous and biomedical techniques to
enhance somatic femininity. Several non-invasive homegrown procedures were used for breast
formation. One of these involved covering the edges of a bowl with warm dough for adhesion,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
24
This clap was also a symbol of aggression. Khwaja siras clapped at each other during disputes
in order to intimidate and insult opponents.
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and then pressing the bowl over each nipple. Air suction made the bowl stick to the chest,
producing a plunger effect. Moments later, the bowl was yanked out, which drew the chest
outward and induced breast development. Others opted for less painful procedures, such as
placing water balloons inside bras in order give the illusion of breasts. Khwaja siras also used
medication, such as hormone pills and injection, to feminize their bodies. These drugs altered the
hormonal balance of the body by increasing estrogen levels that led to breast formation, nipple
expansion, and the redistribution of fat, which gave the body curvature. Gender ambiguous
people were not unaware of the dangers of excessive hormone treatment since some had
developed and died of estrogen-induced cancer.
Among invasive feminizing measures were a variety of surgeries that had gained
popularity among khwaja siras. Gender ambiguous people spent money on breast implants,
testicular castration, physical emasculation (i.e., nirbān; penectomy plus orchiectomy) and
vaginoplasty. In 2011, I knew several khwaja siras in Karachi who travelled to Lahore to get
breast implants where the procedure cost Rs. 50,000 (approx. $571), almost half the price of
surgeries in Karachi. Emasculation operations were mostly performed underground due to the
religious prohibitions against them. In the past, gender ambiguous people ritually emasculated
one another, however, in the contemporary context, doctors who were trusted within khwaja sira
networks had been conducting them. After the procedure, a nirbān khwaja sira was left with a
flattened area (capṭy) with a urinary passage that was unfit for sexual intercourse.
Vaginoplasty was the least common of these procedures, partly because it was not
culturally valued within the khwaja sira system; a gender ambiguous person who surgically
acquired a vagina (seepo) through SRS was considered a woman, which jeopardized her identity
as a khwaja sira. The identifying feature of hijras was the state of being nirbān, that is, upon the
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excision of the penis and testicles, they were anatomically neither male nor female. In contrast,
those who undertook SRS became female, and according to some, could no longer be considered
khwaja sira because their feminine souls were in harmony with their female bodies. Although
some khwaja siras aspired to become women, many did not see the point of undergoing a painful
sex change operation that did not enable them to reproduce and enjoy vaginal intercourse.
Moreover, vaginoplasty was the most expensive of the operative measures available to gender
ambiguous people25. Khwaja siras who planned on having a sex change began their
transformation by getting castrated while they saved up for a vaginoplasty. The penis was
retained for the surgical construction of a neovagina, which utilized the penile skin for the
assembly of the vulva, clitoris and vagina. On the legal front, sex-reassignment surgeries did not
lead to a subsequent change of sex on one’s birth certificate. However, in a few known cases,
Pakistani courts had permitted sex-reassignment operations as treatment for gender identity
disorder26. However, ordinary khwaja siras were unaware of these options, and typically lacked
the resources to undergo the expensive surgery let alone contest a precarious court case.

Partners
The relationships between gender ambiguous people and their partners shed light on their
gendered and sexual desires and practices. The Farsi term giryā generally referred to the male
lover or partner of a khwaja sira. It was not an identity label since the men who khwaja siras
referred to as giryās did not self-identify as such. Most giryās were heterosexual men or those
who were exclusively attracted to gender ambiguous people. Khwaja siras most commonly
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
25
In 2011, Meera’s basic nirbān surgery cost as little as Rs. 17,000 (approx. $194) in Hyderabad,
while vaginoplasty cost close to Rs. 250,000 (approx. $2,857) in Lahore.
26
The petitioners had made a case, one endorsed by medical professionals, that the patient faced
a threat to life if not permitted to undergo a sex change.
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referred to their giryās as “friend” (dost), which served to euphemize the sexual nature of their
relationship for outsiders. Khwaja siras maintained both long- and short-term relationships with
their lovers. The term used for long-term partners was pakī kā giryā (permanent giryā), who was
likened to a husband27. Ideally, giryās and khwaja siras were expected to be monogamous.
However, many gender ambiguous people secretly managed relationships with more than one
lover at a time. Others entered into monogamous love affairs, but as sex workers, engaged in
routine sexual encounters with clients. Gender ambiguous people made a distinction between
giryās and clients/admirers (pun/cāmkā). However, colloquially, the term giryā was used to refer
to all men who were potentially sexually accessible to khwaja siras.28
As men, giryās stood in contrast to women (nehāro) and to khwaja siras. For a gender
variant person to engage in sexual relationships with women was against the khwaja sira ideal,
but in practice, many maintained long-term relationships with their wives. Similarly, sex
between gender ambiguous people was prohibited and considered undesirable according to
khwaja sira cultural values, and those found guilty of involvement in such behavior were
routinely rebuked and ridiculed. What was even worse than sexual encounters with women and
khwaja siras was to be sexually attracted to them. The ideal object of a khwaja sira’s sexual
desire was supposed to be a man—not a woman or a khwaja sira. Those who found women and
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The ideal relationship between a khwaja sira and her giryā was based on love and
commitment. Khwaja siras and their partners expressed love for one another in a number of
ways. Certain public displays of affection, such as hand-feeding one another during meals, were
common. Hajra’s partner of ten years was a rickshaw driver who had named his rickshaw after
her by painting her name on the rear of the vehicle. Love was also expressed through selfinflicted pain. Some resorted to hurting themselves either as a way of coping with heartbreak or
as a public expression of their love. Suicides attempts were also common.
28
In addition to giryās and clients/admirers, the third category of males with whom gender
ambiguous people had sexual contact were known as mīṭhe cāval (also a sweet rice dessert). In
the khwaja sira world, the term referred to adolescent and young men who many khwaja siras
found sexually attractive. Typically, sex with these individuals did not involve a cash exchange
since it was considered sex for pleasure rather than work.
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gender ambiguous people desirable risked having their gender/sexual identity thrown into
question.

Khwaja Sira Weddings
The narratives and experiences of khwaja siras reveal that they aspired to be married to men, a
desire they were painfully aware would remain unfulfilled due to religious and social
prohibitions29. Khwaja siras fulfilled the desire for marriage through certain ritualized practices
that provided some of the pleasures of being married to men. Primary among these was the ritual
celebration of giryās (girye kā joṛā jalsah), which resembled heteronormative weddings. On
these occasions, the bride and groom dressed up in traditional bridal wear, and rituals that are
typically observed at heteronormative weddings (e.g., mehndī procession) were performed.
Traditional ḍānḍīā (stick) dances were took place at some of these events along with solo
routines by individual khwaja siras. This was followed by the distribution of sweets and dinner.
Moreover, the khwaja sira mother of the bride arranged a dowry for her daughter, which,
depending on her affordability, included several outfits, kitchenware and even furniture (see
“Mothers and Daughters”).
A key element of heteronormative weddings that was missing from a lover’s celebration
was the nikā’, the Islamic marriage rite that legally and religiously affirms the relationship
between husbands and wives. Informants claimed having no desire to conduct a nikā’ since the
ritual was permissible only between a man and a woman. I was told that it was sinful to mar the
sacred rite by using it to officiate the forbidden union of a man and a khwaja sira. By avoiding

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
29
The South Indian hijras in Reddy’s study also idealized marriage and yearned for love and the
possibility of a long-term commitment with their partners (2005, 169).
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the nikā’ ceremony, khwaja siras upheld not only dominant religious beliefs but also the
conviction that they were not women.
Beyond the actual ceremony, there were several other aspects of the giryā’s celebration
that mimicked a heteronormative marriage.
The senior khwaja siras get together with the couple to establish rules, such as you will
give her this much every month and in return you can put so and so restriction on her, if
you do so and so, then she can break the friendship with you, or if you decide to end your
relationship then you will have to pay a fine. The man might say that if she leaves me and
goes to someone else, then I will make her bald. Now a khwaja sira’s best feature is her
hair, so she wouldn’t want a bald head.
This oral agreement resembles a nikā’, which is essentially an Islamic prenuptial contract. The
meeting served to formalize an otherwise unstructured and socially unrecognized relationship.
In addition to the lover’s celebration, wedding rituals were often fused into khwaja sira
cultural events. I learned that it was not uncommon for khwaja siras to dress up in bridal clothes
at their initiation ceremonies and birthday parties and to be referred to as brides (dūlhan). Many
of the practices that were incorporated into these events were adopted directly from
heteronormative weddings. For instance, at her initiation, Mehek dressed in a traditional red
colored bridal outfit paired with heavy jewelry and henna on her hands. Next she was showered
with rose petals as she entered the house accompanied by her girlfriends, similar to the way
brides are ushered in a bridal procession. Later, during the photo and video shoot, Mehek
followed the cultural script for brides by imitating stereotypical bridal poses that showed off her
clothes, jewelry and henna-covered hands30.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
30
Yet another practice of feeling married was through wedding photographs. For instance,
Shehzadi had put up two such framed photographs in her house. In the first one, she stood
alongside her partner dressed in bridal wear. Upon a closer look, I noticed that Shehzadi and her
partner’s facial images had been superimposed over the photograph of a bride and groom. The
second photograph showed Shehzadi standing by herself in a bedroom. Again, her face had been
laid over the photo of a bride standing before a studio backdrop of a bedroom.
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Why did khwaja siras incorporate wedding-like rituals into their cultural events? Nadia
explained the meaning behind the practice in the following words:
[We dress up like brides because] we have women-like emotions within us…[At these
events] only one person dresses up like a bride…She looks different from everyone else
so that everyone will know that it is her birthday. We also desire a lover…Every khwaja
sira has a giryā, a friend. So what happens is that her boyfriend is also there at these
events, so she dresses up like a bride for him. This way, a craving that we within us is
fulfilled.
In reality, khwaja siras could not get legally married to their lovers, and publically they denied
the desire for such unions. However, a closer look at khwaja sira cultural practices reveals a deep
yearning for marriage with men. Unfortunately, dressing up like brides was as close as they
could possibly get to fulfilling this fantasy. Enacting a wedding was a means of satisfying the
desire to be a bride and to be the center of everyone’s attention just as brides are on their
wedding day.

Gender/Sexual Roles
In order to fulfill their deep-seated desire to have husbands and to live happy married lives, many
khwaja siras cohabitated with their partners and assumed the role of housewives. Khwaja siras
found myriad possibilities of imagining and mimicking marriage-like arrangements with their
partners. Murat-giryā relationship dynamics demonstrate that, far from complicating and
resisting the heteronormative gender binary, khwaja siras reproduced heteronormativity through
their gendered/sexual roles.
They assumed women’s roles and performed wifely duties while their partners enacted
the role of husbands. “If I make dinner,” said Nadia, “he brings the bread.” Nadia indicates a
gendered division of labor where she took care of the domestic/private sphere (e.g., cooking,
cleaning, doing laundry), and her partner supported the household through his participation in the
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public domain (e.g., earning a living, grocery shopping). However, many khwaja siras financially
supported their lovers, a gendered arrangement that was frowned upon among hijras and
zennanas. The ideal relationship was one where the giryā had a job through which he earned a
living to support his khwaja sira lover.
Khwaja siras were typically the passive sexual partners or recipients during sexual
intercourse with men. Although their sexual behavior did not always conform to a strict
receptive/penetrative oppositional binary (Khan and Khilji 2002), in sexual unions with lovers,
they mostly assumed the role of the receptive feminine partner31. Instances of gender ambiguous
people penetrating their lovers were rare since the expected and desired relationship
configuration between them was best categorized in terms of the complementary masculinefeminine binary.
Gender ambiguous people’s views pertaining to the sexual practices of gay men are
illustrative of the cultural constitution of gendered/sexual preferences within the khwaja sira
universe. Khwaja siras expressed repulsion towards gay sex practices, including the fact that gay
men had sex with people of their own kind (i.e., other gay people), and that both partners in a
same-sex sexual encounter often took turns to penetrate one another. “Khwaja siras don’t like
gays because they do it to each other,” said Hasi. “We think it is wrong because we are not
allowed to do it to one another.” Below, Payal expresses her disgust and bewilderment over the
very idea of sex between men.
Gays have sex with gays, but we hate it. How can we fulfill our desires with someone
who is from among us? We run even from the thought of it. And we don’t have sex with
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
31
Shazia informed me that her giryā had never expressed an interest in being penetrated by her.
During sexual intercourse, he avoided touching her penis and testicles, which Shazia carefully
secured either in her panties or between her legs lest he experienced the displeasure of grazing
against them. Similarly, Nadia’s lover would not allow her to penetrate him. She had, however,
penetrated her former partner.
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each other because we establish relationships with one another. That way, we are able to
have respect for one another. But those who have sex with their own people are not one
of us (she claps). I don’t see how it is even possible. Even if a dog goes insane, it won’t
eat another dog’s meat. And we think that giryās should remain giryās and murats should
remain murats. There are some giryās who like to both give and receive, and similarly
there are some khwaja siras too who like both. But we consider it a bad thing. I think that
a gay who is someone’s husband should only be a husband, and if he wants he can be
some other person’s wife, but not both the husband and the wife of the same person.
According to the khwaja sira belief system, sexual/gender complementarity was the basis of
sexual conduct between any two people. This logic rendered impossible sex between people of
the same gender. Accordingly, gender ambiguous people were expected to only engage in sexual
liaisons with men, and to adopt the role of the passive partner. Moreover, sex between khwaja
siras was forbidden because it undermined the khwaja sira kinship structure. Khwaja siras
extended this cultural reasoning to gay men who they believed should not have sex with other
gay men, and if they did, they should at least maintain a strict top/bottom oppositional binary
within any given sexual encounter or relationship. Khwaja siras morally elevated themselves
from gay men on the basis of their sexual practices, thereby locating themselves higher along the
social hierarchy.

Hijraness
The concept of hijarpan, which can roughly be translated as hijraness32, referred to the essence
of being a hijra, and was at the heart of khwaja sira culture and game playing. Hijraness was
among the markers of hijra identity, one that was roughly at par with physical emasculation.
Importantly, hijraness was also accessible to zennanas; zennanas were often called hijras in
praise if they exhibited hijraness. “To become a hijra you don't just have to get rid of your
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
32
In his study of hijras in Dhaka, Bangladesh, anthropologist, Adnan Hossain, describes a
similar, though not identical, concept, which he dubs “hijrahood” (hijragiri) (2012, 496).
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penis,” said Payal. “You become a hijra when you do what hijras do and behave like them. To
become a hijra means to have hijarpan.” To possess hijraness meant to be a fully acculturated
khwaja sira. Despite its significance, few managed to properly harness it. “Playing” hijarpan
(hijarpan khelnā) was an art that required years of experience within the khwaja sira world along
with guidance from those who possessed it. Hijraness, then, were performances or “aesthetic
practices- patterns of behavior, ways of speaking, manners of bodily comportment- whose
repetitions…structur[ed] individual and group identities” (Kapchan 1995, 479). These repetitions
were “at once a reenactment and a re-experiencing of a set of meanings already socially
established” (Butler 2002, 178).
Hijraness variously referred to the coveted body of hijra knowledge as well as to a set of
ideal traits and gendered practices. Hence, to possess hijraness meant not only to be familiar with
the history and traditions of hijras, but also to exhibit certain skills through performance, such as
by saying and doing that which was expected of hijras. In addition to having expertise in khwaja
sira rituals and customs, the traits associated with hijraness included the dexterous use of the
tongue, that is, the ability to speak masterfully, win arguments, twist conversations, bend logic,
confuse opponents in verbal combat, to insult, and to verbally defend oneself. Another
characteristic of a “true hijra” was being cognizant of khwaja sira mentality, and using one’s
insight about their thought process to predict how they might behave in certain situations. Payal
often prided herself for being “familiar with every little vein of hijras.” This psychosocial
knowledge gave certain khwaja siras the power to create and resolve rifts and to manipulate
others for personal protection and gain. In sum, hijrapan entailed being cunning, shrewd,
resourceful and quick-witted. These are what James Scott describes as the attributes of a
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trickster, who “makes his successful way through a treacherous environment of enemies…not by
his strength but by his wit and cunning” (1990, 162).
Hence, hijraness was essential to the khwaja sira games of deception (and vice versa)
since only those who possessed these special qualities could successfully outmaneuver
opponents. These qualities enabled a gender ambiguous person to respond to ridicule and
critique, to maintain respectability, and to find loopholes within a heteronormative world.
Among these practices, maintaining respect was also particularly important to the Indian hijras in
Reddy’s study (2005). Hijraness informed the representational strategies that khwaja siras
employed not only in interactions among themselves but also in exchanges with the general
public. Hijraness shaped khwaja sira social relationships and was a crucial defense mechanism
that gender ambiguous people that developed to ensure their survival in a world where they were
victims of oppression.
In the excerpt below, Shani speaks in admiration of Payal and Juhi’s hijarpan while
highlighting the characteristics that qualified them as true hijras.
I only consider a person like Mother Payal a hijra. There are so many who don’t have a
brain and they just sit in one corner. They may be the most beautiful murats, but they
don’t have the talent that Māŋ Payal has. She is a complete hijra. Among zennanas there
is just one khwaja sira who I consider a hijra. Her name is Juhi, and she plays hijarpan
with those in the lower echelons. She’s very good at making people fight. For instance,
when a conflict between Juhi and Afi took place, all the khadṛas of Pyala Hotel and the
surrounding areas came over to Afi’s house. Juhi typically wears pant-shirt. There,
outside Afi’s house, the murats clapped at Juhi and said, “Boy! We want to talk to you!”
Juhi clapped back and said, “Aye! What use is the penis you have between your legs?”
Right there, she shut them all up. Then she organized another meeting among hijras and
there she insulted Afi by saying, “You are the father of so many children, and you have
gotten breasts! Don’t you feel ashamed?” Afi fell silent right then and there.
Shani’s description of Payal and Juhi’s traits suggests that hijraness involved being mentally
sharp, possessing the ability to win arguments, to successfully insult an antagonist, and to deploy
a creative verbal assault in self-defense. Juhi managed to fight her adversaries by exposing their
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genital status to onlookers outside Afi’s house. In doing so, she reproduced the beliefs of
dominant society pertaining to sex/gender and corporeality. Further, she morally elevated herself
from Afi by calling her selfish for not considering the impact of acquiring breasts on her wife
and children’s reputation.
Gender ambiguous people could build their status within khwaja sira circles by
demonstrating hijraness. As a leadership quality of sorts, it was sought in khwaja sira gurus,
elders and chiefs. Below, Soni illustrates the relationship between hijraness and leadership.
A murat must build a lot of respect before she can become a leader. She should have a lot
of celās, should know how to talk properly, should know how to make the right decisions,
and should not get verbally trashed by participants. If there’s a meeting taking place
somewhere, and all the murats there start clapping and insulting, the elder should not sit
quietly because then everyone will say, “Look at her, she has become a chief but does not
even know how to talk.”
Soni highlights the importance of superior speaking skills among zennana and hijra chiefs.
Moreover, she indicates that these speaking skills required a quick-wit, which was beneficial in
numerous other tricky situations where quick thinking and swift problem-solving skills were
necessary. In addition, hijraness entailed the high-spirited behavior that khwaja siras commonly
displayed in conflict situations, where aggressive ranting, clapping and insulting were the norm.
Khwaja siras used their hijraness to play with the world around them. This often entailed
a certain manner of speaking.
We khwaja siras have a way of talking in circles, in a confusing manner, at the end of
which, people say that they don’t want to speak with us ever again. When people are
mean to us on the streets, instead of fighting with them, we use our tongues. We never
stopped wagging our tongues. Our tongues help us win. We leave our minds and our
tongues open.
Above, Payal indicates that those who possessed hijraness responded to oppression by talking in
an artful manner that ensured triumph. This involved confusing rivals by twisting logic and by
employing circular speech. This style of speaking also helped to maintain secrecy and a sense of
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indeterminacy about khwaja sira bodies and sexuality. Interlocutors often deployed this strategy
on me in order to conceal knowledge about their corporeal status and sexualized lifestyle. One
evening in late April, I asked Nighat and Mano to explain the difference between the different
types of khwaja siras. Two hours later, I left Nighat’s house dazed and confused by their
bewildering banter, and feeling more uncertain about khwaja sira identity categories than ever
before. My informants had deliberately contradicted themselves so many times during the
conversation that I was no longer able to distinguish one classification from another.

Gender Ambiguity
I conclude this section by assessing the aptness of the term “gender ambiguous” for khwaja siras
by drawing upon a constructionist understanding of gender as being distinct from sex and
consisting of both internal gender identity and gender performance (Butler 2002). Apart from the
mismatch between their bodies and souls, I argue that khwaja siras were rendered ambiguous due
to the combination of several gendered characteristics that were often at odds with one another.
First, they possessed a feminine soul as opposed to a woman’s soul, which partly explains why
they did not perceive themselves as or wished to become women even though they were drawn
to women’s roles and feminine embodiment. Moreover, even if they transformed themselves into
women by surgically acquiring a neovagina, they knew that they still would not be able to
reproduce, which, according to them, was integral to womanhood.
Second, in terms of practice, khwaja siras selectively engaged in both feminine and
masculine performance. Their gender ambiguity was evident in their fluid and situated identities,
especially when they traversed between familial and khwaja sira spaces, and accordingly
transitioned between their masculine and feminine selves by switching their gendered
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embodiment and sartorial practices. Third, their gender ambiguity was evident in traits that were
specific to khwaja siras (e.g., exaggerated femininity, the distinct khwaja sira clap, high-pitched
voice). These attributes, which included the qualities of hijraness or hijarpan, exceeded the
masculine and the feminine. In other words, their gender attributes not only switched between
the characteristics of men and women but also surpassed the binary gender system. Hence,
regardless of their sex/body, khwaja siras’ gender alone rendered them ambiguous, and although
they reproduced many gender norms, they also complicated gender through their ambiguity.

Khwaja Sira Family
The Guru-Celā Bond
Khwaja siras described two sets of relationships as the cornerstone of their social structure, the
guru-celā (mentor-student) and the mān-betī (mother-daughter) bonds. In practice, however, the
former relationship was far more important to the survival of the khwaja sira cultural system.
The guruless had no value in the eyes of khwaja siras since recognition within the system was
obtained through the guru’s lineage and retained upon the guru’s death. Those not affiliated with
a khwaja sira family lacked not only an identity but also access to the material and social
privileges of membership into this system. While the guruless were ridiculed for their lack of
affiliation, the celāless were unable to build a reputation if they failed to adopt disciples to
continue their legacy. Hence, the guru-celā bond was both essential and mutually beneficial.
Although guru and celā are Sanskrit terms that are deeply rooted in Hinduism (Gould 1969, 292),
the mentor-student relationship is not unfamiliar to the Muslim tradition wherein the
fundamental relationship of Islamic Sufi orders is structured around masters (pīr) and disciples
(murīd) (Hassan 557, 1987).
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Entering the “Field”
Khwaja sira narratives of entering the field diverged from induction myths that circulated in
mainstream society. The common misconception was that gender ambiguous people seized
possession of intersexual newborns from parents and raised them as khwaja siras. However, the
personal testimonies of gender ambiguous people about their early encounters with the field
indicate that most voluntarily joined the field, typically between the ages of nine and eighteen.
For many, the first glimpse into this world was through khwaja siras within their immediate
neighborhoods. Curiosity about and yearning to be like khwaja siras drew many into the field.

Novice Training and Initiation
Murats learned under the guidance of their gurus, either through direct training or by observing,
asking questions and making mistakes. Trainings covered aspects of khwaja sira livelihood, and
were aimed at enabling novices to start earning the khwaja sira way. Students learned how to
sing, dance, beg and bless, and to seek and negotiate with clients. They were taught Farsi, the
secret vernacular of khwaja siras, along with other aspects of khwaja sira culture, such as rules of
conduct and rituals33. Importantly, novices learned hijraness through their gurus, which included
methods of survival in an oppressive heteronormative world. They gained an intuitive
understanding of the significance of maintaining secrecy about stigmatizing aspects of khwaja
sira culture by witnessing the deceptive practices of their elders.
Further, they were guided through various modes of feminine embodiment, such as
dressing in women’s clothes, applying makeup, learning the hijra clap, and speaking in a high	
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For instance, students were taught to touch the knees of their gurus and seniors prior to
dancing. The practice was a way of according respect and receiving permission to perform.
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pitched voice. Although novices were interested in many of these gendered activities since
childhood, they learned the khwaja sira way of performing them upon entering the field. These
gendered performances were culturally specific practices, embodied through “the repeated
stylization of the body…congeal[ed] over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a
natural sort of being” (Butler 2002, 43-44). However, far from being natural, khwaja siras
“became” khwaja siras by “doing” or following available gender scripts. Novices also learned to
perform domestic gender roles, which included household chores, such as cooking and cleaning.

Figure 4. Malka initiating a new khwaja sira into her family by
piercing her nose with a threading needle.

Upon entering the field, novices were expected to financially contribute to the khwaja
sira household. However, accessing khwaja sira sources of livelihood often necessitated that they
officially joined a khwaja sira family through initiation. Only after a khwaja sira became
someone’s celā was she recognized as an official constituents of the khwaja sira social structure,
permitted to beg/bless in the areas designated to her guru34 and invited to dance events. Although
a staple ritual, the initiation ceremony (rasm-e-celā) differed slightly across the various khwaja

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
34
Hijra families had designated earning areas called vīrats where clan members were permitted
to beg and bless.
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sira communities35. Through initiation, the initiate formed a bond and reciprocated not only with
her mentor but also with the guru’s extended family.
Mutual Benefits
By forging bonds with mentors, celās not only gained recognition within the khwaja sira social
system, but also access to khwaja sira cultural activities (e.g., rituals, meetings, dance events)
and livelihood options, such as access to a mentor’s earning area (vīrat) and a steady stream of
clients. Membership also offered safe spaces where novices could express gendered desires in
the company of other gender ambiguous people.
For mentors, celās were supplementary sources of income. There were several ways in
which gurus earned through disciples, but these rules varied by region, community type, and by a
guru’s dexterity in obtaining money. First, live-in celās contributed to rent and other household
expenses. Second, a seniority allowance (barāpān) was given to gurus by independently housed
celās in deference to the mentor’s superiority. The allowances symbolized respect for mentors
and highlighted the status differential between gurus and celās, while improper reciprocity
denoted lack of reverence. Even though the allowance was a guru’s right, there were no firm
rules for how often and how much should be given. Some gurus expected unreasonable
allowances from celās, but students were also generally very tightfisted. These negotiations often
led to tensions between disciples and mentors. Third, group blessings (vadhāī), in which several
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
35
At a minimum, the ritual involved covering the initiate’s head with a scarf. Some khwaja sira
communities pierced the nose or stained it with edible lime. This was followed by a ritualized
exchange where the mentor and disciple reciprocated one another with cash and gifts (e.g.,
unstitched cloth). The cash amounts were typically fixed figures that varied by region and
community type and were periodically increased to reflect the cost of inflation. In addition, the
guests made cash contributions to the mentor and the student. During fieldwork, I attended
several initiation ceremonies. I was thrilled to be invited to these sacred ceremonies since
outsiders were typically barred from observing them.
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members of a khwaja sira family blessed newborns and newly married couples, was another
earning option for gurus. The guru could claim a share (bakhṛā) of the earnings even if she did
not accompany her students to confer blessings36. Gurus believed they had a right to the money
earned through blessings since students lived off their territories.
Fourth, commissions earned through the provision of space for sex-work was another
approach to earning through disciples. Safe and private spaces were scarce, especially for those
who lived in their parental homes. Fifth, the transfer of a celā from one guru to another was
typically profitable for a mentor. When an individual decided to sever ties with her guru and
wished to take on another khwaja sira as her mentor, the new guru had to pay the old one a
transfer fee called pesha. The celā, then, was a form of investment that the guru could cash in
when the two decided to part ways. Celās also provided domestic assistance to gurus. The
division of labor between mentors and live-in students was generally egalitarian with tasks
distributed equally between the residents of a household. Independently housed celās also
occasionally helped out in the guru’s house.

Mothers and Daughters
Next to the guru-celā relationship, the social relationship that khwaja siras held in high regard
was the mother-daughter (mān-betī) bond37. A mother was expected to serve the emotional and
material needs that a guru could not. When disputes occurred with gurus, khwaja siras could live
with their mothers just the way women return to their natal homes during conflicts with in-laws.
Mothers could not set restrictions on daughters the way mentors could on disciples. From a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
36
For instance, if a guru sent four of her celās to bless, the money earned was split five ways,
and one of the five portions went to the guru. This way, the guru could earn by sitting at home or
earn through other means while her celās went out to bless.
37
A khwaja sira’s mother and guru did not share a spousal relationship with one another.
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daughter’s perspective, gurus were takers and mothers were givers, but for mothers, daughters
were expensive because they were given money and gifts on special occasions, such as
initiations and birthdays38. Hence, khwaja siras preferred to initiate more students than
daughters. The mother-daughter relationship, like the guru-celā bond, was forged through a
ritualized ceremony. Likewise, this bond could be ritually dissolved through the return of all
items or an equivalent sum received from the mother. Mothers could have several inducted
daughters, but a daughter was permitted just one mother at any given time. Figure 2 illustrates
the kinship ties between mothers and daughters.

Kinship Structure
Figures 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the guru-celā and the māŋ-betī structures, respectively.

Figure 5. The kinship term used by a khwaja sira’s disciples (e.g., Hajra
and Sapna) for one another was guru-bhāī, where bhāī means brother in
Urdu. A khwaja sira’s student’s disciple (e.g., Munni, Aahista) was her
potrā celā, where potrā is phonetically similar to potā and potī, the Urdu
words for paternal grandchildren. A potrā celā was also called poti
(paternal granddaughter). The kinship term used by potrā celās for their
guru’s mentor (i.e., Shehzadi) was dād-guru, where dād is reminiscent of
dādā and dādī, the Urdu terms for paternal grandparents. A dād-guru was
also referred to as dādī (paternal grandmother). A khwaja sira’s guru-bhāī’s

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
38
If a daughter were to die, the mother was expected to arrange one of the meals at her
mourning.
	
  

95	
  

student was her bhatījā celā (paternal nephew) or bhatījī (paternal niece),
and a khwaja sira’s mentor’s guru-bhāī was her caccā guru (paternal
uncle). Hence, Munni was Sapna’s bhatījā celā and Sapna was Munni’s
caccā guru. In some cases, male and female paternal kin terms were used
interchangeably.

Figure 6. A khwaja sira’s daughters (e.g., Shani and Bao) were sisters, and
her daughter’s daughters (e.g., Maria and Ruby) were her maternal
granddaughters (navāsī). Granddaughters viewed their mother’s mothers as
maternal grandmothers (nānī). Moreover, the mother-daughter and gurucelā structure intersected. A khwaja sira could simultaneously be a mentor
and a mother to different gender ambiguous people, and her students and
daughters were brothers and sisters to one another. For instance, Shehzadi’s
disciple, Hajra, and her daughter, Shani, were siblings.

Although the khwaja sira familial structure did not neatly mimic either the patrilineal or
matrilineal stratification systems, it was closer in configuration to the former. This is not to say
that those within this system were male or masculine, but that between the two central
relationships within the structure, the masculinized mentor-student bond was preferred over the
feminine mother-daughter one. This was evident in the fact that gender ambiguous people were
identified through their gurus rather than their mothers. Gurus had supreme authority and
decision-making power, and many expressed their seniority by repressing juniors, preventing
them from expressing opinions and overriding their decisions. This suggests that the khwaja sira
social system was marked by both masculine power and privilege.

Becoming a Mentor
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In order to become a guru, a khwaja sira was expected to possess cultural knowledge of and
experience with the rules and traditions of khwaja siras and be able to impart them to juniors.
When disciples broke rules or ran into conflict, gurus were expected to shoulder the
responsibility for their errors and mediate disputes, a burden that many were reluctant to bear.
Age was not a prerequisite for mentorship since social relationships within the khwaja sira
system were not structured by age.

The Rules of Succession
The disciples of a khwaja sira were the rightful heirs to her property and earning area upon her
death39. The very first student initiate of a khwaja sira had the highest status among her brethren,
and was successor to her territory. As the new head of the household, she was expected to
possess leadership qualities, such as the ability to protect her family’s interests by dexterously
using her tongue to win arguments during disputes. As a rule, priority was given to the senior
most student, however, another disciple was elected as the head if the eldest lacked leadership
skills.

Death Rituals
There was much controversy in mainstream society about khwaja sira funerary practices, and a
prominent myth was that gender ambiguous people buried their dead late at night in their homes.
These misapprehensions existed because khwaja siras were never seen carrying their deceased in
funeral processions. On the day of a khwaja sira’s death, her chosen family did the bathing and
shrouding of the corpse, while the neighborhood men were asked to conduct the funeral prayers
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
39
Khwaja siras could give away property to daughters during their lifetime, but upon death, only
their disciples had a right to their wealth.
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and burial. Moreover, khwaja sira burials were few and far between since the funerals of married
gender ambiguous people were performed by their biological kin. Khwaja siras visited the grave
several days after the burial, and organized death rituals. Known as roṭī 40 in Farsi, these
ceremonies spanned several days and were among the most expensive and elaborate lifecycle
rituals. At the end of the grieving period, mourners were allowed to wear makeup, to sing and
dance, and resume daily earning activities.

Khwaja Sira Network
The khwaja sira network was made up of several social systems, ethnic groups, and lineages. The
two main khwaja sira social systems were the hijra and zennana networks41, each of which
consisted of several sub-groups. One of the key differences between the zennana and hijra social
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
40
Khwaja siras gathered to mourn on each day of grieving. The guru-bhāīs and students of the
deceased covered their heads with white scarves, and the guests were served food. The collection
of funds that took place on each mourning day assisted in covering the cost of food, the coffin,
the fee of the gravedigger and the cleric who led the funeral prayer, etc. These offerings eased
the financial burden on those responsible for organizing roṭīs. The successor of the deceased
hosted most of the mourning events with the exception of the thirty-fifth day (velā), which was
arranged by the deceased’s mother. The fortieth day of mourning (cālīsva or khatam roṭī)
marked the end of the mourning period. Hereafter, the mourning scarves were cast off to
symbolize a ceremonial departure from grieving. In some communities, the new heads of
households were inducted on this day. Mourning events also served as venues for community
meetings (caṭāīs) where important matters were discussed and conflicts were resolved. Roṭīs
were opportunities to end long-standing disputes since they mobilized entire clans.
41
Depending on the context, the terms zennana and hijra could refer either to distinct khwaja
sira social systems or identity categories. As an identity category, zennana generally referred to a
gender ambiguous person who possessed male genitalia (akvā), and hijra was used for a person
who was physically emasculated through the surgical removal of the penis and testicles (nirbān).
A person’s corporeal status was not a criterion for membership into either the zennana or the
hijra system, which meant that both consisted of those who were and were not emasculated.
There was significant intermingling between members of zennana and hijra subsystems; those
who were inducted into the zennana network could also be initiated into hijra families and vice
versa, regardless of corporeal status. Hence, a khwaja sira could simultaneously be a member of
both systems and have two gurus, one in a zennana and the other in a hijra household. The
advantage of dabbling in both systems was that one not only attained the authority to participate
in their governing but also forged alliances with a larger network of khwaja siras.
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systems, in addition to their members being loosely divided along the lines of corporeality, was
that zennana families did not own earning areas (vīrat). Unlike hijras, zennana families were
either restricted to begging on the city’s main thoroughfares and commercial districts or they had
to rely on other sources of income, such as dancing and prostitution. Hence, a key benefit of
joining a hijra household was that it provided access to a lucrative livelihood option, which was
also considered more respectable than sex work42.
The zennana and hijra social systems were divided into several subcategories. The
zennana structure was made up of four groups or circles (dāīrah), including the Marzai,
Ravannay, Muhavti and Chandni circles43. Similarly, the hijra network was divided into several
ethnic groups (e.g., Sindhi, Hindustani, Sarhadi44), and each ethnicity (zaāt) was further
subdivided into lineages. For instance, the Sindhi ethnic group consisted of the Badshehzadi,
Vazirzadi, Lashkarye and Naguru lineages, while Rai Walay, Ganga Rami and Aligarh fell under
Hindustanis45. Khwaja siras could join any lineage regardless of their place of birth. For instance,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
42
The zennana social system was not prominent in Karachi even though the city was full of
zennanas. These individuals joined the hijra network, which was the only platform that existed
for gender ambiguous people in Karachi. The zennana social system was more prevalent in parts
of Punjab, where it coexisted with the hijra system. Although the zennana structure was not
prominent in Karachi, some zennanas with roots in Punjab, practiced it on a very small-scale.
43
Each circle was represented by one or more leader (codhry) in community meetings.
44
These ethnicities indicated the origin of each group. For instance, Hindustanis represented
hijra groups that originated in parts of contemporary India.
45
The various khwaja sira social systems, ethnicities and lineages had distinct histories, statuses,
and sets of rules and traditions. Communal affiliations existed between certain but not all khwaja
sira groups. Specifically, zennana circles tended to be associated with one another, and hijra
lineages belonging to the same ethnic group were also typically interlinked. For instance, the
three Sindhi lineages, namely Badshehzadis, Vazirzadis and Nagurus were institutionally
connected. Their alliance necessitated the exchange of pesha (transfer fee) between the members
of these lineages. This meant that when a person from a Naguru family decided to become the
student of a khwaja sira from a Badshehzadi household, her new mentor had to transfer payment
to her old guru in order to complete the exchange. Upon the receipt of payment, the disciple no
longer retained ties with her old mentor. However, such alliances did not exist either between the
hijra and zennana social systems or between hijra ethnic groups. For instance, the Sindhi and
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among Sindhis, the Naguru lineage consisted of gender ambiguous people from across Pakistan.
Migrants from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces came to Karachi where they
joined Hindustani and Sindhi lineages. Upon admission, these individuals were identified on the
basis of the ethnic groups they joined irrespective of their natal ethnicity. However, this did not
prevent those inducted into the same ethnic group or lineage from stigmatizing one another on
the basis of natal ethnic difference.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
Hindustani ethnic groups were not associated with one another. Hence, when an individual from
a Badshehzadi family became the student of a khawaja sira from a Ganga Rami household, her
new mentor was not required to make a transfer payment to her Badshehzadi guru in order to
induct the disciple into her family. Upon initiation into the Ganga Rami household, the student
simultaneously gained membership into two families and was allowed to maintain ties with her
old mentor. Moreover, some hijra lineages, particularly in Punjab, were affiliated with the
zennana network, that is, they could gave pesha in exchange for students belonging to a zennana
family.
In addition, each khwaja sira lineage had a distinct origin story. Nagurus traced their
origins to Muhammad bin Qasim’s arrival in the Indian subcontinent. Muhammad bin Qasim
(695–715 A.D.) was a general of the Umayyad Caliphate who conquered regions along the Indus
River that are now parts of the Sindh and Punjab provinces in Pakistan. According to the version
this story narrated to me by Payal, the lineage started when bin Qasim annexed parts of Sindh.
The only two khwaja siras he brought along with him from Arabia settled in the city of Nagar
Thatta, and started the Naguru lineage. These stories were passed down from khwaja sira elders
to those disciples who were loyal and capable of becoming future community leaders. Refer to
Junejo (1994) for more hijra origin stories.
Moreover, the various lineages differed with respect to the occupation, practices, status
and/or place of origin of their founding members. According to Soni, a zennana informant, the
creation of the zennana circles could be traced back to the Mughal period. Each circle had a
differential status. “Marzais are like the kings,” she said, “Ravannay are ministers, Muhavtis
were messengers, and Chandnis used to roll out carpets.” According to Payal, who was a hijra,
the ancestors of the Rai Walay lineage (or Raikay) were known for guiding people to the right
path. Among Sindhi hijras, those who placed the saddles on bin Qasim’s horses started the
Badshezadi lineage, those who held the reins and walked the horses were Vazirzadis, and the
remaining khwaja siras in bin Qasim's army (lashkar) founded the Lashkarye lineage.
Badshehzadis ranked the highest among Sindhi hijras. For instance, the relationship between
Badshehzadis and Vazirzadis was similar to that of kings/princesses (bādshāh/shehzādī) and
their ministers (vazīrs). The name, Badshehzadi, was a combination of the Urdu words bādshāh
(king) and shehzādī (princess), while Vazirzadi was a variant of vazīr (minister or political
advisor). In practice, this status differential often entitled Badshehzadi khwaja siras to act
superior to Vazirzadis. “Typically, we work when we visit each other’s homes, but Badshehzadis
don’t,” said Nadia. “They sit like kings, and Vazirzadis come and cook food and serve it to
them.”
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Historic Residences
Each hijra lineage consisted of several primary residences (baṛī maṛī) that were linked to their
founders and current chiefs. According to oral histories, some of these residences were over 700
years old, dating back to the Mughal era46. The elders of these households were represented by
khwaja siras as religious, pious and God-fearing ascetics (faqīr). These khwaja siras were said to
be strictly against sex-work and other “sinful” activities, and men were rarely allowed to enter
their homes. The elders of these residences were known to offers daily prayers and travel to
Makkah for holy pilgrimage. Life at the baṛī maṛīs was guided by a set of rules and customs that
were rarely observed at smaller khwaja sira residences (ḍeṛā)47. Further, the occupants of the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
46
Unlike the rentals where most khwaja siras lived, these large residences were owned by
khwaja sira chiefs. Each residence was passed down from one generation of elders to another;
the head khwaja sira was typically replaced by her oldest cohabitating student upon her death.
The inhabitants of the house were not allowed to sell the property since it was an important piece
of the lineage’s heritage. The heads of these houses were known to be wealthy, and much of their
fortune was inherited from their predecessors. In addition, senior gurus were expected to
reciprocate with big mari chiefs by giving them large sums of money out of respect for their
seniority (barāpān). For instance, Payal told me that she had deliberately avoided meeting Hājī
Amber, the chief of the Naguru mari in Karachi, because she was expected to offer her close to
Rs. 15,000 on her next visit.
The prosperity of historic homes was evident to me during my visit to a big mari in
Lahore. Malka, one of the residents of the house, had invited Payal and I for lunch. Malka was an
emasculated khwaja sira who earned a living exclusively through begging. She was one of the
few khwaja siras I met during fieldwork who did not engage in sex work. Malka’s living quarter
was far more comfortable than the homes of average khwaja siras; her room had an attached
bathroom and was equipped with modern amenities, including an air conditioner, microwave, a
large flat screen television, DVD player, music system, a refrigerator, a filtered water cooler with
an attached mini refrigerator. In addition, the room was fully furnished with wall-to-wall
carpeting, window drapes, a queen size bed and a love seat. Malka seemed fairly self-sufficient
within the four walls of her room, which was one of many rooms within a large house.
Moreover, she wore bangles, a necklace and nose ring made of real gold. Such wealth and
luxury, though largely limited to historic residences, contradicted the trope of the impoverished
khwaja sira.
47
According to their strict code of conduct, younger khwaja siras were not allowed to talk back
to the elders of the house. In addition, respect was accorded to elders by touching their knees and
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houses followed a rigid daily regimen, which involved waking up and going to bed early each
day, and earning a modest livelihood strictly through begging and by conferring blessings.
Most respondents claimed being unable to live the disciplined life of the big residences.
Shani echoed this sentiment in her account of the gradual transition from the big mari to the ḍeṛā.
Before, there were only big maris, but then slowly smaller residences formed. The thing
is that we are a bit modern. We’re into movies, songs, dance. They dance too, but in a
proper manner. But we are disco dancers. So gradually, the students at the big residences
started moving out because there were too many restrictions there. Their boyfriends
couldn’t visit after a certain time of the day. So, the concept of living separately slowly
increased. We started doing dance functions, and giving money to the big gurus to
appease them. This way, more and more smaller houses cropped up.
I often heard about these differences between the inhabitants of the big residences and smaller
units. Life at the big mari represented ideal khwaja sira behavior that was characteristic of the
hijras of yesteryears and that diverged from the contemporary association of gender ambiguous
people with immorality. Many khwaja siras aspired to become like the big mari elders in old age.
In Chapter 8, I discuss the role of historic residences in khwaja sira activism, where the image of
the virtuous lifestyle of big mari residents was projected widely to counter public claims about
khwaja sira immorality.

Conclusion
Chapter 2 expounded what khwaja sira meant in medieval India. This chapter has highlighted the
meanings of khwaja sira from the perspective of those who identified as such in contemporary
Pakistan. Although present-day khwaja siras viewed royal eunuchs as their predecessors, the
historical record indicates that the khwaja siras of the Mughal era, despite superficial overlaps,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
through the practice of salām. Salām, translates into ‘peace’ in Arabic and is commonly used as a
greeting by Muslims. Disciples said salām to elders when given their share of earnings, when
lights were switched on a sunset, while stepping out of bathrooms, and while sitting and getting
up.
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were fundamentally different from their contemporaries. Not only were the socioeconomic
conditions and cultural practices surrounding their emasculation vastly different, but also they
were corporeally and sexually distinct48.
Although gender ambiguous people variously understood khwaja sira, as an umbrella
category, it subsumed a range of overlapping sub-identities and non-normative gender/sexual
subjectivities. This chapter has focused on the corporeality and the gendered/sexual desires and
practices of khwaja siras as well as the foundations of their social structure. The details provided
here will illuminate in later chapters that the ground realities of khwaja siras, particularly with
regards to their corporeality and sexuality, did not always coincide with their self and group
representations in interactions with ordinary people. It has also highlighted a crucial feature of
their identity (i.e., hijraness), which was vital to their deceptive game-like interactions with and
survival in mainstream society.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
48
Unlike imperial eunuchs, present-day khwaja siras were not enmeshed in a culture of slavery
where they were forcibly emasculated and sold as slaves. Moreover, there is no archival evidence
indicating that royal eunuchs possessed a feminine soul or that they were sexually attracted to
men.
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Chapter 4:
Stigma, Ambiguity and Conflict
Ma Nadi was a godly khwaja sira. She was a khwaja sira by birth, and was well known
for her dancing abilities. During the time of kings, she used to go to the palace and there
she would dance in a veil. The king was so happy with her performance that he invited
her to a celebration. But on the day of the event she fell ill and could not go. But some
other zennana went instead of her. He wore a veil and danced in front of the king, and the
king gave him a gift. Later when the king sent Ma Nadi his thanks, she said that she
didn’t even go to dance. The King was furious when he found out that an imposter had
danced in front of him, and he told his army to go after him. The zennana hid in a field
and there he cut off his genitals with a sharp sugarcane leaf. He became nirbān. From that
time on, the custom of becoming nirbān started. Ma Nadi was shocked at what the
zennana had done. She was mortified that such things had started to happen. She was so
upset that she wanted to be buried alive. She prayed that the ground would explode and
pull her in. As the ground began to explode and she started to descend into it, the nirbān
khwaja sira grabbed her scarf and said, “At least tell me how I can heal my wounds,” and
she responded, “Oil and water. Oil and water.” Then the murat let go of the scarf and Ma
Nadi disappeared into the ground. She did not accept the murat, and instead she buried
herself when she saw what the murat had done. But this also shows that nirbāns are
blessed by Ma Nadi. A lot of people are afraid of cutting off their penis because they can
die from it. But they still do it because they believe that they have Ma Nadi’s blessings.
Recounted by Nadia, this narrative is a version of an origin story, centering on Ma Nadi (also
known as Mai Nandi), a revered pre-Mughal era khwaja sira from the Subcontinent to whom
gender ambiguous people traced their roots49. Her legend is closely intertwined with
contemporary khwaja sira beliefs and practices, particularly to those related to genital excision
and issues of authenticity. Importantly, the fable indicates that the very origins of khwaja siras
were entrenched in stigma, ambiguity, and internal fragmentation.
The paradox presented by the fable is that even though Ma Nadi condemned
emasculation, she also prescribed remedial measures to those who excised their genitals. Khwaja
siras believed that Ma Nadi would not have recommended the oil and water treatment had she
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
49
Variations of this origin story appear among hijra communities across South Asia. For
instance, in his study of Bangladeshi hijras, Hossain recounts a very different origin myth
involving an ancient hijra goddess known as Maya Ji (2012, 505), and yet aspects of this legend
overlap with Nadia’s narrative.
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not wanted the zennana to heal. In fact, her suggestion enabled the practice to persist. Her
dubious actions indicate that emasculation was a stigmatized yet condoned practiced. Implicit in
the story is also the discourse of real versus fake khwaja siras. The narrative suggests that
khunsas were deserving ascetics, hijras were condemned yet legitimate alms receivers, and
zennanas were imposters worthy of being chased and punished. This origin myth sets the tone for
many of the present-day struggles between khwaja siras.
This chapter focuses on stigma and its impact on khwaja siras and on their relationships
with one another. I argue that stigma produced states of ambiguity and conflict within the khwaja
sira social system. Goffman writes that the beliefs of mainstream society instruct the stigmatized
person on how to feel about and treat those who diverge from the norm (1963, 111). Similar to
the effects of internalized homophobia (Harrison 2013, 20), khwaja siras were often given to
self-doubt and revulsion towards their own kind. They regularly discriminated against other
gender ambiguous people and sexual minorities on the basis of the dominant beliefs they
endorsed. Moreover, they were constantly plagued with self-stigma and by ambiguities that were
deeply embedded within their belief system, and that aroused uncertainties about their core
practices.

Being Khwaja Sira and Muslim
In public spaces, khwaja siras came across as self-assured, loud-mouthed and high-spirited
people who enjoyed drawing attention to themselves. But underneath this playful and seemingly
self-confident exterior were individuals who harbored ambivalences and insecurities about their
place in Islam. This condition of ambiguity in part reflects the broader failure to achieve
consensus on Islam in Pakistan, and the unending confusion resulting from it in the political
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sphere (Khan 2013, 5). Although religion provided solace, it also produced in khwaja siras
misgivings about the validity of their gender/sexual difference. Consequently, gender ambiguous
people questioned the legitimacy of their own claims about possessing a feminine soul, and
tended to give credence to dominant Islamic views that were regularly used to stigmatize them.

Role of Religion in Life
Few khwaja siras were able to observe religious practices in everyday life. “Praise to God, I am
Muslim,” said Chammo. “But I am not very religious because my work is bad. I engage in every
sin. I sell my body, and I stay in a state of impurity.” Khwaja siras like Chammo distanced
themselves from religious observance because their daily lives were engulfed in religiously
prohibited behavior.
If you think about it, really we are men, but we wear women's clothes. Prayers are not
permitted in these clothes. Often the clerics who preach tell us that men are not allowed
to say prayers in women’s clothes. There should be no nail polish on your nails, and your
nails should not be long. But our khadṛas love their bodies, their beauty, and they live by
taking care of each and every thing of theirs. They have to keep long nails, but if your
nails are long, then your prayers are not granted.
Above, Sunaina justifies her avoidance of daily prayer while indorsing the dominant view that
gender ambiguous people with male genitals were men. For Sunaina and Chammo, it was futile
to be simultaneously religious and a part of the khwaja sira universe.
This general attitude explains why many khwaja siras got married, had children, and left
the field for a normative life upon retirement. “I have a problem being this way,” said Andaaz,
who was clearly discontent with her lifestyle and a desired normalcy. “I want to earn enough so
that I can stop doing this work and start supporting my family the right way.” Unhappy with her
present state, she aspired to leave the field in order to begin leading a virtuous lifestyle. It was
only upon permanently abandoning the field that she believed she could become a devout
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Muslim. Although most gender ambiguous people turned to religion in old age, some left the
field and turned to religion in their youth. Below, Tamanna describes her guru’s estrangement
from the field as a result of religious influences.
I used to have this guru before but now she’s kept a beard and has joined a Tabligh50. She
has completely left the field. Now you’ll find her at a mosque in Lalu Khet. She’s
stopped meeting me. She says that I am bad company for her. Now she only hangs out
with this group of Tablighi murats. They go to the homes of other murats to spread their
religious message. They came to my house too the other day. All of them had these big
beards, but they were very feminine. I said to them, “Come you whores, first I want each
of you to dance for me.” They started clapping at me and said, “Come with us to Tabligh.
God willing, He will help you.” Everyone at the mosque knows about them, and they’re
very happy that they’ve left a bad line and joined a good one.
This rare narrative about religious reformation among khwaja siras demonstrates not only the
efficacy of grassroots Islamic activism in Pakistan but also the controlling influence of religion
over khwaja sira desire and practice.
Only a handful of informants reported engaging in religious performance. Nazo, for
instance, attended Friday prayers in the neighborhood mosque and held weekly Quranic
recitations at her house. For Nazo, observing Islamic rituals served the dual function of earning
both divine merit and social respectability. Despite being generally dislocated from Islam, certain
religious practices were regularly observed by khwaja siras, and some had even become
institutionalized within the field. One of these was the practice of performing the Muslim holy
pilgrimage to Makkah in Saudi Arabia51. Upon their return, khwaja sira pilgrims were honored
with the title of hājī 52, which was added to their feminine names (e.g., Hājī Salma, Hājī Bunty).
Earning the title of hājī improved the status of gender ambiguous people both among khwaja
siras and in mainstream society.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
50
Tabligh refers to a religious movement vested in spreading the message of Islam at the
grassroots level.
51
Khwaja siras perform hajj as men.
52
Hājī is a form of address for someone who has performed Hajj.
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In addition, khwaja siras regularly organized niāz, a religious offering involving the
distribution of food. Gender ambiguous people who performed group blessings (see
“Livelihood” in Chapter 5) put aside a small portion of their earnings for niāz before dividing the
remaining amount into equal shares among group members. Typically, gurus collected the
contributions and put the money towards hosting niāz. Food was either cooked or bought, and
then distributed among khwaja sira guests and the poor53. Gender ambiguous people also made
routine visits to the shrines of Sufi saints. Although worship was the primary goal of shrine
visits, they also presented opportunities to earn supplementary income through dancing and sex
work. I noticed that a number of khwaja siras had hung in their homes posters of the saints they
worshipped. Surkhi, for instance, had put up a poster of Abdul Qadir Jilani, for whom she lit
incense and performed weekly niāz.

Figure 7. A khwaja sira dancing to the beat of the drum at Lal Shahbaz
Qalandar’s shrine in Sehwan, Sindh.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
53
Khwaja siras organized niāz on special occasions, such as Prophet Mohammad’s birthday or
on the day of ‘Ashūrhā. The day of ‘Ashūrhā refers to the 10th of the Islamic month of
Muharram, in which Shia Muslims mourn the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of
Prophet Muhammad. In addition, niāz was offered in the name of God and certain venerated Sufi
saints, such as, Abdul Qadir Jilani, who is widely revered in Pakistan and India.
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Khwaja Siras and Popular Islam
Informants voiced several religious accounts that ranged from outright rejection of khwaja siras
to uncertainty about their status in Islam. The presence of these varied religious beliefs rests on
Islam’s diversity within Pakistan, which includes a significant Shi’ite minority, many Ismailis,
different Sufi traditions, and “traditionalist” communities that belong to various ethnolinguistic
groups (Haines 2012, 13). This diversity is represented in khwaja siras’ religious views
pertaining to their place in Islam. Below, Moti’s staunch views leave little room for any religious
approval of gender ambiguous people.
[W]earing women’s clothes in not allowed for men. I read a hadīth on a calendar that our
Prophet cursed those men who wore women’s clothes. There was a person who wore a
red colored outfit once, and Prophet Mohammed ordered him to be removed from the
neighborhood. In the Quran, God has said that khwaja siras are His beings and they
should not be treated badly, but the Quran refers only to those khwaja siras who are
naturally born. God has sent us in the form of men. He hasn’t sent us as with mixed parts.
And the prophet has declared singing and dancing as haram. I heard a cleric say on a
religious channel that giving money to hijras is forbidden because they earn a living by
singing and dancing which is also forbidden.
Moti’s claim that Islam does not permit men to dress in women’s clothes diverges from the
scholarly interpretation of this hadīth presented by religious historian, Scott Kugle. According to
Kugle, Prophet Mohammad’s condemnation applied specifically to males who were not
effeminate by nature and adopted such behavior merely for ulterior motives (Kugle 2010, 253-4).
Moti had the tendency of adhering to the normative gender binary where individuals born with
male genitalia were deemed to be men even if they believed that they possessed a feminine soul.
This dominant view privileged genitalia over interiorized gender in determining whether a
person was a man, woman or intersexual.
Even though gender ambiguous people believed their condition to be innate, God-given
and permanent, dominant religious beliefs about sex/gender often led them to question their
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views about the concept of the feminine soul. “I think, to say that we have a feminine soul is our
own belief,” said Moti. “God has only descended two types of beings-- man and woman.” Moti
suggests that khwaja siras had conjured up the notion of a feminine soul for personal satisfaction
when in fact Islam did not recognize its existence. Her self-denial is a product of the failure of
Sunni jurists to develop the concept of gender identity independent of biological sex. The social
and religious stigma that khwaja siras experienced often led them to question the validity of their
own claims about possessing a feminine soul. The fact that this soul was intangible, that its
presence and legitimacy were not recognized by dominant Islamic precepts, compounded by the
absence of adequate medical discourse in Pakistan describing gender variance and dysphoria in
positive terms, generated momentary lapses of denial and self-doubt among zennanas and hijras.
To deem the soul an imagined phenomenon, was to deny that gender ambiguous people existed,
and according to this view, those who claimed to be khwaja siras should live in harmony with the
norms attributed to their given bodies.
However, unlike Moti, most interlocutors were unsure about their location in Islam. Their
responses revealed the paradox of their lives, signaling the contradiction between religious
teachings and the reality of their existence.
Hajra: There is no mention of khwaja siras in the Quran, but Allah has made us this way.
There are many things that Allah has made but not mentioned in the Quran.
Bilal: If you look at hadīth, for a man to become a woman is a sin. But khwaja siras also
have a great place in Islam. Our prayers and curses have an effect on others. Sometimes
Allah listens to things that come from the heart, even if they come from the heart of a
sinner.
Ruby: We are men but we have the hearts of women. We are like living corpses.
According to Islam, it is prohibited for us to be the way we are, but we are this way
because God has made us like this.
The above responses highlight the internal conflict experienced by gender ambiguous people
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between their gendered/sexual desires, on the one hand, and the conviction that such behavior
was prohibited in Islam, on the other. The implication of this worldview was that khwaja siras
must suppress their desires and live like men if they wished to avoid a life of sin and disgrace.
Importantly, these interlocutors attributed their gender difference to divine will even though they
believed that it was a sin “for a man to become a woman.”
Hasi presented two religious narratives, one that outright denounced non-normative
sexual behavior, while the other reflected an unclear view of gender ambiguity.
I have heard a hadīth in which Prophet Mohammad was going somewhere when he saw
the funeral procession of a shemale. When he asked whose funeral it was, the people in
the procession took off the cloth from the deceased’s face. The Prophet turned his face
away when he saw the “shemale.” He didn’t say anything and motioned to continue the
procession. He didn’t tell them to stop the procession…or that it is not legitimate. I have
also heard that the people of Prophet Nuh wanted to have sex with boys even though they
had beautiful women among them. I won’t call these boys shemales, but technically
shemales are boys too. Whenever they saw beautiful boys, they went after them. That
community received God’s punishment. Stormy winds blew them into the sky where they
collided with each other and their livers blew up.
The second account clearly condemns sex between men, or according to Hasi, sex between
individuals born with male genitalia. However, the first narrative evokes a sense of ambivalence
about the status of khwaja siras in Islam. Although that act of looking away from the deceased’s
face could be interpreted as a sign of revulsion, Prophet Mohammad also appeared to have
sanctioned the funeral. The incident suggests a reluctant acceptance of gender variant people, as
despised yet tolerated beings.
Historical sources reveal that eunuchs served important functions at the Ka’ba, the sacred
site of pilgrimage for Muslims in Makkah, and at the Mosque of Prophet Mohammad in Medina,
where they were employed. Some sources claim that eunuchs still serve the mosque in Makkah,
but they are fewer in number today than in the early 1900s. Informants frequently mentioned
these individuals and saw them as their “khwaja sira ancestors.” However, they knew little about

	
  

111	
  

these eunuchs other than the role they played in the ritual purification of the holy sites. Further,
they had varying ideas about who these people were. Many believed that they were intersexuals,
while others were skeptical about the possibility that such people worked at Muslim sacred sites.
You know how khwaja siras talk about the by-birth khwaja siras in Makkah and Medina,
and this and that. God only knows what is true. But this one time an elderly khwaja sira
told me that there was a tribe of khwaja siras over there, and they had a ritual in which
they used to operate on a child and make him nirbān as soon as he was born. This way,
she could grow up to protect the house of God. Now if the people of the house of Allah
are doing this, then why would it be wrong for us to do it? In a way, they are the same
sex as us, but they may not have a feminine soul.
Nadia was not convinced that khwaja siras even existed at Muslim holy sites partly because she
had heard inconsistent accounts about their corporeality. She was uncertain whether they were
intersexual or physically emasculated, and she doubted that they possessed a feminine soul.
Similarly, Kugle notes that the eunuchs of the pre-modern period were only superficially similar
to hijras in terms of somatic emasculation; they were involuntarily enslaved, emasculated and
sold into the Muslim Empire, while hijras demonstrate a psychological motivation to willingly
undergo emasculation (2010, 241-42). Regardless of whether or not eunuchs were ancestors of
contemporary khwaja siras, Nadia drew solace in the possibility that “the people of the house of
Allah” performed genital excision since such a practice challenged the popular belief in Pakistan
that voluntary somatic emasculation was religiously prohibited.
The following narrative, recounted by a khwaja sira elder, describes the legend of a hijra
who was linked to the Sufi saint, Khwaja Moinuddin Hasan Chishty54.
A long time ago in Ajmer, a hijra asked Khwaja Gharib Nawaz for a child instead of
guidance. Khwaja said that you will have a child but you won’t be able to see it. “Why?”
she asked, and he said, “Because you didn’t ask for it--you asked for a child.” Then he
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Khwaja Moinuddin Hasan Chishty (1142-1236 A.D.), also known as, Khwaja Gharib Nawaz,
was the founder of the Chishty Sufi Order in India. Today, hijras attend the annual death
anniversary of Khwaja Garib Nawaz in larger numbers, and it is believed that he gave hijras the
power to bless.
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asked her to go to Taragarh55. He told her to stay there until she has a child. So she went
there and hit the mountain, and the mountain opened. When she went inside, there was a
pond there. She put her legs into the pond and it dried up. There was also a marble floor
that was filled with flowers. She lay down on the marble and the mountain closed. Then
nine months passed and her child was about to be born when the angels came down. The
hijra passed away because she asked for a child but she didn’t have a passage. But the
child lived. Khwaja Gharib Nawaz went to the mountain. He took the child and placed it
outside the mountain. When people found out that a hijra had given birth to a child in the
mountain, they went to the mountain. But men were not allowed there, so the men left
and the women stayed back and prayed. And those who were childless, Allah gave them
a child. Then the mountain opened again, and the child went back in and into the
mother’s womb, and the mountain closed again. Today, women who are unable to have
children go to this mountain. The hijra’s shrine is in Ajmer. First, people greet the hijra’s
grave and then they say salām to Khwaja Gharib Nawaz. So this shows the respect that is
given to hijras, but only if they are good and don’t get ass fucked. It is due to the Godly
hijras of the past that we are still eating today.
The above fable is vague about the status of khwaja siras. On the one hand, it demonstrates the
hijra’s imprudence for pursuing her material needs over the saint’s spiritual guidance, which
ultimately led to her death. On the other hand, it indicates the respect accorded to the hijra by
devotees who paid her homage by visiting her shrine. Moreover, the narrator emphasizes that
only khwaja sira ascetics and those who abstained from sin and debauchery were worthy of
respect and high stature in Islam. The aforementioned religio-historical incidents indicate that
khwaja siras were suspended in a perpetual state of ambiguity about their location in Islam.

Internal Conflicts
The internal conflicts experienced by gender ambiguous people due to their divergence from
religious norms produced in them a deep sense of despondency and confusion. The following
excerpt from Nazo’s interview demonstrates her struggle to reconcile her religious beliefs with
her queerness.
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Taragarh is a fort close to Ajmer in Rajasthan, India.
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A lot of people say that we do this deliberately, that we are men…I have been reading the
Quran regularly for so many years. If I had been deliberately putting up an act, I would
have been fixed by now. But maybe it is not working because I read the Quran in
women’s clothes, and it is wrong for us to worship in women’s clothes. But it is my faith
that Allah will forgive each and every human being.
On the one hand, Nazo asserts her gender difference in defiance of the mainstream belief that
some gender ambiguous people were fake khwaja siras. On the other hand, she speculates
whether her religious observances had been invalidated by the act of praying in women’s attire. I
was about to wrap up the interview with Nazo when darkness descended upon her room due to a
scheduled power outage. It was late in the evening and Nazo sat across from me on the floor. An
emergency lamp placed next to her lit up her face from below. Suddenly, she narrowed her eyes
and leaned forward, pointing at her lipstick covered lips. “What is this?” she inquired. “Look at
my face! This lipstick. These clothes I’m wearing. What do you think this is?” After a moment’s
pause she blurted: “This is the devil! You think this is a woman sitting in front of you? No! This
is Satan! Khwaja siras are like Satan!” A couple of minutes later, I scrambled out of Nazo’s
house alarmed by her sudden outburst. Nazo was clearly conflicted about her religious beliefs
and gender identity. Religion and respectability were crucial to her everyday life, but she was
also unable to suppress her khwaja sira identity and desires. Her inability to reconcile the two
conflicting facets of her life affected her psychological well-being.

Sin and Reconciliation
Khwaja sira notions of morality were rooted in dominant social norms that were used to
stigmatize them. Gender ambiguous people identified both sex work and illegitimate sex (i.e.,
anal penetration) as vice or burāī. However, sex work was considered to be acceptable in
situations of dire financial need. “I am fine with those who sell their bodies to support their
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families if they are unemployed, helpless and depressed,” said Shani. Many khwaja siras feared
the negative consequences of earning religious demerit through sex work. “God forbid I do sex
work and then bring that money to my siblings. I don’t want something bad to happen to my
family,” said Nisho. “They say, if you do bad things, then it will come to hurt your children too.”
Moreover, monogamous relations with male partners were acceptable relative to sex with
multiple partners.
Khwaja siras identified a number of other activities in which they engaged as immoral.
Genital excision was believed to be against divine will, that is, voluntarily changing the form that
God intended for human beings was a grave sin. “All the things that God has made and given us
are God’s possessions,” said Saleem “This leg isn’t just a leg-- it is Allah’s bounty. So I can’t cut
it off. Of course, it’s different if I lose my leg in an accident.” I was told by khwaja siras and
ordinary people alike that altering one’s corporeal structure was like “playing with nature,” and
that those who engaged in this “satanic deed” were “at war with God” because they
“challenge[d] Allah for the sake of personal desires.” Importantly, the decision to become
emasculated was believed to be tantamount to renouncing Islam since the prayers of such people
were considered unmeritorious. “The funeral rites of those who are nirbān are not considered
legitimate in Islam,” said Nadia, which meant that they remained in a state of liminality even
upon death. Sherry explained emasculation as a much bigger vice than sex work since there was
no restitution from its permanent state. “As it is, I am detached from Islam because I do bad
work. If I become nirbān, I will be completely cut off from Islam.” This religious understanding
of sex/gender conflated biological sex and interiorized gender, and privileged natural physical
constitution in determining gender identity.
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Further, begging was looked down upon as a religiously forbidden activity, but one that
was tolerable in times of dire necessity. “According to shariáh, begging is prohibited,” said
Saleem. “It is not allowed for him who is able to make ends meet. Now, obviously, if a person
does not have money to eat and clothe himself, then what else is he to do?” Saleem’s views
pertaining to begging were reasonable yet ambiguous; the Islamic rules pertaining to begging left
room for the practice to persist while simultaneously producing uncertainty about its legitimacy.
Many also believed that for men to adorn women’s clothes was not permitted in Islam. Hence,
practically every crucial aspect of being a khwaja sira was believed to be religiously prohibited.
Unable to repress their gender/sexual variance, the daily lives of khwaja siras were burdened by
these socio-religious pressures.
Khwaja siras engaged in a variety of activities to offset their sins. In addition to the
practice of organizing religious offerings, performing the Muslim holy pilgrimage to Makkah,
and regular shrine visits, some khwaja siras established distance from sex work as a way of
countering vice56. Others entered monogamous relationships with men who financially supported
them, thereby replacing the need to earn by selling sex. Another way of reconciling one’s
queerness with religion was by getting married and reproducing in order to satisfy the
expectation of expanding the Muslim Ummah57 and making a personal sacrifice for the greater
social good. In contrast, some khwaja siras defied oppressive beliefs by asserting that their
feminine soul was natural, God-given and permanent. “If God has put this rūh in us then that
means it is God’s will,” said Bao. “I am grateful that Allah gave me this soul instead of making
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Upon achieving some financial stability, many khwaja siras left sex work as a full-time
profession for more respectable livelihood options, such as blessing and begging, and resorted to
sex work only when they were unable to make ends meet.
57
In Arabic, Ummah means nation or community, and it refers to the network of Muslims the
world over.
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me an invalid.” Similarly, Shani stated that, “God tells us to love everything that He has created.
I am living my life by this sentence. God has created us, so we should love khwaja siras just the
way we love other people.”
I wondered if reconciliation was easier for emasculated khwaja siras in light of the fact
that sex-reassignment was legally and religiously permitted in some Muslim countries. One
March evening, I asked Naima, Payal and Nadia about their views on sex change operations in
Iran. Initially, the three of them seemed confused, but then Payal recollected hearing that such
surgeries were legal in Iran. I went on explain that SRS was legal and religiously sanctioned in
Iran, and that the Iranian state partially covered the cost of the procedure. As I spoke, Payal
nodded in agreement, but both Naima and Nadia seemed bewildered. Naima knew little about
Iran let alone the country’s stance on sex reassignment. She asked where Iran was located and
Payal explained that it is a neighboring Muslim country where people from Pakistan pilgrimaged
to well-known shrines. At the end of this discussion, both Naima and Nadia appeared pensive.
Although Payal had some knowledge about the topic, which she had only recently acquired
through discussions with activists, Naima and Nadia knew nothing about sex change in Iran.
Hence, Iran’s treatment of SRS was not a point of reconciliation for most khwaja siras because in
their worldview, localized knowledge, as is often the case, was privileged over everything else.
Khwaja Siras and Public Perception
This section explores how contemporary forms of khwaja sira experience were understood in
mainstream Pakistani society. It highlights the mixed public perception towards khwaja siras,
and explains why gender ambiguous people were concurrently revered, tolerated and persecuted.
One September afternoon, I accompanied Payal and Ruby to Zainab Market where the two
planned on shopping for new outfits. Forty-eight year old Payal was dressed demurely in
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women’s shalvār qamīz with a scarf draped around her neck, and her hair tied in a neat bun in the
back of her head. In contrast, thirty-three year old Ruby was dressed in a striped bright blue
men’s shalvār qamīz. Ruby wore a locket around her neck and left her golden-streaked shoulder
length hair open.
Compared to Payal’s modest demeanor, Ruby’s flamboyance attracted the attention of
passersby. I felt strangely invisible walking next to Ruby since all eyes were on her. We stopped
at a shop that was being run by a bunch of teenaged boys. As Ruby browsed through outfits, the
shopkeepers started fooling around. They teased one of boys in the group to befriend Ruby.
Upon hearing their banter, Ruby flirtatiously responded, “God forbid I become his friend!” The
playful repartee continued until we moved to the next shop. As we made our way out onto the
sidewalk, I noticed a trio of young professional men pointing and laughing at Ruby. I was
momentarily stunned when one of them pretended to grab Ruby’s buttocks as she turned to face
a shop display window. Unaware, Ruby admired a dress on a mannequin as the men walked
away high-fiving and laughing. As we waited at a busy intersection to cross the street, I noticed
two policemen drinking from a public water cooler. Upon seeing us, one of them approached
Payal and served her a glass of water. Payal thanked them, drank the water and then handed the
glass to Ruby. One of policemen respectfully requested Payal to pray for the well-being of his
ailing mother. In response, Payal uttered, “I pray to Allah to heal your mother so that she
recovers soon.” The policeman politely thanked her as we parted ways with them.
It was interesting to observe Payal and Ruby’s interactions with the people at the bazaar.
There was a marked difference in the way people treated the two khwaja siras. This difference in
interaction is partly attributable to the visual markers the two provided their onlookers. Taking a
lead from Payal’s simplicity and Ruby’s flamboyance, the spectators revered Payal as an ascetic
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with special powers while treating Ruby as an object of entertainment and desire. That a khwaja
sira could be both a spiritual intermediary and a sex object is confounding. Further, the
inconsistent treatment of khwaja siras indicates the diversity and contradictions in the public’s
perception of gender ambiguous people. It demonstrates that an array of conflicting ideas
permeated the Pakistani public, which was a fractured entity comprised of multiple publics. That
khwaja siras concomitantly experienced acceptance, social distancing, outright rejection and
violence was evidence of the coexistence of these publics and of their ambivalence towards nonnormative subjects.
Public perceptions pertaining to khwaja siras were enduring but they emerged
ephemerally in discursive and transient moments (e.g., in khwaja sira encounters with the media,
or with ordinary people out on the streets). These mixed opinions were products of the gender
nonconformity, somatic ambiguity, hyper sexuality, and clandestine culture of khwaja siras.
There was an air of uncertainty surrounding their lives, unanswered questions, and myths and
urban legends. To borrow from Susan Seizer, khwaja siras were “seen as most unsettling
precisely due to their unsettledness” (2000, 235). Here, I extrapolate from public perceptions
pertaining to khwaja siras in three ways: through an examination of gender ambiguous people’s
assessment of how they were viewed by worldly people, through my personal conversations with
ordinary Pakistanis, and through an analysis of mass-mediated messages.
One morning over tea at the AIPS rest house in Lahore, I had a telling conversation about
khwaja siras with two men: my driver, Alam, and the center’s cook, Sadiq. In the excerpt below,
Alam contends that only those with ambiguous genitalia should be called khwaja siras.
Alam: I know that many of them aren’t even khwaja siras. I know of this one person who
is just like a khwaja sira in how he walks and talks, but he also has a wife and children.
Faris: Yes, it’s true that many of them are married and have children.
Alam: But then they’re not khwaja siras.
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Faris: See, there are several types of khwaja siras. The general public doesn’t accept all
of them, but they claim that they are indeed khwaja siras.
Alam: In my view, only those who are naturally born khwaja siras, are khwaja siras.
Only they deserve to be given money. God has made them that way, so it is their right to
beg.
Faris: The people who you are referring to are known as khunsā-e-mushkil. But then
there are also those who are physically male but from within they feel that they are
women, and there are also women who feel that they are men.
Alam: The people you’re describing are not khwaja siras. They are zennanas and
khusrahs.
Saqid: I think they are all human beings and God has made them the way they are so we
shouldn’t tease them.
Alam: I wouldn’t call such people khwaja siras. They have simply made this into a
profession. They should live like men. Why can’t they earn a living like ordinary people?
Faris: Many of them do, but they are unable to keep their jobs because those who they
work with ridicule and oppress them, and they eventually leave these jobs.
Alam: Yeah, that’s because of their own behavior.
Faris: I’m sure they sometimes do things that offend other people, but they can’t change
their feminine way of walking and talking. The problem is the way society treats them.
Society does not let them live like ordinary people.
Alam and Sadiq exhibited mixed and conflicting opinions about khwaja siras. Alam’s views
were hardly surprising. He knew more about khwaja siras than most lay people (e.g., that some
get married and raise families), yet he subscribed to the dominant definition of khwaja sira as an
intersexual person. Alam held moralistic views that were intolerant of religiously unrecognized
gender differences. Moreover, he believed that “normal” men with functioning male genitalia
tended to pose as khwaja siras merely as a livelihood practice.
In contrast, Sadiq represented an alternative public, one that was unclear about yet
compassionate towards gender ambiguous people. While Sadiq feared the power of the khwaja
sira curse, Alam criticized it as nonsense. Importantly, my explanation that khwaja siras included
individuals who felt feminine from within did not resonate with him. The only condition that
Alam considered legitimate was the intersex one, which, unlike the feminine soul, was a visible
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manifestation of God’s creation in human beings58. Alam’s views embodied the mainstream
understanding of who khwaja siras were and/or should be.
The diversity of opinions about khwaja siras was reinforced through mass media. Media
representations roughly categorized gender ambiguous people in three ways: as immoral,
humorous, or sympathetic. Often media outlets demonized and misconstrued information about
gender ambiguous people. In 2009, an investigative television program called Sach Ka Safar
(The Search for Truth) on NewsOne TV negatively portrayed zennanas and hijras. The host of
the show interpreted the sexual relationship between khwaja siras and their male clients as
“homosexual” (hamjins) behavior when he discovered that most gender ambiguous people were
biologically male. He referred to murats as “ordinary men” (āche khāse mard) and equated their
sexual behavior to homosexuality: “The government will seriously have to think about this issue
otherwise the army of gays that is developing under the guise of murats will spread AIDS,
hepatitis, cancer and other sexually transmitted diseases in our society.” The host conflated gay
with murat, which was largely inaccurate but also partially true since overlaps between the two
identity categories tended to occur among certain individuals who situationally identified as
both. Moreover, he painted a terrifying picture of the consequences of allowing homosexual
activity to persist. By using the term “gays” and juxtaposing it with AIDS, the host implied that
the phenomena unfolding in Pakistan (i.e., gays and AIDS) were foreign forces from which the
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A short survey conducted on the campus of Peshawar University yielded similar results. The
research participants, which included the institution’s faculty members, were asked to describe
their understanding of the term “hijra.” The results reveled that 33% of participants believed that
hijras were “asexual,” 25% said “hermaphrodites,” 14% considered them “half man half
woman,” another 14% said “mentally disturbed,” 10% said “impotent,” and about 8% said
“homosexual” (Haider 2008, 14). Despite the limitations of the study, the findings illustrate the
extent of uncertainty about gender ambiguous people even among scholars. Importantly, the
percentage of respondents who said “hermaphrodites” would have been higher had the study
included individuals from other class and educational backgrounds and/or asked them to define
“khwaja sira” instead of hijra.
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country must be protected.
Further, the show presented a negative image of the guru-celā system. The guru was
depicted as someone who used murats as a source of personal income and turned them into sex
workers. A guru’s house was portrayed as a sinful space where the norms of society were
inverted, where homosexual acts took place, and where drugs and alcohol were readily available.
“Homosexuality might be illegal on paper but it is not so in reality,” said the host. “The truth is
that a lot of homosexual men in Pakistan known as giryās have gotten married to hijras.” On the
basis of their assigned sex and corresponding sexual behavior, the host misconstrued both
khwaja siras and giryās as homosexual men, and sensationalized their relationships by equating
them to marriages. In addition, the presenter criminalized the practice of physical emasculation.
He claimed that to become nirbān was “to make a male non-male” and “to murder masculinity”
which was an “unforgivable crime.” Further, he referred to those who performed the procedure
as “murderers of humanity.” The host of the show recommended that suitable punishments be
determined for doctors who performed such procedures, for gurus who persuaded “beautiful
young boys” to undergo these operations, and for murats who became emasculated.
Negative portrayals of khwaja siras also circulated through Urdu and English language
newspapers59. The following piece was published on January 14, 2007 in an Urdu newspaper
called Daily Express. The article discussed the expert medical opinion of a psychiatrist named,
Dr. Syed Haroon. In it he states that some boys are raised in environments where they begin to
adopt women’s habits, particularly in cases where the father is less present.
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The English language press in Pakistan conflated and interchangeably used a gamut of terms
for gender ambiguous people, including eunuch, transgender, transsexual, transvestite, hijra,
effeminate men, etc. However, these terms were rarely scrutinized, and the audience’s
understanding was often assumed. The general presumption remained that a khwaja sira was an
intersexual or an impotent person even though ‘normal’ men who were capable of reproduction
(i.e., achay-khasay mard) tended to join their ranks.
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Transgenders are people who adopt the appearance of women. It is an odd thing for a
young man to say that he has a feminine soul within him. Many of them are drawn
towards sex. They used to live separately and secretively, but they are beginning to affect
our society now that it is easier for them to reach the general public. They are uneducated
and they do not have a position in society. Some people associate with them when they
see khwaja siras standing at traffic circles and intersections. The threat of AIDS is also
increasing due to this.
Although the language used in the piece does not demonize khwaja siras, it holds them
responsible for spreading social ills, such as disease and immorality, and presents them as a
looming threat to respectable society.
In addition to their depiction as sinful and immoral beings, khwaja siras were represented
as comical figures on television and film. In 2010, ARY News presented a news package about a
wedding between a khwaja sira and her lover. The news clip opened with a series of quick shots
of khwaja siras being escorted into a police station and being put behind bars. As these images
filled the screen, the classic Bollywood song “Jis ki bivi” from the 1981 film, Laawaris,
featuring a cross-dressed Amitabh Bachan, played in the background. The whimsical song set the
tone for what was a decidedly a humorous situation: the wedding of a khwaja sira and the
subsequent arrest of the wedding participants. The unfeasibility of such a wedding was partly
what made it amusing. The news anchor enhanced the comicality of the incident through his
derisive style of reporting.
And he whose wife is a khwaja sira has very big name. Yes, we are talking about Malik
Iqbal of Peshawar. He has been married twice prior to this, but in marrying a khwaja sira
he has become famous…Sick and tired of dealing with bomb blasts and terrorism, even
police officials appeared to be happy during this investigation. The police put a garland
of flowers around the bride’s neck and welcomed her into the police station. In addition
to the bride and groom and a dozen khwaja siras, forty-two wedding guests were also
arrested…What will become of this wedding will only be determined after the court’s
ruling. But after seeing the condition of this wedding it can be said that either the
population of women has declined or the intelligence of men in the country.
Although the anchor used the term khwaja sira to refer to the subjects of the report, the meaning
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of the term remains unclear. The rules pertaining to the marriage of intersexual people differ
across the various schools of Islamic thought for the different conditions of intersexuality, where
some schools permit individuals with certain kinds of genital anomaly to marry while others do
not (Cilardo 1986). These rules and the different types of hermaphroditic states were not
common knowledge, and the prevalent belief was that real khwaja siras were incapable of
marriage since they lacked the genital capacity to reproduce. Alternatively, for a fake khwaja sira
(i.e., a man) to marry a man was not only sinful but also unviable since the union of same-sex
individuals could not facilitate reproduction, which was perceived as the foundation of marriage.
Hence, the legal, religious and social impossibility of such a union rendered it humorous.
In 2011, Geo News covered a brawl that took place at a khwaja sira’s birthday party in
Sheikhupura, Punjab. According to the report, the fight started when Rawalpindi’s famous
khwaja sira, Ruby, made a grand entrance at the event. Her rival, Kashmala, was unable to
tolerate Ruby’s arrogance, and the two began to physically assault one another after a heated
exchange of words. The dispute finally ended when their gurus intervened, and the festivities
resumed following reconciliation between Ruby and Kashmala. The reasons for the dispute as
cited in the report were at best superficial since the basis of the quarrel was less relevant to the
coverage than the footage of the fight itself. The frenetic episode, broadcasted nationwide, was
meant to operate at the level of spectacle for the sole purpose of entertaining viewers for whom
hijras and zennanas have historically served as a form of amusement. While the news worthiness
of this report is questionable, its entertainment value is evident in the shots of the seductive
dancing of khwaja siras interspersed with scenes of them physically abusing one another.
However, the public’s perception of khwaja siras was not entirely negative, and the
vitriol views against and humorous representations of them were often countered by tolerant
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viewpoints. An example of this is ARY’s Urdu drama serial Moorat (2005)60. The following
précis indicates that the serial provides a sympathetic and relatively accurate portrayal of khwaja
siras as both intersexual and genderqueer people.
The protagonist is a gender variant child named Babar who hails from a poor family and
is rejected by his father and brother. The only people from whom he receives support are
his mother and Reshma, a hijra who resides in his neighborhood. Growing up, the boy
shows an interest in playing with dolls and, much to the chagrin of his father, enjoys
spending time with Reshma, who is represented as a kind-hearted Good Samaritan who
tries leading a respectable life and avoids engaging in socially reprehensible behavior,
including singing and dancing. The child’s father is determined to get Reshma evicted
from the neighborhood; he blames her for her negative influence on his son and tries to
build a case against her. Faced with continuous ridicule, physical abuse and rejection
from family members, the child finally runs away from home and seeks refuge at
Reshma’s house. The father presses charges against her for kidnapping his son and
Reshma is arrested. However, the case is eventually dropped when the police discover
that the child went to her house by own free will. The father curses and beats the boy
when he sees him with Reshma again, and the abuse continues in the protagonist’s
adulthood. The adult Babar, now known as Babara, dresses in women’s clothes, wears
makeup, has effeminate mannerisms and uses feminine gender pronouns to refer to
himself. As the mother tries to protect Babar, his father yells at him to act like a man
while his brother bemoans their ruined reputation in the neighborhood. The father tells
Babar to either live in the house like a “human being” or to leave. The entire family
blames Reshma for turning Babar into a “hijra.”
It is revealed that Babar’s brother is unable to get married because the potential
bride’s family is unwilling to send their daughter to a home where a hijra lives. At the
same time, Babar’s mother harbors the hope that his effeminacy can be fixed, and she is
convinced that getting him married off will fix his condition. They decide that their niece
will make a suitable bride. Babar agrees to the proposal, but appears to be mostly excited
about the wedding. For the first time in his life, his father and brother shower him with
love for agreeing to live a normative life. The girl, Kausar, also agrees to the proposal but
she has not met Babar is years and is oblivious to his gender difference. Babar’s parents
encourage him to be masculine, to cut his hair short and to avoid using feminine
pronouns in front of Kausar. In the meantime, Babar’s mother demands Reshma to sever
ties with Babar. Reshma reluctantly obliges and warns Babar to never return to her house.
On the day of his wedding, she secretly watches him getting married from the sidelines.
Kausar does not get to meet Babar until after the nikā’. On the night after the
wedding, Kausar immediately notices Babar’s effeminacy and breaks down crying.
However, she decides to work on her relationship with him in order to avoid bringing
shame upon herself and her family. Soon after, Kausar gets pregnant, but by this time,
Babar has left home to nurse an ailing Reshma who is fighting cancer. Kausar urges him
to change his ways but she is unable to stop him. Later that night, she too runs away from
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The play was written by Seema Ghazal and directed by Kamran Qureshi.
	
  

125	
  

her in-law’s house to go live with her aunt in Hyderabad. There, she eventually gives
birth to a girl, but Babar does not try to build a relationship with his daughter. Babar and
Kausar’s marriage ends in divorce, and Kausar marries her cousin. Reshma suffers her
entire life due to the sacrifices she makes for Babar; she is abused and threatened by
Babar’s family and evicted from the neighborhood. Her miserable life ends with her
dying a painful death.
With the divorce settled and Babar having left home, his brother is free to marry
the girl of his choice. Babar is excluded from his brother’s wedding because his new
sister-in-law does not approve of him. Eventually the brother and sister-in-law begin
living separately after a dispute involving Babar. By this point in the narrative, Babar’s
parents feel hopeless at the loss of both their sons and his mother goes insane. Babar
returns home to nurse his mother back to health, but she passes away. Babar blames
himself for his her death and regrets not trying harder to build his relationship with his
ex-wife. The serial concludes with Babar continuing to live a life of poverty as a dancer.
The serial focuses as much on Babar as it does on Kausar in order to highlight the betrayal and
sacrifice that Pakistani women endure when they are married to non-conforming “men.” It also
underscores the immense pressure that families exerted on queer children to marry, as well as the
lengths to which they went to ensure that their children conformed to social norms. While both
women and gender ambiguous people are presented as being trapped within an oppressive
heteronormative system, their families are depicted as both pawns in and enforcers of a
patriarchal system.
The term khwaja sira does not appear in the drama serial. This is not surprising given that
Moorat was produced in 2005, at a time when the word khwaja sira was less popular. Instead,
“hijra” is the chosen word used in the narrative by both khwaja siras and ordinary people. The
ambiguity of the hijra identity and corporeality is maintained through the repetition of a singular
dialogue: “It’s not like he is a hijra!” This statement is made by Babar’s mother to emphasize the
fundamental difference between him and the khwaja siras with whom he/she associates. What is
clear is that Babar is biologically male, which makes him/her capable of marriage and
reproduction. When Barbar is married off to Kausar, and she becomes pregnant, the neighbors
mockingly express their disbelief at Babar’s ability to impregnate her. When a neighborhood
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woman says, “I can’t believe your son is having a child,” Babar’s mother responds indignantly,
“He is not a hijra! Only his way of walking and moving around is a little bad.” Moorat
perpetuates the myth that those who possess a feminine soul are not really hijras, and that those
who are real hijras like Reshma suffer from some form of natural physical “disability.”
The serial does not address the source of Babar’s gender difference. Although his
condition is shown to be enduring and immune to human intervention, it is also suggested that
children like Babar joined hijra communities due to rejection at home. Hence, the narrative
entertains the possibility that gender variant males may be spared through familial love and
acceptance. Overall, though, the drama is sympathetic to the plight of those who suffer both
gender and genital ambiguities.
Sympathetic images of khwaja siras also circulated through television news. A 2011
ARY News Report focusing on the homicide of two khwaja sira in Hyderabad is a case in point.
Khwaja siras, who participate in our happy occasions, are humans like us. However, to
give these innocent providers of happiness grief is the biggest injustice of our society.
Two khwaja siras were murdered in Hyderabad. Khwaja siras took to the streets in order
to demand justice and the arrest of the murderers of their companions…We will have to
think about khwaja siras. They too are human beings like us but what kind of treatment
are we meting out on them?
The news anchor’s commentary is meant to evoke compassion for gender ambiguous people.
The same year, Samaa TV news reported on the poverty and unemployment of khwaja siras in
the city of Naushahro Feroze, Sindh. The report voiced the concerns of the interviewees who
urged to the government to create jobs for khwaja siras in order to empower them to lead
“respectable” lives. Despite the diversity in belief and public perception towards them, khwaja
siras were highly stigmatized people. The remaining sections of this chapter demonstrate that the
social and religious stigma attached to gender variance generated unrest within khwaja sira
communities.
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Stigma and Conflict
The Field as Game
The concept of khel was relevant to the culture of khwaja siras, and particularly with respect to
the various khwaja sira social systems, ethnic groups and lineages. Khel was a Farsi word with
multiple meanings, one of which was a happy occasion or a celebration. Additionally, gender
ambiguous people employed the word khel in everyday speech to refer to the rules, rituals and
traditions of the various khwaja sira networks. Incidentally, khel is also an Urdu word meaning
“game,” which suggests that the beliefs and practices of the various khwaja sira assemblages
could be likened to a form of play. “Our parties and rituals are like games where we celebrate
and have fun,” said Nadia. Khwaja siras often used phrases, such as “the game of Sindhis”
(Sindhioon ka khel) or “the game of zennanas” (zennanoon ka khel), where khel or game referred
to specific khwaja sira ethnic and social systems and their cultural content.
However, the understanding of khel as a form of play also suggests that khwaja siras
considered their world to be somewhat removed from reality. Hasi referred to the kin ties within
the khwaja sira social system as fictional relationships (filmī rishte) that could never replace
blood ties. I often heard khwaja siras referring to their chosen names as screen names (filmī
nām), especially since many of them were literally derived from movies and popular culture
(e.g., Bollywood inspired names, such as Kiran and Sapna), and the domain of khwaja siras as a
cinematic world (filmī dunyā). Filmī evoked the impermanence, interchangeability and the
invented quality of the personas and social relationships within the khwaja sira universe. It was
not unusual for gender ambiguous people to change their names or their khwaja sira families.
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Gender ambiguous people made a distinction between mainstream society, which
consisted of their biological kin, and the field where khwaja siras had created their own set of
rules and relationships. As a stigmatized group, they were cognizant not only of their own
shortcomings but also of the fashioned quality and the divergence of their cultural system from
the norms of the wider society. They displayed a sense of ambivalence towards their adopted
culture, which many denigrated as an invented reality. This is not to say that the culture of
khwaja siras was an artificial reality, but that gender ambiguous people themselves were at times
unwilling to give it credence. They saw as authentic the norms of mainstream society into which
they had been enculturated. However, the fact that this culture was as much a construction as the
khwaja sira universe into which they had been acculturated was inconceivable to them.
Like games, the khwaja sira world was a temporary existence for many gender
ambiguous people, particularly for those who were married with children. The obligation to
preserve one’s paternal bloodline and the need for old age support resulted in a lack of
commitment to the khwaja sira way of life and an eventual return to biological kin upon
retirement. While on the one hand, gender ambiguous people claimed that they were unable to
live without khwaja siras, on the other hand, they were unable to ignore the significance of blood
ties even though these relationships were as tenuous as their khwaja sira ones. The cultural
importance of biological ties and heterosexual marriage trumped the relationships forged within
the khwaja sira universe. Even though the field was an important aspect of their lives, many
khwaja siras perceived it to be a porous and transitory sphere. This enhanced the game-like
quality of the khwaja sira social system, which was, nonetheless, just as captivating as games are
meant to be.
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Hierarchy and Dissention
Despite their commonalities, the relationships between zennana, zānkhā, hijra, transgender and
gay individuals were fraught with conflict. Within their power structure was an institutionalized
rivalry between zennanas and hijras where the former have traditionally been considered inferior
by the latter due to their duality. Hijras criticized zennanas for wanting to make the best of both
worlds by living a double life between their biological and khwaja sira families. They contended
that zennanas were untrustworthy and disloyal, and that they exploited the khwaja sira cultural
system for personal benefit only to get married to women and abandon their queer relationships
in old age.
Once a person gets operated, he cannot leave the field. Then he becomes a full-time
hijra...[and other] hijras trust her completely [because]…a nirbān closes all the doors for
herself and has only one direction to go in.
Payal implies that, unlike zennanas, hijras did not have offspring to rely on for retirement
support, and they were committed to the khwaja sira way of life, which hinged on severing ties
with biological kin.
Alternatively, zennanas claimed that hijras were untrustworthy and self-centered because
they denounced their religion and blood ties by committing the grave sin of emasculation. On a
cold winter day, Soni, a zennana, and I sat in the warmth of her kitchen next to the open flame of
the stove. Between puffs of her cigarette, Soni said, “Today let me tell you the gist of everything
about hijras.” My eyes lit up as I waited intently for her to elaborate.
Those who sacrifice their bodies, can never be loyal to anyone. Those who forego that
part of their body, break off many relationships at the same time. A person who breaks
his ties with his parents and siblings, and gives up his religion, can such a person be loyal
to others? Never!
Soni linked emasculation to religion, familial ties, and moral character, suggesting that those
who opted to become nirbān were unreliable and selfish because they placed personal desires
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above family and faith. Even though zennanas and hijras forged familial relationships, the
underlying tensions between them produced frictions in their everyday interactions.
Those in the upper echelons of the khwaja sira social hierarchy categorically
discriminated against those who ranked below them. Roughly, hijras were situated above other
gender ambiguous people, followed by unmarried zennanas who dressed mostly in women’s
clothes, and finally married zennanas who situationally adopted either a feminine or masculine
appearance. Other queer groups (e.g., zānkhā and gay men) ranked much lower along the
hierarchy of non-normative beings. During disputes, it was not uncommon for hijras to disparage
zennanas by calling them men because they possessed male genitals, situationally adopted a
masculine persona, and many were even married with children. “A zennana’s heart is like a
khwaja sira’s, and his behavior is like a khwaja sira’s, but he is only 50% like khwaja sira in
terms of talking, dressing, walking,” said Payal. “Akvās are not complete khwaja siras,” added
Naima, an emasculated khwaja sira. This viewpoint was a reproduction of the mainstream
perception that those who possessed male genitals and were capable of reproduction were men
who posed as khwaja siras merely to earn a living. As a result, some zennanas choose to elevate
their status through emasculation.
Likewise, unmarried zennanas who were committed to a khwaja sira lifestyle excluded
married zennanas from the khwaja sira identity category. “A complete khwaja sira is someone
who only lives life as a khwaja sira,” said Noor, an akvā khwaja sira who dressed in women’s
clothes fulltime. In turn, both hijras and zennanas denigrated zānkhās as individuals who were
exclusively interested in sex with men and enjoyed being penetrated by them, an act that lowers
a person’s status as a man. In contrast, a khwaja sira’s desire to be penetrated by a man did not
lower her status among gender ambiguous people because khwaja siras did not consider
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themselves to be men. Further, hijras and zennanas criticized gender ambiguous people who
underwent sex-reassignment or belonged to middle-class families.
Then you have those who think they are women. They don’t want to be khwaja siras. These
types do overacting, “Hello! Hi! How are you?” They don’t consider themselves to be
khwaja siras. Khwaja siras have their own way of talking. They clap! But these madams
don’t like the clap at all. They wear modern clothes and whatnot.
Above, Naima censures transgender-identifying individuals who were ashamed to call
themselves khwaja siras. Moreover, through her mimicry of their pretentious affectations and use
of the English language, she underscores the difference in class and level of modernity between
them and ordinary khwaja siras. Gender ambiguous people discriminated against one another in
line with dominant beliefs pertaining to khwaja sira identity, sexuality and corporeality. The
double stigma that many khwaja siras experienced, both from mainstream society and from
within their networks, often led them to question the validity of their own claims. Consequently,
in compliance with the normative view, one that hijras used to ridicule them, zennanas
oftentimes conceded that they were men since they were genitally male.
Most khwaja siras, especially those who did not have direct social ties with gay men, did
not look kindly upon them. They viewed them as zānkhās, and addressed them with pejorative
terms like gāndū and dharonā (a man who enjoys being anally penetrated). Khwaja siras
believed that gay men were promiscuous because they engaged in sexual activity with multiple
partners for pleasure as opposed to financial need.

Mentor-Disciple Conflict
Although the field provided safety and emotional support to gender ambiguous people, it was
also an oppressive space for many. The guru-celā relationship was one of the sources of strife
within the khwaja sira universe. Conflicts between mentors and disciples generally revolved
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around issues of money, insufficient care, jealousy, and disrespect. Every so often, local law
enforcement intervened in family feuds if they got out of hand. The connection between gurus
and celās was likened to the father-son or parent-child relationship. In effect, mentors treated
students with love and kindness but they also disciplined and punished them as they saw fit. “I
treat them like children,” said Hajra. “When a child misbehaves…the parent punishes the child.”
However, such parental chastisement often became oppressive. Gurus and celās who were not on
good terms with one another compared their relationship as one between a mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law (sās and bahu), highlighting the particular strain of contentions that are typical
for these affines within the South Asian context.
While some mentors were nurturing, others routinely reprimanded disciples and made
them slog over domestic chores. For instance, Saima regularly ordered Bubbly around and
pointed out her mistakes. Bubbly detested being mistreated but refrained from retaliating. Even
though she could have left Saima, she chose to stay with her in order to avoid having to start
afresh in another khwaja sira family, which would entail relocating, forging new relationships,
and getting acquainted with a new earning area. However, other khwaja siras were more easily
inclined to severing ties with abusive mentors.
The following altercation between Myla and her celā, Anila, illustrates how khwaja siras
reproduced dominant cultural beliefs to stigmatize one another.
Anila: Guru, give me that outfit before you leave.
Myla: (raises her voice) Do I even have clothes to wear right now?
Anila: I'll give you another outfit.
Myla: These celās have no shame! I wish God gives them students just like them.
Anila: You insult me all the time. You don't understand my feelings, Guru.
Myla: (Myla starts clapping at Anila) It's good that you became my celā and learned how
to bless. Otherwise, you used to get your ass fucked.
Anila: But that's how we all start.
Myla: Right, by running brothels…I never opened a brothel.
Anila: (in exaggerated seriousness) You'd never open one, Guru.
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Myla: I just do it to the extent that I can fill my stomach…But my ass isn’t open. I have
so many celās that I would feel ashamed if still I had to do sex work.
Eventually, the argument subsided, and the two began cutting unstitched cloth. Later, when Myla
left, Anila told me her side of the story.
She insults me so much, Faris Bhāī. Am I any less than other khwaja siras? Don't I look
beautiful? What am I lacking in? I was thinking about this all day yesterday. Sometimes I
feel like exposing her, but then I get scared. Before I became her celā, she and I used to
get ass fucked together. Today she exposed me to Deeba. She told her that I like to
penetrate men. I got so annoyed. I don't know why she did it. Doesn't she see that I do all
the work that women do, that I live like a woman. What manliness does she see in me?
In conflict situations, khwaja siras often endorsed normative gender binaries, denounced illicit
sexual behavior, and morally differentiated one another on the basis of mainstream beliefs.
This was evident in Myla’s criticism of Anila’s excessive involvement in sex work even
as she justified her own limited participation in it as a dire financial necessity. Anila reinforced
the belief that operating a brothel was immoral rather than challenging her guru’s contempt for
her choice of vocation. She did, however, express exaggerated compliance, a relatively safe form
of resistance, when her guru claimed that, unlike Anila, she had never opened a brothel.
Moreover, Anila reinforced dominant gender roles. Khwaja siras expected one another to
observe feminine gender and sexual roles in everyday life, and they believed it was disgraceful
for them to penetrate a man. Anila did not challenge these heteronormative expectations when
Myla ridiculed her for wanting to penetrate men. Instead, she compensated for her “improper”
conduct by emphasizing her femininity and involvement in women’s roles in other areas of life.
Gurus could place disobedient students on probation (hukka-pāni band karnā), which
entailed a temporary ban from the mentor’s familial network. No one within the guru’s kin group
was allowed to entertain the expelled disciple in their home or elsewhere. Those caught
associating with the banned celā were required to adopt her as their own student. In addition, the
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guru could levy a fine (ḍanḍ), an amount the disciple had to pay for the restrictions to be lifted
and for her to regain access to her familial network.
Ideally, khwaja siras were expected to associate with a single guru over their lifetimes.
However, in reality, the guru-celā relationship was prone to dissolution. In situations where
conflicts became irreconcilable, the pair parted ways by ritually breaking ties. The celā could
join another khwaja sira family, and her new guru was required to pay the estranged one an
appropriate transfer fee in order to complete the exchange (pesha)61.
The language employed in induction and transfer rituals is suggestive of how khwaja
siras perceived themselves relative to ordinary people. For instance, zennana communities in
Lahore appropriated a vocabulary of purity and pollution to describe a student’s formal
membership into a khwaja sira household, where the celā was said to be “stained” or “sullied” by
her guru (us kī gandī ho jānā). If she decided to sever ties with her teacher, the new guru had to
get the old one’s “stain washed” (dāgh dhulvāna) in a ritualized transfer through which the celā
was ‘purified from’ (pāk ho jānā) the impurities of her previous guru and thereby polluted by her
new mentor. Similarly, khwaja siras in general emphasized the role of a person’s first guru in
“ruining” her. Here, “ruin” (bigārah) refers to the state of impurity following one’s involvement
in sexual activities and other morally questionable behavior.
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In this ritual, the previous guru broke a matchstick in the lap of the new mentor while
declaring, “From this day on, I spit (student’s name) in your name.” Transfer amounts varied by
time, place, lineage and the student’s corporeal status. For instance, peshas in Lahore were
different from those in Karachi for both emasculated and non-emasculated khwaja siras, and they
increased over time to account for the rising cost of living. However, the transfer amount of a
beautiful khwaja sira who danced well and had a higher earning potential was generally more
than the going rate. In 2011, pesha was set to Rs. 25,000 (approx. $286) for non-emasculated
khwaja siras and Rs. 50,0000 (approx. $571) for emasculated khwaja siras among certain groups
in Karachi. Student transfer fees were fixed but negotiable, and the families involved collectively
decided the final amount of the exchange.
	
  

135	
  

To an outsider like myself, these linguistic expressions seemed unusual and superfluous,
and yet they ideologically configured the relationships between students and mentors. The
vocabulary used suggests that mentors were not merely a source of corruption but of a particular
strand of impurity linked to her household. Moreover, they underscored the overall state of
impurity of those associated with the field relative to respectable society. By this logic, everyone
within the khwaja sira cultural system was stained and ruined since each individual was
associated with a guru and was involved in socially unacceptable practices. Hence, as
stigmatized people, khwaja siras upheld the dominant social belief that they were dirty people
and drew upon a vocabulary that rendered them impure. Although the specific phrasing varied by
region and identity, a general language of purity and contamination was prevalent across khwaja
sira communities. To my knowledge, such language was not appropriated to describe other
mentor-student type relationships beyond khwaja sira communities.

Communal Conflict
Community meetings (caṭāī) were regularly held by gender ambiguous people to discuss
important matters involving entire clans, and especially to deliberate over and resolve conflicts
between its members. Khwaja sira conflicts revolved around a number of issues, such as the
violation of codes of conduct (e.g., the illegal adoption of someone else’s student, disrespecting
elders, improper reciprocal exchanges, forbidden sexual practices), theft, ethnic disputes,
wrangles over corporeal differences, etc. The family elders of those involved in conflicts were
expected to intervene in and mitigate disputes through community meetings. These meetings
become heated quickly and fierce fights tended to occur before any resolution was reached.
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The following incident highlights community stigma and the production of status
marking boundaries among gender ambiguous people. Here, boundary-making refers to everyday
activities through which differences in lifestyle, habits, desires, and practices are articulated and
negotiated (Ray and Qayum 2009, 8). The example below draws attention to the significance of
secrecy in interactions between khwaja siras and the general public. This dispute, the most
impassioned one I witnessed during fieldwork, took place between Noreen and her guru, Sarhadi.
The altercation took place during a community meeting that had been organized to resolve an
ongoing quarrel between the disciple and her mentor. Twelve other family members attended the
session. Payal, who was the mother of the individuals involved in the dispute, served as the
moderator for the meeting.
First, Noreen and Sarhadi were asked to narrate their individual accounts of the dispute,
from which I gathered the backstory. Noreen had purchased a gold nose ring from her hard
earned money. When Sarhadi asked Noreen to give her the nose ring, her student suggested that
she buy it from her for Rs. 3,000, the amount that she had paid for the item. Sarhadi proposed a
selling price of Rs. 2000 and Noreen agreed. However, at the time of the meeting, Noreen had
received a mere Rs. 300 from her guru. In addition, Sarhadi had borrowed a pair of Noreen’s
gold earrings but never returned them. In her defense, Sarhadi asserted that taking things from
disciples was a mentor’s right. A week prior to the meeting, Sarhadi and Noreen physically
attacked one another in the street over the outstanding amount when a passing police patrol
intervened and arrested them. In lockup, Noreen received a severe beating from her guru for
revealing to the cops that Sarhadi had a wife and child. The following day, Payal bailed both of
them out.
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Sarhadi maintained an aggressive stance throughout the meeting, which eventually led to
high drama. When Noreen started narrating her side of the story, Sarhadi tried to attack her but
other khwaja siras interceded to prevent the assault. Unable to say her piece, Noreen grew
increasingly frustrated. Then, suddenly she tore the front of her top. As she stood with her bra
exposed, Noreen threatened to tell the police that Sarhadi had torn off her clothes. In a fit of rage,
Sarhadi sprung to her feet and tore the rest of Noreen’s top off her chest. Payal got up and
violently pushed Sarhadi away from Noreen. Tensions ran high as other participants chimed in,
but ultimately, Sarhadi triumphed over Noreen who found herself defenseless against the
argument that a mentor had the right to seize her student’s possessions. Even though the meeting
participants sympathized with Noreen, they were unable to bring her justice. Instead, she was
admonished for disclosing Sarhadi’s marital status to the police officers62. Payal reprimanded
Noreen for disclosing the secrets of khwaja siras to non-khwaja siras, and threatened to
personally put Noreen behind bars for telling outsiders that khwaja siras get married and are
capable of reproduction.
This incident sheds light on a variety of issues: the contentions between mentors and
disciples, the high drama characteristic of community meetings, the boundary-making practices
of this stigmatized group, and the role of secrets in everyday life. Khwaja siras frequently used
the beliefs of the dominant society as a dividing practice against one another. For instance, in
revealing to the police officers that Sarhadi was married with children, Noreen echoed the
normative belief that khwaja siras were incapable of reproduction, and that those like Sarhadi
who were able to produce offspring with women were inauthentic khwaja siras. Unmarried
khwaja siras often used this dominant misconception as a boundary-making practice against
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Reporting community members as ‘fake’ hijras to the police during personal and communal
disputes is also common practice in India (Hall 2005, 126).
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married khwaja siras. The conflicts between gender ambiguous people were not only products of
stigma but also a matter of power. Foucauldian analysis indicates that “dividing practices”
depend upon institutionalized knowledge to categorize, ostracize, and disempower people
(Knauft 1994: 405). As a stigmatized group, khwaja siras adhered to and perpetuated the norms
of the wider society as a means of accessing power, often at the cost of disempowering their own
kind.

Beauty and Self-Esteem
The importance of physical attractiveness within the khwaja sira social world was partly
responsible for rupturing relationships among gender ambiguous people, and was among the
factors that contributed to issues of self-esteem among this stigmatized group. “It’s all about
looks in our field,” said Pinky. “A celā who is m’ashūq, who has good looks, is beneficial to a
guru. The more beautiful a murat, the more she will earn.” M’ashūq referred to a younger and
beautiful khwaja sira who was aware of her youthful good looks. These beauties were believed to
have a superiority complex, that is, a grand sense of self and a false self-confidence that was
predicated on physical appearance. “Murats think they are m’ashūq,” said Nadia. “Even when
they fall, they get right up and say, ‘So what? I'm m’ashūq!’ and then continue walking with an
attitude even if the rest of the world laughs at them.”
A superiority complex is often closely linked to a low self-esteem and narcissism.
Khwaja sira activists and NGO employees who worked with gender ambiguous people believed
that they suffered from low self-worth due to the social stigma they experienced from an early
age, and that the ridicule, rejection and violence they suffered in everyday life resulted in an
inferiority complex. Psychologists have suggested that a superiority complex is often a façade to
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conceal personal insecurities and imperfections. For instance, narcissists simultaneously
experience both a high and a low self-esteem (Brown and Bosson 2001, 210). Such individuals
are in constant need of admiration and respect from others (Baumeister and Vohs 2001, 208).
They are also prone to attaining a false sense of security by ridiculing and criticizing others.
Fault-finding in others, getting defensive when criticized, and feelings of jealously are signs of a
low self-image (Hauck 1992, 13-5).

Figure 8. Saima performing a solo dance at Muskaan’s birthday party.

When khwaja siras entered the field and began to feminize, they tended to receive praise
and approval for the very first time in their lives. They were praised for their appearance both by
khwaja siras and male admirers, and many gained recognition as dancers and sex workers.
Within khwaja sira communities, these compliments sowed the seeds for a superior sense of self
among attention-starved and narcissistic gender variant youth, who clung to their accolades,
constantly sought the admiration of others, and turned against their competitors in a bid to weed
them out. “Murats gets jealous very easily,” said Jhalak. “When they see someone moving up,
they think, ‘Why not me?’” Similarly, Nadeem, an NGO employee, suggested that “[w]hen a
person does not get anything her entire life, and when she finally gets some fame, she wants that
she alone should get it because she just started getting it.” Many gender ambiguous youth were
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convinced that their beauty made them the targets of the jealousy and ill will of their
competitors. Such beliefs instigated jealousy and fierce rivalry between them and their
contenders. Structural violence left psychological scars that surfaced in their aggression towards
one another.
“When a m’ashūq khwaja sira is jealous of a murat, she will go to that khwaja sira’s party
and try to ruin it,” said Nadia. “In most parties, something or the other always happens towards
the end of the night.” When two rowdy drunk men gatecrashed her party, Tina swiftly had them
removed from the premises. She was convinced that her nemesis, Kajal, had deliberately invited
the men to ruin her day. Gender ambiguous people routinely acknowledged the lack of unity
within their communities, a phenomenon they attributed to the personal jealousies among
m’ashūq khwaja siras. Although a psychoanalysis of khwaja siras is beyond the scope of this
study, the concept of m’ashūq and its connection with inferiority/superiority complex helps to
explain in culturally grounded terms the conflicts that occurred among gender ambiguous people.

Sex and Morality
Among the secrets that khwaja siras kept from the general public were their sexual relationships
with men. In light of the taboos associated with sex, it was prudent of them to be discreet about
their love and sex lives. Although sex was not a taboo topic within their culture, khwaja siras
often drew moral boundaries among themselves on the basis of sexual behavior.
Generally, a partnered khwaja sira (girye valī murat) was distinguished from a khwaja
sira prostitute (pun valī murat). Within the khwaja sira universe, being in a monogamous
relationship with one lover was considered more respectable than being sexually active outside a
committed relationship. This was evident in altercations between khwaja siras wherein
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participants morally elevated themselves by criticizing opponents whose primary source of
livelihood was sex work or if they had multiple sexual partners. They appraised their own status
through monogamy and deemed inferior those khwaja siras who were sexually active outside
committed relationships. Fidelity was perceived to be less sinful and more respectable compared
to sex work and extra-relationship sexual liaisons because it mimicked marital bonds.
As Goffman has suggested, internal discrimination is common practice among
stigmatized groups since they tend to hold the same beliefs as the wider society that aims to
oppress the stigmatized (1963, 111). Gender ambiguous people perceived the khwaja sira
lifestyle to be generally disrespectable. However, within this regime of morality, sex work and
sex with multiple partners was denigrated to the lower end of the respectability spectrum.
In contrast, monogamy was held in high esteem. When questioned about their sex life
during interviews, khwaja siras were generally hesitant to discuss their involvement in sex work
but were far more comfortable describing relationships with their partners. “Prostitution, I do
very little,” said Chammo, and added after a moment’s pause, “Actually, I barely do it. I have a
friend, so whatever I do is with him.” Chammo’s dubious response left me feeling as though she
had not been entirely truthful about her involvement in sex work. When I switched off my voice
recorder upon the completion of the interview, Chammo finally decided to reveal intimate details
about her sex life. I learned that she had eight steady “giryās” who financially supported her.
The reason why Chammo was reluctant to divulge facts about her sexual relationships
during the interview was because she did not want any audio evidence that could link her true
identity to such practices. However, Chammo was not opposed to me taking notes, which I did,
once the recorder was switched off. Hence, she was less concerned with revealing private
information and more with maintaining anonymity. To this end, I have secured her and the
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identity of other informants by using pseudonyms and withholding other identifying information
that could impact her moral standing within the communities of which she is a part.
With respect to love and sex, there was a stark difference between Chammo’s recorded
and non-recorded interview narratives. While being recorded, she was uncomfortable discussing
her involvement in sex work, but was unopposed to describing an imagined relationship with a
partner. However, after the interview, I learned that Chammo had lied about being in a
relationship with a man. Interestingly, she referred to her eight steady clients as “giryās,” a term
that was generally used to describe a single lover, boyfriend or husband. Instead of employing
the Farsi word for client (pun), Chammo used the term “giryā,” which encapsulated
respectability and sexual propriety. Evidently, having eight steady clients was less immoral than
having sex with every other man that was willing to pay for it.
Informants emphasized the need for collective secrecy about sex work as a form of
communal responsibility among khwaja siras. Those who rarely engaged in sex work
discriminated against brothel and street operators who were generally less cautious about hiding
their engagement in prostitution. Informants attributed the gradual decline in the status of khwaja
siras to their open association with “vice.”
Back in the day people used to hire khwaja siras to work in their homes. But now this no
longer happens because khwaja siras have become sex workers. And those who are sex
workers don’t have to make it known to the whole world that they are sex workers.
Above, Shazia suggests that khwaja siras were personally responsible for the disappearance of
employment opportunities that were traditionally associated with them. People were generally
reluctant to hire khwaja siras as domestic workers due to the stigma of immorality associated
with their sexualized lifestyle. Moreover, she emphasized the need to make sex work
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inconspicuous to the public eye. Similarly, Chammo claimed that the negligent behavior of hijra
and zennana prostitutes adversely reflected on all khwaja siras.
It is these ordinary khadṛas who have spread this filth, and because of them others are
also getting affected… They don’t do ṭolī, they don’t know how to dance. They are only
masters of sucking…And if you really need to do it, if you are really that helpless, then
you should do it in hiding. I have a complaint against khwaja siras who have started
putting up advertisements on the net that say that they are sex workers. These khwaja
siras should stop doing this because it affects the reputation of other khwaja siras. In our
society, if people see even one person doing it, then they think that we all do it.
Chammo believed that it was the responsibility of each gender ambiguous person to consider the
impact of her actions on the entire khwaja sira population. Such cooperation was necessary to
ensure the survival and to assuage the oppression of khwaja siras. Moreover, Chammo
condemned street-based soliciting and the use of Internet dating/hookup websites where
educated khwaja siras had created personal profiles to advertise their services.
Chammo also feared that that the actions of imprudent sex workers would negatively
impact khwaja siras whose livelihood depended on begging and blessing.
There are men who go online and see these ads. What if they tell their wives? Then
women will find out. This makes things really bad for those who do beg and bless and
meet women everyday. These women are really nice to khwaja siras, they love and
embrace us, invite us into their homes, they are comfortable with us and they trust us. But
all of that is going to change when these women find out that we are perfectly all right.
Chammo alludes to the fact that most gender ambiguous people had functional male sexual
organs, a reality that was incongruent with the myth of intersexuality upon which the ascetic
practices of begging/blessing were premised. Khwaja siras who begged and blessed for a living
relied upon the patronage of the women whose houses they frequented. These women were
comfortable with khwaja siras because they saw them as intersexuals who did not pose a sexual
threat to them. However, Chammo believed that the recklessness of those who engaged in “vice”
was detrimental to the economic activities of socially responsible khwaja siras.
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Countless informants blamed the public exposure of immoral conduct among khwaja
siras on the rise in rural-urban migration. In the absence of an established social network,
seasonal migrants lacked not only a client base for sex work, but also membership in an earning
area. Consequently, these itinerants turned to street-based sex work. Away from their natal
villages, these individuals were quite comfortable prostituting openly in a city where no one
knew them. This issue was regularly raised on television talk shows where gender ambiguous
people were censured for tarnishing society’s moral order. Khwaja siras blamed genderqueer
migrants for marring their public image through acts of indecency. In truth, migrants alone were
not liable for the deteriorating social status of khwaja siras since many gender variant Karachiites
also worked the streets.
Khwaja siras viewed sex work to be immoral even as they engaged in it63. Many khwaja
siras whose primary source of income was begging, blessing or dancing engaged in prostitution
strictly to supplement their incomes. They minimized their involvement in sex work by limiting
it to times of financial need. Noor, for instance, used to run a brothel in her home where she and
her guru-bhāī prostituted themselves. However, after several years of being in the sex industry,
she decided to make a career change by switching to begging as a primary economic activity in
order to distance herself from vice. Unfortunately, she was unable to make ends meet through
begging, and returned to sex work from time-to-time to cover her monthly expenses. The khwaja
sira worldview consisted of shades of sin, where the occasional rendezvous with a client was
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Although the average khwaja sira viewed sex work as a reprehensible sin, there were a handful
of educated activist khwaja siras from middle-class backgrounds who held more progressive
values. For instance, even though Mehreen considered sex work to be sinful and claimed to have
reduced her personal involvement in it, she also believed in the individual right to choose how to
use one’s body. “Yes, sex work is a sin, but I also think there should be freedom to do sex work
for those who want to do it. No one should have the right to raise a finger against those who do
it.” However, Mehreen represented a minority voice along the khwaja sira social spectrum.
Gender ambiguous folk who held similar beliefs were few and far between.
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considered less shameful than full-time prostitution. In times of conflict, khwaja siras used their
opponent’s level of involvement in sex work to morally elevate themselves.

To Excise or Preserve?
The origin story cited at the beginning of this chapter highlighted that the practice of physical
emasculation was steeped in stigma even though it was a crucial marker of hijra identity. The
decision whether or not to become emasculated was guided by a number of stigmatizing factors
that generated in khwaja siras a sense of ambivalence about becoming nirbān. One of the primary
motivations behind genital amputation was to achieve upward mobility within the khwaja sira
social structure. A khwaja sira’s identity changed from zennana to hijra after her excision, and
with it her status among khwaja siras also rose. “Nirbāns respect other nirbāns because they
know that they have nowhere else to go,” said Shehzadi. Unlike zennanas who came and went,
hijras were permanent members of the khwaja sira universe. Their fixity, owing to their postsurgical liminality, made them loyal and dependable since they had a stake in carving space for
themselves within their communities. In contrast, zennanas were considered unreliable.
Another incentive of becoming nirbān was that it gave gender ambiguous people the
confidence to pose as an authentic khwaja siras, that is, as individuals with congenital
ambiguities. An emasculated khwaja sira was better suited to maintaining the façade of
intersexuality in interactions with the wider society.
If you put a nirbān in front of society, they will accept her. Say we go to someone’s house
to beg and they say things like, “You’re not even a khwaja sira,” then we have to show it to
them as proof. But this is a bad thing, so we mostly lift our shirts and only threaten to show
them our genitals. But if you put an akvā in her place, people will say that she is a poser, a
man, someone who is pretending to be a khwaja sira, and that there is nothing physically
wrong with him. People turn against akvās. Akvās loose their confidence in front of the
general public because they have penises.
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Above, Payal explains that hijras could resort to the practice of exposing their mutilated genitals
to ordinary people and misrepresenting them as God-given in order to prove their legitimacy as
deserving alms receivers. In contrast, akvā khwaja siras risked persecution from the general
public in the event that their genital status were revealed. Hence, physical emasculation
promoted the well being of khwaja siras in everyday life and authenticated them as worthy
recipients of charity.
Several gender ambiguous people claimed to have emasculated themselves out of
jealousy (khundak) and competition with hijras. Quite often, hijras exposed rival zennanas to the
general public as “men” with penises. Competition and conflict within khwaja sira networks
prompted some zennanas to become nirbān in order to protect themselves from internal
adversity. For instance, Naima’s battles with her khwaja sira family members led her down the
path to emasculation.
My guru kicked me from our area, and she and my guru-bhāī started telling the neighbors
that she threw me out because I was a boy and not a hijra. She wanted to make sure that
no one gave me money if I tried to beg in her vīrat…So I decided to become a source of
tension for them. I knew that I could only be victorious once I become a complete hijra. I
saved up money and got myself operated. Then I returned to the area. When they saw me,
again they ridiculed me and called me a boy. They said, “Hai! hai! He is a boy!” So I
said, “Hai! Hai! Why don’t you see for yourself?” And I showed it to them…Anyway,
then those khwaja siras started being nice to me.
The only way Naima knew how to compete with hijras was by becoming a hijra herself. She
became nirbān out of spite because she wanted to avenge her opponents for mistreating her. She
sought respect and access to her livelihood, which were possible through emasculation64.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
64
Yet another impetus for genital excision was the belief that it enhanced femininity. “When you
become nirbān, you become more like a lady,” said Neelam. “Your body is no longer the
same…Even your body odor changes, and you smell like a woman.” Scientifically, the
elimination of testosterone produced by the testes leads to a number of physical transformations
that are associated with femininity, such as the softening of body hair, the conversion of muscle
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Alternatively, the chief impediment to genital excision was the popular belief among
khwaja siras that becoming nirbān was a grave sin. As discussed earlier, changing the natural
constitution of the body, that is, the form in which one is born, was considered to be against
divine will. In addition, what dissuaded many khwaja siras from becoming nirbān was that it was
permanent and irreversible. Consequently, it led to complete estrangement between khwaja siras
and their biological families and also closed the option of heterosexual marriage. Many hijras
regretted removing their genitals when the realities of emasculation failed to match their vision
of life after the ritual. Emasculation was devalued by many khwaja siras and often discouraged
within their communities.
The lack of post-surgical care was yet another deterrent to emasculation. While
describing their post-op experiences, nirbān interlocutors complained about the absence of
support from within the khwaja sira system. During a late night rendezvous at Payal’s house,
Shazia announced that she wanted to become nirbān. Annoyed, Shani and Payal told her to shut
up and never to speak of it again. Next, Anjali, who had recently undergone emasculation,
narrated her post-op experience as a warning to Shazia. She told Shazia to be prepared to be
abandoned for at least three months by her khwaja sira contacts once she got operated. She
complained the murats living with her fled when she returned home from the hospital because
they were afraid of being in close proximity to and attracting her negative energy. Some khwaja
siras believed that during recovery the newly emasculated possessed special powers that fed off
the vitality and beauty of those with whom it came into contact65. Shazia wondered if the concept
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
into fat, smoother limbs, the development of breasts, etc. The demand for attractive khwaja siras
in Pakistan’s sex industry drove many gender ambiguous people to opt for emasculation.
65
On another occasion, Nadia recalled coming down with a very high fever after visiting her
girlfriend, Sibby, who had recently undergone emasculation. Nadia wondered if she contracted
the negative energy when Sibby greeted her with a suspiciously long embrace.
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of negative energy was merely an excuse to evade the provision of post-op care for nirbān
khwaja siras. Horror stories about lack of post-op support circulated among khwaja siras as
warnings again the pitfalls of emasculation. Moreover, the concept of negative energy was yet
another way in which khwaja siras stigmatized one another.
Importantly, the voluntary removal of the genitals could also be cause for a criminal
investigation. Genital excision was believed to be illegal according to both secular and Islamic
laws. The perceived illegality of the procedure explains why such surgeries were performed
underground. The prohibitions against the non-essential removal of genitalia also elucidate why
nirbān khwaja siras concealed their post-operative status from mainstream society. In conflict
situations, fear of the law gave zennanas ammunition against their hijra foes. For instance, when
Noor Vicky and Jugni, two influential khwaja sira gurus of Rawalpindi had an epic brawl, the
former informed the authorities of the latter’s emasculated status, which led to Jugni’s arrest.
However, the accused was later released without further investigation. The very basis of the
practice of emasculation was steeped in multiple streams of stigma. Religious, legal and social
disapproval from within and outside the khwaja sira system perpetuated a sense of fear and doubt
among some khwaja siras while validating to most others that genital excision was an
illegitimate practice that had to be obscured from the general public if not avoided altogether.

Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted that social stigma generated ambiguity within and conflict among
khwaja siras. The stigma surrounding gender ambiguity was rooted in dominant religious and
cultural notions of sex, gender and sexuality. But because these beliefs were diverse and often
vague, they perpetuated a sense of indeterminacy among khwaja siras about their location in the
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world. Moreover, stigma and low self-esteem destabilized khwaja sira communities, weakening
relationships among their members who were prone to morally differentiating and marginalizing
one another on the basis of hegemonic norms. This chapter has also revealed the dominant
cultural meaning of “khwaja sira” and how gender ambiguous people were publicly perceived.
The mainstream construction of khwaja sira as an intersexual person deviated from the realities
of both medieval (Chapter 2) and contemporary khwaja siras (Chapter 3).
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Chapter 5:
Oppression, Marginalization, and the Games of Deception
Late one evening I was at Billo’s house when her guru, Sano, stopped by for a visit. I knew Billo
well but I had met her guru just once before. While we were chatting, Sano received a call on her
cell phone. I was unable to understand much of the conversation since Sano spoke, perhaps
deliberately, in Sindhi, but it appeared that she was giving the caller directions to Billo’s house.
When she hung up, Sano told Billo to get ready to perform a blessing. “This late?” I asked. Sano
said that she had just heard about a birth in her area, and wanted to visit the family right away.
Billo reluctantly got up to change her outfit and put on makeup. When she was done, Sano
grabbed her purse and slipped into her shoes. Taking that as my cue to leave, I asked Billo to
escort me out of the colony. “I’ll wait here while you go drop him off,” said Sano. “Besides we
have to go in the opposite direction.” I said goodbye to Sano, and then Billo and I exited through
the chaos of meandering lanes in her neighborhood. I asked Billo if she and her guru typically
worked late in the evenings.
Billo: No, we don’t. And we’re not going to go today either.
Faris: Then where are you two going?
Billo: Try to understand. (she said with a smirk)
Faris: Understand what?
Billo: That call Sano received was from a client. My guru is going to do it in my house.
Suddenly everything made sense. Sano had created an elaborate ruse to get rid of me from
Billo’s house. There was no plan to bless a newborn, yet Sano made Billo get ready in order to
make the façade believable. Sano wanted to ensure that I, a non-khwaja sira outsider, would not
discover her involvement in sex work and lose respect for her. Her student, Billo, who I had
become well acquainted with, helped to maintain the pretense in front of her guru, but revealed
her secret and deception to me in private.
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Khwaja siras regularly deceived the public, especially in matters related to their
corporeality and sexuality. This chapter focuses on the games of secrecy and deception that
khwaja siras played with one another and with ordinary people. These strategies of concealment
fell into the realm of what James Scott refers to as “public transcripts,” a term encompassing the
public interactions between subordinates and powerholders (1990, 2). I argue that these games
were responses to the cultural, structural and direct violence that gender ambiguous people
experienced. Galtung defines cultural and structural violence as indirect forms of oppression that
are built into the dominant structure, and that legitimize unequal distribution of power,
opportunities (Ho 2007, 4), and even direct violence (Galtung 1990, 291). Farmer adds that the
suffering that results from such violence constrains the agency of those who hold less power
(1996, 263). Given the constraints on their agency, khwaja siras countered oppression and
marginalization, not by addressing the cultural and structural sources of violence, but by
engaging in secrecy and deception. These, I contend, were acts of self-preservation that allowed
khwaja siras to reduce discrimination, promote security, secure livelihood, and gain advantage
over oppressors. This chapter also illustrates that although they were largely excluded from the
dominant cultural system, khwaja siras found inroads into it and in many ways relied upon it for
their livelihood. But this was the domain where they were most ostracized and persecuted.

Biological Family
Worldly People
The familial home was a place of oppression and marginalization for khwaja siras, and their
sense of alienation from their natal kin is best captured by the concept of dunyādār (dunyā means
world in Urdu). Gender ambiguous people underscored the distinction between khwaja siras and
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non-khwaja siras through their use of this term. Dunyādār generally referred to the uninitiated, to
persons belonging to mainstream society, and individuals involved in materialistic pursuits. The
word indicated a person’s non-khwaja sira status, which in turn suggested that they were
untrustworthy outsiders from whom secrets had to be kept. By implication, khwaja siras were
insiders with whom the secrets of the khwaja sira universe could be shared since they had a stake
in protecting them for the sake of individual and communal security. The use of dunyādār to
describe ordinary people suggests that khwaja siras did not belong to the normative social world.
The term reified their marginal position in and exclusion from mainstream society.
Khwaja siras were generally believed to have no links to their biological families. The
dominant misconception among the general public was that khwaja siras were intersexuals, and
that when an intersexual child was born in a particular household, gender ambiguous people took
the child from the parents and raised it as their own. According to this narrative, the child lost
ties with his parents and was socialized solely among khwaja siras. In reality, this notion was an
inaccurate reflection of khwaja sira corporeality, of how they joined the field, and the kind of
social ties they retained with biological kin. Contrary to popular perception, most khwaja siras
had close though unsteady affiliations with blood relatives.

Relationship with Relatives
The relationships between khwaja siras and their families were characterized by routine ruptures
and reconciliations, by bouts of separation and reintegration, and by repression and violence. For
many, ties with family were important though largely unstable, and estrangement from relatives,
however transient, was a key feature of the biographies of gender ambiguous people. The
instability of these relationships hinged on the inability of khwaja siras to conform to the
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gendered expectations of their assigned male sex. Parents were among the first to notice and
attempt to control the gender divergence of khwaja siras. Their lack of masculinity and inability
to perform their expected gender roles led to their marginalization and oppression.

Familial Abuse and Shame
Khwaja siras generally lived unhappy lives in their parental homes where they were regularly
ridiculed and abused by relatives. “The first time anyone calls us khadṛa in life are our family
members,” said Shushmita. “Others call us names later when we step out of the house.”
Shushmita indicates that khwaja siras were not spared by their own families let alone from the
larger society. Physical violence and verbal abuse were meant to realign the gendered behavior
of queer children with the norms of their assigned sex. “There was no joy in the life I spent with
my brothers and sisters,” said Nazo. “Among them I felt suffocated. I was around seven when
my mother scolded me for walking like a girl.” Shushmita and Nazo indicate that the source of
their miserable childhoods was the constant policing and humiliation from family members.
Such disciplinary control also had an adverse effect on their self-esteem.
Although khwaja siras tended to have positive ties with their mothers and sisters, the men
in their families mistreated them (i.e., fathers, brothers, uncles and male cousins). Shugufta’s
narrative describes the heavy-handed abuse she received from her brothers.
When I started mingling with the khwaja siras in my neighborhood, my brothers said,
“You go to school and along the way you start talking to shemales.” My brothers started
beating me up. The next three years my brothers tortured me a lot. They tried to forcefeed me kohl in order to ruin my voice. They said that I sounded like a woman, and they
wanted me to have a masculine voice. But I managed to save myself.
Embarrassed by her queerness, Shugufta’s brothers tried to masculinize her through brute force.
In addition, the uncles and cousins of gender ambiguous people were known for harassing and
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spreading rumors about them. Hence, parents and siblings aimed to conceal the difference of
their sons/brothers from relatives and neighbors since a gender non-conforming child was a
source of shame for the family. A male child’s femininity could lower a family’s status and cast
doubt on the respectability of the entire family unit. Munnia’s brothers resented her due to her
queerness. “They say, ‘You are a khusrah! You have ruined our reputation! Don’t come to our
house!’”

Severing and Maintaining Ties
When the pressure to conform became unbearable, khwaja siras ran away from home and joined
the field where they found acceptance. For instance, when she was 18, Shugufta’s brothers told
her to leave their neighborhood. Shugufta started living by herself in a different colony where
she started earning through sex work. In contrast, parents who feared losing their queer sons
were careful not to pressure them to conform. Shani, who hailed from an educated lower-middle
class family, said that her parent’s perceptivity saved her from absconding from home.
Initially, my parents were afraid that relatives would say things, but then they realized
that if they try to stop me then I would run away from home and join other khwaja siras.
They preferred that I stayed with them, before their eyes…I’ve never lived apart from my
family with khwaja siras, but sometimes my guru calls me to stay over at her place.
Shani suggests that gender variant children could live a happier and healthier childhood under
the supervision of accommodating parents. Parental acceptance of a child’s queerness and the
absence of pressure to conform could not only create a welcoming familial environment, but also
could spare such children from a life of limited options (i.e., sex work, begging and dancing).
Leaving the parental home to join the field was typically not a singular and permanent
event for most khwaja siras. Rather, it entailed several episodes of separation and reintegration,
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particularly in the initial years of the move from the familial home to the field. Below, Afi
describes her experience of parting and reuniting with her family.
My family members used to stop me from entering this field. They would beat me. Every
time they did, I would run away from home. My brother is quite strict, and he would
catch me and bring me back every time. He would put police pressure on my guru and
my girlfriends. He would cut my hair and make me bald. I would cry a lot. I even ate
poison because of this, but I survived. Once I ran away to Bhawalpur, and I started
dancing there. My mother came to get me when she found out that one of my girlfriends
had been murdered by her partner. She told me to return home with her. She said that I
could get my own house there. They thought at least I’ll be in front of their eyes. Now I
have my own house in our city, but my brother continues to pressure me.
Many parents, like Afi’s, did not give up on their gender ambiguous children when they ran
away from home. However, miserable with the oppressive conditions in the familial home, queer
youth repeatedly distanced themselves from relatives.

Fluidity and Assimilation
Many gender ambiguous people continued to maintain ties with and even financially supported
their families after joining the khwaja sira social world. However, they had to take certain
measures to ensure retention into their kin group. For instance, they had to switch their social
identity from khwaja sira to man. This entailed transforming one’s physical appearance by
discarding women’s clothes and dressing in men’s attire, and enacting as masculine a
performance as possible. Nazo, for instance, who lived in Karachi but occasionally visited her
natal village in northern Punjab, cut her hair short in addition to dressing in men’s clothes. Nadia
adopted a masculine performance that involved walking like a man and speaking in a deep manly
voice whenever she went home to Multan. However, her masculine enactment betrayed her
overpowering femininity, which she was unable to fully obfuscate.
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These performances were meant less for immediate kin and more for the larger familial
network (i.e., extended family, villagers). The primary objective of masculine enactments was to
avoid negatively impacting one’s filial reputation during home visits. Moti wore men’s shalvār
qamīz whenever she visited her family even though her parents and siblings were aware of her
involvement in the field. Gender ambiguous people “covered” their khwaja sira identities from
their natal network in order to preserve familial respect (izzat)66. I view this ruse of gender
conformity as a strand of khwaja sira deception, and a product of the social stigma they and their
families experienced.

Worldly Khwaja Siras
Many ordinary people believed that khwaja siras were intersexual ascetics who were physically
incapable of reproduction. Contrary to this popular perception, khwaja siras were not situated
beyond the realm of heterosexual marriage. In fact, a large majority of my informants were
married to women and had children. Put differently, becoming a dunyādār, a “worldly person,”
was not beyond the reach of khwaja siras.

Significance of Marriage
Khwaja siras got married due to a number of cultural, religious and practical reasons. As
explained by Seema below, the primary motivation for entering a heteronormative union was
reproduction.
When you're the only son, you have even more responsibilities. After all, you’re a
Muslim and you have to carry on your parent's lineage. Lineages can only be carried on
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Deeply embedded within South Asian cultures, the concept of izzat has a “moral valence” and
is associated with several axes of difference, including gender, sexuality, kinship, religion and
class (Reddy, 2005, 43).
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through sons. Daughters belong to the homes of others. It’s different if you have two or
three brothers but you have to marry when you are the only one. Besides, the closeness
you feel with your own blood, you can never have with anyone else. One day God also
has to take measure our good and bad deeds. We have to look at our religion. So we
shouldn't always follow our own desires. Instead, we should do what God wants.
Seema explained the necessity of marriage in terms of a son’s duty of reproducing and carrying
his patrilineal bloodline. The patriarchal notion that bloodlines could only be transmitted through
sons was taken as a biological fact rather than a cultural construction. The pressure for marriage
was much higher for Seema since she was the only son in her biological family. In addition, she
made an essentialist argument about affinity in social relationships, which in her opinion was
strongest between individuals associated by blood. This implied that relationships forged
between khwaja sira kin and lovers could never replace biological ties. Importantly, the pressure
to marry came both from one’s biological family and the field; khwaja siras frequently pressured
unmarried members of their households to fulfill their social and religious duties through
marriage. Many viewed the cultural expectation of marriage as a religious obligation, a belief
that served to bolsterer the centrality of the institution. Marriage was generally viewed as
Sunnah67; to marry, reproduce and increase the number of Muslims was considered a
requirement for Muslims.
The secondary reasons for marriage underscore the significance of preserving familial
honor and respect. One informant claimed feeling helpless when her father took off his turban, a
symbol of honor and respect, and placed it by her feet. It became a matter of her father’s pride
and she felt compelled to concede to his wishes. When it came to marriage, khwaja siras
privileged communal concerns over individual desires, which is not unusual in the wider context
of the arranged marriage system. Moreover, heterosexual marriage was a means for gender
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Sunnah is the way of life prescribed as normative for Muslims on the basis of the teachings
and practices of Prophet Muhammad and the interpretations of the Quran.
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ambiguous people to enhance personal social respectability. Another pragmatic objective of
raising a family was old-age support; khwaja siras realized that their earning potential was bound
to decline with the deterioration of their appearance and inability to dance and engage in sex
work as they aged. The support of children was particularly important since the khwaja sira
system did not ensure old-age care to khwaja sira elders. Upon retirement, married khwaja siras
returned to their families and relied upon the care of their children. Nonetheless, some gender
ambiguous people refrained from marriage. A few had brothers to sustain their paternal
bloodlines, while others privileged individual desires and resisted the pressure of marriage.

Marital Relationships and Identity Splits
Salma was nervous about having sex with her wife on the night after her wedding. Although she
was not a virgin, she had no sexual experience with women, and the thought of sleeping with her
wife filled Salma with dread. That night, she pretended to be tired and went to sleep instead of
engaging in the obligatory sexual act. This was very upsetting for her wife, particularly in light
of the tradition in Salma’s community where the morning after, the women of the household
came to bathe the bride after her night with her husband. When the women arrived in the
morning, Salma’s wife informed them there was no need for her to shower. Salma was mortified
when she heard this. She felt humiliated because her wife had implicitly disclosed her failure to
fulfill her spousal role. Fearing that she would become the laughing stock of her family, Salma
decided to rectify the situation by having sexual intercourse with her wife. This was a daunting
task for which she had to imagine being with her giryā in order to achieve arousal. Afterwards,
she got dressed and went outside to tell her sisters-in-law to bathe the bride. By speaking
audibly, Salma ensured that everyone in the house heard that she had successfully completed her
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duty. Salma’s narrative illustrates that khwaja siras routinely had to establish respect within
familial contexts by affirming their position as men.
After marriage, khwaja siras maintained a dual life between the field and their families.
They achieved this duality through the fluidity and situatedness of their multiple selves, which
allowed them to switch roles, that is, from man/son/husband/father, on the one hand, to khwaja
sira/zennana/hijra on the other. Notably, migration enabled khwaja siras to participate in multiple
social worlds. The situatedness of their identities was evident in their migration practices,
particularly when they traversed geographical spaces, from rural to urban and between khwaja
sira and worldly contexts. For instance, gender ambiguous people from across Pakistan migrated
to Karachi for work, where the sheer distance from their families enabled them to live openly as
khwaja siras.
The wives of gender ambiguous individuals were generally unaware of their husband’s
queerness. Seema hid her khwaja sira identity from her wife and children who lived in rural
Punjab.
I do not make it obvious to them that this is what I am. They don't know at all. I live in
Karachi and send them a remittance every month. Now my older son, māshaāllah 68, is
working at a big company. [He]…has made contacts with big people. If I live with them,
then obviously people are going to notice. So I have come here, far away from them.
Seema distanced herself from her wife and children in order to protect them from shame. On the
rare occasion that she visited them, she obscured her queerness by transforming her appearance.
Although gender ambiguous people were unable to fully conceal their femininity, most were at
least able to hide the fact that they lived and earned a living as khwaja siras, which was

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
68
An Arabic term meaning “willed by God,” used to express appreciation for a person or an
occurrence.
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considered to be far more shameful. In contrast, a few individuals opted for a full disclosure of
their khwaja sira selves.
My wife knows everything. I told her, “I've kept you with respect. I've never asked you to
work. So many men bring their wives to Karachi and make them work in big houses. At
least, I've kept you at home under our roof and maintained your respect, haven't I?” I told
her, “This is how I am, and this is how I will always be.” Her girlfriends wish they had a
husband like me because I don’t beat my wife and I take good care of her. I send Rs.
10,000 to her every month. I even make clothes for her. A lot of khwaja siras stop caring
about their wives when they become too involved in the field.
Nadia told her wife about her khwaja sira identity instead of carrying the burden of deceit.
Women who learned about the non-heteronormativity of their husbands were likely to conceal
their spouse’s queerness in order to protect both personal and familial respect, especially since
divorce was rarely an option for women from poor households who were financially dependent
on their husbands. The same applied to the children of those khwaja siras who knew or at least
had a good idea that their fathers lived as khwaja siras in the city69.
The families of gender ambiguous people had to engage in secrecy because the stigma
attached to being a khwaja sira extended to them by association. Goffman writes that “[i]n
general, the tendency for a stigma to spread from the stigmatized individual to his close
connections provides a reason why such relationships tend either to be avoided or to be
terminated, where existing.” (1963, 30). Although some khwaja siras terminated their ties with
their relatives, in most cases, both they and their families variously engaged in avoidance,
secrecy and image management in order to sustain their relationships with one another while
preserving the pretense of respectability. In contrast, in the cities where they lived openly as
khwaja siras, gender ambiguous people concealed their marital status from mainstream society in
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After her wife’s untimely death, Naima, who had adopted a permanent khwaja sira
appearance, had her teenaged son come live with her in Karachi.
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order to perpetuate the stereotype of intersexuality, childlessness and asceticism associated with
being a khwaja sira.

Partners
Gendered Violence
Besides family members, khwaja siras experienced oppression and abuse from their partners.
The gendered interactions between them and their giryās indicate that male power and privilege
was reproduced in hijra and zennana circles. Men who financially supported their khwaja sira
lovers were particularly strict, and often a breach of the parameters set by them resulted in verbal
and physical abuse. While some giryās treated their partners with love and affection, others were
downright demeaning; they interrupted their speech, did not respond to questions, and laughed at
their comments. I was appalled to observe Khurram mistreat Tamanna one afternoon at her
guru’s house. He scolded and pushed her whenever she stood in front of the window in plain
sight of her neighbors. After lunch, he snapped his fingers and rudely motioned her to take his
plate to the kitchen. When she refused, he repeated his command in a strict tone of voice.
However, Tamanna complied only when her grand-guru gently asked to remove the plate. Giryās
tended to treat their partners the same way they believed women should be treated. Male
dominance was thus reinforced in giryā-murat relationships, and to some extent, khwaja siras
expected and encouraged it.
Some jealous men took extreme measures to restrict their khwaja sira lovers from
interacting with other men. For instance, when Hasi fell in love with a boy at the age of twentytwo, she did not expect her life to change completely at the end of her seven-month relationship
with him.
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He started to torture me. He would fight with me all the time. He’d say, “Don’t dance!
Don’t stand there! Don’t meet so-and-so.” These were the things that made me run away
from him. I started living in another neighborhood. He looked around for me and found
out where I was living. Then one day he came to my house and threw acid on me. I spent
quite a lot of time in the hospital. My face and hand got badly burnt. After that, I saved
up and had two operations.
Hasi’s giryā scarred her for life as punishment for her insubordination. Similarly, Nammo’s
partner shot her in a fit of rage while under narcotic influence. Nammo succumbed to her
wounds after spending several days in the hospital. Khwaja siras responded in a number of
different ways to domestic abuse. Some, like Hasi and Nammo, failed to take timely action, but
many stood up against violence and promptly broke ties with abusive partners.

Financial Support and Control
The relationships between khwaja siras and their lovers were based primarily on love, but often
also on monetary benefit. Giryās had to support their partners for practical reasons, especially if
sex work and dancing were their primary sources of income. When a gender ambiguous person
commenced her relationship with a man, her lover was likely to restrict her from dancing before
or having sex with other men. These khwaja siras had little means of sustenance other than their
partners giving them monthly stipends comparable to their income potential through sex work
and begging. In such situations, the khwaja sira and her giryā determined a suitable monthly
amount that enabled her to maintain financial stability while allowing the couple to be
monogamous.
Khwaja siras who were financially supported by their partners had fewer freedoms since
giryās tended to impose restrictions on their mobility, social interactions, and livelihood
practices. Gender ambiguous people developed different approaches to dealing with controlling
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men. Hasi, who had previously been in an abusive relationship, claimed that she was no longer
willing to settle for and be controlled by a man unless he could satisfy her monetary needs.
There are so many men who say they want to do friendship with me. They say that they
will give me Rs. 20,000 a month but I will not be allowed to meet other men, and I tell
them that that won’t be possible. Why would I settle for Rs. 20,000 for the whole month
when I make much more on my own?
The price of a monogamous relationship with Hasi exceeded Rs. 20,000/month (approx. $229),
and for anything less than this amount, she was only willing to consider an open-relationship.
Khwaja siras did not blindly follow their lover’s instructions, and when partners were
unreasonably overbearing, they managed to circumvent authority by playing games with them.
For instance, many admitted to secretly engaging in sex work without the knowledge of their
lovers. This enabled them to earn extra money in addition to the stipends they received from
them. For example, Kaisar found creative ways to bypass the rules imposed by her lovers.
I have two full-time partners right now (laughs). One is an old man (buḍhā bābā) and one
is young. I have been with the old man for 10 years now. I love them both and they both
cover my expenses. They don’t know that I see them both. Once I was out with the old
man and the younger one saw us together. Later when he asked me about the old man, I
told him that he was my father (laughs). I spend time with the old man at my guru’s
house, and the other one comes to my house in Gizri. The old man used to put a lot of
restrictions on me. He wouldn’t let me talk to other boys. So I got another place in Gizri
where I see the other one and do sex work. He doesn’t know about it.
Kaisar’s game of deception allowed her to maximize her earnings through two concomitant
relationships. Her living arrangement enabled her to simultaneously maintain two lovers who
supported her financially, while she performed sex work on the side. Many khwaja siras
maintained secrets from oppressive partners, and evaded the stigma associated with sex work
through deceptive techniques that enabled them to earn unhindered.
Importantly, some giryās managed to exert control even when they did not financially
support or were financially dependent upon their khwaja sira partners. A few older informants
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reported giving money to their lovers in exchange for their time and loyalty. Reema’s man rarely
visited her unless she coddled him with cash and gifts. I also heard about giryās who served as
pimps, provided their lovers with a regular stream of clients, and lived off their earnings. When
asked why a khwaja sira would want to be in a relationship with a controlling and exploitative
partner, Payal responded: “This heart of ours is really soft. When it settles on a lover, it makes us
do all kinds of things.”

Lover’s Marriage and Family
The relationship experiences of khwaja siras were limited due to social stigma. Payal explained
how a khwaja sira and her lover were restricted in how and where they could express their
feeling of togetherness.
A man can have ten women friends but having even one khwaja sira friend can be a
problem for him. It is a double problem because he cannot go anywhere with her. He
can’t openly tell anyone that he is in love with a khwaja sira. They cannot roam around
together the way he can take his wife or a girl out to enjoy. People will make fun of him.
Sometimes I feel very suffocated by this.
The lack of social acceptance of the relationship between a man and a gender ambiguous person
limited the expression of their love to certain spaces, behind closed doors or constrained to
khwaja sira cultural venues.
Khwaja siras were cognizant of the transience of their relationships with men. They
lacked faith in them because these unions were socially and religiously prohibited, and
consequently tended to be short-lived. Many relationships ended when the giryā reached
marriageable age and was wedded to a woman. Some khwaja siras were cynical about
relationships with men. Noor claimed to have given up on the prospect of being committed to a
man due to her disenchantment with such relationships.
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These relationships don’t last. Some might even go on for 20-30 years, but eventually
they have to end. When men and women who are married to one another and who have
children get divorced, then what is there to hold a khwaja sira and a man together. It’s
better not to have such friendships. It’s better to take care of yourself in a way that you
never need such a friend.
Noor was among many khwaja siras who failed to see the point of love relationships since men
were eventually bound to leave them for women. The importance of marriage and reproduction
made heteronormative nuptials essential and unavoidable. Khwaja siras were well aware of their
inability to replace women given their incapacity to bear children even if they changed their sex
through SRS. Shazia had internalized and accepted that her boyfriend, Sajid, would eventually
marry a woman.
If he gets married, then I am quite alright with it. Obviously, his family will get him
married. This is a reality that you cannot fight. If you start fretting about it, then you
won’t even get to enjoy the good times that you’re having with him right now. There is
no man who will not get married. If you have someone who loves you, supports you,
takes care of you…even these qualities are really good in the world we live in.
Khwaja siras recurrently emphasized the inevitability of their partner’s impending matrimony.
Interestingly, some played an important role in facilitating the union between their
partners and their wives. This often involved picking out a suitable bride, making wedding
arrangements, and even financing the wedding. During fieldwork, I attended Sapna’s partner
Zaheer’s wedding, which had been arranged and financed entirely by Sapna. She picked out the
bride, who lived a couple of doors down from her house, and had her khwaja sira family and
friends assist her with the wedding preparations. In addition, Sapna rented a small house for the
couple, which was conveniently located behind her own rental. On the eve of the wedding, I
asked Sapna how she felt about her partner’s marriage. In response, a teary-eyed Sapna indicated
the break in her relationship with her partner by drawing an imaginary heart in the air before
running a knife through it. “We’re broken,” she added for emphasis.
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Sapna considered it her responsibility to get Zaheer married off since she was the one
who “ruined” him by getting him involved in vice. She wanted to steer him back to the path of
respectability. Sapna, like many others I knew, did not want to be responsible for depriving their
partner of the right to marry and reproduce. In addition, she wanted to offset some of her own
sins by bringing two people together in holy matrimony, which was believed to be a meritorious
deed. Sapna’s response indicates her internal conflict between her desire for a lover and her
conviction that having one was against Islamic precepts. This was the paradox of the lives of
khwaja siras; on the one hand they yearned to be in long-term relationships with men and, on the
other hand, they believed that such a lifestyle was forbidden. By executing the wedding, Sapna
and her khwaja sira family also earned the respect of their neighbors by performing the
admirable deed of getting two people married. Such commendable public presentations enabled
khwaja siras to promote a positive self-image as decent and honorable people.

The Power of the Curse
Blessing and cursing were among the few culturally instituted forms of power that
khwaja siras were believed to possess. Although informants were generally ambivalent about
whether or not they held special powers, many had personally witnessed their potency. Khwaja
siras attributed the source and efficacy of the curse to the sheer force of their supplications,
whether noble or vindictive, which they believed were heard by God. “Sometimes Allah listens
to things that come from the heart, even if they come from the heart of a sinner,” said Bilal, who
believed that the utter misery of the day-to-day existence of khwaja siras (and other oppressed
people), was what enabled them to effectively implore for divine intervention. In other words,
the strength of a khwaja sira’s entreaty and subsequent retribution through celestial intercession

	
  

167	
  

corresponded with the extent of the violence meted out on her. However, gender ambiguous
people often took advantage of the widespread belief in their curse in situations that involved no
threat of violence.
It was the power of the curse that drove some families to reluctantly accept the illicit
relationship between their sons/brothers/husbands and their khwaja sira lovers. I was initially
suspicious of such claims until Nadia took me to her partner’s parental home. When a sudden
bout of fever prevented Azeem from getting groceries for his family, Nadia volunteered to
purchase and have them personally delivered to his house. When we arrived, Azeem was resting
in bed with his parents by his side. Two of his sisters were also present along with a bunch of
small children. The family appeared to be well acquainted with Nadia and seemed quite
comfortable with her. One of the sisters asked her to tailor a new outfit for her and Nadia
promised to make her something nice. When Nadia announced that she wanted to take Azeem to
her house, his mother, worried about her son’s health, politely requested Nadia to let him rest at
home until he had fully recovered. Nadia insisted that she would take good care of him, and the
two continued to negotiate for a while until his sister changed topics. When we finally got up to
leave, Nadia asked Azeem if he wanted to come along. Azeem immediately jumped to his feet
while his defeated mother watched in silence. Nadia was beaming with joy by the time the three
of us were out the door. She said, “See, what a strong influence I have over his household?”
Nadia was pleased that I got to witness her standing among her “in-laws,” who I later discovered
were afraid of her curse. Khwaja siras wielded a certain amount power as a result of the
widespread cultural belief that they bore the ability to bless and curse.
Similarly, Meena described how the fear of the khwaja sira curse offered her some
control in her partner’s household.
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I live mostly at my friend’s house…with his wife and children…His wife knows. She
doesn't say anything to me. If he beats me, she gets angry at him. She tells him not to hit
me. She says that we are ascetics and our curse will be upon them.
Meena had succeeded in installing herself in her partner’s conjugal home partly due to his wife’s
fear of her curse. Some had managed to establish positive relationships with their partner’s
wives, owing to the prevalent belief that khwaja siras possessed special abilities. Using the threat
of their curse was among of the repertoire of games that khwaja siras played with the general
public. They exploited this cultural notion as a means of accessing power that was withheld from
them. Although many were uncertain of their own unique ability, they were careful not to reveal
their personal doubts about its efficacy to their oppressors. Instead, they misled the public by
upholding the myth of the curse in order to retain influence over the normative world from which
they were largely excluded.
The following vignettes provide further details about the role of the curse in empowering
khwaja siras.
Malka: Whenever people wrong me, I see bad things happen to them. Once this guy
teased me. I cursed him all night long. In the morning, I heard that the cops arrested him.
He was imprisoned for a year. When he returned, he teased me again and I cursed him
from my heart. Then, right in front of my eyes, he was hit by a motorcycle.
Harvest in Punjab: When Payal went to Punjab during the wheat season, she used to
accompany khwaja siras on their daily rounds of wheat collection. Together they would
go from house-to-house to gather wheat. According to Payal, villagers were simpletons
who were terrified of the khwaja sira curse. Gender ambiguous people often took
advantage of this fear by extorting wheat contributions from village residents.
Gender ambiguous people utilized the curse not only to find justice but also to exploit people.
Some wished ill upon their oppressors to seek retribution for injustices, while others played lay
people merely by using the threat of their curse in order to gain undue advantage over them.
Hence, the curse was among the illusory acts that khwaja siras used in interactions with ordinary
people.
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Men and Violence
See, when people don’t give us an outlet, when the things that are available to other
people are not given to us, I feel very suffocated. Even in the open air I feel suffocated.
And then I feel like choking those who make me feel that way. Whenever something bad
happens with me, I scream. But if they still try to repress me, then my heart aches. –Payal
Our society uses us for sex, makes us dance at weddings, brings us into their homes to
bless babies, and gate crash our parties. But they also say we are dirty, that we do dirty
things, that we shouldn’t live in their neighborhoods, that we ruin their children, and that
we should be locked up or drowned or killed. The same people who fuck our assholes
blame us for spreading vulgarity and immorality. –Ameera
These excerpts capture the degree of oppression and marginalization experienced by khwaja
siras, which correlated with the stigma attached to gender non-conformity in Pakistani society.
Khwaja siras suffered verbal and physical abuse from nuclear and extended family members,
from peers at school, neighbors, coworkers, law enforcement, male partners, clients, gurus and
from society at large. They were excluded from their familial circles, from residential areas, and
employment opportunities. Here, I discuss the abuse they experienced in schools, by law
enforcement, and by men in general.
The low retention of gender ambiguous youth in schools was a product of both poverty
and harassment from fellow students. While some gender variant children started working at an
early age to support their families, others dropped out of school due to abuse at the hands of
classmates.
Nargis: Boys used to call me “Khusrah! Khusrah!” during half time. They would tease
me because my way of walking was bad. I didn’t like going to school, so my father put
his foot on my neck and my crushed my vocal chords. When my voice became bad, the
boys started teasing me even more. I was so ashamed that I stopped going after class 8.
Hajra: When I was in school, I used to paint my nails with markers, and I would carry a
ladies’ bag. I had a girlish style. The principal noticed that I was different, so she casted
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me as Anarkali70 for the farewell party play. I was in class 7. She dressed me up as
Anarkali and applied full makeup on my face. Then after that the boys at school drove me
insane. They started pulling me into classrooms. Whenever I would go to the washroom,
ten boys would come after me. All this drove me mad. Then teachers started escorting
me. I would walk to school early with a teacher from my neighborhood. But after school,
I would go home alone, and boys would catch me, pull my shirt and break the buttons. I
was a kid at that time. I didn’t know what to do. Eventually, they committed sin with me.
Then I stopped going to school.
Both Nargis and Hajra were subjected to extreme violence during their school years, which
eventually led them to forsake their education to escape persecution. With this commenced a
cycle of abuse and deprivation: genderqueer youth abandoned their education as a result of daily
torture at school, which in turn augmented their marginality in adult life and limited job
prospects.
In public spaces, khwaja siras attracted attention by their mere presence. Many reported
experiencing a sense of shame when walking out of their homes. “When I go out of the house,
the kind of looks I get, make me feel a sense of shame, as though I am not even a third gender
but of some fourth kind,” said Shani. Although many grew accustomed to people staring at them,
and some even enjoyed the attention, others despised being constantly under the microscope.
Late one evening, Payal, Shani, Shazia, Maria and I took a taxi to the Pathan-dominated Shireen
Jinnah Colony to attend Hasi’s student’s initiation ceremony. When we reached the outskirts of
the colony, Payal asked the driver to park the car while she called Hasi for further directions to
her house. In the meantime, we were swarmed by a large group of children who began stoning
the car and hurling insults. One of them pulled Shani’s hair, who moments later slipped into a
state of panic and began to scream. A nearby group of male spectators incited the children to
continue the assault. Fearing the worst, Payal yelled at the driver to bolt out of the colony. The
children chased after the taxi until we were at a safe distance from the settlement. Such instances
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A legendary courtesan from Lahore who lived during the rule of Mughal emperor, Akbar.
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of violence were routine occurrences.
Those who begged and blessed for a living tended to respond differently to sexual
violence than did khwaja sira sex workers, for whom such incidents were routine trade hazards.
Below, two mendicants describe their experiences of sexual assault.
Tina: When I go out to beg, sometimes people tell me that they will give me money if I
let them touch me. I don’t like this at all. It is a sin both for me and for them when I ask
for money in the name of Allah and they ask for such things.
Neelam: This one time I was returning home from begging at 1 o’clock in the morning. I
literally collected one-one rupee notes for hours and then as I was heading home, I ran
into a bunch of gangster boys. They teased me so much. They tore my clothes off and
made me dance naked. They said, “Go! Who is there to listen to you?” And they were
right. We have no one who will listen to us. My heart broke so badly that day. I felt like
touching electricity and killing myself or drowning in the ocean.
Khwaja sira beggars were deeply affected by sexual harassment because they intentionally
distanced themselves from sinful acts with the intention of leading a respectable life. Narratives
of violence contextualize the games of secrecy and deception that gender ambiguous people
played with the public. Although it appeared that khwaja siras took undue advantage of lay
people, it is essential to apprehend that much of this game-playing was a reaction to the violence
meted out on them. In contrast, some khwaja siras reinforced the dominant belief that sex
workers deserved mistreatment. This view held that those who had self-respect received respect
from others, while those who were involved in immorality invited persecution. Accordingly,
blame was laid upon the victim instead of the oppressor. Khwaja siras who endorsed this
perspective, blamed sex workers for ruining their reputation and for spreading social ills.
The thugs and gangsters of Karachi regularly victimized khwaja siras. Such men were
known as bīlā in Farsi. I learned that there was a prominent network of bīlās in Karachi. Among
them was a noteworthy figure named Nisar, a stocky man in his fifties who sported a thick
moustache and dyed jet-black hair. Nisar was known for his cruelty towards khwaja siras, and
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was particularly infamous for his signature punishment of shaving the heads of those who
disobeyed him. According to rumors, Nisar had a wall display in his house where he showcased
the hair of each of his conquests. His brutality helped him gain notoriety among the lovers and
admirers of khwaja siras who had begun approaching him for help in moderating disputes
involving gender ambiguous people. For instance, a man could call a meeting if he suspected that
his khwaja sira partner was having an affair with another man. In such a situation, both the
khwaja sira in question and her secret lover were forcibly taken to Nisar who controlled their fate
with appropriate punishments. Rather than standing up to him, khwaja siras respected Nisar in
fear of incurring his disfavor. My first encounter with him was at Puja’s birthday party where he
had been invited as a chief guest. Some khwaja siras at the event paid their respects to Nisar by
kissing his cheek while others prostrated before him to kiss his hands.
Police harassment had dropped significantly but had not entirely disappeared in the years
since the Pakistani state granted rights and protections to khwaja siras. Verbal and sexual
harassment and extortion at the hands of policemen were commonplace. One day as we left
Nadia’s house, Meera said, “A couple of years ago it wouldn’t even be possible for you and I to
walk together so freely because the cops would have harassed us and accused you of being a
client.” Despite the improvement in the status of khwaja siras, Meera felt the need to cover her
head as we walked past a police patrol unit. Similarly, other gender ambiguous people erred on
the side of caution to avoid unnecessary confrontations with local law enforcement. In addition,
the police were known to disrupt khwaja sira parties if they do not receive a cash bribe. Payal
intervened when a police patrol car pulled up next to the roadside tent where Nighat’s birthday
party was taking place. The police officers offered “protection” in exchange for petty cash. After
protracted negotiations, they settled on Rs. 500, and then continued to watch over the party until
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it winded down around 3am. “Prior to the court’s orders, the same cops would have shut down
the party,” said Payal, “but now they are at least willing to cooperate.”
Drug use was widespread among khwaja siras. Marijuana joints were regularly shared
and copiously consumed in the homes of most informants. Farzana said that she used drugs to
drown her sorrows. In light of the daily discrimination and violence that khwaja siras
experienced, it is hardly surprising that drugs acted as a crutch to alleviate the misery of
everyday life. Although drugs momentarily assuaged the burdens of existence, they also pushed
khwaja siras deeper into a state of apathy surrounding their grim conditions.

Neighbors and Neighborhood
Finding and retaining a residence was an arduous task for khwaja siras since they were not
welcome in most residential neighborhoods, including colonies and shantytowns. Landlords were
typically reluctant to rent property to them and neighbors treated them with contempt. People
feared the deleterious influence of khwaja siras on their neighborhoods: What if our children join
their ranks? What if our men engage in immoral activity with them? What if they put a curse
upon us? The negative public perception of khwaja siras led to their exclusion from various
arenas of social life, including residential spaces.

Figure 9. Three different slums in Karachi that were home to khwaja siras.
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The neighborhoods that khwaja siras called home were some of the most unsanitary and
dangerous areas of Karachi. These slums were lined with piles of garbage, open sewage streams,
meandering dirt streets, dug up pavements, and uncemented brick houses. Amid the chaos of
vehicles and pedestrians, the little civic sense that sustained some semblance of order on main
city streets was lost the minute one stepped foot into these colonies. Most shantytowns were
ravaged by crime, gang wars and political party disputes, and neighborhood thugs routinely
targeted and victimized khwaja siras. And yet these slums contained the sense of intimacy and
solidarity that is characteristic of the mohallah (neighborhood) in South Asia (Verkaaik 2009,
71-2). Although khwaja sira migrants from rural areas generally enjoyed the low cost of living in
these colonies, they complained about being excluded from “decent” neighborhoods.
The urban experiences of khwaja siras dwelling in Karachi’s slums shed light on their
everyday negotiation and identity representation practices. Rather than contesting oppressive
social norms, khwaja siras reproduced social relations in order to maintain respectability. They
engaged in games of secrecy and deception in order to uphold a positive self-image and to access
power in their neighborhoods.

Livelihood and Neighbors
The neighborhoods where khwaja siras lived were not only their homes but also their workplace.
The homes of khwaja sira sex workers were typically their place of business, that is, where they
entertained clients, and their neighborhoods and surrounding environs were where they earned
by going from door to door to beg and confer blessings. Hence, maintaining a relationship of
goodwill with the men, women and children of the mohallah enabled khwaja siras to maintain
their residence and their livelihood. Khwaja siras who begged in their localities usually managed
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to forge close ties with the neighborhood women. They regularly visited these women in their
homes and shared local gossip with them. Unlike most neighborhood men, khwaja siras were
granted admission into the domestic quarters of women because they were not perceived as a
sexual threat. “We go to people’s homes,” said Tina, “and the women tell us their stories. They
openly tell us everything, all their gossip, all their problems, even the sexual ones.”

Retaining Space
The ḍeṛās or homes of khwaja siras differed in size depending on the number of occupants.
Single occupant ḍeṛās were typically no bigger than a small room, but it was not uncommon for
such spaces to be inhabited by more than one khwaja sira. Many gurus who had two to three
student residents were able to afford two room rentals in shantytowns. The material
circumstances of gender ambiguous people varied by income, with professional sex workers
earning the most and enjoying a better standard of living. Televisions and music systems were
staples in the homes of average khwaja siras since they were necessary for entertaining and
socializing. Those who managed to retain long-term residence in certain neighborhoods owned
bigger items, such as refrigerators and heavy furniture. Most homes were decorated with light
furnishings, including floor mattresses, cushions, carpets and curtains.
When khwaja siras managed to find a place to live, they had to make a dedicated effort
not to risk losing the property. For instance, when I met her, Nadia had been living at her current
residence for the past six years. Her guru had been pressuring her to move to a nicer
neighborhood where the two could cohabitate, but Nadia was unwilling to leave her mohallah
because she had finally managed to establish a positive reputation among her neighbors. She was
reluctant to start over in a new place since she had been unlucky in the vicinities where she had
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previously lived. One night Nadia was escorting me out of her colony when we ran into a
wedding procession. One of the men in the group spotted Nadia and walked over to embrace her.
Nadia turned me to and said, “Faris Bhāī, this is the groom! He’s getting married today.” Then
she turned back to the groom and said, “Why didn’t you call to tell me you were getting married
today? I had to hear from someone else.” The groom said apologetically, “I’m sorry. We were so
ill-prepared.” His mother joined us and added, “Everything happened so suddenly.” Then the
groom and his mother entreated Nadia to attend the wedding and Nadia promised to be there. As
we walked away from the groom’s entourage, Nadia excitedly said to me, “Did you see the kind
of respect I get in this neighborhood? This is why I don’t want to leave this place.”

Earning Respect
Not unlike the hijras in Reddy’s study in Hyderabad, India, khwaja siras in Karachi “emphasized
ways to assert and maintain their izzat” (2005, 18) in order to circumvent the detrimental impacts
of the stigma associated with non-heteronormativity. Khwaja siras had to preserve an image of
respectability in their mohallahs because they were perceived as symbols of immorality. Tina
said that the she was spared from eviction when her neighbors decided to drive out the khwaja
sira residents in her lane. “When they came for me, my landlord told them that there is a world of
difference between me and the other khadṛas…So it was decided that I would stay, but everyone
else was removed.” Similarly, Nadia bragged about her standing among her neighbors: “I’ve
built my respect in my neighborhood. My respect is worth lākh of rupees.”
Khwaja siras earned the respect of neighbors by engaging in acts that reinforced the
dominant social structure. This included religious observance and the enactment of morally
laudable behavior. Nazo experienced difficulties wherever she lived, but her situation improved
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once she began to pray and read the Quran. “I go to the mosque to offer prayers on Friday. The
people in my neighborhood get very happy when they see a khwaja sira at the mosque, and
children from the neighborhood come to my house to read the Quran.” Nazo also regularly held
Korān khwāni71 and niāz72 at her house. Some genderqueer people exceeded social expectations
in order to carve personal space in the mohallah. To this end, Reema helped a neighbor by
adopting and raising one of her children, which improved her status as a doer of good deeds.
Additionally, khwaja siras provided financial support to neighbors in times of need, assisted in
getting their children married, and helped to resolve communal conflicts.
In addition, respect was established by covering involvement in vice. Khwaja siras who
did not use their homes for sex work often told me that their neighbors respected them because
they never saw strange men enter their home. Those who engaged in sex work at home typically
entertained clients from other vicinities and avoided contact with the men from their own
neighborhoods. Noor also stressed the importance of avoiding sexual ties with neighbors.
I’ve never liked having neighbors at my house…If you keep them away, then they won’t
have the guts to disrespect you. So I keep myself in check. Also, I think to myself, I go to
the homes in my neighborhood to beg, and so I shouldn’t have the same men over at my
house. Otherwise, what respect will they give me?
Upholding respect among neighbors was essential for khwaja siras since their residence and
livelihood depend on it.

Engendered Experiences
At the time of this investigation, khwaja siras living in certain shantytowns in Karachi,
particularly in areas that had recently experienced an influx of Pashtun migrants, had begun to
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
71
A religious gathering in which people recite parts of the Quran.
72
A religious offering involving the distribution of food, and often made on behalf of the
deceased.
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face social pressures that are typically experienced by women. In these neighborhoods, the
norms of modesty, spatial segregation and mobility that mostly apply to the public behavior of
women were being imposed on khwaja siras. These social processes were the effects of the
tribalization of certain urban enclaves, which, coupled with party politics, were increasingly
being governed by the traditions of the resident’s distant hometowns.

Figure 10. Gulabo posing in her guru’s ‘abāaiya (cloak).

One day, I was at Payal’s house when Hasi arrived with her lover. I was surprised to see
Hasi dressed in a black‘abāaiya (a full body cloak worn by women in parts of the Muslim world)
since it is rare for khwaja siras to be completely covered up. I learned that Hasi’s partner rode
her to Payal’s house on his motorcycle, and that the two did not want to be judged or harassed by
the people in their neighborhood, by onlookers on the streets, or by cops along the way. Hasi
lived in a fairly conservative Pathan dominated neighborhood in Kimari where khwaja siras were
regular victims of harassment. “So it is better for us to be dressed modestly,” she said.
Similarly, Tina responded to the changing ethnic composition of her locality by
conforming to the expectations of her neighbors.
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Now, what’s started happening in my lane is that whenever there’s a power outage, the
khadṛas here sit outside on charpais and laugh loudly. They have such long hair and they
keep it open. These Pathan men sit in front of them and they show them their breasts. We
can’t call ourselves khadṛas if we sit outside with men. We’re men if we sit outside.
When we decide to grow our hair and become like women, then we should sit at home
like women. Respect is respect. Even when the light goes out, I sit inside my house.
As liminal beings who were neither men nor women, khwaja siras generally enjoyed easy access
to both genders since the norms of segregation did not apply to them. However, Tina
demonstrated a tacit acceptance and reinforcement of the spatial separation of khwaja siras
expected by the men in her neighborhood. Rather than freely socializing with her friends and
neighbors, she confined herself to her home. Moreover, she was frustrated by the immodest
behavior of the khwaja siras in her street whose actions risked damaging the reputation of
“decent” gender ambiguous people like herself. The spatial segregation between men and khwaja
siras reinforced the power and privilege of men over both women and gender ambiguous people,
and exacerbated the subjugation of this already marginalized group.
Other khwaja siras described similar engendered experiences in their neighborhoods and
in other parts of the city. Naima’s experiences below speak to her awareness of the general
public’s negative attitude towards khwaja siras.
Whenever I go out to get groceries, I buy whatever I need and then quickly return home,
because if I’m standing outside at night, people will wonder what I’m doing. I feel really
weird about that…I feel bad because of the clothes I wear. Even if we don’t do sin,
people still think badly about us because of how we look. There are so many men who do
bad things but they go undetected…which is why if I had a choice I would want to be a
man because being a woman comes with a lot of problems too. You have to live within
your four walls. A man can sit outside whenever he wants…but a woman cannot.
The experiences of khwaja siras like Hasi, Tina and Naima centered on their manifest sexuality,
which was visibly mapped onto their bodies. Dominant social attitudes towards them constantly
played on their psyche and influenced their actions. Hijras and zennanas reproduced social
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oppression by self-policing their public behavior. These adjustments were essential for those
striving to maintain dignity in Karachi’s evolving ethnic environment.

Deceptive Agency
The portrayal of khwaja siras as oppressed people reveals as much as it conceals. Gender variant
Karachiites had a keen understanding of social norms and of the way in which they were
perceived by mainstream society, and they often used this knowledge to their advantage. Rather
than readily conforming to oppressive norms, khwaja siras often exercised deceptive agency, that
is, their “socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (Ahearn 2001, 112) in a disingenuous manner.
These everyday practical strategies did not veer away from locally defined value (Peletz 1995,
351) even as they reproduced social relations (Giddens 1984). By identifying gaps within and
manipulating the social structure, khwaja siras were able to fulfill their desires without
compromising the overall integrity of the gender stratification system.
The outward appearance of respectability masked their private sexual behavior and
allowed khwaja siras to escape persecution. Nazo highlighted the importance of exercising
caution when acting upon her sexual needs. “We’re Muslim and it is wrong for people to have
sex openly,” she said. “Therefore, if you’re going to commit sin, you must do it behind closed
doors in order to keep your respect.” Following this statement, Nazo described how she managed
to sustain a clandestine relationship with her former lover.
I used to have a lover, and whenever he would come over, I would ask him whether or
not any one saw him. I would lock the door after he’d come inside. Then we would eat
together before making our faces black. In the morning…I would peer out onto the street
to make sure no one was present, and he would leave if the coast were clear. One day as
he was leaving, my neighbor saw him and asked me who he was. I lied to her. I told her
that he was my cousin who lives in Hyderabad, but because he sometimes works late in
Karachi, I let him sleep over at my place…My neighbor said that it was nice of me to
help him out. If I had told the truth, she would have lost respect for me.
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On the one hand, Nazo’s use of the phrase “making our faces black” (mun kālā karnā) indicates
her belief that illegitimate sexual contact led to loss of self-respect. On the other hand, her
agency is evident in the fable she narrated to her neighbor, which not only allowed her to
maintain her liaison with her lover right under their noses, but also helped her preserve her selfimage as a caring individual. Her public façade of propriety served as a veil for private
promiscuous acts, and enabled her to satisfy her needs without disrupting social norms.
While Nazo’s agential act took the shape of damage control, Nadia engaged in a kind of
preventive gaming, that is, a precautionary measure to preserve her reputation and her mobility.
When I first moved into this neighborhood, the men here would make fun of me all the
time. But now no one says anything to me, and they all respect me. My status improved
after I managed to seduce and fuck some of these men. Now many of them are afraid that
I will tell others about what I did to them.
Nadia exhibits a clear manipulation of sociocultural norms by using them as a bargaining chip
against her oppressors. Being the receptive partner lowers a man’s social status and casts doubt
on his masculinity. Nadia used the cultural knowledge that it was degrading and shameful for a
man to be sexually penetrated to her benefit. By seducing and penetrating these men in private,
she managed to gain power over them in exchange for keeping their secrets out of the public
domain.
Dapne Spain writes that “[s]patial segregation is one of the mechanisms by which a group
with greater power can maintain its advantage over a group with less power,” and that “[b]y
controlling access to knowledge…through the control of space, the dominant group’s ability to
retain and reinforce its position is enhanced” (2005, 49). Nadia demonstrates that the less
powerful can unsettle power dynamics by gaining access to the dominant group’s private
information. Previously, Nadia avoided neighborhood spaces occupied by her oppressors in
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order to escape harassment from them. However, by controlling knowledge of these men’s
private acts, she enhanced her social position, reclaimed access to these spaces, and collapsed the
spatial boundaries that contributed to her unequal status. On the one hand, Nadia’s ambiguous
gender enabled her to meander between the spaces of both men and women. On the other hand,
through her game of manipulation, she managed to simultaneously cheat and reproduce the
system by stifling the cycle of ridicule yet maintaining her subjugated thirdness within the
gendered constitution of society.
The urban experiences of khwaja siras dwelling in Karachi’s slums included such acts of
secrecy, deception and misrepresentation. Rather than contesting the cultural norms of spatial
segregation and male privilege, khwaja siras consciously reproduced social relations through
subtle interventions in order to maintain respectability, to protect their livelihood, and to retain
their residence. The everyday identity politics of khwaja siras hinged on projecting a deceptive
public self-image that was meant to neutralize the stereotype of the depraved khwaja sira.

Livelihood
Khwaja siras were generally from lower class backgrounds, and most received very little formal
education. Employers were typically unwilling to hire them due to the stigma associated with
gender/sexual nonnormativity. The few who managed to find employment emphasized the
difficulty in retaining jobs on account of routine harassment from coworkers. These factors led to
the economic marginalization of khwaja siras, who subsequently, turned to the field for
livelihood opportunities. In addition to offering a safe social sphere where gender ambiguous
people could coexist, the field provided a number of economic opportunities to its members,
including begging, singing and dancing, blessing newborns and newly married couples, and sex
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work. These livelihood patterns were essential to the survival of khwaja siras. This economic
system was not self-contained since it functioned by providing services to the larger society. It
connected gender ambiguous people to the general public, and many of the interactions between
them took place on the job.

Rural Exodus and Livelihood
Karachi had gained a reputation among khwaja siras as an ideal place to earn. Interlocutors
described the city as the “London of Pakistan” and the “mother of the poor.” Many gender
ambiguous people from rural Pakistan migrated to other big cities, such as Lahore and
Rawalpindi where they were able to earn a living in relative anonymity from their familial
networks. The social structure of modern society permits a high degree of secrecy (Ritzer and
Goodman 2003). Given the sexualized nature of their culture, khwaja siras intentionally hid
aspects of their lives from natal kin. Maintaining secrecy was feasible for gender ambiguous
people within the urban setting of contemporary Karachi. The city afforded them a comfortable
level of privacy given its physical distance from their rural hometowns. Migrant khwaja siras
included both long- and short-term residents. Those who had permanently moved to Karachi
regularly visited their natal villages and sent home remittances. Many were long-time residents
of the city, but planned on retiring in their hometowns and villages. Others were seasonal
workers who came to Karachi once or twice a year for a couple of months at a time. In addition
to rural migrants, the city’s khwaja sira population consisted of native Karachiites. While
conducting daily economic activities, those born and raised in they city had to take greater
precaution to cover their involvement in unrespectable work from relatives.
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Begging and Blessing
Known as ṭolī in khwaja sira vernacular, begging (ḍhīngnā) and blessing (vadhāī) were crucial
khwaja sira livelihood practices. Khwaja siras believed that they had been permitted to live off
the land through begging and blessing by royal decree when they lost their stately functions in
the courts of Mughal emperors. Begging was a fairly lucrative source of income for khwaja siras.
Informants reported earning between Rs. 400-1,200 (approx. $5-14) each day through begging
(i.e., Rs. 12,000-36,000/month, approx. $137-411). This monthly earning potential was much
higher than the minimum monthly wage rate of Rs. 7,000-8,000 (approx. $80-91), as determined
by the Pakistani government in 2011 for unskilled workers (Minimum Wage Report: Pakistan).
Hence, contrary to the stereotype of abject poverty associated with khwaja siras, gender
ambiguous Pakistanis could live above the poverty line through begging alone. However, daily
earnings varied depending on the type of neighborhood and the amount of time spent begging.
While some khwaja siras began work early in the mornings and traversed several neighborhoods
during their daily rounds, others started work in the afternoons and spent merely a few hours
begging houses, offices, shops, and fruit carts. Begging involved excessive walking, and contrary
to the popular belief that it was an easy way out of honest hard work, it required much diligence
and discipline.
Begging was fraught with problems because it was highly stigmatized work. On the one
hand, it was illegal73 and selectively enforced, and on the other hand, it was religiously forbidden
but also permitted in cases of dire necessity. Khwaja sira mendicants argued that they had to
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Begging is illegal in Pakistan according to the West Pakistan Vagrancy Ordinance, 1958. The
said Ordinance states that “[a]ny police officer may without an order from a magistrate and
without a warrant, arrest and search any person who appears to him to be a vagrant and may
seize anything found on or about such person which he has reason to believe to be liable to
confiscation under this Ordinance.”
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resort to begging professionally because no one was willing to hire genderqueer people. Given
that begging was acceptable only in times of acute need, khwaja siras maintained the façade of
poverty in order to continue begging without compromising their image of self-respectability.
However, experiencing humiliation and harassment while begging was not uncommon. For
instance, asking for alms was prohibited during Ramzān (the holy month of fasting for Muslims),
and during this time, police harassment of khwaja sira mendicants increased. Informants reported
being arrested or picked up by police patrol vans, having their valuables and earnings
confiscated, and being dropped off in deserted areas along the outskirts of Karachi.
Some khwaja siras, especially those who were new to the field, claimed that they were
ashamed to beg. “When people say things to me…I become very disheart for a couple of
minutes, but then I have to continue begging again,” said Shahana. Shahana was not accustomed
to the daily insults and humiliation that accompanied begging. However, experienced khwaja
siras like Moti had grown comfortable asking for alms.
Begging is nothing to be proud of. It is shameful. But I have become stubborn since I
have been doing it for years. Initially, I used to feel ashamed. And now…I know how to
deal with people and maintain my respect.
Moti, who had been begging for twenty years, was no longer afraid of retaliating with insults
when faced with opposition. Hijra begging techniques included flirting, shouting, dancing,
clapping and cursing. The very appearance of khwaja siras was cause for embarrassment, and
usually the threat of being shamed by one was enough for most people to cooperate.
Blessings entailed sanctifying the birth of a newborn (typically the birth of a male child)
and the union of a newly married couple. Blessings were meant to bestow good luck on and to
ensure the wellbeing of a newborn or the success and longevity of and fertility in a marriage.
Khwaja siras heard about childbirths and marriages in their neighborhoods either through word
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of mouth or direct invitation, and they visited relevant households in small groups consisting of a
guru and a few of her disciples. In the case of childbirth, the khwaja siras examined the genitals
of the infant to verify their development. This practice was in keeping with the myth that khwaja
siras seized hermaphroditic infants from parents. In reality, none of my research participants had
come across an intersexual child let alone take possession of one from parents. Nonetheless, the
threat of seizure provided them some power over the public. During these visits, khwaja siras
held the male child and sang lullabies before making demands for money and gifts. The amount
received was divided into equal shares (bakhṛā) between the khwaja siras involved.74

Earning Areas
Most hijra kin groups had designated earning areas (vīrat) where non-family members were not
permitted to earn. These regions included the commercial and residential streets of colonies and
shantytowns, while major city thoroughfares were excluded. Earning areas could be as small as
minute sections of colonies or as large as several subdivisions of Karachi. 	
  
Those found begging or blessing in an area that did no belong to their family risked being
physically attacked or fined by the rightful owners of the said neighborhood. Some migrant
khwaja siras and most seasonal visitors did not have access to earning areas if they were not
members of one of the Karachi-based hijra households. These khwaja siras begged on main
roads where anyone was allowed to work without restrictions. Family elders managed earning
areas, whose membership and borders evolved over time.
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Some money was set aside for niāz before the earnings were divided into equal shares. The
concept of shares generally applied to the money that khwaja siras earned through group
blessings. Typically, one share was for the guru, and the remaining shares for each of her
disciples in the group. If the students lived in the guru’s house, then an additional share went
towards household expenses. In other words, if five individuals were in the group, the earnings
were divided into six shares since the guru received two.
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The Game Called Ṭolī
“The khwaja siras of today are the same as the saints of today,” said Nadia. “Both are frauds!”
Nadia made this analogy in reference to khwaja sira livelihood practices. Her statement implies
that khwaja siras earned a living by defrauding the general public into believing that they were
intersexuals, and were therefore worthy of charity. Nadia indicates that both holy men and
khwaja siras were charlatans since neither of them possessed the attributes that were central to
their public identities. In Nadia’s statement is an implicit acquiescence of the dominant belief
that “real” khwaja siras were born with genital irregularities. Rather than challenging the myth,
Nadia reinforced the mainstream perception that those who possessed functioning male genitals
were imposters.
Tricking the public into believing that they were intersexual was at the core of hijraness.
During social interactions, gender ambiguous people demonstrated their shrewdness by
exploiting cultural stereotypes and perpetuating myths related to khwaja siras.
One day I was out begging and a woman told me that a khwaja sira stole her mobile
phone. I asked her who it was and she said her name was Aina. I told her that Aina is a
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man and not one of us, and that she should beat him up the next time she saw him.
(laughs) Then, the other day, a khadṛa named Imran insulted me in my neighborhood, so I
decided to get back at him. I took Meena, Zubi and Nammo with me to the house where
Imran had talked badly about me. I said to the woman in the house, “Sister, what do all of
us look like to you?” She said you all look like khusrahs. I told her that we’re all the
same, but the next time Imran comes to her house, she should check him, and I told her
how to do it smoothly and swiftly.
In the first instance, Nadia protected the reputation of the khwaja siras in her neighborhood by
singling out Aina, the mobile thief, as an imposter. Nadia did not want the residents of her
neighborhood to distrust khwaja siras merely due to the misconduct of one gender ambiguous
person. In the second example, Nadia relied on her competence to get even with Imran for her
misbehavior instead of retaliating with insults. In both cases, Nadia used her hijraness to target
rival khwaja siras while simultaneously deceiving the general public by misrepresenting gender
ambiguous people.
When khwaja siras went to people’s homes to beg and bless, they did so under false
pretenses by defrauding the public into believing that they were intersexual khwaja siras.
Intersexuality was religiously sanctioned based on the logic that it was a God-given condition.
Mainstream society believed that intersexuals were truly deserving of charity since they were
unable to reproduce and have marital relationships with women. In contrast, physical
emasculation was believed to be prohibited in Islam. This was premised on the idea that altering
the form in which God has created human beings is against divine will. Further, mainstream
society believed that those with male genitals were men who voluntarily adorned women’s
clothes in order to make a living through begging, blessing and sex-work. The notion that a
khwaja sira could be someone who possessed a feminine soul was largely beyond the
sociocultural purview. This soul, invisible to the naked eye, remained largely a socially
unrecognized phenomenon even though khwaja siras described it as their most fundamental trait.
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While the general public had a strong inkling that many of those who identified as khwaja siras
either had male genitalia or were physically emasculated, social and religious norms prevented
them from accepting such individuals as real khwaja siras.
In contrast, according to khwaja siras’ own structuring of identities, any biological male
who possessed a feminine soul qualified as a khwaja sira. Nevertheless, gender ambiguous
people maintained the ruse of intersexuality since the general public did not consider biological
males as real khwaja siras. Hence, rather than challenging society’s presumptions, khwaja siras
concealed their corporeal status and deceived their benefactors into believing that they were
intersexual, often in order to earn a living75. Hijras, since they were emasculated, were in a better
position than zennanas to make a case of personal authenticity by exposing or threatening to
expose their surgically altered genitals and misrepresenting them as God-given. Common among
hijras in South Asia (Reddy 2003, 166), the practice of threating to expose one’s genitals was
meant not only to shame onlookers but also to separate real khwaja siras from the phonies.
In her study, Reddy observes that hijras in India manipulated “popular cultural
symbols…to legitimize their basis for (political) authority” (2003, 172). However, the crucial
difference in representation between Indian hijras and Pakistani khwaja siras was that the former
emphasized that they were operated ascetics, a portrayal that was linked to popular cultural
symbols of the Hindu tradition (e.g., semen-loss anxiety and the culturally valued image of the
sanyasi or renunciate) (2003, 175-6), while the latter projected themselves as
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The hijras in Hossain’s Bangladesh also engaged in the “art of concealing” their genital status,
but their obfuscation took a very different form. Hossain describes this practice as a “performing
art” wherein non-emasculated hijras literally tucked their penises between their thighs (2012,
501). Akin to the skills of hijraness among Pakistani khwaja siras, this physical act of
concealment required great dexterity and was a matter or immense pride for Bangladeshi hijras.
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intersexual/impotent ascetics, which was in keeping with Islamically accepted forms of genital
non-normativity.
The following narrative demonstrates the role of secrecy and deception in khwaja sira
livelihood practices. Below, Payal describes an incident where she masterfully passed as an
intersexual and out-smarted her opponents in order to make money.
My grand-guru was the only one in our group who had been operated. I used to beg and
confer blessings with her in our neighborhood. A bunch of us would go together in a
group. But then I had a fight with them and they stopped taking me. They tried to kick me
out of the earning area by telling the residents that I'm a boy and not a hijra. They thought
that I would get scared and leave, but instead, I started roaming around the neighborhood
in front of them. My grand-guru used to take 5-6 khwaja siras to Bezerta Lines, and I
started following them. One day, they danced at someone’s house and then demanded Rs.
700. That’s when I showed up. I told them that if they take Rs. 600, then they would have
to give me Rs. 100. Then my grand-guru stepped in and told the residents that they had
thrown me out of the group because I am a boy. I said that that wasn’t true and then I told
them that she is my grand-guru, my senior, so lets leave her out of this, but why don’t
you go ahead and strip the rest of the khwaja siras in her group, and in the end you can
strip me naked. If I turn out to be a boy, then you can throw shoes at me. Now I knew that
those khwaja siras would never get naked because they all had boy parts. The residents of
the house liked my idea. They said, “Well today lets find out what hijras are really like.”
My grand-guru chimed in again and said, "Child, just give her the money," and then she
quickly fled the scene. When she left, I told the rest of the khwaja siras to either
cooperate with me or else get ready to create a spectacle. So they agreed to cooperate,
and I got Rs. 100. Afterwards, I told them to tell grand-guru to call me the next day or
else I would do the same thing again.
In the above situation, Payal’s skillful manipulation of the cultural myth that khwaja siras were
intersexuals enabled her to fight adversity and to earn a living. She engaged in an identity
politics that hinged on maintaining a deceptive public image of khwaja siras as socio-religiously
acceptable. Payal exercised her agency to deceive not only the residents of her earning area but
also her queer family members, while simultaneously reinforcing the dominant belief that those
with male genitals were fake khwaja siras.
Misappropriating by being dishonest about one’s corporeal status was common practice
among khwaja siras in their everyday struggle to earn a living in an exclusionary environment
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where employment was reserved for those who conformed to society’s gender and sexual norms.
Such games of deception were necessary in enabling khwaja siras to sustain a livelihood and to
maintain their legitimacy and security. Misappropriation was a necessary survival skill for
gender ambiguous people to subsist in a world where they had endured long-term discrimination
and oppression.

Functions
Functions refer to dance events and weddings where khwaja siras entertained audiences by
dancing. Creating a spectacle by showering performers with rupee bills (tamāshbenī) was
common at functions. At dance events, khwaja sira entertainers performed solo acts before male
audiences, and found new clients for sex work76. At wedding functions, gender ambiguous
people typically accompanied musicians (marāsī). For instance, Nadia’s troupe consisted of one
or two khwaja sira dancers and several musicians with whom she divided her earnings. Khwaja
siras had a unique advantage over their marāsī colleagues due to their access to the women
guests at weddings.
I enjoy singing to women, so sometimes I go to the women’s side of the gathering and
sing maiyas to them. Whatever money I make from the women, I hide it in my purse.
When the marāsīs ask where I was, I tell them that I had gone to urinate.
Most weddings were gender-segregated and men were not allowed to enter the women’s
quarters. However, given their liminality, khwaja siras could easily move between the spaces of
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Some khwaja sira dancers earned a reputation as dancers through their talent and business
acumen. For instance, Reema’s demand skyrocketed partly due to her shrewd marketing efforts,
which involved producing several personal dance videos. In the recordings, Reema is seen
dancing to popular Bollywood and Pakistani tunes in different scenic locations dressed a variety
of striking outfits. In addition to earning through DVD sales, Reema’s videos also served as
marketing material to promote her talent for live performances.
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both men and women. Nadia regularly frequented the women’s section where she secretly
performed for the guests, and hid her additional earnings from the rest of the troupe.

Sexual Labor
Khwaja sira sex work exposes and challenges the polarities between oppression and liberation,
violence and pleasure, and victimhood and agency. Sex work was a topic of secrecy in
interactions between khwaja siras and outsiders. During interviews, many respondents denied
participation in sex work in order to uphold the pretense of respectability. However, I had the
distinct advantage of spending extended periods of time with informants and gradually
discovering hidden truths about their lives. Covering one’s involvement is sex work was meant
to reduce discrimination and to promote personal security.
Sex work was motivated by extreme poverty and was often the example of employment
set by khwaja sira elders. Although they were impoverished when they initially entered the field,
khwaja siras were not as poor as they were believed to be, especially since sex work was a
lucrative source of income. Many khwaja siras resorted to survival sex when they left their
familial homes, only to find it increasingly difficult to quit sex work upon gaining financial
stability. Abandoning paid sex was challenging for a number of reasons: 1) earnings through
prostitution were significantly higher than other kinds of work; 2) it was less time consuming
since more money could be earned in less time (e.g., a khwaja siras could earn Rs. 500 through
one hour of sex work instead of spending six hours begging to earn the same amount); 3) sex
work had a pleasure component while begging entailed receiving insults and miles of daily
walking; 4) leaving sex work was difficult because khwaja siras lacked the professional skills for
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other career paths; 5) some sexual health NGOs claimed that “sex addiction,”77 which was
believed to be common among sex workers, perpetuated a cycle of dependency upon the
profession; and 6) many believed that forsaking prostitution was futile since they had already
compromised their physical and spiritual purity.

Sexual Space and Network
Khwaja siras engaged in sex work in their homes and/or out on the streets at night. Home-based
sex workers tended to have a client base that was largely built on word of mouth (i.e., clients
shared the cell phone numbers of sex workers and vice versa). In addition, the client pool
expanded when khwaja siras came into contact with men while begging and dancing. Streetbased work started mostly after dusk and continued all night. Khwaja siras stood on main city
streets and around busy intersections in affluent neighborhoods of Karachi. There, they waited
for customers to pull over in cars to pick them up. In 2011, the younger generation of
genderqueer people in Lahore had started frequenting novel spaces to seek out potential clients.
Fida, for instance, regularly visited several shīshā cafes (hookah bars) dressed in men’s clothes
to be picked up by male patrons.

Sexuality and Sexual Practices
Khwaja sira sex workers had sexual encounters with a variety of men, including heterosexual
men, men who were exclusively attracted to khwaja siras, and certain gay-identifying men. The
sexual practices of khwaja sira prostitutes varied and often reflected the wishes of their clients.
Most customers were penetrative partners during sexual intercourse, but some enjoyed being
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Here, sex addiction refers to compulsive sexual urges and an excessively frequent need for
sexual gratification. 	
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penetrated by the khwaja siras whose services they sought. Khwaja siras disparagingly referred
to such individuals as guptī, that is, men who hid their desire to be sexually penetrated out of a
sense of shame. While corporeally emasculated khwaja siras (nirbān) did not have the physical
capacity to penetrate, those who possessed male genitals (akvā) complied with the demands of
clients regardless of their own sexual desires. “See, I am a professional,” said Hasi. “I do
whatever work I get. I do it when clients ask me, but my personal desires are those of woman.”
Although some gender ambiguous people enjoyed penetrating, few were willing to admit it, and
the ones who did, recalled the horror of having to do so.

Rates
Informants reported charging clients anywhere between Rs. 150 and 7000 (approx. $2-80) per
client. Differences in service rates varied based on the following criteria: the demand/beauty of a
sex worker, her long and/or short term monetary needs, the kinds of sexual services desired by
the client, and the client’s affordability78. Due to rising competition and poverty, many khwaja
siras engaged in sex work for very low amounts. Genderqueer sex workers in Karachi competed
with both male and female sex workers as well as migrant/seasonal prostitutes who were known
to charge lower rates.

Sex Work and Violence
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Khwaja sira sex workers relied on visual cues to determine a new customer’s class background
and quoted an appropriate amount accordingly; in street-based work, the client’s attire, car and
pickup location indicated how much he could afford, while in phone-based dealings, his manner
of speaking and use of language (i.e., Urdu, English or some other language) were indicators of
purchasing power.
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Sex work was both stigmatized and highly dangerous work since it was often accompanied by
physical abuse and brutal gang rapes. Khwaja sira rape victims tended to be apathetic to the
brutality meted out on them. For instance, I was chatting with a small group of khwaja siras at
Payal’s house one day when Hasi giggled and said that she was once raped by four men. In
response, Meera boasted being dragged into a car and taken to an unknown location where she
was forced to have sex with a group of eleven men. Oddly, Meera took pleasure in describing
herself as the object of desire and the chosen victim of a bunch of men. Incidents of sexual
violence were treated matter-of-factly, and they gave the victims bragging rights over their
exploitation. Their flippancy towards such incidents of brutality either served to mask their
trauma or indicates their belief that sex workers deserved mistreatment due to their involvement
in vice.

The Games of Sex Work
Known as aḍībāz in Farsi, some khwaja sira sex workers were pickpockets and extortionists who
robbed clients while performing sexual services. One day, Simmy, an aḍībāz sex worker, proudly
described the games she played with her customers. I learned that she and her guru, Ruby, stood
around busy intersections of affluent neighborhoods at dusk each day. Dressed in niqāb79, they
were mistaken for women by onlookers and potential clients. When a car pulled up, Simmy took
the front seat next to the driver and Ruby sat in the back. Once inside, the duo would begin
dealing with the driver while scanning the vehicle for valuables (e.g., cellphone, wallet). After
settling on a sexual service (generally some form of oral sex), they took the money upfront and
carefully observed where the client stowed the wallet. The customer either continued driving or
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
79
A headscarf that covers the entire face except the eyes.
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pulled over in a dark empty plot where Simmy sexually serviced him. While pleasuring the
client, her wandering hands would furtively find the wallet, which she quietly handed over to her
guru. Ruby would empty its contents and hand the wallet back to Simmy who put it back in its
place. The client was typically too distracted driving the car or being sexually aroused to notice
this exchange. Typically after discharging, clients were too rushed to get rid of the prostitutes
from their car that they failed to notice the missing belongings until it was too late. Simmy and
Ruby would ask to be dropped off at a busy intersection where they disappear into the crowd.
The highest amount they had made by robbing a single client was Rs. 50,000. “I’ve even gotten
expensive mobiles,” said Simmy. “The other day I brought home an iPhone. I’ve also brought
back laptops from people’s cars.”
Sometimes, pickpocketing turned into blackmail. Once an unsuspecting driver offered
Simmy a ride, unaware that she was a khwaja sira or a sex worker.
I was walking down the street late at night. I was completely covered up in a veil, and
this old man with a big beard pulled over his car. He said to me that I shouldn’t be
walking alone so late in the night. He offered me a lift, so I got in. When he started
driving, I began taking my clothes off. He got really flustered. He’s was like, “What are
you doing? What you do want, child? Betā, you’re like my daughter. Don’t get naked!
Don’t get naked!” I said to him, “I want Rs. 10,000 right here! Right now!” He quickly
took out whatever money he had. He handed me Rs. 5,000. I saw the money and I just sat
there naked. I told him that I was going to start screaming. So he quickly took out another
5,000. I took the money and got out.
Simmy decided to blackmail the man when she realized that he was not interested in sex. In such
situations, drivers feared losing respect, and panicked over getting into trouble with law
enforcement or being attacked by angry mobs for the attempted rape of a young woman. Yelling,
screaming and threatening drivers with rape allegations were enough for Simmy to get her
victims to comply with her demands. Simmy laughed wickedly as she recounting her skillful
manipulation of these men: “When you notice that a man is scared, then doing this work is way
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more fun.” These sex workers played with the world through creative methods of theft. These
acts of trickery were among the techniques that they had developed in response to being forced
into an “unrespectable” profession.
Simmy’s biography partly explains why she felt little remorse for her actions. At the age
of seventeen, she was a victim of brutal violence at the hands of a gang of miscreants who raped
her and left her for dead. “They cut my hair and poured alcohol over me. Beat me up really
badly,” said Simmy as she showed me a set of deep scars on her back. “Initially, the doctors said
that I may never be able to walk again.” Simmy’s mother sold her jewelry to cover the cost of
her treatment. Indebted to her mother, Simmy vowed to make a lot of money to support her
family.

Seasonal and Miscellaneous Work
In addition to their routine livelihood activities, khwaja siras earned through seasonal work, such
as begging, dancing and sex work at the shrines of Sufi saints during their annual death
anniversary festivals (‘urs), dancing in the well/globe of death (maut kā kunvāŋ/
golā)80 at traveling circuses, begging during the festivals of Eīd, and collecting and selling wheat
during the annual wheat harvest81. Birthday parties were another source of income for khwaja
siras. Through these celebrations, the hosts made money in the form of cash contributions from
khwaja sira guests (moṛā) and through the practice of dropping cash on khwaja sira dancers
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
80
A wooden trellised well/globe in which stuntmen rode cars and motorcycles. Khwaja siras
danced at the bottom of the structure, and risked death in the event the vehicles fell over them.
81
Each year during the wheat harvest, many khwaja siras from Karachi went to live in
agricultural areas in rural Sindh and Punjab for a couple of months. They earned by serving as
intermediaries between farmers/landlords and the marketplace. During the harvest, they went to
the homes of farmers/landlords to collect wheat as a form of charity, and then sold it to market
vendors. In 2011, khwaja siras made close to Rs. 100,000 (approx. $1,143) on average during
each month of the harvest.
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(tamāshbenī)82. Some khwaja siras ran part-time tailoring businesses from home and offered
services to their khwaja sira contacts and to the women in their neighborhoods. Other kinds of
work for which they were generally known included common housekeeping chores, such as
cooking and cleaning.83
Those who wished to be involved in “respectable” work, or at least wanted to maintain
the illusion of propriety, took up jobs as cooks and peons in the service and corporate sectors.
Informants reported working in restaurants, factories, mills, as rickshaw drivers, and
hairdressers. They temporarily covered their khwaja sira identities and adopted as masculine a
persona as they could for such work. However, most khwaja siras were unable to retain such jobs
due to routine harassments from co-workers.
Nadia: One day I was begging on the streets and a man asked me if I would change how I
dress if someone gave me a proper job. I said yes and he hired me at his office. I worked
there for three months. He would pay me Rs. 3000 and my job was to clean, get tea, and
do other small tasks. I would dress in a pant-shirt for work. My boss was really nice but
the other employees there did not like me. Even though I dressed up in men’s clothes, I
was very feminine, and I made the other employees uncomfortable. They would say that
I’m the boss’s second wife. And whenever one of his friends would visit, they’d make
fun of him for hiring me…That used to make me feel really bad, so I left the job. You
see, we often find ourselves at a loss because of our way of walking and talking. We
can’t change it. But people laugh at us because of it.
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This event was not held on the actual day of a khwaja sira’s birth even though they were called
birthday parties and involved cake-cutting. For these elaborate parties, the hosts distributed
invitation cards, reserved wedding halls, hired videographers and DJs, and wore specially
tailored outfits. The guests included both khwaja siras and their admirers. The organizers
profited from these parties because cash contributions received from guests were typically
several times the cost of hosting the event. Birthday parties were mostly held on a need basis.
The money that a khwaja sira received was considered a form of loan that she eventually had to
pay back. In 2011, khwaja sira consultants made between Rs. 60,000-130,000 (approx. $6861,486) per party.
83
In the past, people hired khwaja siras as domestic employees in their homes. The practice was
largely defunct, partly due to the unwillingness of khwaja siras to settle for low wages when their
earnings could be significantly higher through begging, dancing and sex work.
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Mahnoor: I used to work at a garment factory, but murats can’t work in places like that.
People would tease me and touch me and say all kinds if things. A lot of people there
wanted to do things with me.
Sheeri: I used to teach English and Mathematics, but I left teaching because students did
not treatment me with respect. They would call me hijra and whatnot. It was torture.
Sameera: I used to work as an accountant at a multinational company. Once, his
colleague told him, “What kind of creature have your kept in your office?” In response,
my boss said, “He does the work of so three people, so I’m not at a loss by having him.”
After that, I got a job at a joint venture company…But I reflected badly on the company,
and my employer had to lay me off against his will due to pressure from his clients.
No matter how much they tried, gender ambiguous were unable to fully conceal their femininity.
In the workplace, slippages during performances of masculinity tended to result in harassment.
The testimonies of those who tried their hand at “decent” jobs before resorting to khwaja sira
work are rife with episodes of sexual violence, emotional abuse and humiliation.

Government Jobs
Among the rulings passed in their favor, the Supreme Court announced a 2% job quota and
ordered the government to create employment opportunities for khwaja siras. Several
government departments followed the Court’s ruling by offering them employment. The
National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), the department responsible for issuing
national identity cards to khwaja siras, appointed a khwaja sira for a desk job at one of its
branches. In addition, CBC and CBF, the governing bodies of two distinct municipal towns in
Karachi hired khwaja siras as tax recovery officers. In 2011, the two civic bodies combined had
hired around twenty khwaja siras. Their job entailed going from door to door to distribute
outstanding tax notices and collecting unpaid dues. The khwaja sira employees at CBC and CBF
employed hijra begging techniques, which involved creating a spectacle and shaming home and
business owners into paying their dues. In 2011, khwaja siras broke the recovery record by
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surpassing their periodic quotas. Critics argued that employing gender ambiguous people to
exploit their conventional approach to begging reproduced their inferior status rather than
enabling them to become “respectable” constituents of society. Alternatively, khwaja sira
consultants were proud to be government employees and did not view their cultural practices as
markers of inferiority.
In early 2014, the Government of Sindh offered several positions to khwaja siras in
various departments as social workers and data entry operators. This was part of an extended
plan to hire more gender ambiguous people as public servants and loan recovery officers for
private banks. The provision of jobs was part of an effort to “mainstream” khwaja siras, and to
steer them away from “indecent” and “immoral” work. By this logic, the state’s attempts were
only partially successful since many khwaja siras supplemented their government salaries with
earnings through begging and sex work. In Chapters 7 and 9, I further assess the factors that
impeded the government’s policies aimed at uplifting khwaja siras.

NGO Work
Between 2011-12, the number of khwaja siras employed in sexual health NGOs in Pakistan
increased significantly partly due to the shift in interest among international donor agencies to
fund community-based organizations (CBOs) that required a greater involvement of “at risk”
populations, such as khwaja sira, in HIV/AIDS intervention programs. An NGO by the name of
“Male Health Society” (MHS) established several CBOs in different parts of the country. Backed
by a handsome multi-year grant from a foreign donor, the CBOs linked to MHS hired gender
ambiguous people and offered them generous salaries. In 2012, the senior most khwaja sira
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employees at these organizations made close to Rs. 80,000 (approx. $914) a month, inclusive of
benefits.

Competition
Khwaja siras constantly competed with one another in their everyday struggle to earn a living.
Their marginalization from mainstream jobs resulted in the scarcity of work within the field,
which in turn led to fierce competition among khwaja siras and other sexual minorities. Internal
competition often manifested in the form of ethnic conflicts between khwaja siras. These
tensions mirrored the larger faultlines that “perpetually undercut belongingness” (Khan 2010, 8)
in Pakistan, especially in the ethnically diverse and conflict-ridden city of Karachi. For instance,
Payal’s student, Naima, constantly found herself caught in brawls with khwaja siras from
different ethnic backgrounds.
The Sindhi khwaja siras here say that we are everything. “Why did you people come
from Punjab?” They come and fight with us, so we don’t even meet with them.
Hindustanis say that Karachi is theirs. I say, “Okay sister, it is yours. I don’t have the
right to earn here. I will sit in my house and not meet with you.”
Naima was regularly made to feel like an outsider even though she was a long-time resident of
Karachi. Although she was inducted into a Sindhi household, her Sindhi-speaking family
members constantly reminded her of her ethnic difference. Sindhi khwaja siras believed that they
had a greater earning right over Karachi than migrants from elsewhere. Payal’s family consisted
of khwaja sira migrants from different parts of the country, and many of the fights that took place
between them were either produced or aggravated by ethnic differences. Faced with increasing
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competition, the Karachi-natives asserted their right over the familial earning area and treated
their migrant kin as unwelcomed occupiers84.
In addition to internal competition, khwaja siras competed against a number of other
types of sex workers. Regardless of their involvement in sex work, khwaja sira prostitutes
viewed gay identifying individuals as competition. A growing number of educated gay youth
from lower middle-class backgrounds engaged in paid sex either on a full-time or need basis85.
Moreover, khwaja siras considered ordinary gay boys as competition because they provided free
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One day, I witnessed a ferocious brawl at Payal’s guru-bhāī’s house. The two opposing groups
included Payal and her students, Nadia and Moti, on one side, and her guru-bhāī, Laali, and her
disciples, Naeem and Chamak, on the other. Payal and Laali’s students shared an earning area
since they belonged to the same extended family. Naeem claimed that Nadia had been telling the
residents of the neighborhood that she had exclusive begging privileges over one of the
subdivisions in the area, a claim that Nadia denied. Instead, Nadia insisted that she had advised
the neighbors that if Pinky, a khwaja sira thief who belonged to another earning area, came to
their house asking for money, they should bar her from entering their house. Pinky belonged to
another khwaja sira family but was a longtime friend of Naeem’s. Apparently, when Naeem took
Pinky for begging one day, she stole an item from one of the houses in the area. In reference to
this incident, Nadia stated that gender ambiguous people from other neighborhoods were ruining
their family’s reputation within the locality.
The situation aggravated when Naeem declared, “We are from here-- all of you are
outsiders!” Naeem insinuated that she and her guru-bhāīs had more rights over the earning area
because they were born and raised in Karachi (desī), while Payal’s students, Nadia and Moti,
who had migrated from Punjab, were non-natives (pardesī). On hearing this, Moti, who had been
sitting quietly, suddenly jumped to her feet and began verbally abusing and clapping wildly in
Naeem’s face. Chamak and a few others came to Naeem’s rescue in what turned into a collective
verbal assault. Soon after, the neighbors started banging on the door of the house, demanding the
khwaja siras to put an end to the feud. Payal and Laali joined the dispute in an attempt to put it to
rest, but their overbearing voices made the altercation louder instead of silencing the participants.
Fearing that the fight would become violent, I stepped away from the group and stood at a safe
observable distance. The argument continued unrelentingly for sometime, but fortunately it
ended right before the clan came to blows. The neighborhood barber entered the house and
separated the parties into two separate rooms, which finally helped to calm everyone down. Once
peace was restored, Payal made her and Laali’s disciples embrace one another.
85
In addition to gay boys, young heterosexual boys between the ages of 12-18 (chāvā) were
known to have sex with men for small sums of money. These boys came from poor families, and
they charged lower rates compared to both gays and khwaja siras. Male masseurs (mālīshīah),
who were also typically heterosexual, were known for their involvement in sex work. These men
were mostly seen at nighttime around busy intersections and traffic circles carrying bottles of oil.
	
  

203	
  

sexual access to some male clients86. Gender ambiguous people disparaged gay boys for
appropriating a feminine appearance in order to attract men. Below, Noman, a self-identified gay
man, describes the benefit of makeup as a visual marker of queerness.
My friends and I wear light makeup. The benefit of having a feminine touch is that boys
get attracted to you really quickly. No one is able to figure out that I’m gay if I dress
normally. Typically, boys see me when I wear makeup and they start talking to me and
one thing leads to another.
Others used the Internet to interact with potential clients. In order to access a broader clientele,
some gay sex workers experimented with cross-dressing and created Internet profiles of their
feminine personas. Khwaja siras despised gays for impinging on their livelihood, especially since
they were educated and had access to mainstream job opportunities.

Earning/Spending Patterns
Khwaja siras were culturally marginalized and limited to earning a living through socially
unacceptable work. However, they were not impoverished in terms of gross income. The khwaja
sira residents of Karachi were earning between Rs. 20,000-30,000 (approx. $ 229-343) per
month on average, which was well above the poverty line in 2011. Earnings varied depending on
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In Pakistan’s male dominated society, women were less present compared to men in the public
sphere. Strict moral codes and limitations on mobility restricted men from accessing women.
These constraints fueled the sex industry in Pakistan, where gender ambiguous people, gay boys,
heterosexual boys, male masseurs and female sex workers provided sexual relief to hordes of
single and married men. With sexual release being the primary objective for many, it was not
surprising that an overlap had developed in the clientele of this diverse group of sex workers.
Consequently, those involved in the industry tended to view one another as competitors vying for
a share of the client pool. In some situations, however, competitors turned into allies. This was
certainly the case for some khwaja siras and female sex workers who had found ways to
collaborate for mutual benefit. For instance, Ghazal informed me about a vast inter-city network
of sex workers through which she frequently made money by serving as an intermediary between
women sex workers and clients. This sex worker network extended beyond Pakistan to places
like Dubai where women and khwaja siras worked seasonally as bar dancers and escorts.
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a khwaja sira’s beauty, her location, source of livelihood, and the number of hours worked each
day.
However, the high incomes of khwaja siras were offset by their high monthly expenses.
This was because most supported two households, which, in addition to personal living expenses,
included sending remittances to their natal kin. Moreover, khwaja siras spent a significant
portion of their incomes on personal upkeep, which was crucial to those who earned through
dancing and sex work. In addition to spending on clothes, wigs, makeup and jewelry, they
invested in enhancing their physical appearance through medical procedures (e.g., breast
implants, physical emasculation, laser hair removal, hormone therapy) as well as less invasive
methods (e.g., threading, waxing, bleaching and skin lightening). Moreover, khwaja siras had to
spend on both men’s and women’s products given their need to maintain two genders.
Our expenses are twice as much as common people. For instance, we use razors and Fair
and Lovely (skin lightening cream). Women only have to spend money on things that
women need, but shemales have to spend on things that both men and women need. We
have to get both men’s and women’s outfits made because we need men’s clothes when
we visit our families.
Importantly, their expenses would have been lower had the social stigma surrounding khwaja
siras not existed. Finally, a considerable amount of money was squandered on food, alcohol,
marijuana, cigarettes, and on cash contributions made at cultural events. These earning and
spending patterns are astonishing in light of the stereotype of khwaja siras as impoverished
people.

Khwaja Sira Self-Representation
Deceiving the Anthropologist
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Stigma, oppression and marginalization necessitated khwaja siras to engage in secrecy and a
deception in interactions with outsiders. During the first couple of months of fieldwork, the
games of secrecy and deception that khwaja siras played with me worked quite well. Often my
communication with them left me feeling confused, frustrated and unclear about many aspects of
their lives. As a pawn in this web of deceit, I gradually pieced together the puzzle that my
informants had created for me. Here, I describe my firsthand experiences with khwaja sira
obfuscation and deception.
Foremost was the secrecy surrounding corporeality. Colloquially, many interlocutors
employed the term “khwaja sira” for gender ambiguous people even though formally many
understood it to mean an intersexual person. Goffman suggests that stigmatized persons use
various strategies to fashion a virtual identity that is distinct from their actual social identity
(1963, 41). Similarly, the true identity of khwaja siras as akvās and nirbāns was different from
their virtual public identity as intersexuals. During initial interviews, my casual use of the term
khwaja sira produced some unexpected results. When I told prospective respondents that I was
studying khwaja siras, some of them thought that I was looking to interview people with
congenital irregularities and, therefore, claimed to be intersexual. They engaged in a form of
mimesis by feeding me information that they thought I was seeking, particularly since they were
afraid of revealing their akvā and nirbān statuses. In order to circumvent the politics of the word,
Nadia and I decided to avoid using the term khwaja sira in subsequent recruitment efforts.
However, the performances of deception persisted during interviews. One day, I
interviewed Malka as she lay comfortably on her bed. Nadia sat beside me smoking a cigarette as
I questioned Malka about her gender/sexual identity. Nadia and Malka were guru-bhāīs, but I
barely knew Malka and had only briefly met her once prior to the interview.
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Faris: If I ask you who you are, what would you tell me?
Malka: I am a khwaja sira.
Faris: What is a khwaja sira?
Malka: A khwaja sira is someone who is by birth (paidāishī).
Faris: What do you mean by “by birth”?
Malka: Those who are born with both boy and girl parts.
Faris: I see. What about other types of khwaja siras?
Malka: What types? There are no other types.
Faris: What about those who are akvā and nirbān?
Malka was momentarily stunned by my knowledge of khwaja sira somatic categories and use of
Farsi terms for non-emasculated and emasculated people.
Malka: Oh, those types. Yeah, but I’m not like them. I’ve always been like this.
Faris: But I thought most khwaja siras are either akvā or nirbān.
Malka: Yes, but I’m not like that. I’m by birth.
Malka and I continued to dance around the topic of identity and corporeality until I realized that
she was not going to give up the charade. I decided to stop probing and moved onto the next
question. I had grown familiar with these informant dance routines by the time this interview
took place. Simmel argues that people’s ability to be truthful or not depends on their level of
knowledge of one another (Lieberman 1977, 66). In social interactions, it is easier to deceive
others in the absence of reciprocal knowledge, and the act of deceiving depends upon on the
deceived’s lack of information (Lieberman 1977, 67). Likewise, the relationships between
khwaja siras and ordinary people were characterized by the latter’s limited and distorted
knowledge of the former. These interactions were also influenced by khwaja sira’s perceptions of
and experiences with the social stigma attached to gender/sexual variance. In such situations,
gender ambiguous people engaged in a deceptive game of self-representation in which they
asserted the religiously sanctioned intersexual identity. Similarly, interviewing was like playing a
game of bluff, where the players, in this case the interviewer and interviewee, tried reading the
other for signs of knowledge and deception, while carefully calculating their next move.
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Even though I doubted Malka’s claim about her being intersexual, her resolute response
left me feeling uncertain. It was not until after the interview that Nadia cleared my uncertainty.
“So is she really by birth?” I asked Nadia as we left Malka’s house. “Of course not!” said
responded. “She’s such a liar! She has such a big penis.” While interacting with outsiders,
informants reinforced the dominant meaning of khwaja sira in order to protect themselves from
discrimination. However, unlike Malka, most interlocutors reluctantly dropped the ruse when I
demonstrated my insider knowledge about gender ambiguous people. Their façade of deception
collapsed in the presence of reciprocal knowledge.
Khwaja sira games of secrecy and deception were grounded in the partial and erroneous
knowledge—comprised primarily of myths and stereotypes— that the general public had of
them. Khwaja siras benefitted from the awareness that non-khwaja siras people knew little about
them, which helped to facilitate their deceptive acts of survival. They either blatantly
misrepresented themselves as intersexuals or evaded questions pertaining to corporeality.
Faris: There are different types of khwaja siras. What type are you?
Noor: A tree has one root, but it has branches that go in different directions. Essentially
all khwaja siras are the same. There are some who are beautiful so they think they are
women, and they look down upon those who are less beautiful than them. They think that
they are better than others.
Faris: I have heard that nirbāns look down upon akvās.
Noor: Yes, you are right, but even nirbāns stem from akvās. Akvās are the root.
Noor avoided discussing the genital constitution of gender ambiguous people, or what
Lieberman refers to as “deception by omission” (1977, 78) and skirted the topic of emasculation.
Further, she digressed by commenting on the contentions between khwaja siras, which she
misleadingly attributed to differences in gender ambiguous people’s physical beauty. It was not
until I demonstrated my insider knowledge of Farsi terms related to emasculation that Noor was
more forthcoming with me. My deliberate use of the words akvā and nirbān made her
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obfuscation attempts futile, and she immediately dropped the tree analogy for a literal
explanation of corporeal taxonomies. However, even then, Noor refrained from revealing her
own somatic status.
Among the secrets that khwaja siras kept from the general public were their sexual
relationships with men. People’s involvement in illegitimate sexual behavior casts doubt on their
moral character. Hence, informants reinforced the myth that khwaja siras were either asexual
ascetics or physically incapable of engaging in sexual behavior. In light of the taboos associated
with sex, it was prudent of khwaja siras to be discreet about their love and sex lives.
Gender ambiguous people also concealed their marital status in order to perpetuate the
stereotype of intersexuality, childlessness and asceticism associated with khwaja siras. When
questioned about marriage, Shani laughed and said, “See, khwaja siras cannot get married.”
Shani’s use of the word “cannot” was meant to suggest that gender ambiguous people were
incapable of marriage and reproduction. Similarly, Guppo laughed nervously when I asked her if
she was married. “We don’t get married,” she said. When I insisted that I knew married khwaja
siras, she said, “No, no. There’s no such thing.” However, about a month after the interview,
Guppo trusted me enough to confide that she was married with three children.
Further, informants were dishonest about their involvement in sex work. When I first met
her, Kajal gave me the impression that she had never engaged in prostitution. It was not until my
sixth month into fieldwork that she finally admitted being a sex worker. By then, she felt
comfortable entertaining clients in a private room in her house during my visits to her ḍeṛā. On
one such occasion, Kajal excused herself when a client arrived, and upon her return, offered
vivid details about her experience with him. Her warming up to me was a stark contrast from her
initial self-representation as a “respectable” khwaja sira. Likewise, most informants initially hid
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their involvement in sex work and many denounced it as a reprehensible act. However, over time
they confided in me, especially upon realizing that I was not one to pass moral judgment based
on sexual behavior. Khwaja siras who barely knew me hid the same aspects of their lives that
they covered from other “worldly” people.
Secrecy was often maintained through the use of Farsi. Over tea one afternoon, Maina
taught me key Farsi terms for my research. When her guru-bhāī, Nighat, overheard our
conversation from across the room, she quickly approached Maina and uttered in Farsi, “Be
quiet!” (Kaṛe karājā). With a subtle glare, she signaled Maina to quit teaching me their secret
code. By then, I had already picked up enough Farsi to understand the exchange between the
two. This was not the first time I had witnessed a khwaja sira expressing concern over an
outsider learning Farsi. I assured Nighat that Maina had not taught me anything that I did not
already know. Farsi enabled khwaja siras to secure communication in the presence of third
parties they did not trust. It was a cryptographic tool that allowed them to control information
and to maintain privacy about the clandestine aspects of their lives.

Significance of Secrecy and Deception
The motivations behind such performances of deception were sundry. One of the primary
reasons was the fear of negatively impacting the respectability of one’s immediate kin (i.e.,
parents, siblings, wives, children) and being persecuted by extended family. As one khwaja sira
told me, “Anything can happen. God forbid my relatives see the interview and I get into trouble,
so it is better to avoid giving interviews altogether.” The suspicion of outsiders was not
completely unfounded since the carelessness of media outlets had previously gotten khwaja siras
into trouble. I learned that before my arrival in the field, a local television channel covered a
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story on khwaja siras, and upon the participant’s request, promised to blur their faces. However,
the informants were exposed when the show finally aired, and as a result, many were persecuted
by their extended families.
Moreover, secrecy and deception were essential since most key aspects of the khwaja sira
lifestyle were either illegal or religiously and socially objectionable. For instance, sex work and
anal sex were unlawful and believed to be sinful and disrespectable. Begging was frowned upon
and tolerable only in situations of dire financial need, while dancing was considered to be a
dishonorable profession. Those who possessed functioning male genitals were viewed as
reproductively capable men who posed as khwaja sira, while the feminine soul was a culturally
unrecognized condition. Instead of challenging social norms, gender ambiguous people
obfuscated aspects of their sexuality, identity, corporeality and livelihood, and engaged in the
games of deceit with the general public in order to maintain individual and communal security
and respectability, and to gain personal advantage over their opponents, who sometimes included
other khwaja siras.
When I met her in March 2013, Naima complained about the negative effects of the
public attention that khwaja siras had received since the 2009 Supreme Court directives. “In the
past, people did not know or care about us, but now they know everything.” Naima blamed
media outlets and zennanas for disclosing the secrets of khwaja siras to the public, thereby
preventing gender ambiguous people from peacefully earning a living under the guise of
respectability. “Now so many people know that we are not by birth, that we have children, and
that we get operated,” she lamented. Naima alluded to the public’s growing awareness about
khwaja siras, or what Lieberman refers to as “closed and suspicious awareness” (Lieberman
1977, 68). This meant that mainstream society was either oblivious to the fact that gender
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ambiguous people lied to them or they harbored suspicions that they were being deceived.
Suspicious awareness produced a state of ambiguity about khwaja sira corporeality, sexuality
and livelihood. This emerging situation highlights the enduring need for concealment and
deception among khwaja siras.

Conclusion
Cultural, structural and direct violence from natal kin, partners, neighbors, employers, patrons,
and from other khwaja siras compelled gender ambiguous people to engage in the games of
secrecy and deception with their oppressors. They had to constantly negotiate respectability
because their culture and livelihood were entrenched in socially and religiously reprehensible
practices. In everyday life, khwaja siras exercised deceptive agency to escape persecution.
Moreover, they portrayed themselves as moral and responsible through constant self-policing in
public spaces, by producing an aura of respectability through participation in socially and
religiously commendable acts, and by successfully managing their dual roles as khwaja siras (in
the field) and as men (in their familial networks). They tried to pass as men during visits to their
familial homes, but in their lives as khwaja siras, they tried to pass as intersexual and asexual
ascetics while covering involvement in socially offensive behavior. Indeed, covering and
misleading was much easier than confronting social norms and risking further marginalization
and disempowerment. This chapter concludes Part 2 and its focus on the culture and subjectivity
of khwaja siras. Part 3 reveals that the issues encountered by ordinary khwaja siras, such as
stigma, repression, exclusion, and the complications emanating from varied understandings of
their identity, were replicated in the domain of activism. It sheds light on how khwaja sira
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activists dealt with these problems and the kinds deceptive techniques they deployed to counter
their subjugation.
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PART THREE:
Activism
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Chapter 6:
Internal Identity Politics: Activism, Stigma and Social Differentiation
Although khwaja siras had an ancient system of social organization, their organizing for rights
and social justice was in its infancy at the time of this research. This chapter explores many of
the challenges faced by the khwaja sira movement from within. The habitus or the dispositions
and internalized structures embedded within individual consciousness (Bourdieu 2008, 82-3)
impact social movements on the microcosmic level (Salman and Assies 2007, 235). The
everyday life of khwaja sira activists and their organizations represented these smaller
constellations where generative behavior emerged. When khwaja siras entered activist spaces,
they brought with them the burdens of the past. In other words, they were influenced by the
“deeply buried structure that shape[ed]…[their] dispositions to act in ways that they wind[ed] up
accepting the dominance of…‘the system,’ without being made to do so” (Ortner 2006, 5). As
subjects of their time and place, khwaja sira activists were swayed by unconscious constraints
since they and their organizations were not removed from the larger society. Consequently,
normative constructions of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, morality and so on were reproduced in
khwaja sira activism. However, human beings also have the ability to make choices that allow
them to maneuver around their limitations (Barnard 2000, 143). Likewise, khwaja sira leaders
found ways to make the structure enabling for themselves.
This chapter lays bare the challenges posed by the activist’s habitus, which reproduced in
institutionalized contexts many of the same problems that plagued khwaja sira communities
(discussed in Chapter 4). The lack of unity within the khwaja sira cultural system was replicated
in the realm of activism. I argue that the harmful effects of social stigma trickled into khwaja sira
organizations, prompting activists to discriminate against one another on the basis of normative
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culture and khwaja sira ideals. And yet, the imbrications between and the mutual interests of
distinct queer groups occasionally enabled collaborations across difference.

Queer and Khwaja Sira Organizing in Pakistan
Encounters With the State
I begin with a brief introduction to the history of queer organizing in Pakistan, highlighting the
role of sexual health NGOs in paving the way for khwaja sira organizations. Queer encounters
with the Pakistani state include a ban that was imposed on hijra activities in the early 1960s.
According to an Urdu daily, the state’s action was a measure to weed out fake hijras, for which it
prescribed as punishment shaving the heads of those impersonating hijras (Daily Express, 2007).
However, the prohibition was lifted after khwaja siras staged a sit-in in front of President Ayub
Khan’s residence where they complained to Khan’s “mother about her son’s decision…
reminding her that they had sung a lorī (a lullaby for infants) for Ayub when he was born”
(Naqvi and Mujtaba 1997, 266). The next notable queer confrontation with the state occurred
during the 1990 elections when a zennana was nominated by the people of Abbottabad to run for
public office (Naqvi and Mujtaba 1997, 267). The candidate, Mohammad Aslam, a singer/dancer
and waiter by profession, did not win a seat but certainly paved the way for greater khwaja sira
involvement in politics (Pamment 2010, 36). In 1997, Almas Bobby, a Rawalpindi based khwaja
sira attempted to contest a seat in the national assembly but the government rejected her
application (Pamment 2010, 36)87.
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Hijras in India have also demonstrated interest in local and national politics by running for
public office. In their campaigns, these hijras have represented themselves as being above the
corruption and immorality typical of Indian politics (Reddy 2005, 223).
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Since the mid-2000s, several factors have played a role in facilitating queer organizing in
Pakistan. First, the economic liberalization of the early 1990s introduced changes in trade
policies, strengthened the private sector (Chaudhry 1995, 188), and increased the transnational
traffic of people and ideas. Second, the sexual health and advocacy programs that were set up to
contain HIV/AIDS created opportunities for sexual minorities to organize and to learn about
rights activism. Third, the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of khwaja siras not only invigorated
khwaja sira activism but also encouraged other queer groups in the country. In 2013, seven
khwaja sira leaders from across Pakistan contested in the Pakistani General and Assembly
Elections as independent candidates. Although none of them were triumphant, their participation
was a democratic milestone for the country.

LGBT Organizing
Queer organizing began in small measure in Pakistan in the mid-2000s, however, to date, the
country does not have a visible LGBT movement per se. While the majority of this activism was
centered on khwaja sira groups publically fighting for citizenship rights, other sexual minorities
also began to organize surreptitiously. In light of legal, religious and cultural restrictions, it is
hardly surprising that much of this organizing transpired underground. Although there were
several queer activist organizations in Pakistan at the time of this research, they kept a very low
profile, and the few that were registered with the government managed to do so under the guise
of minority rights and youth development. Most were involved in community support and
development rather than public advocacy and demands for rights. A few had managed to acquire
foreign donor funding for small research and development projects involving sexual minorities.
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In 2013, at least two queer organizations that I know of had office spaces, but the vast majority
were online entities, functioning as secret Facebook groups, websites and blogs88. Online
organizing played a key role in connecting local and diasporic queers and in fostering a sense of
community. It was also instrumental in disseminating information and facilitating dialogue
around issues pertaining to sexuality and rights.
Rather than adopting an aggressive top-down approach to activism, most of these
organizations opted for a measured grassroots strategy that suited the Pakistani context. In
contrast, khwaja siras were visible in the public sphere, where they openly engaged in advocacy
and demanded rights. Unlike gays and lesbians, khwaja siras were culturally tolerated, but they
were not free from many of the restrictions and dangers that applied to other sexual/gender
minorities.

Khwaja Sira Development and Activism
Moments of khwaja sira mobilizing in the history of Pakistan have been few and far between.
However, there was a marked shift in the intensity of their activism in the first decade of the
twenty-first century owing partly to legal reform and to HIV/AIDS intervention. The present turn
to khwaja sira organizing started roughly around 2004 when community leaders began to
organize and publically challenge the status quo. What further propelled their activism was the
2009 Supreme Court decision to grant rights to khwaja siras. After decades without legal
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The administrators of queer websites and blogs had to be careful about the kind of material
they posted on their online forums in order to avoid getting banned by the Pakistan Electronic
Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). At the time of this study, certain online content was
inaccessible to Internet users in Pakistan, including pornography, gay dating and hookups
websites, and websites containing words deemed offensive by PEMRA. Moreover, amid fears of
government surveillance, many queer groups on Facebook had strict admission and membership
policies. 	
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recognition and protection, the Pakistani state collaborated with NGOs and activists in an effort
to empower khwaja siras. As a result of the Court’s decision, community leaders gained
confidence, started forming organizations, launching protests against harassment, and
collaborating with media outlets to highlight rights violations. However, other than empowering
activist leaders and diminishing police brutality, improvement in their legal status did little to
positively impact the everyday lives of ordinary khwaja siras. This, in turn, explains the
continued involvement of khwaja sira rights groups and NGOs in the social development of this
minority population.
Pakistan is home to a host of NGOs that are engaged in the surveillance and control of
HIV/AIDS. Many of these organizations work on the sexual health of vulnerable males who
have sex with males (MSM), a broad framework that oftentimes includes khwaja siras. Along
with disease prevention and control, a few NGOs focus on issues of rights and on the social
development of khwaja siras, but up until 2013 there had been little overall progress in this area.
There is a strong yet complex link between health and activism in that issues of public
health invite social reform when human life is at stake (Pigg and Adams 2005). Consequently,
political organizing often occurs in and through public health domains. This has certainly been
the case for HIV/AIDS intervention in India and now increasingly in Pakistan, where programs
to control the spread of the virus have mushroomed across the country in the last decade or so.89
Sexual health organizations employed khwaja siras and created new venues for them to convene.
Though project funds are meant primarily for HIV intervention, they are also used for the
capacity building of smaller organizations that provide services to sexual minorities. Capacity
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
89
HIV/AIDS programs have blossomed partly due to the Pakistani government’s commitment to
curb the spread of the disease in the country, to which end it has been providing free treatment
(i.e., medication, monthly testing and counseling) to HIV positive patients since 2005.
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building refers to the process whereby individuals and organizations create and improve a set of
desired qualities that can be drawn upon to perform and achieve certain objectives (Potter and
Brough 2004, 337). It can include activities, such as the provision of material and financial
support, educational training and skill enhancement, leadership development, alliance formation,
fundraising, research and assessment, media advocacy, strategic planning, and so on. The
educational training of these NGOs also covers topics related to gender, sexuality, and human
rights along with issues of sexual and reproductive health. NGOs regularly recruit indigenous
minorities and provide them educational training on these topics in order to build their capacities
and to transform them into rights-conscious activists.
Up until early 2013, NGOs in Pakistan had done little to build the capacities of khwaja
siras. One of the few exceptions was Male Health Society (MHS), a relatively new NGO that
focused on the sexual health of MSM and “transgender” people. In addition to educating
vulnerable groups about their right of access to sexual health, MHS initiated a literacy project for
khwaja siras in mid-2013. This program aimed to teach English, Urdu, and basic arithmetic to
gender ambiguous people. Nonetheless, such development activities were rare, and most NGOs
had made halfhearted attempts that had little impact on the lives of khwaja siras. Instead of
capacity building, many focused on developing close ties with khwaja sira communities through
the provision of services and resources. In addition to condom distribution and clinical services,
some opened their premises for khwaja siras to hold cultural events. A few NGOs played a role
in helping khwaja sira leaders set up organizations of their own by allowing them to run their
operations from the NGO’s office90.
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Among the problems facing the NGO sector in Pakistan was corruption, which indirectly
affected khwaja sira activism. Project funds were frequently misappropriated instead of being
utilized for their intended purpose. Needless to say, NGO corruption was detrimental to the
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In recent years, donor agencies have become increasingly interested in funding
community based organizations (CBOs) in developing countries. CBOs are either independently
run or are non-profit subsidiaries of large NGOs. Individual CBOs are run by and for specific
local or indigenous communities, and are either self-funded or operate on a voluntary basis.
Their recent popularity among donors is based on the notion that small local groups are more
effective in addressing the needs of target populations than large organizations. Many NGOs in
Pakistan, including MHS, caught onto this CBO-centered funding trend. For instance, MHS set
up MSM and TG CBOs across the country that focused primarily on sexual health91. In 2013, the
organization and its CBOs had employed close to 99 individuals, 92 of whom were either gay or
gender ambiguous.
NGO-led sexual health programs have played a role in propelling khwaja sira activism in
Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, development programs play a key role in transforming their
target populations by educating them about sexuality, identity and rights. NGO trainings and
employment not only taught khwaja siras about advocacy, but also how to run organizations of
their own. By late 2013, I knew of eight organizations that were being run relatively
independently by khwaja siras, less than half of which were government-registered. Five of these
were in Punjab, one in Kyber Pakhtunkhwa, and four in Sindh. Despite their best efforts, most
khwaja sira organizations were handicapped due to lack of education and basic skills, even
though some, including GSS, received technical support from larger organizations like MHS.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
social development of khwaja siras. While some activists had become disillusioned with NGO
work, others mastered the dishonest practices of these organizations, which resulted in a
collective drive to land large grants rather than focusing on the problems facing khwaja siras.
91
AKS, the Lahore-based khwaja sira organization that I studied, was among the CBOs set up by
MHS.
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Although khwaja siras learned valuable lessons through their participation in sexual health
projects, their activist politics were deeply rooted in their culture and subjectivity.

Gender Solidarity Society: A Brief History
Payal, the president of GSS, was an illiterate hijra in her late-forties. Over the course of her
career, she had gradually risen in rank within her local hijra community. Not only was she the
chief of one of the largest earning areas in Karachi, but she was also the elder of an extensive
network of khwaja siras who were filially linked to one another. She started her journey as a
social worker in 2006, and around the same time she met Hira, a student of gender and sexuality
at a liberal arts college in the United States, and her mother, Aaliya, a veteran activist of the
women’s movement in Pakistan. Hira wanted to make a documentary on khwaja siras for her
senior thesis, and her project connected her with Payal. Payal’s outlook changed when she met
Hira who inspired her to begin working for her people. In fact, it was Hira who suggested that
Payal set up her own organization, and she even coined the name Gender Solidarity Society.
When GSS was eventually formed, Aaliya contributed to the online content of the organization’s
new website. Aaliya also introduced Payal to women activists and took her to various meetings.
This gave Payal the opportunity to learn how other activist organizations function. The
intervention of this mother-daughter duo was instrumental not only in establishing GSS, but also
in shaping Payal into an activist leader.
GSS was the first khwaja sira run organization in Sindh to get registered. It began
operating in Karachi in 2009, and it functioned primarily as an advocacy group, which spoke on
behalf of khwaja siras. GSS organized and participated in various activist events, such as public
protests, press conferences, media advocacy, consultation workshops on the rights of khwaja
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siras, and trainings and events related to HIV/AIDS. The organization established alliances with
government departments, politicians, celebrities and numerous activist groups and NGOs that
worked on issues of sexual health, minority rights, community building and on the empowerment
of vulnerable populations92. However, GSS had had a tenuous existence since its formation,
which, in addition to a host of technical constraints (e.g., lack of sufficient education, skilled
membership, funding) was exacerbated by a slew of sociocultural problems that I discuss in this
chapter. In the absence of the resources required to keep it afloat, the organization went through
several periods of dormancy.
When I met Payal in early 2011, she was running her organization from her residence, a
small one room flat located next to a sewage stream in Akther Colony. The office space was
restricted to Payal’s unfurnished bedroom, which consisted of two metal storage boxes, a
bedcover that she was using as a carpet, and a few floor cushions. Payal had temporarily
retreated from activist work following a series of unfortunate incidents, including the death of a
key member of her organization and the subsequent splintering of the group. Over the course of
its tenuous existence, GSS had switched offices several times. Previously, the organization was
housed in a sexual health NGO that had assigned GSS office space on its premises. However,
Payal lost this space due to disputes with the NGO’s staff. Several months into my fieldwork,
GSS moved yet again when the organization’s members found a proper two bedroom flat along
the outskirts of an affluent neighborhood. The space not only served as GSS’s office, but also as
Payal and Shani’s residence. Shani was Payal’s daughter and the organization’s treasurer.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
92
I use the term “alliances” loosely to describe certain sets of relationships between GSS and
sexual health NGOs, queer organizations, women’s rights groups, specific gay social circles, etc.
At the time of my research, these groups did not combine to form an intersectional movement
that was united by a common political purpose. Hence, I view them as individual relationships
between specific groups. For instance, GSS had ties with both women’s groups and gay
organizations, but these groups did not necessarily have a relationship with one another.
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Payal’s lack of education and her reliance on others factored into the organization’s persisting
instability.
In addition to Shani, GSS’s core member body included Nyla, the organization’s vice
president and a former participant in several HIV intervention projects. Shazia, the general
secretary, was a twenty-something college graduate who worked as a government tax collector
by day and a beautician at an upscale hair saloon in the evenings. Maina, one of GSS’s two joint
secretaries, was a government tax collector and tailor. Nadia was also a joint secretary and
Payal’s disciple. Ameer, GSS’s communications officer, and the organizations’ only non-khwaja
sira core member, worked at a sexual health NGO. Within the activist domain, Payal was
typically called “Mother Payal” or “Mama,” terms of address that I too adopted out of deference
for her seniority and status when I began volunteering at GSS. Besides GSS, I cite examples
from my two-month long fieldwork in Lahore, where I spent most of my time at a CBO named
Association of Khwaja Siras (AKS).

GSS and Patriarchy
Patriarchy in Khwaja Sira Organizations
The patriarchal leadership of zennana and hijra communities was replicated in khwaja sira
activist organizations where it often produced conflict. Many prominent khwaja sira leaders
managed to enter public activism as a result of their high status within their social networks. For
instance, Payal’s position as the chief of a major earning area in Karachi prompted her entry into
the activist sphere. Similarly, Noor Vicky, a wealthy khwaja sira and the chief of roughly twenty
five hundred gender ambiguous people in Rawalpindi was the obvious representative for her
community in the public sphere. These individuals possessed hijraness or indigenous leadership
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skills through which they rose in rank both within their districts and in the activist sphere. They
were in the unique position to represent khwaja siras because they had a sizable following within
their large kin groups.
Khwaja sira activism was not entirely independent of the hijra and zennana kinship
systems. Executive positions within activist groups were often designated to the relatives of
khwaja sira leaders. For instance, Payal had installed one of her students and daughters in GSS’s
core committee. Having relatives within one’s organization was useful because it ensured a level
loyalty and reinforced the authority of activist leaders. This was particularly important given the
general environment of mistrust and suspicion within khwaja sira networks. Entering a hijra or
zennana family subjected its members to checks and balances, which entailed fines levied against
those who violated rules or broke the circle of trust. Hence, a daughter or a disciple was less
likely to deceive the organization’s head since the consequences of her misconduct would not
only affect her professional relationships but also her personal ties with her kin.
The reproduction of the khwaja sira social structure within activist contexts also assisted
in mobilizing gender ambiguous people. Activist groups must perform the important task of
deploying frames that resonate with target populations in order to recruit and mobilize them for
collective action (Snow and Benford 1988, 198). However, khwaja sira leaders were advantaged
in this process since their indigenous social setup, with its vast network of intricately connected
households and lineages, was prearranged for the quick and easy mobilization of constituents.
For instance, Payal, like most other activist leaders, managed to organize protests rather
effortlessly by making a few phone calls to select members of her extended family. Being a
prominent guru with a large family bolstered her ability to assemble khwaja siras at a moment’s
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notice. The linkages between gender ambiguous people through their vast kinship networks
aided in mobilizing them and served as a resource for their activism.

Hierarchy and Seniority
As mentioned in earlier chapters, hijraness entailed being respectful of khwaja sira elders.
Juniors were expected to show deference to senior family members, to obey their orders, and to
avoid undermining their authority. These rules of seniority were carried over into khwaja sira
activism where they prevented juniors from engaging in public advocacy. If gender variant youth
become activist leaders, they would inevitably undermine the authority of gurus and elders,
thereby weakening the traditional power structure within khwaja sira communities. Hence, even
though juniors were selected for governance roles within activist groups, they were mostly
subordinate to the senior khwaja siras who presided over the daily management of the
organizations. As a result, the patriarchal structure of khwaja sira families was replicated within
these groups.

Figure 12. A group photo of the anthropologist with khwaja
sira activists taken after a meeting at an NGO in Karachi.
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The importance placed on seniority produced frictions within khwaja sira organizations,
particularly in situations where younger and educated activists threatened to destabilize the
prevailing leadership hierarchy. A case in point was the contentious relationships between Payal
and Farah. Payal recruited Farah and gave her an important post in GSS. At the time, Farah had
not been initiated into the guru-celā system and was relatively unfamiliar with the ideals of
seniority within khwaja sira culture. Farah’s presence in GSS was unsettling for other members
of the organization. She spoke out of turn, defied Payal’s instructions, and repeatedly
undermined her authority. Alternatively, Farah found GSS’s power structure to be oppressive.
Payal wants to be superior, and I have no objection to that, especially when we’re just
hanging out. But when we’re working, I think we should all be equal. But they think that
I don’t have the right to comment on anything. Every person has an opinion and you
cannot shut them up. But they believe that she is senior due to her experience…I couldn’t
stand all the bitchiness and playing guru-celā within the NGO.
Farah’s ambition, her distaste for the guru-celā system, and her inability to abide by the
principles of seniority eventually led to her expulsion from GSS. She formed her own
organization, Murat Collective (MC), after she was cast out of GSS due to her misdemeanor. Her
experience highlights the oppressive nature of patriarchal leadership in khwaja sira social and
activist networks. Not only did it produce tensions within khwaja sira organizations but it also
hindered younger gender variant people from expressing fresh ideas and steering activism into
new directions. Educated youth viewed the patriarchal structure of khwaja sira communities as
an impediment to the development of gender ambiguous people, and they considered indigenous
seniority (barāpān) to be at odds with modernity, independence and progress.
Moreover, the older generation of khwaja siras who resided in historic households (baṛī
maṛī) disapproved the involvement of gender ambiguous people in the public sphere. These
seniors preferred to keep a low public profile because they feared that participation in
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mainstream society would bring undesirable attention to khwaja siras and jeopardize their
reputation and security. These differences in opinion between khwaja sira activists and lineage
chiefs produced inter-generational conflict that inhibited activist work. Many leaders felt guilty
for defying their elders, while some abstained from participating in activism altogether in order
to avoid criticism from them.

Ethnic Discrimination
The sociocultural diversity among gender variant people impacted the relationships within
khwaja sira organizations. The politics of differentiation within GSS reflected broader issues that
had fragmented khwaja sira communities. “There is a lot of grouping within GSS,” said Farah.
“And the problems of the community [have] entered the group.” Farah’s observation underscores
the numerous social ruptures within activist groups, which emerged due to differences in
ethnicity, class, identity, corporeality and occupation, and were exacerbated by issues of
inferiority/low self-esteem, superiority/hierarchy, and power relations. I begin with a discussion
of the impact of ethnicity on the social relationships within activist networks.
In chapter 5, I described the ethnic conflicts within khwaja sira communities. The ethnic
discrimination within guru-celā networks, which reflected broader social fissures within
Pakistani society, seeped into activist circles. Although, in her public advocacy, Payal
represented khwaja sira social networks as accepting of difference, in her everyday life, she
herself tended to favor Sindhi khwaja siras like herself. This also influenced the composition of
GSS’s core membership, which consisted of four Sindhis, one Saraiki, and one Punjabi khwaja
sira. The Sindhis, which included Payal, Shani, Shazia and Maina, favored one another and
frequently colluded against Nadia and Nyla. Nadia was convinced that her fellow team members
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did not want Saraikis to progress, which explained their animosity towards her. She was
frustrated by their sense of superiority and desire to promote other Sindhi khwaja siras. Nadia’s
suspicions were not unwarranted since just a few weeks earlier, Maina had personally admitted
that she and the other Sindhi members of GSS were not fond of “outsiders” like Nadia because
they did not share the same language, beliefs or practices. Like anyone else, gender ambiguous
people had an affinity to those with whom they shared linguistic and cultural similarities.
During a consultation workshop jointly organized by GSS and MHS at a hotel in Karachi,
a violent argument broke out between Payal and her student, Moti. GSS members, gender
ambiguous people from Payal’s social circle, and MHS’s gay staff attended the event. The
squabble started when Payal stated that migrants from Punjab were less likely to register for
khwaja sira ID cards because a large majority of them were married to women and had children.
Moti: It is not necessary for you to only mention khwaja siras from Punjab…Here we
have Punjabi khwaja siras, Saraiki khwaja siras, Pathan khwaja siras, Sindhi khwaja
siras…Any one ethnicity should not be made a target.
Payal: We are not talking about different ethnicities here. We are here in a meeting!
Suddenly, Payal sprung to her feet and started clapping violently. In response, Moti started
shouting back at her guru.
Moti: Again and again you talk about Punjab! I’m from Punjab! Won’t we feel hurt if
you single us out!
When the argument escalated, someone suggested singing in order to diffuse the tension, and
immediately a couple of khwaja siras broke into a song. The meeting resumed after a long break,
but by then, Moti had stormed out of the hotel along with two of her disciples. Later, Payal
attributed Moti’s behavior to low self-esteem while the other participants lamented the lack of
cohesion among gender ambiguous people. Needless to say, ethnic conflict reproduced social
stigma within hijra and zennana networks and was counterproductive to khwaja sira activism.
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Corporeality and Conflict
The corporeal differences among khwaja siras produced conflict not only in their everyday lives
but also in their activism. In fact, some of the most contentious differences between activist
leaders were related to emasculation, which split the khwaja sira movement into two broad
groups: those who viewed both akvās/zennanas and nirbāns/hijras as khwaja siras and those who
only included the latter in the khwaja sira identity category.

Zennanas, Hijras and Activism
The public misrepresentation of gender ambiguous people by prominent community leaders
produced discord within khwaja sira social and activist networks. In their public advocacy, many
activists, such as Noor Vicky, regularly demonized akvā khwaja siras as “normal” men who
joined khwaja sira communities for ulterior motives. The fact that these activists were
emasculated served to deepen the culturally instituted rift between akvās and nirbāns. Akvās saw
Noor’s public misrepresentation of khwaja siras as a direct attack on zennanas by hijras. Farah,
who was non-emasculated, echoed this sentiment. “[W]hy do they appear on TV and say that
they are by birth? Noor says this all the time. She claims that she is by birth, and those who stand
on the streets at night are fake.” The public advocacy of certain nirbān activists produced
frictions within the realm of activism, escalating hostility between khwaja sira leaders and
between activist and ordinary gender ambiguous people.
The ideological differences between the two groups surfaced in a meeting organized by
MHS where thirty prominent gurus and khwaja sira activists from across Pakistan were asked to
define the meaning of various identity terms. “[T]hat meeting ended up in disaster because
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everyone was fighting with each other,” said Kareem, the director of MHS. “The castrated ones
think that they are at a higher position than the non-castrated ones.” Kareem highlights the
detrimental impact of the hierarchal differences between hijras and zennanas.
The hostility between akvās and nirbāns posed a serious problem in the struggle for khwaja
siras rights in Pakistan. In retaliation for their exclusion from the khwaja sira category, akvās
threatened to expose truths about nirbāns.
[S]ome akvā murats found out that I was going to the SC to fight for a distinct gender
category for khwaja siras. Two akvās planned that they will also go to the SC and tell the
Chief Justice that people like Nirmal have gotten themselves operated…They wanted to
defame us nirbān khwaja siras. But that day, thank God, there were too many cases and
the Chief Justice postponed the date of the hearing.
Above, the Rawalpindi-based activist, Nirmal, suggests that akvās threatened the safety and
respectability of emasculated gender ambiguous people. She feared that the reckless behavior of
her zennana adversaries would ruin her reputation and possibly lead to her arrest.
Some nirbān activists, including Payal, supported akvās and included them in the khwaja
sira category even though, in their public advocacy, they were mostly elusive about their support
for them. In 2012, this ideological divide resulted in a televised dispute between activists Noor
Vicky and Beena Shah. The incident was recorded outside the SC following one of the hearings
that centered on the topic of khwaja sira parentage. The following excerpt is from Dunya News
channel’s report about the incident.
A group of khwaja siras started fighting with Noor Vicky and her companions over the
issue of whether the guru’s name should replace the father’s name [on national ID
cards]…Prior to the fight, Noor Vicky complained to the court…that certain normal
individuals were getting khwaja sira ID cards and misusing them…The SC order
NADRA to resolve the issue of whose name to list on the ID card.
The news anchor’s statements were interspersed with comments made by the khwaja sira
activists who were involved in the dispute. One of Noor’s followers was shown insulting Beena.
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“Why are you interfering in the issues of us hijras? What have you got to do with us khwaja
siras?” This statement was meant to disparage Beena as fake a khwaja sira. Although Beena was
emasculated, her support of akvās made her the target of ridicule of her nirbān opponents93.
Noor’s student played on the cultural myth that khwaja sira networks had been infiltrated by
charlatans who impersonated khwaja siras. According to the news report, Noor had complained
to the court that certain “normal individuals” were registering for khwaja sira ID cards.
Following this incident, Express News invited Noor and Beena along with their followers
to a talk show to discuss the dispute between both parties. Both leaders brought along with them
an entourage of khwaja sira kin and supporters. During the debate, the two opposing groups
began physically assaulting one another; amid the violent yelling and clapping, some
participant’s clothes were ripped off while others were brutally beaten. The host helplessly
threatened to shut down the studio as Noor and Beena silently watched the fight unravel from the
safety of the stage. Eventually, some of the assailants were escorted out of the studio where the
high drama continued.
Following the failed interview on Express News, Samaa TV did an interview with Noor,
who was unaware that Beena would later join the live broadcast from Multan. The host began the
show by asking Noor to define “khwaja sira,” to which she responded: “[A khwaja sira
is]…[s]omeone who is not married, who doesn’t have a wife and kids, who cannot get married
and is incapable of it.” Noor described khwaja siras strictly in corporeal terms, as individuals
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Beena was in favor of listing the father’s name on khwaja sira ID cards, while Noor advocated
having the guru’s name. Gender ambiguous people would inherit property depending on whose
name appeared on their identification documents. Many nirbān khwaja siras like Noor, because
they were estranged from or disowned by biological kin, wanted to become heirs to their guru’s
property since they did not seek to benefit from parental inheritance. Unlike Beena and Noor,
Payal insisted that khwaja siras be given the choice of listing either their father’s or their guru’s
name in order to resolve the issue of parentage.
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who did not possess functional male genitals. Soon after, Noor found herself ambushed when
Beena was introduced on the show and asked to verify her opponent’s claim.
Noor lies so much. She says that those who stand on the roads should be caught. Who do
you think are the people who are standing in Pir Wadhia94? Who started a fight during a
television shoot? These fake khwaja siras that she is talking about are her own students.
Quick to expose Noor’s lies, Beena revealed that the individuals who her rival publically
denounced as men were in fact members of her own family. However, when the host asked her
to describe khwaja siras, Beena was uncharacteristically candid in her description.
Do you think khwaja siras are only those who are impotent? Here, we have khwaja siras
who even have long beards. To be a khwaja sira is to have a soul that one naturally has
from within. Khwaja siras are people who like covering their heads with scarves, and
sitting demurely. Among them, 20% have less hormones, and 80% are fine, so they get
married, and Allah gives them children. And there are also 50% who cannot have
children. They too live among us.
Beena’s response is slightly convoluted since her percentages do not add up. Importantly, her
truthful public representation is an outlier since it diverges from the dominant khwaja sira
practice of concealing the corporeality of gender ambiguous people. Although Beena evades the
topic of physical emasculation, she reveals that a large number of gender ambiguous people are
capable of heterosexual marriage and reproduction. I wondered what would drive an activist
leader, who was known to engage in the techniques of concealment, to risk exposing truths about
khwaja siras to the wider society. This is when I was reminded of something that Naima had
once said to me: “If you want the truth, all you have to do is make hijras fight each other. They
themselves will blurt the truth!” Likewise, television channels had managed to extract
information from activists by pitting them against one another. The internal politics of the
khwaja sira movement were so divisive that they threatened to topple the façade that gender
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A town in Rawalpindi District.
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ambiguous people had built to protect themselves from social stigma. Elements within the
movement left it susceptible to internal collapse.
Many activists believed that the akvā-nirbān controversy was an offshoot of the selfish
motives of khwaja sira leaders. Rani was convinced that Noor’s primary objective was to protect
her own interests over the rights of ordinary khwaja siras. She claimed that Noor’s public stance
against akvās was a means of safeguarding her business from external interferences. Noor was a
wealthy khwaja sira with a large family of close 2,500 students, grand-students and great grandstudents. According to the rumors that circulated within khwaja sira networks, Noor had imposed
a tax on her kin, and that she made a commission on every party and ritual that took place within
her dominion. This was Noor’s business and the key to her fortune. Her opponents believed that
in order to ensure the smooth functioning of her trade, Noor publically denounced akvās in an
effort to avoid surveillance from state bodies and religious groups. Similarly, it was believed that
Noor’s staunch advocacy in favor of listing the names of gurus on khwaja sira ID cards was
motivated by her ambition to inherit her own guru’s property.
Further, within khwaja sira activist organizations, members frequently stigmatized one
another on the basis of corporeal differences. Even activists, such as Payal, who were supportive
of non-emasculated khwaja siras, were not above citing corporeal differences in order to ridicule
or to morally differentiate themselves from other gender ambiguous people. For instance, during
petty arguments, Payal had the tendency of ridiculing Nadia, her disciple and a core member of
GSS, on the basis of her non-emasculated status. Once I heard Payal tell Nadia, “Go away, boy!
What would you know! You have one!” Even though Payal supported them in her activism, she
used the culturally devalued status of akvās to deride them during disputes. Activists tended to
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perpetuate stigma within khwaja sira social and activist circles by employing such boundarymaking practices to discriminate against one another.
One evening at AKS, a large group of khwaja siras gathered in the CBO’s drop-in-center.
When I heard that a community elder, Guru Basheer, was among those assembled in the room, I
approached Shazia, who was standing by the entrance of the DIC with a few of her associates,
and asked her to point out Guru Basheer. Before Shazia could respond, her colleague, Remal,
quickly pointed towards an elderly individual in the room, and said. “He’s the man sitting right
there!” Her statement immediately elicited laughter from those standing around us. Guru Basheer
was an older zennana who sported a moustache and was dressed in men’s shalvār qamīz.
Laughter and contempt were boundary-making practices employed by the CBO staff to
distinguish Guru Basheer from other khwaja siras. Even though socially, politically and
professionally he was enumerated as a khwaja sira because he possessed a feminine soul and was
inducted into a zennana household, he was simultaneously considered inferior and less authentic
due to his preference for masculine attire.
Allegiance to the khwaja sira lifestyle was viewed as the norm, and those who diverged
from it were regularly shamed within khwaja sira social and activist circles. The lack of
commitment of some “worldly” khwaja siras was also evident in their reluctance to engage in
media advocacy. Those who lived dual lives between their khwaja sira and familial circles were
not willing to appear on television, risk public exposure of their queerness, and bring shame
upon their families. This further exacerbated the divide between zennanas/akvās and
hijras/nirbāns.

Sacrifice and Suspicion
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Within activist circles, some gender ambiguous people contended that married khwaja siras
should not benefit from the rights granted by the state. Payal often wondered if khwaja sira rights
should be commensurate with a person’s level of sacrifice. She argued that those who were
married with children should not receive the same perks as nirbāns and those intent on remaining
single. Married khwaja siras had the option of old-age security through their offspring, while
emasculated gender ambiguous people had cut off ties with biological kin. For these reasons,
Payal believed that the former should not profit from government schemes, and that statesponsored opportunities should be limited to those who were truly deserving of assistance and
were committed to the khwaja sira lifestyle.
In Karachi, the akvā-nirbān animosity worsened due to the educational disparities
between the two groups. Not only were the Naguru lineage chiefs bothered by Payal’s
involvement in public affairs, but also they were annoyed that she had appointed akvās on her
organization’s executive committee. “They told her, ‘You have left us nirbāns and gone after
akvās,’” Shani related. “But Mother Payal knew that we were the ones who were going to run the
operation and move the work forward.” Payal had appointed akvās due to her inability to find
any educated nirbāns to assist her in running GSS. Moreover, potential constituents may remain
uninvolved in political activism if a social movement fails to represent them (Burdick 1998,
146). Payal was careful not to alienate akvās because they made up the majority of the
genderqueer population and were therefore strategically valuable to the khwaja sira movement.
Unfortunately, her close association with them deepened the divide between her and the lineage
elders.
The distrust between akvās and nirbāns also constrained khwaja sira development. One
evening at AKS, I asked Soni if she knew the names of the khusrah/hijra lineages based in
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Lahore. Soni, an akvā khwaja sira who belonged to the zennana social network, did not have the
information I was seeking. However, she made a couple of phone calls to her hijra contacts to try
and get the information that I had requested. Unfortunately, extracting this information became a
challenging task since none of the nirbān gurus were willing to disclose the names of their
lineages. Most of them rebuffed Soni’s request, and some were curious to know why zennanas
were suddenly interested in learning about them. An hour into our research, Soni was frustrated
and ready to give up. As we abandoned the task, she said that hijras becoming suspicious and
nervous (jhalakte) when outsiders, including zennanas, question them about the inner workings
of their communities.

Class Divide
Class divides were another source of contention within activist spaces. Much of this conflict
revolved around lower class khwaja siras and middle-class “transgender” identifying individuals.
Class produced dissonance in identity, lived experience, values and skills. The dispute between
Payal and Farah is illustrative of the class related constraints within activism.

Class and Lack of Hijraness
Farah first met Payal through her friend, Aisha, who, at the time, was the general secretary of
GSS. Farah was educated, English-speaking and belonged to a middle-class family. Initially, she
believed that hijras/khwaja siras were completely different from transgender people. However,
through Aisha she gradually began to see the similarities between the two gendered categories.
Farah became more involved in GSS when Aisha passed away after a long battle with cancer,
and she promised to assist Payal in running her organization. However, after Aisha’s passing,
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Payal resigned from activist work and retreated to Punjab for several months, leaving Farah in
charge during her absence. The core members of GSS were upset at Payal for entrusting the
organization to a new member who did not even identify as khwaja sira. Sometime after her
departure from Karachi, Farah lost all contact with Payal. She tried to reach Payal on her cell
phone to discuss urgent matters, but was unable to get through. Frustrated, Farah confided in
Shani about Payal’s shirking of her responsibilities. Shani, who was envious of Farah’s growing
prominence within GSS, seized the opportunity to encourage Farah to take charge and resolve
the problem. Other core members also gave Farah their vote of confidence. “What she did not
know was that I was in touch with Mān Payal that entire time,” said Shani. “I had Man’s other
number and I would call her regularly and give her a full report of what Farah had been saying.”
Farah called a GSS meeting as soon as Payal returned from Punjab.
Shani: She was so disrespectful to Mother during the meeting. She asked her, “What
work have you done for the organization in the last few months?” Her guru, Zara, said to
her, “Farah…she is your elder…We should support her instead of talking like this.”
Payal: That is because there is hijarpan in Zara. That day Farah wanted to become the
president of GSS. She wanted me out. She had rallied every one against me when I was
in Punjab. But at that time she was not aware of one thing. She was not familiar with
hijarpan! She did not know that hijras say a lot behind each other’s backs, but when they
sit with other hijras, they always support each other. This is why she lost. She said that
we should take a vote on who should be president. But I was sure that everyone had my
back, so I told her that there was no need for a vote. That a simple show of hands would
do. So we did that and everyone voted for me, which she wasn’t expecting. In fact, she
didn’t get any position on the executive committee. She didn’t see that coming.
Payal suggests that, as a covert body of knowledge and set of practices, hijarpan was the domain
of khwaja siras—not of men, women or other sexual minorities. Only those who possessed
hijraness could play it with each other and with unsuspecting outsiders. Payal indicates that
Farah’s ignorance led to her downfall within GSS; due to her lack of hijraness, Farah was
uninformed about the respect accorded to seniors within khwaja sira communities. Her disregard
for Payal’s rank foiled Farah’s attempt to oust her from GSS’s presidency, and her ignorance of
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the hijra norms of hierarchy only served to highlight her difference from khwaja siras. Farah also
did not suspect, partly due to her unfamiliarity with hijraness, that the core team members of
GSS were playing a carefully crafted game of deception with her. In organizational contexts, the
art of trickery was counterproductive to the activist agenda. A happy collaboration between
Payal and Farah would have been in GSS’s best interest since the organization was in dire need
of a skilled workforce. Unfortunately, activist leaders were often occupied in elaborate personal
feuds that prevented them from focusing their energies on the larger problems facing their
communities.
Farah’s lack of hijarpan stemmed from her class difference from khwaja siras. Payal
explained that Farah had lived a sheltered middle class life in her parental home, and growing up,
had received little or no exposure to the culture of khwaja siras.
People who have spent their entire lives in comfort, they cannot understand the feelings
of ordinary khwaja siras…[T]hey…wake up in flats, have a mummy-daddy
situation…going to school, being dropped off and picked up in a car. Just recently she
has become someone’s celā…[but she]…has not lived with khwaja siras for a long time.
She has never begged or been to a function. She’s new to this field. What does she know
about the sun and the shade.
Farah’s lack of familiarity with the beliefs, practices and problems of lower class gender
ambiguous people not only led to her downfall in GSS, but also made her an unsuitable
representative of the dominant khwaja sira majority.
Farah found flaws in the hierarchal structure of the guru-celā system. She viewed the
system as a detriment to the progress of gender ambiguous people, and took issue with the
limited vision of lower class khwaja siras. “[A]ll they care about is this guru-celā business and
nothing else,” she said. “They do not want to change or learn anything new.” Farah saw khwaja
siras as backward and lacking in modernity. In contrast, not only was she educated, but had also
benefited from attending international workshops and conferences. Farah was selected for these
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opportunities precisely due to her middle-classness, that is, her educational background and
proficiency in the English language. These trainings shaped her views on khwaja sira
empowerment, which in turn, deepened the divide between Farah and Payal’s distinct approach
to activism. Eventually, Farah set up her own organization, MC, which specialized in serving and
representing middle-class “transgender” youth.

Residual Gayness
In Chapter 4 I explained why many transgender-identifying individuals formerly misidentified as
gay. In activist contexts, khwaja sira leaders stigmatized middle-class transgender people on the
grounds that many of them were ex-gays, an identity category that was despised by many khwaja
siras. “Farah had a beard before, and she used to call herself gay,” said Payal. “Her name was
Zain. And now she’s become one of us.” Farah acknowledged that at the dawn of her sexual
awakening, she erroneously miscategorized herself as gay. At the time, she had no knowledge of
“transgender” as a queer category, and she thought hijras were intersexual people.
Within activist circles, the mistakes made by “transgender” people were attributed to
their residual gayness. A year after the dispute between Payal and Farah, efforts were initiated to
mend the relationship between members of GSS and MC. When Farah’s misconduct with Payal
was revisited during the meeting, Shani underscored Farah’s gayness as the source of her bad
behavior. “Listen Zara, you are a murat,” said Shani to Farah’s guru. “You were a murat from
the beginning and you always will be. The concept of being gay is so strange to you, but Farah
still has some of that gayness in her.” Shani implied that Farah’s latent gayness, which she had
not been able to fully discard, was partly responsible for the conflict between GSS and MC and
was responsible for her inability to adjust to the ways of khwaja siras.
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SRS Versus Nirbāni
Another boundary-making practice adopted by khwaja siras against middle-class gender
ambiguous people was based on their preference for SRS over the nirbān operation. Farah and
other members of MC, for instance, had acquired breast implants and been castrated while they
saved up for the relatively expensive vaginoplasty procedure. However, post-SRS they would
technically turn into women. In contrast, nirbān khwaja siras were identified by their state of
being neither men nor women. Some gender ambiguous people, however, argued that a khwaja
sira identity could be retained after SRS through membership in a zennana or hijra household.
In times of conflict, GSS members underscored the somatic differences between
themselves and the members of MC. When Payal’s problems with Farah escalated, she wished
that her nemesis would obtain a vagina so that she could publically expose her as a woman.
The day she gets a vagina…[t]hat day I will go to the Press Club and hold a conference. I
will call all the khwaja sira activists and together we will say that when she has gotten a
vagina and changed her sex, then she has nothing to do with us khwaja siras. Then my
path will be cleared off of her.
The GSS team regularly castigated Farah and her MC associates for their impending sex change.
Markers of class and corporeal difference were routinely employed to erect boundaries between
members of the two groups, and to exclude the latter from the khwaja sira construct. Initially,
Farah resisted the guru-celā system as an oppressive social structure. However, she eventually
decided to align herself with a khwaja sira household in order to gain protection from her
opponents. In the event that she underwent SRS, Farah knew that GSS would be less likely to
take a public stand against her if she were formally inducted into the khwaja sira social system.

Psychological Constraints
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Vice, Stigma and Loss of Respect
The views of khwaja sira activists paralleled the beliefs of the wider society. They shared the
pervasive attitudes related to moral conduct and sexual propriety that were held not only by large
sections of the general public but also by most ordinary khwaja siras. These cultural ideals were
replicated in the domain of khwaja sira activism where community leaders also suffered the
harmful affects of social stigma.
One afternoon, Soni, a community activist, and her sixteen-year-old student, Shiza, told
me about the rape vālā gang, a notorious group of young men who frequented Lava Lounge, a
shīshā café in Lahore. Every Thursday and Saturday, Shiza visited Lava Lounge dressed in fitted
jeans and a t-shirt with light makeup on her face. There she socialized with the café regulars, and
at the end of the night, one or more of them would take her home. One day, a group of men
visited the café. Unbeknownst to Shiza, they were members of the infamous rape vālā gang.
Shiza flirted and danced with the men, and later that night, they took her to an unknown location
where all fourteen of them gang raped her.
As they recounted the episode, Soni and Shiza seemed unfazed by the shear violence of
the incident. “It’s good for them. It opens them up,” said Soni in jest, and then added that Shiza
herself was to be blamed for getting raped. Like many, Soni believed that immoral conduct
invited sexual violence, and that those who lacked self-dignity should not expect to be respected
by others. I was not surprised by Soni’s sentiment since it was one that I hard previously heard
from ordinary khwaja siras. However, I was dismayed to hear an activist echo a widely held view
that stigmatized the victims instead of the perpetrators of violence. Many khwaja sira activists
that I came across during fieldwork were of the opinion that promiscuity rightfully begets
mistreatment. Moreover, khwaja sira leaders were generally afraid of speaking publically against
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rape for it directly implicated genderqueer people with immoral behavior, and discredited the
activist agenda, which revolved around dislodging khwaja siras from sex and sexuality. They
feared that making an issue about sex scandals would bring undesired public attention to khwaja
siras, which could potentially expose the extent of their involvement in socially, religiously and
legally unacceptable sexual conduct.

Low Self-Esteem and Lack of Unity
Although khwaja sira activists possessed leadership qualities, they too, like ordinary gender
ambiguous people, suffered from low self-esteem. Their biographies were rife with episodes of
ridicule, rejection and violence from family and society. The excerpt below details aspects of
Payal’s childhood, which she ascribed to her sense of low self-worth.
When I used to go to school, often I would get beaten up. I didn’t know how to fight. I
would just cry like girls…[D]uring childhood, I was kept hidden from other relatives. I was
not allowed to go out. This gave me a lot of stress. I used to wonder why I was treated like
that but not my other siblings. And then when I started mingling with khwaja siras, and
wanted to hang out with them, my relatives would…make fun of me. Whenever my
relatives would gather and talk, they would praise each other’s kids. So and so’s daughter
did some great deed or is really good in his studies…At times like this, I would feel very
small. I would get very angry. Everyone is praised, but why not me?
As an adult, Payal was haunted by childhood memories of familial abuse, which affected her as a
community activist. Khwaja sira leaders were constrained by their mental stumbling blocks
despite years of participation in activist work.
The effects of social stigma, discrimination and low self-esteem reverberated within
activist contexts where khwaja sira leaders sought to compete against instead of working in
tandem with one another95. “As far as their activism is concerned, I have noticed that it is merely
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In Chapter 4 I explained that many khwaja siras projected a superior sense of self, which came
from being young, beautiful and having many admirers. This superiority complex served to
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for the self-promotion of individual activists rather than for the rights of TGs as a whole,” said
Nadeem, the project manager of AKS. “This is the drawback of their movement.” Competition
between leaders splintered the khwaja sira movement, forming organizational and regional
clusters of cooperation and resentment. Rather than focusing all of their energy on the
empowerment of gender variant Pakistanis, khwaja sira leaders spent much time on shameless
self-promotion, outdoing one another, and resolving inter- and intra-organizational conflicts. Just
the way ordinary khwaja siras competed with one another to be more physically attractive, have
more admirers, and to earn more money, activists were consumed with attaining more power, a
larger following of supporters, and fame and fortune. The professional jealousies between them
were products of their low self-worth and façade of superiority.
It was not unusual for members of khwaja sira organizations to be envious of each other’s
accomplishments. For instance, the battle between Payal and Farah contained an element of
jealousy. Soon after she joined GSS, Farah was nominated to represent Pakistan at international
conferences even though Payal and other members of the organization, who had been toiling for
years, had not received similar offers. Payal complained that Farah was only interested in
promoting herself. “[S]he has always put herself forward. When she was in GSS, she would only
talk about herself instead of promoting the organization.” Ameer lamented that, “Payal and Farah
could have worked really well together because each had qualities that the other did not possess.
Instead, they wanted to further themselves, which is why they ended up fighting and parting.”
The feud between Noor Vicky and Beena was exacerbated by the personal and
professional jealousies between the two activists. Among the things that Beena took issue with
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
conceal their low self-worth, and was a coping mechanism against the rejection, ridicule and
violence they experienced in everyday life. Khwaja siras gave vent to social injustice and
oppression by competing against other gender ambiguous people and by unleashing their anger
upon them during times of conflict.
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was Noor’s public declaration that she was the leader of all khwaja siras in Pakistan. In reality,
Noor’s reach was limited to her immediate region in Rawalpindi, based on the longstanding
tradition of earning area chiefs. However, aggravated by her claims, Beena staged a protest in
Multan against Noor to publically denounce her leadership. In retaliation to Noor naming her
organization, Shemale Coalition of Pakistan, Beena named her group All Pakistan Shemale
Federation in order claim a broader scope for her own leadership. Noor shamed Beena for being
jealous of her during a confrontation between the two on national television.
You have become a victim of jealousy due to my appearances on TV. Tomorrow again I
will be appearing on another big channel. You can watch that too. And again tonight at
7:30PM. I will keep appearing on TV, and you will keep getting jealous. Don’t get
jealous or else you will get wrinkles on your face.
Noor laughed ominously as she successfully delivered an insult to Beena. Before Beena, Noor
had competed for power with her archenemy, Nirmal, who landed in hospital in the aftermath of
a violent standoff between the two.
Personal jealousies also created rifts between activists and their khwaja sira kin. For
example, Naima accused her guru, Payal, for stifling her efforts to earn a living and achieving
celebrity status. Below, she describes the game of deception Payal played with her in order to
avert her from achieving success in the public sphere.
Samaa TV was making a documentary on khwaja siras…Whatever they kept asking, I kept
telling them because they were giving us money. I got a hijra married to a man and they
shot it. Eventually, the film was shown on TV and everyone saw it…Then my guru called
and told me that the cops were looking for me because I had arranged an illegal marriage. I
got scared, but there were no police vālās after me. My guru kept scolding me everyday
and I kept listening. Then Samaa TV called me again to arrange a cricket match for khwaja
siras. I told them that I will never appear on TV because my guru had said that cops are
after me. They asked me for my guru’s number and I gave it to them. When they spoke
with her, she struck a deal of her own, and the TV channel casted her and I was left out.
Then I realized that what my guru really wanted was to appear on TV herself. I had been
popular on TV for so long, but after she came on TV, she became popular and people in
every household started recognizing her. So she got ahead and I’ve made no progress.
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Naima echoed the discourse of rivalry among khwaja siras where gender ambiguous people
competed with one another for fame and fortune, and inhibited their contenders from getting
ahead. Naima believed that Payal had manipulated her in order to steal her livelihood and
growing popularity. Although I do not discredit Naima’s conviction, it appeared that Payal also
wanted to prevent her disciple from negatively representing khwaja siras and counteracting the
activist agenda of humanizing them in mainstream society.
Competition and conflict within activist circles consumed community leaders and
prevented them from focusing on the empowerment of ordinary khwaja sira. Although khwaja
siras routinely acknowledged that their lack of unity was a deterrent to their advancement, few
were able to apprehend that social stigma, structural violence and low self-esteem were at the
heart of this problem. Khwaja siras were often reprimanded by ordinary people within NGO and
media sectors for working against one another instead of inculcating change within their
communities. However, little emphasis was placed within NGOs on the need to develop
programs that could address the problem of stigma and low self-esteem among khwaja siras.

The Activist’s Habitus
In everyday life, activists were constrained by the force of the habitus (Bourdieu 2008, 82-3), the
pre-existing and unconscious structures within and against which they conducted their
organizational goals. Activist domains, despite being propelled by a vision for progress and
change, were not free from this inhibiting influence. As subjects of their time and place, khwaja
sira activists were not above the limitations imposed by their immediate sociocultural
environments. In 2013, I attended AKS’s annual social and cultural event, which was attended
by khwaja siras, gay allies, and representatives of sexual health NGOs and the Punjab AIDS
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Control Program. The entertainment for the event included situational parodies, which were
organized by AKS’s non-khwaja sira staff members. A few khwaja sira guests were randomly
selected to perform a number of improvised skits. One of the situations was to enact a fight with
a gender ambiguous person who had stolen her lover. The enactment was meant to showcase the
aggression and humor in fights between khwaja siras. This skit played on the oft-televised
spectacle of khwaja sira catfights, where participants were shown clapping and physically and
verbally abusing one another.
The drawback of these parodies was that they not only made a mockery of an already
marginalized population but they also directly involved them in dehumanizing enactments. The
parodies were reminiscent of the way in which khwaja siras were treated historically as comedic
figures intended for public entertainment. The segment did a disservice to AKS’s vision of
promoting the dignity, respect and wellbeing of and social justice for khwaja siras by reinforcing
their socially marginal position. Importantly, khwaja siras typically engaged in these comedic
representations, an expected facet of their livelihood, in their daily struggle to earn a living.
Likewise, as gender-bending entertainers, the khwaja sira guests at the event enjoyed the
segment while the activists affiliated with AKS were complicit in perpetuating stereotypical
images of gender variant people as subhuman caricatures of ordinary citizens. The activists’
habitus promoted their compliance with stigmatizing images that begged the question aptly
posed by Farah: “Until and unless you accept and respect yourself, how can you expect others to
respect you?”

Collaboration and Conflict with Gay Men
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The relationship between khwaja siras and gay men was both antagonistic and collaborative
within activist and NGO contexts. Ordinary khwaja siras considered gay men to be morally
inferior, expressed aversion for their sexual practices, and viewed gay sex workers as
competition. These everyday conflicts were replicated in institutionalized spaces, even though
the confluence of genderqueer and gay people produced some positive outcomes.
When I started fieldwork in early 2011, khwaja sira activists and gay men barely had any
professional working relationships. However, that year, members of GSS and other organizations
began to develop ties with the gay employees of MHS who had begun to reach out to khwaja sira
leaders. MHS was preparing to launch a number of CBOs for TGs and their work necessitated
that they build relationships with khwaja siras. That same year, the GSS team came into contact
with a few other LGB groups that included a circle of about fifteen young middle-class gay
friends who met regularly in the city’s Johar Mor district.
Five or six years ago, gays didn’t like talking to us at all. They would say, “He’s a hijra!”
But after seeing former gays like Farah and Aisha, who came into our field and did so
well for themselves, gays have started to open up to us. And God has given us respect
and we got our rights. So, now they are thinking that they should also get rights.
Payal believed that the new alliances that were being formed between gender variant and gay
people were motivated by the changing legal landscape wherein khwaja siras had gained rights.
Payal suspected that gay men desired social and legal recognition for which they sought to
benefit from a close affiliation with khwaja siras. Although the GSS team welcomed the positive
change in the attitude of gay men towards gender ambiguous people, they had not forgotten that
the same individuals used to ridicule and keep away from khwaja siras.
Even though the hostility between the two groups did not completely dissipate, the
growing social exchange between them produced a level of mutual ease that was previously
absent. Over the course of that year, I observed the GSS team making a concerted effort to
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understand gay men and vice versa. Payal’s views about them changed slightly once she started
spending time with her new gay friends, and she began to notice the overlaps between khwaja
sira and gay identities. For instance, Payal observed that the feminine soul was pronounced in a
large majority of her gay contacts, many of whom were effeminate, enjoyed cross-dressing, used
feminine pronouns, and had adopted the khwaja sira Farsi. Similarly, one of the statements that
was repeatedly articulated by different members of the Johr Mor group was, “Even though we
are gay, we have the same rūh.” One day during my last month in the field, Payal said to me,
“Now I’m beginning to think that there is little distance between gays and us. Their emotions are
the same, but their views are a little different. I think that a khwaja sira is hidden somewhere
within every gay.” This realization was significant for a khwaja sira such as Payal who had never
had a high regard for gay men.
Through this “logic of affinity” (Day 2005), khwaja sira and gay groups managed to
forge alliances with one another despite their social differences. Singh and Conway note that
“convergence [across difference] is by definition, fluid, episodic and ephemeral” (Singh and
Conway, 2011: 697), which explains why amity towards gay men tended to change very quickly
in times of conflict. Nonetheless, the very fact that khwaja siras and gay men had begun to
associate with one another was significant. This was a remarkable transformation made possible
by the confluence of transnational donor funding, sexual health NGOs, khwaja sira activism and
legal reform. In discussing “women” as an analytic category, feminist theorists have emphasized
the strategic value of “provisional unities” as a political enterprise that goes beyond the
articulation of a unified identity (Butler 21, 2002; Mohanty 1991, 69). Likewise, Payal realized
that strategic coalitions with other sexual minorities could benefit her resource-starved
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organization, especially since gay men were educated and capable of assisting in securing grants
to keep GSS afloat.
However, not all khwaja sira activists were as sympathetic towards gay men. When I
returned to Pakistan in early 2013, MHS had set up several CBOs where it had employed both
khwaja siras and gay people. As a result of MHS’s intervention, professional ties between
khwaja siras and gays were established. However, activists, such as Noor Vicky and Beena, who
were not affiliated with these organizations, continued to be openly hostile towards gay men. In
late 2012, the Coalition for the Rights of Khwaja Siras (CRKS), an alliance of khwaja sira
organizations in Sindh and Punjab, held a meeting in Lahore, which was attended by community
leaders. Nadeem, AKS’s gay-identifying manager, also participated in the event along with his
staff member and khwaja sira activist, Soni. However, Nadeem’s presence created a stir at the
meeting. “When I sat down, Beena asked loudly if I was a khwaja sira, and when I said no, she
told me very rudely to leave,” said Nadeem. “I tried to explain to her that I work with khwaja
siras even though I am not a khwaja sira. Then, Soni intervened. She played a supportive role.”
Below, Soni explains how she reasoned with Beena.
I said to her, “Beena you are my sister, and I will never say anything bad to you. But this
is Nadeem, he is a human being, and on top of that, he is my manager. How he identifies
himself and how he thinks is his own decision. He has a life of his own so who am I or
you or anyone else to interfere in his life. We consider ourselves murats because this is
our life and no one has the right to tell us that we are not murats. If anyone says anything
to Nadeem, then I don’t think I should participate in this meeting. There are some people
here who are married and they even have children but they call themselves khwaja siras.
We should first kick them out of here before Nadeem.” Then she shut up.
Soni’s interpolation helped to diffuse the situation. As Nadeem succinctly put it: “Where there
are khwaja siras who discriminate, there are also those who are supportive.”
The intermingling of gay and gender ambiguous individuals within institutionalized
contexts produced both cooperation and conflict. Some khwaja sira activists had a tough time
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being subordinate to gay men, especially in light of their perceived inferiority. AKS’s gender
variant staff regularly subverted Nadeem’s authority, particularly due to his sexual orientation.
Moreover, they resented the fact that gay men were controlling funds to run “TG” organizations,
and many believed that their gay supervisors were misappropriating money that was meant for
the advancement of their communities. AKS, which was a community-based organization that
was supposed to be run by khwaja siras, was being led by gay men due to lack of qualified
gender ambiguous people who could fill managerial roles96. Khwaja sira activists believed that
they were the rightful leaders of TG CBOs instead of their gay supervisors. Consequently, they
were suspicious of and harbored professional jealousies towards gay men in the NGO sector.
We have only had problems with khwaja siras since we started working. They’ve
threatened us and they have protested against us because we weren’t giving them jobs.
They sent the police to raid our office in Karachi, they took gangsters into our Lahore
office, and they complained about us to the Intelligence Bureau in Rawalpindi.
The conflicts between gay men and khwaja sira activists, many of whom were employed at these
CBOs, hindered productivity in activist and NGO circles. The hostility and mistrust
demonstrated by khwaja sira leaders spoke in part to their insecurities and marginalization.
Without an education, they lacked an understanding of how grant funding was allocated and
utilized. Not having visibility to this process made them susceptible to misgivings about the use
of donor funds.
Further, the khwaja sira employees of transnational CBOs found the policies of their
organizations to be intrusive and at odds with their culture. For instance, AKS prohibited its
employees from forging kinship bonds with one another in order to prevent clusters of authority
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
96
The reason why gay men were selected for these positions instead of qualified heterosexual
candidates was due to their similarities and potential to assimilate with gender ambiguous
people. “Gay people are emotionally similar to khwaja siras, they dance with TGs, and it is
easier for them adopt the culture of TGs, so we thought it was better practice for us to hire gay
rather than straight people,” said Nadeem.
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and loyalty from forming within the organization. A parallel system of hierarchy would threaten
to undermine AKS’s organizational power structure. When Guru Mir and Shazia decided to
become mother and daughter, the organization’s management intervened to stop them from
performing the ritual. This upset the khwaja sira staff members who interpreted their employer’s
actions as an affront to their rituals and traditions. “We become intimate with those with whom
we spend most of our time, and in our case, those are mostly the khwaja siras at AKS, so
obviously we will want to establish relationships with them,” said Soni. “But they are trying to
control us and change our culture!” Soni believed that her gay employers were attempting to
weaken the traditional stronghold of khwaja siras and trying to undermine their authority. Fed up
with AKS’s regulations, Soni hoped to one day set up her own organization that, like GSS,
would be governed in keeping with the norms of the khwaja sira social system. Unfortunately,
indigenous khwaja sira organizations had their own limitations, such as lack of resources and the
debilitating impact of the patriarchal power structure of khwaja siras. Gay and khwaja sira
organizing in Pakistan were not only interdependent and mutually beneficial, but also entangled
in thorny power relationships that renewed conflict between these two queer minority groups.

Conclusion
This chapter mirrors Chapter 4 to the extent that it demonstrates that the problems experienced
within khwaja sira communities were reproduced within activist organizations. The negative
effects of social stigma permeated these spaces, and activists’ unconscious constraints stifled
their ability to overcome the obstacles plaguing their movement. These conditions, rooted in selfstigma and low self-esteem, generated conflict among activists along the lines of rank, ethnicity,
corporeality, identity, and class. There were, however, a few exceptions where khwaja sira
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organizing fostered alliances across social difference among sexual and gender minorities. These
were rare moments that allowed activists to make the structure enabling for themselves, though
often for personal gain.
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Chapter 7:
Identity Politics, Strategic Essentialisms and Incoherence
Coined and later retracted by Gayatri Spivak, “strategic essentialism” (Danius et al. 1993; Spivak
1990) refers to the pragmatic necessity of using identity categories to advance political claims in
the public domain. These strategic identities are intended for the purpose of forging alliances
across social difference to promote the success of collective political action (Mohanty 1991, 69).
Although the purported homogeneity of identity is an illusion, it can still be deployed “to
displace hegemonic knowledges and structures of oppression” (Alcoff 2000, 323). Alternatively,
“presenting a unified picture of social movements means choosing some subalterns over others,
[and if]…we do not pay attention to alternative or multiple subjectivities within movements…we
are likely to miss (or misunderstand) broader…trajectories” (Wolford 2010, 12). Strategic
essentialisms have played an important role in both facilitating and constraining khwaja sira
activism. I argue that the essentialisms deployed by activist leaders were beneficial to gender
ambiguous people but they also produced incoherence. On the one hand, they promoted the
security of khwaja siras, and enabled community leaders to articulate a virtual identity that
misrepresented gender variant Pakistanis as a unified populace. On the other hand, they played a
role in impeding the state’s efforts to “mainstream” khwaja siras. The ambiguity that activist
leaders perpetuated through these essentialisms, created confusion within state bodies that
reverberated back into khwaja sira communities.

Identity Terminology
The institutionalization of the term “khwaja sira” elucidates how it gained popularity in
contemporary Pakistan, and how it has come to be imagined by different groups of people partly
due to the identity politics of community leaders. I begin this chapter by detailing the various
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khwaja sira identity terms that were used within institutionalized contexts by key stakeholders
(e.g., activist organizations, NGOs, government departments), and how khwaja siras were
perceived within these domains. The mixed meanings of khwaja sira and the varied
understandings of gender ambiguous people within activist, NGO and government quarters are
indicative of the general sense of incertitude towards nonnormative genders and sexualities.

Activist Terminology
The term “khwaja sira” lost currency when eunuchs lost their royal functions upon the downfall
of the Mughal Empire, but it was revitalized in the first decade of the new millennium, owing to
the efforts of community leaders and to the legal recognition of khwaja siras by the Pakistani
state. Below, Payal explains how she came to be acquainted with the word.
The first time I heard the word “khwaja sira” was from my grand-guru. At first, I thought
it was a weird word, but when she told me its importance, I only wanted to be called
khwaja sira. But it took years to make it happen, and for the last few years it’s being
used. When we first started protesting and newspapers would cover our story, they would
say, “Hijras had a demonstration.” Once they published a photo of me and Aisha, and
under the photo it said, “Two hijras are having a conversation.” I felt so bad about it.
Then I told everyone to stop saying hijra. “We are khwaja siras,” I would say. And
gradually this change came about, and the media started saying khwaja sira. Once people
used to call us many things, but now we have a respectful term.
Activist leaders took credit for promoting khwaja sira as an identity label in mainstream society.
The term gained further popularity through the SC hearings on the rights of third sex/gender
people in which activists encouraged the use of “khwaja sira.” Research participants admitted to
hearing the term in the mid-2000s either through the media advocacy of community leaders or
through their personal connections with them. As an identity construct then, the category
“khwaja sira” was as an “expansion” of the norm, in the sense developed by Susan Seizer (2000),
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given that it stretched the previous normative boundary beyond the use of derogatory terms, such
as hijra and khusrah.
The appropriation of “khwaja sira” was strategically advantageous. In the conversation
below, the members of GSS explain why they adopted it as an identity label.
Shabnam: There are so many terms we could have chosen, but we chose “khwaja sira.”
Payal: This is what we wanted people to call us. People would always use the term
“hijra” for us, which I did not like because hijra is a strange word.
Shabnam: It is not respectful.
Payal: But khwaja sira is a word of respect. We use all kinds of words when we’re
among ourselves. But when we are being respectful or when we talk to television
channels, then we only call ourselves khwaja siras.
Shazia: Another reason for using “khwaja sira” instead of hijra is that it is an Urdu word.
“Hijra” is used in India, but in Pakistan, Muslims should say “khwaja sira.”
Payal: In Punjabi we are called khusrah, Sindhis say faqīr, Balochis say something else.
In every language there is a different word for us. But we should have one word, and in
Urdu, that is khwaja sira.
Shabnam: In olden times, they used to keep khwaja siras to guard the palace.
Payal: And we also have the special blessings of Khwaja Gharib-un-Nawaz of Ajmer.
This exchange illustrates that, as an identity category, “khwaja sira” was meant to essentialize,
territorialize and nationalize gender ambiguous people. Though not explicitly stated above, the
term khwaja sira, as popularly understood in present-day Pakistan, strategically characterized
gender variant people as hermaphrodites, that is, as individuals whose state was biologically
determined by no fault of their own. Undeniably, arguments in favor of queer rights are more
persuasive when sexual difference is framed as being natural rather than a choice.
Moreover, this ancient title located gender ambiguous people in the nation’s cultural
history, giving them a sedimented identity. The adoption of “khwaja sira” was an act of
reclaiming this history along with the cultural perceptions associated with Mughal era khwaja
siras. Appropriating this title of honor was an “atavistic response” (Nash 2005, 15) or a form of
“recovery work” (Puar 1998, 411) through which khwaja sira activists attempted to recast into
the present the respect accorded to imperial khwaja siras. Activists favored “khwaja sira”
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because it denoted respect and was devoid of the negative connotations associated with words
like hijra, khusrah, zennana, and khadṛa.
Importantly, as Shazia suggests, the term provided religious and cultural authentication to
gender ambiguous people by grounding them in the South Asian Muslim past of the
Subcontinent, one that was distinct from the Hindu tradition. Through this “politics of insertion”
(Khan 2011, 395), khwaja sira activists claimed cultural belonging as Muslims and Pakistani
citizens. That a revered Sufi Saint blessed khwaja siras served as further validation of their
privileged status in Islam. Additionally, Payal suggests that “khwaja sira” functioned as an
umbrella category that was intended to unify gender ambiguous people along the lines of ethnic,
linguistic, corporeal and gendered difference. In effect, the use of the term by genderqueer
Pakistanis was a collective manipulation of language and history, but one through which this
marginalized segment of the population claimed respect, cultural and biological legitimacy,
internal unity, and social and national inclusion.
Nevertheless, “khwaja sira” was a highly contested term, and there was no firm
consensus among activist and ordinary khwaja siras about who should be enumerated under this
identity construct. The core members of GSS took khwaja sira to refer to anyone who possessed
a feminine soul (rūh) irrespective of corporeal status. Payal included zennanas/akvās in the
khwaja sira framework even though she held grudges with them in her personal life. However,
some prominent activist leaders publically denounced zennanas/akvās as male imposters.
Hijra and zennana communities beyond GSS and Karachi had also adopted khwaja
sira as an inclusive identity category. One hot October afternoon, Payal, Soni and I rented a car
and drove from Lahore to Kasur, a small city along the Pakistan-India border, to visit a group of
zennanas who had set up a CBO named Saya Development Foundation. Upon our arrival, we
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met our hosts, a group of effeminate zennanas who were dressed in men’s shalvār qamīz and
sported mustaches. A few wore feminine accessories, such as light makeup and scarves. Once
seated inside Saya’s office, I noticed that the walls were covered with posters. One in Urdu had
the motto of the organization: “The support of the rights of khwaja siras is our duty.” During the
meeting that followed, Saya’s representatives identified themselves as khwaja siras, and
emphasized the need for zennanas and hijras to work collectively to build a stronger alliance. As
khwaja siras, zennanas benefitted from the rights granted to third sex/gender people by the
Supreme Court (e.g., the right to vote and take public office, inheritance right, job and education
quotas, welfare support, as well as legal and social recognition). In contrast, other sexual
minorities, such as homosexual men, enjoyed neither legal protection nor respect in society.
Hence, the “imperative to form bounded populations” through the appropriation of culturally
recognized identity categories was “to access governmental policies” (Dutta 2013, 13).
GSS was one of the few organizations that had appropriated “transgender” as a synonym
for “khwaja sira.” The reason for selecting this label over others terms had to do with the
organization’s longstanding consultative relationship with and dependence on sexual health
NGOs that used “transgender” and “TG” to refer to zennanas and hijras. Moreover,
“transgender” resonated with group members because it resembled “khwaja sira” as an umbrella
category that subsumed other gendered and sexed typologies, such as transvestite and
transsexual. Unlike GSS, other khwaja sira organizations were drawn to the English word
“shemale,” which gained popularity when khwaja sira activist, Noor Vicky, named her
organization “Shemale Coalition of Pakistan.” Activists from other parts of the country followed
suit by adding the word shemale to the title of their own organizations.
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NGO Terminology
NGOs tend to use a unique set of terms to describe the sexual minority groups they support. The
reliance of the LGBT movement in the United States on the neoliberal funding regime and
constructions of acceptable queerness (Ward 2008, 11-13) can be likened to the ties between
international donor agencies and local recipients within the NGO industrial complex. Dependent
upon grant funding for HIV/AIDS prevention from foreign entities, local queer groups adopt the
cultural capital of their transnational donors, that is, they draw upon either Euro-American or
indigenous identity terms, or some combination of both, in keeping with the dictates of
international funders and the personal preferences of elite NGO leaders. On the ground-level,
however, queer communities had their own distinct classifications (e.g., khwaja sira, zennana,
hijra) which did not always match NGO-speak.
Khwaja siras who had professional ties with rights-based NGOs and those who were
employed by such organizations had started using NGO jargon, such as “transgender” and “TG”
in everyday speech. Alternatively, khwaja sira activists drove sexual health organizations to
accept their preferred indigenous terminology (i.e., khwaja sira) over hijra, which was more
widely used in HIV intervention programs throughout South Asia. In other words, each had
influenced the other to some degree. That gender ambiguous people had managed to exercise
some control over the identity frameworks within the NGO sector was partly attributable to the
rise in the significance of CBOs among foreign donors, who were increasingly interested in
authenticating queer groups and “supporting a diversity of niche causes across the globe” (Dave
2008: 393), such as smaller organizations that were run by and for specific minority groups. The
semi-independent structure of these CBOs gave khwaja siras some degree of power in decisions
related to issues of representation.
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NGOs involved in HIV intervention in Pakistan adhered to the MSM framework. MSM
was not an identity but indicative of the behavior of all males who had sex with males, which
typically included khwaja siras since they were born with male genitals97. MHS and its affiliate
CBOs placed TGs within the MSM framework due to the following overlaps between the two
categories: 1) the birth-sex of both groups was male, 2) they were attracted to the male body, 3)
they experienced a contradiction between their socially expected and individually desired sexual
behavior, 4) like TGs, many MSM were effeminate, and 5) both bore the social cost of being
effeminate. However, the khwaja siras who were affiliated with these CBOs resisted the MSM
framework since they did not wish to be identified as males/men.
Paralleling gay men’s perception of kothis in India (Gupta 2005, 128), gay-identifying
NGO workers in Pakistan perceived zennanas as homosexual men rather than khwaja siras or
transgender. They believed that the absence of culturally grounded models of homosexuality in
Pakistan resulted in their misidentification as hijras and zennanas. This line of reasoning
assumed that the biological truth of sexuality was erroneously subsumed by a backward cultural
model of dominant queerness. The uncritical adoption of Euro-American understandings of
sexuality, that is, as a fixed and defining component of a person’s identity (Khanna 2007, 166-8),
did not correspond to the experience of many local queer groups for whom sexual identities were
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The historical transformations that took place in the MSM framework as an umbrella category
did not seem to apply in Pakistan. In India, for instance, MSM initially included gender
ambiguous people, but the two were eventually deemed separate categories based on the insights
gleaned from new research and community consultation. However, CBOs in Pakistan continued
to adhere to the older classification of MSM as an umbrella category inclusive of TGs. This
framework was subdivided into three categories: 1) The gendered framework referred to sexual
contact between two males where one assumed the masculine role and the other the feminine
role. Hijras and zennanas mostly fell into this framework. 2) The discharge framework included
those who had sex with either men or women in order to release body heat, which was believed
to develop as a result of pent up sexual urges. 3) The gay framework included those who
identified as gay.
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fluid, situated and imbricated. Western notions of sexuality lost sight of the fact that, in addition
to identity, desire was also socioculturally shaped. Many constructionists argue that culture has
the power to influence desire, be it the direction of gendered or erotic interest or object choice
(Vance 2005, 20).
Nonetheless, the attitudes of gay NGO employees suggest that zennanas were not privy to
the deeper veracity of sexuality as a result of their class background, lack or education and
exposure. Indeed, human beings are prone to mimicking the cultural models that are available to
them; the more the models the greater will be the diversity in queer identification and practice.
Exposure to alternative modes of queerness may indeed influence zennana self-perception.
However, the etic notions of NGO officials were impositions that ignored the subjective
experiences of zennanas, and overlooked the cultural processes of acculturation that instilled
genderqueer desires in seemingly homosexual subjects. Although some homosexual men (i.e.,
zankas) did indeed misidentify as khwaja sira while others joined khwaja siras networks simply
to enjoy the benefits of membership (e.g., easy access to parties and men), to insist that all
zennanas were homosexual was to deny gender ambiguous subjects the right to selfidentification.
Moreover, MHS’s English-speaking gay staff was unhappy with the appropriation of the
term “khwaja sira” by hijras and zennanas. On our way to a khwaja sira’s house, MHS
representatives, Saif and Ali, said that “khwaja sira” was problematic since everyone did not
identify with the term, and that it was confusing too because its historical meaning diverged from
the way in which it had been appropriated. Saif believed that an entirely new word should be
invented for khwaja siras. In contrast, I suggest that the term had gained salience both among
gender ambiguous people and the general public. Hence, instead of inventing a new term, NGOs
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and khwaja sira activists should seek to transform the way the general public understood “khwaja
sira” and work towards developing social acceptance of zennanas and hijras. Importantly, a new
term could be potentially dangerous, especially if it was not historically and culturally grounded,
in which case, it could be viewed as a foreign threat to Pakistani society. Although Ali reflected
on it, Saif did not seem convinced with my argument.
Similarly, MHS’s director, Kareem, was displeased with the problems posed by khwaja
sira identity politics. The public belief that a true khwaja sira was (or should be) an intersexual
person was reinforced within NGOs, even by gay identifying staff members who worked closely
with gender ambiguous people and were privy to the truth about their somatic composition.
Kareem acknowledged that even though he respected gender ambiguous people’s choice of selfidentification, it was his personal belief that the term khwaja sira by definition applied to
intersexual people. Further, he disagreed with the self-framing of zennanas as khwaja siras.
Ideally, I think a khwaja sira is someone who is born with ambiguous genitals, a hijra is
someone who is castrated…and a zennana is a feminized man. A zennana is an MSM along
with gay identifying boys. This is how in my mind things should be just to get things more
organized, but I still respect anybody who says whatever they are.
Kareem adhered to the dominant understanding of sexual identities and seemed unwilling to
modify his personal structuring of indigenous queers even though he claimed to respect their
self-identification.
[W]hatever your identity is, you need to first define it. You can’t just start throwing terms
around because you like the sound of it. It doesn’t make sense. It confuses other people and
it confuses you. Over time, I have come to the conclusion that we should respect whatever
the person wants to identify as…If people want to call themselves khwaja sira, fine…But I
still think there needs to be a definition.
Kareem emphasized the need for clear identity definitions and neat classifications because
organizing target populations into distinct groups was crucial to “knowing, manipulating, and
managing bodies” (Pigg and Adams 2005, 1), and providing appropriate services to beneficiaries
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in HIV intervention programs. Due to the lack of consensus over the meaning of “khwaja sira”
among community activists, Kareem categorized indigenous sexual minorities by taking a lead
from dominant culture, and by privileging prevalent identity framings within the NGO sector and
his own personal views about sexual diversity. However, his cartography was not only divorced
from the ground realities of gender variant Pakistanis but it also failed to account for temporal
shifts in meaning and identification.

Government Terminology
At the governmental level, several identity terms gained prominence over others, and many of
them were products of the Supreme Court proceedings on khwaja siras. In the series of hearings
that took place between 2009-2012, a few prominent figures played a role in influencing the
state’s choice of identity classifications. The most prominent among these were khwaja sira
activist, Noor Vicky, and the human rights lawyer who filed a petition on behalf of gender
ambiguous people in the SC, Aslam Khaki. As an expert on Islamic jurisprudence, Khaki
provided the court with information about Islamic approaches to sex/gender ambiguity, while
relying on Noor’s input on khwaja sira identity nomenclature. Consequently, the judiciary and
the government began using the terms “khwaja sira” and “shemale” interchangeably for gender
ambiguous people. During the hearings, Noor propagated the term “shemale,” which made its
way into court documents along with other terms, such as eunuchs and middle sex. Eventually,
the term gained currency at the national and provincial levels when government departments
began using it in official documents98. Alternatively, the government’s chosen referents for
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For instance, documents on khwaja siras were contained in dusty files marked ‘shemale’ at the
Social Welfare Department in Karachi.
	
  

263	
  

gender ambiguous people would have been different had some other khwaja sira activist attended
the hearings instead of Noor.
In November 2011, the SC ordered NADRA, the country’s citizen registration
department, to issue national identity cards to khwaja siras by giving them the option to register
in one of the following three categories: 1) Male (khwaja sira), Female (khwaja sira), and
Khusna-e-mushkil. These three classes bore resemblance to Islamic classifications of
intersexuality, which include those whose anatomy is similar to male genitalia, female genitalia
or neither male nor female genitalia (i.e., indeterminable). However, the SC and the government
were vague about how they defined the above three khwaja sira classifications. Through my
personal exchange with Aslam Khaki in 2013, however, it became clear that the court
deliberately left the meaning of khwaja sira open to interpretation in order to accommodate all
those who self-identified as khwaja sira (see Gender Verification and The Perils of Taxonomic
Regulation for more information).
The significance of the identity terminology appropriated in activist and national
discourse cannot be undervalued. The vocabulary used can deeply impact a movement and its
target populations. Pakistan’s stance on the UN Resolution on LGBT Rights is a case in point.
This resolution was severely condemned by Pakistan in 2011 partly because “LGBT” sexualities
were perceived as immoral foreign threats to the country. Pakistan’s stance against LGBT rights
in the global arena was ironic given that the country had already recognized the rights of its
genderqueer citizens. Evidently, the Pakistani envoy to the UN did not consider the “T” in LGBT
to include khwaja siras. Like most Pakistanis, it appears that he too viewed khwaja siras as
intersexuals. This bolsters the argument that locally constructed, culturally grounded and
religiously endorsed conceptions of queerness have greater potential for acceptance in
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mainstream Pakistani society. In contrast, foreign queer constructs, such as LGBT, were
regarded as threats to Pakistani sovereignty, culture and religious norms. The country’s official
position on the UN resolution for LGBT rights speaks to the power of language and indigenous
terminology, which, though limiting, played a critical role in facilitating positive policy changes
for gender ambiguous people.

Institutionalization of Dominant Discourses
Dominant ideas related to khwaja siras were reproduced within activist and institutionalized
contexts, where the language used to refer to them impacted the direction of their activism. Here
again, the multiplicity of the Pakistani public emerged in the diverse social attitudes that ranged
from acceptance to extreme violence against khwaja siras. Understanding how khwaja siras were
perceived in these contexts is a necessary step in illustrating the relationality between the public
imaginary and khwaja sira identity politics.
In 2011, the US Embassy in Islamabad hosted a pride event, and issued a press release
expressing its support for LGBT rights in Pakistan. This sparked anti-US and anti-gay protests in
several Pakistani cities. Religious parties took to the streets in protest, condemning the event as a
form of “cultural terrorism” and “an assault on Pakistan’s Islamic culture” by the US (Express
Tribune). Meanwhile, fearing the worst, local gay and lesbian activists decided to lay low instead
of participating in the public debate surrounding the event. Recent social movement literature
indicates both the collaborative potential of transnational connections (Speed 2008) as well as
their detrimental impacts. In this case, local queer activists viewed the Embassy’s action as an
imperialist move that jeopardized their already meager efforts to organize.

	
  

265	
  

Several months after the US Embassy pride event, a religious organization known as
“Muslim Youth Forum” (MYF) launched a campaign against homosexuality by displaying antigay signage in Lahore. A banner hung at a busy city intersection stated that, “There is no place
for Gay and Lesbian in Islam.” Another poster mentioned the US Embassy pride event, and
called for the immediate dismissal of the representatives of “Gays and Lesbians in Foreign
Affairs Agencies” (GLIFAA) and “Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network” (GLSEN)
from Pakistan. In speaking to the press, a representative of MYF claimed that the two groups
were actively recruiting individuals to join their organizations by offering them large sums of
money (Kashif 2012). However, the fervor with which the program started seemed to dissipate
soon after, and what became of the campaign is unclear.
Interestingly, khwaja siras were either unaware of or unfazed by the controversy
surrounding this incident. In fact, even the protesting religious groups did not seem to view
khwaja siras as a part of “LGBT.” This is not entirely surprising given that the local meanings of
khwaja sira often did not translate into “transgender” in mainstream discourse. Further, unlike
LGBT individuals, khwaja siras were typically not perceived as foreign imports but as an
indigenous group with deep roots in South Asian history. The language that is used to identify
minority groups has consequences for how they are perceived. Khwaja sira activists made a wise
choice in appropriating the term khwaja sira since it spared them from the negative impacts of
English terms, such as LGBT and transgender. Although, transgender was the preferred English
term used by GSS and sexual health NGOs, it was mostly employed within activist contexts or in
select forums rather than in public khwaja sira advocacy. Despite its limitations, “khwaja sira”
was a safe and respectable word that promoted the security of gender ambiguous people and
protected them from the harmful effects of social stigma.
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With the exception of a few select NGOs, such as MHS, the employees of most sexual
health organizations in Pakistan were unaccepting of the MSM and TG populations for whom
they claimed to provide services. NGO employees adhered to dominant religious and social
beliefs in spite of receiving extensive “sensitization” training. For instance, Ameer, who worked
for a sexual health NGO and was the only heterosexual man in GSS’s core membership, believed
that most khwaja siras suffered from a “psycho-sexual disorder.”
I think that if we carefully listen to their problems, manage their psychological hurdles,
give them proper counseling, and if they are given more options and those options are
facilitated, then they will change their ways. Plus, some khwaja siras are men who are
either gay or bi. I’m talking about those who regularly like to fuck boys. I think that such
individuals become khwaja siras because they are in need of money. They have found an
easy way to earn by studying the khwaja sira community and penetrating it.
Ameer believed that gender dysphoria could be cured through psychotherapy, and that gender
ambiguous people could function as men if they received proper treatment. Moreover, he echoed
the dominant view that “normal” men joined khwaja sira networks in order to earn a livelihood.
His views also reflect the popular belief within NGOs that most khwaja siras were homosexual.
Moreover, Ameer perceived gender in terms of a strict top-bottom oppositional binary,
where the feminine partner should necessarily assume the passive/receptive sexual role. That a
woman or a feminine person could possess the desire to penetrate a man was beyond Ameer’s
cultural understanding. Hence, in line with the dominant view, he based gender identity solely on
behavior instead of also considering desire as a crucial component of queer subjectivity. This
understanding was derivative of widespread cultural and religious interpretations of sex/gender,
which privileged physical constitution, bodily function, and behavior in determining gender.
Hence, even NGO workers who sustained long-term contact with sexual minorities were often
unable to comprehend the interplay between behavior and desire.
Similar views were prevalent within state institutions. For instance, the SC advocate,
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Aslam Khaki, believed the condition of khwaja siras to be treatable disorder.
A male would never want to dress up as a woman and expose himself to the public. He
would feel ashamed. But if he is doing this by choice, then he must have some
psychological tendencies. Some people say that those who are psychological khwaja siras
should be treated just the way you would treat a psychological problem. You do not
submit to him and follow his wishes. The people who don’t recognize psychological
khwaja siras don’t understand that they have a disorder and that they are patients. This is
what I have been told by experts.
Khaki’s views were informed by the opinions of medical practitioners and scholars with whom
he had been in consultation for his SC case on khwaja siras. Although he accepted zennanas and
hijras as khwaja siras, he was advised that such people could be fixed through psychotherapy and
be made to function as “normal” men. The information from his sources appears to be based on
dated and localized psychological studies of homosexuality and transgenderism.
Worse still was when NGO staff took a moralistic stance on issues pertaining to sex,
gender and sexuality. During a visit to an NGO involved in HIV intervention in Karachi, I
witnessed a revealing conversation between two NGO employees. Over tea, Khalid initiated a
discussion about the corporeal practices of khwaja siras. He said that gender ambiguous people
who altered their bodies tampered with God’s creation, and that voluntary genital excision was
tantamount to being at war with God. In agreement with Khalid, Arif stated that his professional
involvement with khwaja siras was strictly on a humanitarian basis, as one human being helping
another. However, his personal belief was that “TGs should not be encouraged by the
government because what they are doing is wrong.” Much like Khalid and Arif, many NGO
workers in Pakistan were not above mainstream morality and respectability.
NGOs typically trained their staff to separate their personal opinions from their
professional ones in order to prevent the former from interfering with service delivery to
beneficiaries. However, the religious and cultural beliefs of NGO staff often intruded upon the
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prescribed approach to the provision of services to clients. Some NGO employees attempted to
change the behavior of sexual minorities through instruction on religiously unacceptable sexual
acts (e.g., sex work, extramarital sex, and same-sex sexual behavior). These practices reflected
prevailing attitudes towards gender ambiguous people and influenced how khwaja siras
represented themselves to their NGO contacts.
Khwaja Siras and Ambiguity
Founded on anatomy and biology, essentialist perspectives conjure a sense of certainty about
gender. However, gender variant bodies destabilize this certitude and evoke ambivalence
precisely because they are inscribed with ambiguity. Khwaja siras, by their mere presence, made
sex/gender indistinct, while their deceptive representations reinforced the skepticism associated
with their bodies. Together, the imprecise form and game-like strategies of khwaja siras distorted
dominant notions of the contemporary forms of gender and sexual diversity in Pakistan. This
section focuses on the Pakistani state’s attempt to overcome the uncertainty presented by khwaja
siras. It describes the impact of the strategic essentialisms deployed by activists on the
government’s attempt to monitor, categorize and organize khwaja siras.

Somatechnics of Sex/Gender
The drive to normalize and regiment subversive bodies is among the responses to the
destabilization of the normative sex/gender system. Here, I discuss the somatechnics of
sex/gender devised by the state for the regulation and surveillance of genderqueer bodies.
Somatechnics refers to the inextricable link between the body and the technologies, techniques
and technics that shape embodiment (Pugliese and Stryker 2009, 1). It “evokes how bodies
(soma) and technologies (specific discourses and social and cultural practices within disciplines
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such as medicine, law, science and information technologies) form the basis of contemporary
understandings of embodiment” (Mackenzie 2008, 398). These techniques include biopolitics or
the state’s construction and control of citizens through the disciplinary technologies of power,
which, according to Foucault, include such controls as confession, medical intervention, and
public moral policing (1977; 1979).
Colonial rulers justified the registration, surveillance and control of hijras by categorizing
them as a criminal caste under the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 (Reddy 2005, 26). After
independence, the Pakistani government categorically ignored them, but in 2009 gender
ambiguous people came under state scrutiny as a result of the rights granted to them by the SC.
Although the attention they garnered fell under the rhetoric of rights rather than criminality, the
techniques used by the Pakistani state to address the “mainstreaming” of khwaja siras resembled
colonial methods of surveillance. This approach aims to divide target populations into taxonomic
traits based on corporeal and behavioral classifications.

Gender Verification
In 2009, Aslam Khaki filed a petition to the SC on behalf of khwaja siras. The case entailed a
series of hearings that occurred over a span of three years, and during this time the Court passed
several historic rulings in favor of khwaja siras. One of the most controversial decisions made by
the Court was ordering NADRA, the government’s citizen identification and registration wing, to
regulate khwaja siras by mandating a sex/gender verification test. The purpose of this
examination was to medically determine the thirdness of those who claimed to be khwaja siras in
order to ascertain their eligibility to register for third gender identity cards. The test was meant to
measure the hormone levels of registrants (Redding 2014) presumably since hormonal imbalance
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was believed to be indicative of genital irregularities. Such testing reflected the Court’s
essentialist understanding of “khwaja sira” as a biological category.
The announcement of the test created a stir among activists who feared that the invasive
medical procedure would expose gender ambiguous people as “normal” men, thereby resulting
in the termination of the rights granted to khwaja siras by the SC. “They are afraid of what will
become of them if, after doing the checkup, the doctor declares that they’re not khwaja sira,”
said Ameer, GSS’s communications officer. Many others believed that the ID card debacle
would lead to a government crackdown on khwaja siras and force them into hiding.
In order to prevent such as situation from arising, khwaja sira groups protested against
the medical requirement. With guidance from women activists, GSS argued that the examination
was discriminatory and flawed.
Everyone knows who they are and what is inside them, but no human has the right to tell
another human what he or she is. But [NADRA]…gave us unnecessary tension by saying
that they will do a medical test. A doctor will tell us what we are? Really? Well, then they
should also check men and women. Why only khwaja siras? As for checking hormones,
there are so many women whose [male] hormones levels are higher. Will the government
call those women men? This is wrong.
GSS argued that hormone level testing was a defective method of determining thirdness.
Moreover, it was discriminatory since the exam was not mandated for ordinary men and women.
In the following SC hearing, the chief justice repealed the sex/gender verification requirement in
light of the arguments set forth by khwaja sira activists. “It was decided that it is sufficient that
they claim they are khwaja sira because…no individual will claim for themselves a title that is
shameful in society,” said Aslam Khaki, the lawyer who represented khwaja siras in the SC.
Thereafter, NADRA was ordered to register khwaja siras and to issue them ID cards without
subjecting them to medical examination.
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The Perils of Taxonomic Regulation
The confusion surrounding the Supreme Count’s organization of khwaja siras illustrates that
gender variance is fundamentally intertwined with ambiguity. That non-normative genders and
sexualities evoke uncertainty is not uncommon cross-culturally, and even in the South Asian
subcontinent where they are revered as ascetics, hijras emanate ambiguity. The confusion
surrounding the SC decisions pertaining to gender variant people elucidates the extent of the
ambiguity encasing queer bodies and categories. This uncertainty not only plagued state
institutions but also mystified khwaja sira leaders.
As mentioned earlier, in late 2011, the SC announced three khwaja sira sex/gender
subcategories, namely, mard/male (khwaja sira), ‘aorat/female (khwaja sira) and khunsā-emushkil, and ordered NADRA to allow khwaja siras to select one of the three categories of their
choice for their new identity cards.

Figure 13. A khwaja sira’s national identity card indicating her
“Sex” as “Male (khwaja sira)” in the red box above.

However, ordinary and activist khwaja siras found these three classifications bewildering,
primarily because the SC did not define them. Activists were left on their own to interpret the
meaning of the categories, which affirmed to many that the state viewed khwaja siras as
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intersexuals. This was a logical assumption given that the SC first mandated a medical exam and
subsequently espoused sex/gender categories that closely resembled the three Islamic
classifications of intersexuality.
GSS leaders were unsure how to interpret the three categories when they were initially
announced. Some interpreted male (khwaja sira) as zennana/akvā, female (khwaja sira) as
hijra/nirbān, and khunsā-e-mushkil as intersexual. Others felt that both zennanas and hijras
should register under the male (khwaja sira) subset because female (khwaja sira) was more
appropriate for women who experienced gender/genital ambiguities. Alternatively, they realized
that, in the absence of a medical exam, they could technically select any of the three
subcategories of their choice irrespective of their somatic status. The following conversation
between Sherry, Nighat and I demonstrates the disparate readings of the three khwaja sira
classifications among constituents.
Sherry: A few day back, a khwaja sira asked me which category I selected for my new
ID card. I said male (khwaja sira) because when we die, we are supposed to have the
funeral of men. When we go for Hajj and ‘Umrah we have to go as men. But it was her
wish to get registered as female (khwaja sira).
Nighat: Both akvās and nirbāns come under male (khwaja sira).
Faris: So who falls under female (khwaja sira)?
Nighat: Women who start getting facial hair, a beard and mustache.
Faris: What about khwaja siras who have gotten breasts? How will they do Hajj and
‘Umrah in men’s ihram99.
Sherry: Those who have silicon implants don’t even think about doing Hajj and‘Umrah.
Despite their emasculated status, both Sherry and Nighat were drawn to the male (khwaja sira)
category for religious reasons. Like most interlocutors, they believed that they should perform

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
99
The sacred dress of Muslim pilgrims. Men’s ihram consists of two lengths of white cotton, one
wrapped around the loins and the other draped over the left should. Women can dress in any
modest outfit as long as their head is covered but face and hands remain exposed.
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the Muslim pilgrimage to Makkah as men since they were born male100. However, some khwaja
siras wanted to register as female (khwaja sira) because a feminine identity was more appealing.
Even as khwaja sira activists self-interpreted the state-issued categories, they found
themselves engulfed in uncertainty about their legal status. Soni’s dubiousness about the
government’s stance on gender ambiguous people was evident in my conversation with her in
January 2013.
Faris: What do male khwaja sira and female khwaja sira mean?
Soni: Male khwaja sira could include people like zennanas who are akvā or even those
who are nirbān….
Faris: So then you’re a male khwaja sira?
Soni: Exactly!
Faris: But do you think the SC’s definition of male khwaja sira is the same as your
definition of male khwaja sira?
Soni: Maybe.
The above discussion ended abruptly because Soni swiftly changed the topic when my line of
questioning became disconcerting. Although she was quick to align herself with the male khwaja
sira category in light of her non-emasculated status, she was uncertain if the state recognized her
as such. Likewise, many gender ambiguous people suspected that they did not qualify as khwaja
siras from the legal standpoint. Ironically, the ambiguity that gender variant individuals projected
onto the wider society, now reflected back on them and produced uncertainty within their
communities. Khwaja siras had unknowingly created a cycle of doubt, and they found
themselves entrapped in a web of their own making.
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Most khwaja siras were unaware that a change of sex on one’s national identity card would
not be accompanied by a corresponding adjustment on one’s passport. Aslam Khaki explained
that gender ambiguous people who select the female (khwaja sira) field on their ID cards would
continue be listed as ‘male’ on their passports and accordingly perform pilgrimage as men.
Khwaja siras would have to apply for Hajj visas either as men or women since the Saudi
government did not recognize third sex/gender categories. The same would apply to the visa
forms of countries that followed a binary sex/gender system.
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The confusion experienced by community activists was a product of the state’s own
uncertainty, which reverberated into khwaja sira networks. During follow-up research in 2013, I
finally had the opportunity to apprehend the state’s legal definition of “khwaja sira” through a
personal interview with Aslam Khaki in Islamabad. Khaki’s testimony explains that the SC had
been deliberately silent in defining “khwaja sira” partly due to its own misgivings. Khaki’s
personal experience with this case sheds light on his and the Court’s initial presumption and
emerging understanding of who khwaja siras really were, while also highlighting the process of
knowledge production.
When I filed the petition in 2009, I had limited knowledge of khwaja siras. I used to think
that khwaja siras are those who are unable to have children. But then many khwaja sira
gurus started coming to me, people would bring literature from the Internet, and
researchers like you came in contact with me and added to my knowledge drastically.
That’s how I came to know about these different classes. Initially, we were only talking
about khwaja sira rights. Then gradually, newer issues came up when khwaja siras
themselves started attending SC hearings. The big gurus started narrating their problems,
and from that we learned new things and also started developing solutions.
Khaki’s testimony elucidates the Court’s uncertainty and evolving awareness of the communities
to whom it was granting rights over the course of three years. Khaki started the court case under
the erroneous assumption that khwaja siras were intersexuals and/or impotent. However, in
consultation with a few khwaja sira leaders, researchers, and NGOs, he and the Court acquired
new knowledge, which they used to devise rulings.
In this case, knowledge was produced and polices implemented through ordinary
interactions. As is often the case, history is made not as a result of cascading macropolitical
forces but by the everyday interactions and intervention of both influential and ordinary people.
The events surrounding this case also demonstrate the Pakistani state’s continual attempts “to
gauge the demands upon it and to adjudicate on contentious issues” (Khan 2010, 25).
Alternatively, the Court’s deliberate silence over the meaning of its recently formulated
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sex/gender categories was consistent with the contradictions and the general state of anxiety that
have historically plagued Pakistan with respect to potentially controversial and religiously
objectionable matters, particularly those related to gender and sexuality.

Figure 14. The anthropologist with a khwaja sira
activist outside the Supreme Court in Islamabad.
Community leaders from across the country
attended one of the khwaja sira case hearings in
late 2011.

To this end, my personal meeting with Khaki was significant because it shed light on the
Court’s eventual, though yet undeclared, stance on khwaja siras at the end of the three-year
period of the case.
The SC court hasn’t really defined the term khwaja sira. It has left it open…[A]ccording
to the SC, khwaja sira includes both biological as well as psychological khwaja
siras…Male (khwaja siras) are those in whom the male characteristics are dominant. This
includes those who have masculine features. Their hands might be rough and tough, their
facial expressions and the way they walk might be masculine, but they adopt the getup of
females. Similarly, female (khwaja sira) are those in whom the female characteristics are
dominant…Individuals who are physically female but psychologically male can also get
a female (khwaja sira) card…And khunsā-e-mushkil means those who cannot be
identified as either male or female. They are mixed. In Islamic law, a [urine] test has been
prescribed to determine their sex. But back then they did not take notice of psychological
khwaja siras. …The term khwaja sira has an extensive and broad definition, which
applies to anyone who we can call sexually abnormal in this culture.
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According to Khaki, the state considers, in addition to intersexuals, those who experience gender
dysphoria or possess a feminine soul as khwaja siras, regardless of corporeality. For the purpose
of ID cards, the “male (khwaja sira)” category may be selected by masculine-looking zennanas,
males who experience gender dysphoria, and intersexuals who urinate through the male genitals.
The “female (khwaja sira)” category may be selected by feminine-looking zennanas, hijras,
females who experience gender dysphoria, and intersexuals who urinate through the female
genitals. Finally, “khunsā-e-mushkil” is appropriate only for intersexuals whose sex cannot be
determined through the urination test. Curiously, Khaki suggests that the broad legal definition
of “khwaja sira” could be extended to all non-normative sexualities, but he does not specify
which ones.
However, due to the SC’s deliberate silence, most ordinary and activist khwaja siras were
unaware of the state’s perspective on gender ambiguous people, which led many to experience
insecurity about their legal status. Upon my return to Karachi, I promptly related the information
I had gathered from Khaki to GSS members. Nonetheless, in the absence of an official
explanation by the state, the gender ambiguous majority remained not only unclear about their
rights but also vulnerable to injustices. Many continued to fear that the SC narrowly defined
khwaja siras as intersexuals. “I think that if the SC found out that khwaja siras are not by birth, it
might change its decision,” said Farah. “The truth cannot remain hidden for long, and it will
become a huge scandal when it comes out.” Activist leaders were reluctant to make an issue of
the state’s ill-definition of “khwaja sira” since a vague law was more amenable than a concrete
one that excluded them altogether.
On the one hand, the confusion surrounding the Supreme Count’s decisions pertaining to
gender variant people elucidate that judicial knowledge was produced and government policies
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implemented not through certitude about khwaja siras, but by a process that entailed
presupposition, perplexity and an emerging comprehension about sex/gender ambiguity. On the
other hand, it was the presumptions of intersexuality that enabled the case to be taken up and
entertained in the first place, and for the SC decisions to be passed without public protest.

Conclusion
Strategic essentialisms have been both beneficial and detrimental to khwaja sira activism. The
misconceptions and incoherence they perpetuated about khwaja siras encouraged a public
discourse around khwaja sira rights in Pakistan and promoted the security of gender ambiguous
people. These essentialisms worked precisely because khwaja siras have always evoked a sense
of ambiguity in the wider society. This ambiguity is evident in the mixed perceptions about them
in institutionalized domains. Conversely, essentialisms also injected uncertainty into the
judiciary and the government, thereby hampering the state’s efforts to classify and organize
khwaja siras. The indeterminacy that activist leaders propagated about khwaja sira identities
produced much confusion within state bodies. This sense of ambiguity unwittingly echoed back
into khwaja sira social and activist networks, thus creating a cycle of incoherence surrounding
genderqueer identities in Pakistan.

	
  

278	
  

Chapter 8:
Transnormativity and the Games and Khwaja Sira Activism
Lisa Duggan describes homonormativity as “a politics that does not contest dominant
heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them” (2002, 179). In my
appropriation of this perspective, I employ the derivative term, “transnormative,” to denote a
political strategy that does not merely reproduce heteronormativity but social norms at large.
Here, transnormativity describes a deceptive activist approach through which khwaja sira leaders
fashioned a relatively “normal,” non-disruptive, and easily acceptable queer persona. In addition,
they engaged in strategic maneuvers to control and manage information. The virtual identities
they shaped through these techniques both converged with and diverged from actual khwaja sira
identities. The foci of this chapter are activist strategies, particularly deceptive framing and the
game-like social interactions of khwaja sira leaders in the public sphere. I claim that khwaja sira
politics was mostly aimed at stifling public awareness of the corporeality and sexuality of gender
ambiguous people. These games of secrecy and deception reproduced the uncertainty attached to
queer bodies and subjectivity.

Framing Khwaja Siras
David Snow and Robert Benford suggest that “the success of participant mobilization, both
within and across movements, depends upon the degree to which” a movement is able to develop
suitable frames (Snow 1988, 199). Framing refers to the “politics of signification,” of assigning
meaning to and interpreting “relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize
potential adherents and constituents” (Snow 1988, 198). I appropriate the notion of “framing” as
a strategy aimed not so much at gender variant constituents but mostly at raising public support
for them.
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Religious and cultural notions of morality and decency have played a role in shaping the
legal and activist discourse around khwaja sira rights in Pakistan, which has revolved around
making genderqueer people “decent citizens.” This reasoning emphasized the need to create job
opportunities for khwaja siras in order to prevent them from leading an immoral life of begging,
dancing and prostitution. In light of this discourse, the strategic framing of gender ambiguous
people was vital to khwaja sira advocacy. Activist leaders wanted to change the public image of
khwaja siras by dispelling select myths about them and by framing them as poor, deprived,
moral, respectable, asexual, religious and responsible Pakistani citizens. This positive depiction
was meant to garner the sympathy of the general public whether on TV, documentary films,
newspapers or magazine articles. Although many of the prevailing ideas about gender variant
people were simply untrue, others were not too far from reality. Regardless of their validity,
khwaja sira activists contested stereotypes that were damaging to their reputation while
upholding those that were beneficial.
In analyzing the history of transgender representation in film and television, Cael Keegan
theorizes transnormativity as an approach to making gender non-normativity accessible to
mainstream publics by representing genderqueer subjects as generic and desexualized characters
that evoke sympathy and have a wide recognition and appeal (2013).
At base, these representations imply that transgender difference is ultimately resolvable-something that can be unproblematically folded into heteronormative familial and social
structures through a democratic extension of progressive optimism and a re-stabilization
of the gender binary. Transnormativity is therefore an expression of hegemonic cultural
expansion, a sign of the enduring assimilative power of liberal democratic ideology and
its gendered logics. (Keegan 2013)
Similar processes were at work in the framing strategies of khwaja sira activists. As part of what
I view as its “transnormative agenda,” GSS’s media advocacy focused primarily on three broad
themes, including: (1) the representation of gender ambiguous people as normal, respectable,
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modern and capable, (2) khwaja siras as poverty stricken, and (3) the meaning of the term
“khwaja sira.” This framing was meant to cover the “true, hidden, self” while presenting a
“contrived self…for social recognition” (Dave 2011, 14).

Transnormativity
GSS’s transnormative framing included separating the notion of sex and sexuality from the
public discourse on khwaja siras. However, certain forces worked against the organization’s
crusade of unhinging the linkages between gender ambiguous people and immorality. Among
them was GSS’s former vice president, Farah, whose liberal views were poles apart from Payal’s
conservative approach. While Payal wished to publicaly distance khwaja siras from socially
unacceptable behavior, Farah was intent on asserting the rights of gender variant sex workers. “I
told Farah, ‘When you were going abroad to a sex worker’s conference…I told you not go,” said
Payal. “‘But you didn’t listen to me. I curse upon your life for going there! You were GSS’s vice
president! You had respect in society!’” Although Payal supported sex workers, she did not want
her team to be publicly associated with it. Payal believed that the Pakistani public was not
prepared for Farah’s progressive stance, and that they would judge her and GSS as bastions of
sin for their defiant support of sex work. She wanted her team to be role models for khwaja siras
and to show the Pakistani society that gender ambiguous people were capable of mainstream
employment. However, Farah threatened to destabilize GSS’s framing of gender ambiguous
people as respectable human beings, which was among the factors that eventually led to her
expulsion from the organization.
Moreover, Payal lamented the damaging effects of HIV surveillance on the reputation of
khwaja siras. In 2011, HIV research indicated that khwaja siras ranked second among the most at

	
  

281	
  

risk groups for HIV/AIDS after injecting drug users. Payal was suspicious of these statistics and
was dismayed by their widespread dissemination because they strained the already questionable
status of khwaja siras in the mainstream. It was shameful enough that khwaja siras were blamed
for tarnishing the moral fabric of society, but now they were also being held responsible for
spreading a life threatening disease in the country. HIV research threatened to corroborate the
popular belief that all khwaja siras were sinful people who engaged in immoral acts. As part of
her activism, Payal was determined to change this negative portrayal.

Televisionary Advocacy
Much like the “televisionary” approach of a Nicaraguan feminist NGO of normalizing local
queer subjects (Howe 2001, 49-50), GSS occasionally collaborated with media outlets to
disseminate its transnormative vision of khwaja siras to the public. The organization countered
harmful myths through media advocacy, which entailed mimetic representations of middle-class
domesticity, model citizenship, and moral rectitude. One of these myths was that gender
ambiguous people bury their dead in their homes after midnight, which is a sacrilegious act
according to Islamic funerary practices. In 2012, Sare Aam, an investigative television show on
ARY, presented a special report on the urban legend pertaining to khwaja sira funerals in which
several GSS members participated. The report begins by showing khwaja siras mourning the
death of a family member in the front yard of a house. They cry, howl and embrace one another
as melancholic music fills the scene. After the purification ritual, the corpse is laid out in the
yard so that the mourners can take one last look at their deceased companion. The men in the
neighborhood are then requested to shoulder the coffin to the cemetery. With the exception of

	
  

282	
  

Maina and Maria, who attend the funeral procession dressed as men101, the remaining khwaja
siras continue to mourn from home.
After receiving shariáh guidelines from a cleric over the phone, a man from the
neighborhood leads the funeral prayer of the deceased. In this case, the rules pertaining to the
funeral prayers of men are carried out. After the prayers, the corpse is carried to the graveyard
where it is buried. The reporter emphasizes that all the rules for the burial of men were followed
for this funeral, and his narrative throughout the show remains sympathetic.
What is the religion of khwaja siras? Like ordinary people, they too are the followers of
different religions, and in Pakistan most of them are Muslim. The purpose of today’s
show was to raise the curtain off those secrets that have taken the shape of extremely
incorrect stories.
The objective of this sympathetic portrayal of gender ambiguous people was to collapse the
deleterious urban legend surrounding khwaja sira funerals, and to represent them as practicing
Muslims. Crucially, the report busts this myth without disrupting the fable of intersexuality. The
reporter emphasizes that the funerary rites mandated for a male were carried out, which could
either be interpreted to mean that the deceased possessed male genitals or that he was an
intersexual person whose genitals were closer in constitution to male sexual organs. Shariáh
prescribes male funeral rites for the latter. Either way, the corporeal status of the deceased
remains unclear. In a private conversation after the show had aired, Maria informed me that GSS
had collaborated with ARY to stage the funeral shoot, and that the report was not the coverage of
an actual death.
The discourse around the rights of khwaja siras also brought unwanted attention to their
culture. Many outsiders saw the khwaja sira social structure as a system of exploitation where
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  In Pakistan, women do not generally follow funeral processions to the graveyard, and many
believe that they are not permitted to do so.
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gurus mistreated their students. This negative notion threatened to disrupt activist representations
of gender ambiguous people as peaceful and respectable. When the guru-celā system came under
the scrutiny of the pubic eye, GSS assumed responsibility of representing the ancient tradition in
positive terms. The excerpt below is from the documentary shoot of Transgenders: Pakistan’s
Open Secret (2011), which GSS helped facilitate. As participants in the documentary, Payal and
her family members took the lead in speaking on behalf of khwaja siras. The following exchange
between the filmmaker and Payal proceeded the filming of an induction ritual in which Payal
initiated Hasi as her celā. Traditionally, the initiation ceremony was a sacred rite of passage that
outsiders were not allowed to attend. However, in recent years, community activists had become
increasingly open to providing public visibility to their customs in order to dispel damaging
stereotypes about gender ambiguous people. Portraying themselves as harmless was far more
important than maintaining ritual secrecy.
Filmmaker: What was this ritual all about?
Payal: Khwaja siras don’t have children of their own. So, when someone willingly wants
to become our student, we have this ritual as a kind of celebration…Gurus and celās have
a parent-child relationship. Celās respect their gurus, and gurus treat them like their
children.
Filmmaker: What happens when celās disobey?
Payal: They are fined. The fine helps to make sure they do not repeat their mistakes…
Filmmaker: How much does a celā have to give to a guru from her earnings?
Payal: …See, if I’m ever in need to money, I can always go to my celā for help…[and] if
a celā needs help or falls sick, then the guru goes to her aid...
The filmmaker poses a number of pointed questions that presume the khwaja sira system to be
exploitative, but Payal carefully answers each question, painting a positive picture of the gurucelā bond. Payal accurately depicts the khwaja sira social structure as an alternative kinship
system without addressing the tensions characteristic of its core social relationship. Instead, she
compares the mentor-student bond to a paternal relationship while perpetuating the myth of
khwaja sira childlessness.
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Despite GSS’s best efforts, however, the released version of the documentary describes
the guru-celā system as a form of modern-day slavery. Although the documentary provides a
sympathetic portrayal of gender ambiguous people, it demonizes the guru-celā system on which
their culture stands. Gurus are depicted taking advantage of celās, and of taking away their hard
earned incomes. Moreover, the narrator repeatedly employs the vocabulary of slavery; she
describes celās as the “property” of gurus, draws on the terms of ownership (e.g., buying,
selling), and refers to the transfer of a disciple from one mentor to another as a form of sale. The
film gives the impression that celās are nothing more than indebted slaves who are fined and
persecuted by their mentors. The narrator asserts her authority, insisting upon a grim etic
interpretation of the guru-celā system. Although fines and punishments are a staple of any
society, the general public routinely censured khwaja siras for imposing them on one another. It
was precisely such an insidious portrayal of khwaja siras that GSS aimed to counter.
GSS leaders represented khwaja siras as “normal” people whose everyday lives were
similar to the experiences of ordinary men and women. In the following extract from her
interview on the Sahir Lodhi Show (2008), Payal highlights her sameness with ordinary people.
I live with my family. My family cooperates with me fully…They never differentiate
between me and themselves…Some khwaja siras loose touch with their families but this
is no different from how in ordinary families siblings fight with each other or a brother
starts living separately. It’s the same with us…Everyone in my neighborhood calls me
baji (sister), and I have always thought of my neighbors as my own.
Payal portrays khwaja siras as ordinary people by misrepresenting herself as someone with close
links with her biological family. She likens the estrangement between gender ambiguous people
and their families to disputes that occur between siblings in normative households. That
everyone in her neighborhood affectionately addressed her as “sister” is meant to suggest that
they treated her with respect instead of discriminating against her on the basis of her difference.
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Through her media advocacy, Payal sought to make khwaja siras approachable to the public. She
emphasized through her personal experiences, however mendacious, that gender ambiguous
people could coexist with “normal” people.
GSS’s media campaign, which was geared towards articulating a world where khwaja
siras could be equal constituents of the wider society, relied on depicting them doing “normal”
things. One of the ways in which GSS circulated a normative image of gender ambiguous people
was by collaborating with local TV channels that were interested in covering khwaja sira’s
celebrating Eīd. In these programs, Payal’s khwaja sira kin were presented observing Eīd no
differently than other Pakistanis, that is, by spending time with family and friends. However,
there was a stark divergence between these virtual representations and how most gender
ambiguous people actually spent Eīd. In reality, many khwaja siras, including some members of
GSS, devoted this religious holiday to begging, especially since it was one of their most lucrative
earning days. However, in media encounters, community activists reinforced the illusion of
normalcy in hopes that the wider society would cease to see them as social anomalies. They
wanted to be perceived as normal beings, and they believed that transnormative performances
would “make them perceptible” to their audiences (Puri 2009, 51). Demonstrating compliance
with social norms, this politics of sameness was meant to foster a sense of relatability with
khwaja siras. In other words, community activists engaged in the “careful management of
difference” one that Jasbir Puar describes as a “difference within sameness” and a “difference
containing sameness” (2007, 25).

Social Media
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Payal had discovered the power of photographs through her experience of working with NGOs
and media outlets. She had witnessed both sectors benefitting by manipulating reality through
images. Payal learned to play this game of deception by observing other professionals, and by
putting her own spin on it, she hoped that GSS too could someday reap the rewards of fabricated
photography. She wanted photographic evidence to serve as a public testament to the capabilities
of khwaja siras. Moreover, she wanted to showcase GSS’s diligent engagement in constructive
work in the eyes of state agencies who she naively hoped would offer to extend their assistance
to keep her floundering organization afloat.
Incidentally, I became a crucial part of GSS’s photography and social media campaign
since I provided the resources that made it possible. Through me, Payal gained easy access to the
Internet and a digital camera. This enabled the organization to launch a media campaign that
gave it the power of self-representation instead of having to depend solely on the intervention of
established media outlets that were not only less available but also could not always be relied on
to positively represent khwaja siras. During fieldwork, I accompanied Payal to NGOs,
government offices, khwaja sira conflict resolution meetings, rituals, social gatherings, out of
town visits, television shoots, etc. I visually documented each event both for my own research
and for GSS, and posted relevant photos to the group’s Facebook page under Payal’s
supervision. Payal handpicked the photos, specified which ones to omit, and dictated
accompanying captions. Even though these tasks seem mundane, the kind of information I was
asked to post and omit was valuable in enhancing my understanding of GSS’s “framing” of
khwaja siras. My own involvement in these illusive acts was limited to trying to grasp the
meaning and full range of the games khwaja siras played with the general public while carrying
out the duties that were assigned to me.
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Many of GSS’s representations were misleading if not entirely orchestrated. Payal often
utilized khwaja sira cultural gatherings as sites to engage in or to stage her advocacy campaign.
For instance, she conducted an HIV awareness session after her great granddaughter’s transfer
ritual. A couple of condoms, GSS’s banner, a camera and an audience of twenty or so khwaja
siras was all she needed. Nadia hung the organization’s banner in clear view of my camera, and
Payal asked me to film and then post the session on GSS’s YouTube channel. Even though it was
a staged event, it gave Payal the opportunity to impart safe sex practices to her extended family
members while demonstrating GSS’s capabilities and civic engagement.

Figure 15. Khwaja siras protesting against terrorism and violence outside
the Karachi Press Club.

Besides promoting GSS, Payal harnessed the power of photographs to positively
represent khwaja siras. During a visit to Hyderabad (a city in the Sindh province of Pakistan) for
her student’s post-emasculation ceremony, I accompanied Payal and a few other khwaja siras to
a Hindu temple, where her newly nirbān disciple, Anjali, a practicing Hindu, wanted to make
offerings to a deity. Payal made me document the excursion, and upon our return to Karachi, had
me publish photos on Facebook with the following caption:
Payal met with a group of khwaja siras living in Hyderabad who are from the Hindu
community. She and Nadia crossed the River Indus by boat with them in order to get to
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the temple, which was located on the other side of the river. At the temple, the Hindu
khwaja siras prayed for the country and its citizens.
Needless to say, Payal deliberately omitted mentioning Anjali’s recent emasculation and its
connection to the temple visit. She misled the online audience into thinking that the purpose of
the trip was to pray for “the country and its citizens.” In reality, Anjali prayed for her good health
and quick recovery from the life-altering surgery. Payal inserted khwaja siras into the narrative
of the nation-state by depicting them as responsible Pakistanis who cared for the country and its
citizens even though they were excluded from mainstream society. Hence, GSS’s depiction of
gender ambiguous people put a positive spin on situations while masking their complicity in
socially unacceptable practices. The ground reality of the stigmatizing activities that khwaja siras
performed simmered under the thin veneer of these deceptive images.
My examination of GSS’s deceptive representations raises critical questions about the
ethics of analyzing information that informants wished to keep secret. Here, it would be
expedient to mention that GSS’s framing shifted contextually, particularly in keeping with the
platform it used for public advocacy (e.g., television, social media, English or Urdu language
publications, NGOs, meetings with government officials) and with respect to the corresponding
audience in each case. Activists either highlighted or concocted information depending on what
was situationally safe, beneficial or convenient. Accordingly, divulging clandestine knowledge
in certain venues was considered safe, especially where the audience was foreign or considered
to be liberal. For instance, GSS activists were unopposed to exposing the corporeality and
sexuality of khwaja siras in interviews for foreign documentaries. In fact, GSS facilitated the
shoot of a British film that chronicled the livelihood practices of a khwaja sira sex worker. I take
into account GSS’s context-dependent representations in writing this dissertation, which is meant
primarily for North American and English-speaking academic audiences, who, in the
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aforementioned instances, were not the targets of GSS’s identity politics. I have also maintained
the anonymity of GSS activists in order to prevent feelings of embarrassment that might
otherwise occur from my writing.
Morality and Respectability
Allah has granted us so much respect now. We have worked so hard to achieve it, so we
shouldn’t let it go to waste. (Payal)
Here, Payal underscores the significance of maintaining respect (izzat) in light of the rights
granted to khwaja siras by the Pakistani state. Maintaining social respectability had become far
more important to khwaja siras since receiving legal recognition. Gender ambiguous citizens had
experienced a slight improvement in status that they did not wish to forgo, which in turn required
taking necessary steps to maintain the illusion of respectability.
In the following example activist leaders deploy virtual identities while attempting to
control how third parties represented them. It demonstrates how social norms pertaining to
sexual propriety influenced their politics despite efforts to separate morality from activism and
development. Previous efforts to promote safe-sex practices through various media failed in
large measure because HIV/ AIDS-related messages did not clearly explain how the infection
spreads. For example, posters attempted to communicate ideas about virus transmission through
the idiom of morality. Instead of stating explicitly how the infection circulated, posters warned
against leading an “immoral and unnatural lifestyle” and encouraged people to “use caution,”
“observe the Islamic lifestyle,” and “protect our country from this shame” (Khan and Khilji
2002, 15). Informed by the failures of earlier HIV programs, some NGOs attempted to expunge
moralistic views from their intervention efforts. This example also provides an avenue for
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marginal voices to be expressed (Leap 2002, 142), and enables a careful listening and analysis of
queer negotiations.
In late 2011, Payal and I, along with two other GSS representatives, attended a workshop
hosted by MHS in Islamabad. Various NGO and CBO partners from across the country were
invited to share their experience of working with marginalized communities. This was a sizable
gathering consisting of khwaja sira, gay, and HIV/AIDS activists and NGO workers. One of the
sessions focused on the impact of social conditioning on the well-being of MSM and transgender
populations. A close analysis of this session provides useful insights into both the effects of
transnationalization and the identity politics of khwaja siras.
The moderator of the session, Saif, a tall and lanky man, was dressed in skinny jeans and
a fitted top paired with leather boots. He stood before the participants with one hand on his hip.
He held a marker in his other hand, which was supported by a limp wrist. With a slight lisp, Saif
asked, “What is normal?” Met with silence, he rephrased his question: “What does the general
public consider normal? A girlish boy or one who is completely like a boy?” Finally, a khwaja
sira responded by saying that a person who was physically and behaviorally a man or a woman
was considered normal according to Islam and Pakistani culture. In agreement, Saif stated that
society determined what was and was not normal, even though in reality all individuals were
normal in and of themselves. Next, Aisha, a hijab-clad woman doctor, stated that it was the job
of medical professionals to determine whether or not a person was normal or sick. In response,
Saif described the role of science in determining normality and abnormality, noting that scientific
knowledge differed across time and space.
Back in the day, psychology manuals used to say that homosexuality and transsexuality
were abnormal, but then scientists realized that they were wrong. Today, transgender
people are not considered abnormal in the US…But here, even now our medical books
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say that it is abnormal. Perhaps people in the West are more broadminded…Who a
person sleeps with in their bedroom should not concern us. That is between them.
When an NGO worker reacted strongly to Saif’s comment by asserting that sexual encounters
between men were abnormal, the khwaja sira participants applauded the man’s remark. Aisha
echoed the NGO worker’s response by declaring same-sex sexual behavior to be immoral.
Again, the khwaja sira attendees applauded enthusiastically.
Saif’s objective was to challenge the participants’ preconceived ideas about normal and
abnormal, to highlight that each society defined normalcy differently, and to clarify that those
who were deemed “abnormal” had fewer rights. He emphasized that every person was normal
and had equal human rights, including the right to health, regardless of their sexuality. Saif’s
agenda was to transform his audience into critical thinkers who were capable of emancipation
from sociocultural restrictions. This form of capacity building was a vital component of HIV
intervention through which individuals from marginalized groups were transformed into
community leaders and avid activists.
Unfortunately, the exercise was a failure, and heated arguments broke out between the
moderator and the participants who perceived Saif’s radical statements as an affront to religious
and social norms. To them, Saif encompassed unbridled modernity with his radical views,
effeminacy, and “Western” clothes. For instance, in describing cross-cultural and temporal
differences in medical information, Saif privileged knowledge originating from the West.
Moreover, he advocated beliefs and practices that were considered immoral and sinful, or the
antithesis of being Muslim and Pakistani. Consequently, the participants openly resisted what
they were being taught because they felt their cultural views were under attack by a “sellout.”
The khwaja sira trainees reacted to the discussion by expressing support for those who
spoke against same-sex sexual behavior. By applauding their remarks, the khwaja sira activists
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distanced themselves from men who have sex with men, a view enhanced by their new legal
status as a third sex distinct from male and female. By this logic, their sexual encounters with
men did not fall under the category of same-sex sexual behavior.
Later in the session, Beena, a khwaja sira activist, reacted strongly when Saif started
explaining the sexual practices of khwaja siras. When she urged him to stop focusing on the
“vices” of khwaja siras, Saif suggested that she reconsider her perception of sex work as a vice.
Beena: Please stop talking about our vices!
Saif: Beena, we cannot call it a vice.
Beena: You don’t have to call it a sin if you don’t want to, but I think it is a sin. Even
though some khwaja siras engage in sex work, we ourselves are against it and we
declare that this is wrong! Wrong! Wrong!
The audience clapped in support of Beena, and the fervor of the participants grew as Aisha went
over to embrace her.
Saif: Beena considers sex work to be a bad thing, but not everyone thinks that way.
Beena: I was talking about us khwaja siras—we think it is bad!
Aisha: Beena is right! A vice is a vice no matter what!
Saif wanted to use this opportunity to underscore his argument that culture and society
determined propriety and impropriety, and that sex work should not be considered a vice merely
because people were conditioned to believe that it was wrong. Nonetheless, Beena upheld her
views by defiantly declaring sex work to be a sin.
Beena’s strong statement against sex work contradicted her behavior when she was in the
company of gender ambiguous people. Earlier that day I had overheard her telling a group of
khwaja siras that one of her students—also a workshop attendee—had been covertly engaging in
sex work with a male participant at the training. Beena was excitedly giving her listeners a
graphic description of her student’s sexual encounter. I wondered why someone whose own
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disciples engaged in sex work and who took great pleasure in talking about sex would
vehemently oppose both during the training.
Beena’s aggressive stance against the moderator’s remarks made sense given the
presence of normatively gendered people at the workshop, some of whom had already expressed
their condemnation of non-heteronormative sexual behavior. That the discussion kept focusing
on the sexual behavior of gender variant people agitated a number of khwaja sira activists who
were uncomfortable that these issues were being discussed in the presence of outsiders. They
were afraid that the moderator would damage the reputation of khwaja siras by exposing the
particulars of their lives. Beena’s strong reaction speaks to the identity politics of khwaja siras,
which hinged on maintaining a public image of respectability.
This situation was further complicated by the fact that most khwaja siras considered
themselves to be sinners and viewed their lifestyle to be in conflict with Islam. In other words,
Beena’s proclamation about sex work being a sin paralleled the khwaja sira belief that they were
sinners due to their involvement in socially and religiously prohibited behavior. However, they
also believed that they were helpless due to their feminine soul, which allowed them to be
attracted only to men. That the khwaja sira trainees resisted the moderator’s acceptance of their
sexualized lifestyle reveals the paradox of their lives, highlighting their internal conflict between
their desire for a lover and their involvement in sex work, on the one hand, and their conviction
that having a lover and engaging in sex work were immoral and prohibited in Islam, on the other.
Khwaja siras neither resisted behavior that was socially unacceptable nor advocated for it
to be legally sanctioned. Instead, they conceal their involvement in such activities and engaged in
a public representation of khwaja siras as good Muslims and responsible Pakistani citizens. For
instance, during the training, Beena felt compelled to represent khwaja siras as decent members
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of society when Saif began discussing the sexual behavior of gender variant people, including
the fact that they had functional sexual organs.
Not all of them are like that! There are many who have never in their life had an erection.
You shouldn't talk about something you don't know. I want to clarify that there are many
categories of khwaja siras…There are some who are like males, they have a penis but no
testicles. There are some who have testicles but no penis. There are some who are like
women from below and like men on top. Please don't describe it as just one thing.….[and
please] don’t think that we khwaja siras want that someone should have sex with us.
There are so many hijras who have never done it with men. You shouldn’t talk about
something you don’t know. Our big households where our elders live are locked up at
dusk . . . and no stranger can enter their home. Many of them have been to Mecca for
holy pilgrimage, and Allah’s grace is upon us since we can bless people. Some of our
khwaja siras even veil their faces and go out in burkas. My point is that if one woman is a
character that doesn’t mean everyone is like that.
Beena emphasized conservatism, asexuality and intersexuality among khwaja sira elders and
urged the moderator not to misrepresent gender ambiguous people by focusing exclusively on
those who engaged in “sin.”
At the workshop, this maneuver was exercised in response to the negative remarks of the
non-queer participants against same-sex sexual behavior. The khwaja sira trainees aligned
themselves with these “respectable” people and spoke out against the moderator, who was
clearly in favor of their sexualized lifestyle. They thought that the moderator was doing them a
disservice by exposing their clandestine sexual life. They countered his claims by depicting
khwaja siras as religious and moral, even though they engaged in socially objectionable behavior
in their private lives.
The question of “[w]ho has the right to speak for whom?” (Kennedy 2002, 100) becomes
relevant when those who have privileged access to participation assume authority in representing
sexual minorities. Those who do not acquire fluency and proficiency in the codes crucial to
activism are unable to represent themselves and assume positions of authority and prestige (Leap
and Boellstorff 2004, 3). Being represented by outsiders was disconcerting for khwaja sira
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activists, especially in situations where they were present to speak for themselves. They had
much to hide from the public, and they felt that NGO officials who assumed the responsibility of
speaking on their behalf, risked exposing their well-kept secrets to potentially unpredictable
audiences. The elite NGO employees did not share the concerns of khwaja siras about their
safety and reputation. Moreover, they did not possess the unique set of skills (i.e., hijraness)
required to tactfully represent gender ambiguous people as respectable and moral102. It was
disempowering for khwaja siras to lose their voice and the ability to self-represent, which is why
they were aggressive in making themselves heard.
During the workshop, Payal explained why Beena and other activists reacted strongly to
Saif’s account of khwaja sira corporeality and sexual practices. “When someone interferes in our
personal affairs, we get irritated,” she said. Payal’s statement affirmed the overall attitude of the
khwaja sira participants towards Saif who took a lead in talking about them. Saif’s “indiscretion”
in revealing truths in the presence of respectable worldly people prompted Beena to intervene
and control the portrayal of khwaja siras. The discussions that transpired at the workshop reveal
the propensity of khwaja sira activists to maintain a positive image of their communities in an
effort to gain social respectability.

Modernity and Image Transformation
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Although I do not deny my collusion in discussing the sexual and corporeal aspects of khwaja
siras’ lives, I am vested in and have the opportunity of presenting a holistic picture of their
cultural beliefs and practices in a manner that is aimed at generating a humanistic understanding
of this marginalized population. I also have an informed awareness of the contexts and audiences
before whom khwaja siras would exercise caution, and where and before whom they would
prefer to speak for themselves. Within the context of my writing, I have no qualms with taking a
lead in representing gender ambiguous people since a large majority of my readership is directly
inaccessible to them, allowing me to avoid interfering with their politics with regards to
audiences that matter to khwaja siras.
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Another transnormative virtual identity deployed by activists was the modern khwaja sira. As a
marginalized population, gender ambiguous people experienced multiple streams of stigma due
to their non-normativity and association with “vice.” In addition, their exclusion from
mainstream society was augmented by their lack of educational skills and inability to be
gainfully employed. GSS members were cognizant of their incapability to effectively run an
NGO in the absence of basic qualifications. Funding and travel opportunities were regularly
awarded to a competing organization by the name of Murat Collective (MC), whose educated
members hailed from a higher-class background. GSS strove to compensate for its inadequacies
in other, more easily achievable ways, particularly through the consumption and performance of
modernity.
Payal was determined to transform the image of her organization and to represent its
members as modern subjects. To this end, she placed the most qualified and modern-looking
khwaja siras she could find in leadership positions. Unfortunately, even her most competent
candidates were not qualified enough. Moreover, this approach led her to mismanage human
resources within GSS by impelling khwaja siras with little interest or competence in activism
into leadership positions simply based on their appearance.
Most gender ambiguous people, especially those who were visible in the public sphere,
came from lower class backgrounds, and their class location contributed to their portrayal as
unrefined people. Woefully aware of their own lower-classness, GSS activists aspired to
represent themselves as a collective of educated, progressive and respectable khwaja siras who
were not only distinct from ordinary gender ambiguous people but were also a model for them to
follow. One way of achieving this objective was by appropriating modern middle-class
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femininity. Adopting this look was an attempt at fashioning a transnormative aesthetic through
which community activists produced a relatively “normal” and acceptable khwaja sira persona.
In recent times, a shift in tastes had occurred among urban gender ambiguous people who
aspired to appear more like women and less like khwaja siras. Instead of appropriating the
distinct hijra clap, a high-pitched voice and garish makeup, some gender ambiguous people had
started using lighter makeup and less gaudy outfits, which were associated with respectable and
middle-class femininity and modernity. GSS members adopted this sartorial aesthetic, not only a
as means of achieving class mobility and urban sophistication, but also to establish distance from
the traditional hyper sexual khwaja sira look. GSS members wanted to “pass” as decent and
modern as opposed to uncivil, immoral and sexualized.
In 2011, GSS’s executive committee consisted of Payal, Shani, Shazia, Maina and Nadia.
Nadia was the latest addition to the group. However, Payal began to regret her decision of
instating Nadia soon after she took her post. One afternoon at GSS’s office, Payal started
blaming Nadia for ruining GSS’s reputation. Over the past week, a local television channel had
invited GSS to participate in a weeklong talk show series based on the theme of weddings. The
GSS team attended the first four days of the televised series, however, their invitation was
mysteriously rescinded for the remaining days of the shoot. Payal was convinced that Nadia’s
indecorous behavior had led to their exclusion from the show. “It’s because she dances so wildly
and flaps her scarf all over the place,” she said. Maina, who was present at the scene, added that
Nadia’s inability to adopt a simple urban aesthetic had marred GSS’s social standing.
These big people do not like such behavior. When I go out to beg, I go exactly as I am
dressed right now in these simple clothes without any makeup. The homes that I go to,
and the people who I meet, they ask me why other khwaja siras aren’t like me.
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According to Maina, “respectable” people preferred simplicity over excessive ornamentation and
exaggerated femininity, which were linked to vulgarity and coarseness. In effect, this was a
question of morality, which Pandian suggests is aligned with culture, civility and modernity, and
cast in opposition to the immorality characteristic of nature, savagery and backwardness (2009).
Undoubtedly, Nadia stood out from the rest of the group because of her social
background. Even though the majority of GSS activists belonged to a lower socioeconomic
strata, they had managed to improve their standing by mimicking a contemporary urban
appearance. Nadia, however, was the exception. Although, Maina, Shazia and Shani had the
distinct advantage of being more educated, the illiterate Payal had succeeded in aligning herself
with them by appropriating their aesthetic. In contrast, Nadia, who was more educated than
Payal, lacked this modern metropolitan sensibility since she had retained close links to her natal
village and was unable to distance herself from her rural mentality.
Several weeks later, Payal decided to address her concerns during the organization’s
executive committee meeting. She emphasized the need to revamp GSS’s image and urged the
core members to improve their style. Payal offered Nadia a probationary six-months period to
undergo a complete makeover, and highlighted what needed overhauling.
You've done a complete beggar getup, a khusrah getup. Your clothes are too bright. We
want you to wear sober and decent clothes. Don't wear deep collars. Wear clothes with a
higher neckline so that you don't look too vulgar. Don't wear excessive jewelry. See, on
one wrist you have these two traditional bangles and on top of that you're wearing these
modern bangles. The modern bangles look really good, but lose those awful bangles.
They make you look like a village woman. And you must focus on how you walk and
talk. Don’t spread your legs so widely when you sit down. Be civil. Be nice.
Nadia reluctantly acquiesced to the advice and promised to make a dedicated effort to change her
appearance. This kind of transnormativity calls attention to the “logic and politics whereby
minoritarian subjects are…domesticated…as ‘good citizens’ of the…state” (Bryant 2008, 456).

	
  

299	
  

In neighboring India, scholars have described similar accounts of exclusion and institutionalized
phobia of certain behaviors within activist contexts that diverged from normative notions of
decorum (Hall 2005, Reddy 2004; Shahani 2008). Likewise, the policing of non-normative
bodies within GSS operated on the premise of dignified difference. It was through such taming
that khwaja sira activists attempted to publically embody moral, normal, and socially responsible
gender ambiguous citizens.
Besides sartoriality, GSS members performed modernity in a number of other ways.
Shazia, for instance, took private English lessons and employed her limited vocabulary of
English words in interactions with “respectable” outsiders. Shazia managed to carry herself with
the poise of upper and middle class women with whom she interacted in her professional
capacity. Payal instructed the rest of the GSS team to take a lead from Shazia in their efforts of
self-transformation. She also wanted everyone to acquire basic English speaking skills. “If you
speak with someone in English, they immediately pay attention to you,” she said.
In addition, the GSS team wanted to improve other aspects of their lives. When I first met
Payal, she was living in a slum next to an open sewage channel, and she desperately wanted to
move to a “respectable” neighborhood where she would not feel embarrassed to invite media
vālās and other important people. Payal also urged Nadia to move out of her squalid residence.
She despised the entrance to Nadia’s colony, which was partially blocked by a gargantuan
garbage dump that visitors had to traverse in order to reach her house. As a new member of GSS,
Nadia was expected to make necessary lifestyle changes to reflect her new and improved status.
It was critical that GSS activists showed the public that they were prosperous in life and that
khwaja siras were capable of more than simply begging, dancing and prostitution.
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As public figures who were frequently in the limelight, activist leaders were under
immense pressure to exemplify model khwaja sira citizenship despite their involvement in
stigmatizing activities, such as begging and sex work. A public revelation of ties to prostitution
would have made them vulnerable to legal action, and to persecution and violence from
conservative vigilante groups. Consequently, they took precautionary measures to mask their
involvement in “vice” in order to avoid jeopardizing their newfound social status.

Image of Deprivation
Although GSS leaders represented themselves as modern and accomplished individuals, they
maintained an image of deprivation for ordinary khwaja siras in order to evoke sympathy for
them in mainstream society. Emotions play an important role in social movements because they
can be strategically evoked to accomplish organizational objectives (Goodwin, Jasper and
Polletta 2001, 9), such as garnering public support. The virtual image of the impoverished
khwaja sira served this purpose.
When I initially met Shani, she told me that “[k]hwaja siras are very poor…There are
days when they aren’t even called for dance functions, and when they do, it’s like Eīd for them.”
I believed Shani. Her statement matched my own perception of gender ambiguous people, and it
seemed reasonable since it justified the prevalence of khwaja sira beggars. But several months
into fieldwork, I was perplexed to learn that the average khwaja sira earned between Rs. 20,00030,000 (approx. $229-343) a month.
GSS’s deceptive politics eventually became evident one afternoon when MHS hosted an
Eīd party in collaboration with GSS. The event was held at a hotel in Karachi, and among those
invited were ordinary khwaja siras and representatives of the Sindh AIDS Control Program.
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During the dancing portion of the event, the khwaja sira guests began engaging in tamāshbenī,
the act of dropping cash on dancers103. The practice was a symbol of prestige both for the giver
and the receiver, and it was also a way for khwaja siras to reciprocate with one another. When
the khwaja siras at the party began dropping big rupee bills on the performers, Payal sprinted
over and advised them that NGO events were not appropriate venues for tamāshbenī. However,
when they refused to comply, Payal felt compelled to take the podium to explain the function of
the practice to the NGO workers and government officials in the audience. She decided to use
the opportunity as a teachable moment by describing the custom as a traditional form of
reciprocity between khwaja siras. She emphasized that the practice was not a waste of money,
and that that the recipients were very much in need of it. Later, when I asked Payal why she felt
obliged to justify the custom, she said that she did not want the guests thinking that khwaja siras
had money to squander. Although tamāshbenī was a reciprocal practice, Payal eschewed
disclosing that it was often motivated by the giver’s desire to flaunt his/her affluence and to
outshine others.
That khwaja siras were not poverty stricken must be tempered with the knowledge that
their entry into sex work was motivated by poverty. Although they enjoyed high earnings by
selling sex, most were extremely poor when they initially joined the field. Moreover,
discontinuing one’s involvement in the profession was difficult given its profitability. Payal was
determined to cover from the public khwaja sira’s high incomes while highlighting the relative
modernity and success of the GSS team.
Younger middle-class activists were frustrated with Payal’s portrayal of gender
ambiguous people as pathetic and distressed. “Payal…only says things that make people feel
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This was a customary practice at khwaja sira cultural events where solo dancers were given
money by male admirers and their khwaja sira family and friends.
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sorry for transgenders,” said Mehreen. “Yes, the things that happen to us are terrible, but
transgenders do not need sympathy. We only want our rights!” Mehreen was less attuned to
represent gender ambiguous people as poor since the class of “transgenders” she represented
were more educated and enjoyed easier access to mainstream opportunities. For Payal, however,
perpetuating the discourse of the poverty-stricken khwaja sira was strategically advantageous. In
situations where opponents charged gender ambiguous people for spreading social ills, Payal
retorted by blaming the wider society for precluding them from respectable work, thereby
forcing them to sell their bodies for survival. This is an instance of “how non-normative
subjectivities entangle with dominant discourses,” and the “processes by which inequality is
challenged through forms of reverse discourse” (Boellstorff 2007, 23). Although exclusion from
mainstream opportunities was a valid concern, Payal’s defense for the involvement of khwaja
siras in prostitution relied on misrepresenting them as destitute.
The right to charity and welfare were among the benefits granted to khwaja siras by the
state. Under the new policies, gender ambiguous people could claim monthly support from the
Zakāt104 Fund and the Benazir Income Support Programme, which were meant for populations
living below the poverty line. Below, Payal explains the importance of these rights.
Māshaāllah, we earn enough that we don’t need financial assistance. We don’t need
zakāt so much that each month we should have to go get Rs. 500 from the Zakāt
Committee. Why would a khwaja sira who lives in one corner of the city spend Rs. 250
to get there and then Rs. 250 to get back home? He will say, to hell with it. I’d rather just
ask people for money in my own neighborhood and make that much in two hours. But we
don’t want to forgo of these things because we want the same rights as common men and
women. Besides, there might be a khwaja sira who is very poor, who does not beg, who
might want to take the bus to get zakāt.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
104
The Islamic practice of charitable giving based on accumulated wealth.
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Payal highlights that government welfare was not substantial enough to be worthwhile for
khwaja siras. Nonetheless, activists were unwilling to relinquish the right to welfare on the
principle of equality for all citizens, including khwaja siras.

Opposition and Control
Oftentimes, activists deployed virtual identities in their struggle for control over the meaning of
khwaja sira. The goal of activism is to promote awareness and to provide alternative perspectives
that counter conventional thinking concerning issues of import. Although khwaja sira activists
regularly engaged with the public, their efforts cannot be categorized as a form of counter-public
or “counter-hegemony” (Crehan 2002), which can be defined as non-hegemonic discourse,
thought or action. Even as they struggled to control what it meant to be a khwaja sira, they took a
lead from popular logic and worked within the dominant order rather than against it. Khwaja sira
activists did not always counter public opinion, but reproduced it when it was individually and
communally beneficial.
I highlighted earlier that not all genderqueer people identified with the term “khwaja
sira.” The following online encounter demonstrates differences in the meaning of the term
among activist and ordinary gender ambiguous people. As part of my volunteer work at GSS, I
managed the organization’s Facebook page, website and email account since Payal was illiterate
and therefore unable to manage them on her own. It was my job to read out Facebook messages
to her and to post her responses. In August, we received a Facebook message from an individual
named Annie from Lahore. Annie’s middle-classness was apparent from her English-speaking
skills and self-identification as “transgender.” Annie emphasized that she was not a khwaja sira
and asked to be put in touch with a transgender person.
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Payal suggested that I connect her with Rani, a Lahore-based khwaja sira activist. A few
days later, after speaking with Rani, Annie sent another message stating that Rani was not
transgender but a khwaja sira, and again requested to be put in touch with “a transgender” or a
“shemale.” She clarified that transgender people were those who had a male body and the heart
and soul of a woman. In response, Payal asked me to inform Annie that GSS did not differentiate
between khwaja sira and transgender, and that our membership included people who selfidentified as both. The following week, I created a Facebook event page to publicize GSS’s
imminent protest against the delays in issuing ID cards to khwaja siras. When a foreign news
correspondent posted a comment inquiring the meaning of khwaja sira, I relayed Payal’s
response on the forum that khwaja sira meant transgender. Annie, who had also joined the event
page, jumped into this online discussion by emphasizing her disagreement with Payal’s
definition, and again, Payal emphasized that GSS did not exclude anyone from the umbrella
category of khwaja sira.
Annie’s definition echoed the general public’s comprehension of a “khwaja sira” as an
intersexual person. She disidentified with “khwaja sira” because she did not possess ambiguous
genitalia. For her, transgender encapsulated her experience of gender dysphoria. Much like
mainstream Pakistani society, she was not familiar with the broad indigenous and activist
definition of khwaja sira wherein the feminine soul was prioritized over corporeality. Annie’s
Facebook exchange with Payal highlights the prevailing confusion over the meaning of “khwaja
sira.” This was partly a class-based issue. The way in which the term khwaja sira had been
appropriated by many activist and ordinary zennanas and hijras did not resonate with gender
ambiguous individuals from the upper and middle classes.
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Importantly, Payal was vague in defining khwaja sira in her Facebook exchange with
Annie. Little public awareness existed of how khwaja sira had been appropriated within activist
circles. This was largely because activist leaders were intentionally ambiguous in their public
representation of the term. While they had done a tremendous job of inserting the “khwaja sira”
into the public consciousness, they were intentionally vague about their internal understanding of
the term as an inclusive third gender identity category that prioritized felt femininity over
somaticity. Activist leaders perpetuated doubt about who they were and what types of people
constituted their ranks due to the fear of losing respect and the rights granted to them by the
Pakistani state. Further, they used the term “khwaja sira” inconsistently, which blurred the
already distorted representation of gender ambiguous people in the mainstream.
The following example describes how many ordinary people rejected the notion of the
“feminine soul.” One day, Payal and I met an elderly man named Mir Sahab at a khwaja sira’s
house. We learned that Mir Sahab, a retired army man, had recently poured his savings into
setting up a vocational school for khwaja siras. Sympathetic to their plight, he wanted khwaja
siras to have livelihood options other than working on the streets. However, Mir Sahab’s
compassion was limited to those who were born with genital irregularities. Unfortunately, it was
only after he had inaugurated the school that he discovered that most people who identified as
khwaja sira were born male. Mir Sahab saw such individuals as “complete men” who were
ineligible for charity. In contrast, he viewed intersexual khwaja siras as disabled and therefore
rightly deserving of monetary assistance.
In the excerpt below, Mir Sahab describes his views on the concept of soul (rūh).
Mir Sahib: According to shariáh, there are three categories of khwaja siras. Those who
are similar to men, that is, they have a male organ through which they can urinate, but
nothing else beyond that. Then there are those who are similar to women, that is, they can
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use their organ to urinate but nothing beyond that. The third category is khunsā-emushkil, which include those who are neither similar to men nor women.
Faris: What does Islam say about those who have a feminine soul, who are physically
male but feel as though they are women from within?
Mir Sahab: See, what you are describing is desire (khwaish). These people claim that
they are like women. But a person’s personal desire cannot change their sex. Islam only
sees these three categories. That’s it! Nothing more than that. The sex of two men who
engage in vice with one another will not change simply because they are doing bad work.
If they are male, they will remain male. Now, if there is someone who says that it is his
desire to wear women’s clothes, shariáh won’t permit a person like that to change his sex
simply because that is what he desires. He will remain the way Allah has created him.
Faris: So Islam does not recognize those who have a feminine soul?
Mir Sahab: What is this soul that you keep talking about? You cannot call that a soul.
Rūh is something that makes our body functional, so when it leaves the body, all our
body parts stop working…
Faris: To say that someone has a feminine soul is a way of describing how they feel from
within.
Mir Sahab: But you cannot call it a soul. There is no soul. It’s desire.
Mir Sahab’s staunch religious beliefs prevented him from accepting the “feminine soul” as
anything other than desire. If fact, he conflated feminine/gendered desires with homosexual acts.
In privileging the external reproductive organs as determinants of sex/gender, he viewed
individuals born with male genitals as men even if they desired or claimed to be feminine. In Mir
Sahab’s perspective, the concept of gender as a form of internalized identity independent of
physical constitution did not exist. For him, sex was synonymous to gender, and any ambiguities
beyond the body’s natural givens were sinful desires.
Payal listened to Mir Sahab in silence before finally speaking up. She contested his
narrow definition of khwaja sira by arguing that the feminine soul itself was a biological
phenomenon rather than an ethereal or an unverifiable entity.
The fact that we have a soul is true, and we are also khwaja siras. Some men have
women’s hormones, and some women have men’s hormones. A couple of years ago there
was a case where a girl had gotten herself operated and became a boy and then she got
married to a girl. When people found out, they raised their voice against them and took
them to court. When the judge ruled that they would be imprisoned for five years, a
women’s organization asked me to intervene. Apparently, the judge had said that there
are only two sexes, men and women. So the women’s group announced that they were
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going to file an appeal because the judge had incorrectly ruled that there are only two
sexes. They said, “We are bringing a third sex person with us—Payal!” I told them that I
am ready to get my medical checkup done, which will prove that I am neither a man nor
woman. The tests will show that I have women’s hormones but I am not a woman, which
means that I am of the third sex. So, then that case was dropped.
Payal responded to Mir Sahab’s views by suggesting that the feminine soul was a product of an
excess of estrogen in the male body, which resulted in male effeminacy and generated feminine
desires in gender ambiguous people. Payal’s explanation implies that the feminine soul could not
be equated to mere wish or whim. As an innate desire, it had a strong biological basis that was
beyond the control of the subject who possessed it. Whether or not Payal personally believed this
explanation to be true is less important than the fact that it was among the framing strategies that
she employed in interactions with antagonistic opponents.
Deceptive Representation
The public transcripts that ordinary khwaja siras executed in the microcosm of everyday life, in
their mohallahs with neighbors, out on the streets with strangers, or within the privacy of their
homes with lovers/clients, were replicated in the macrocosm of activism. Though similar, these
games of secrecy and deception had a wider scope in the realm of activism, where they were
deployed to conceal knowledge, maintain ambiguity, and potentially push normative boundaries.
The successful execution of these games demonstrated hijraness, the repertoire of qualities that
zennanas and hijras were expected to hone if they wished to become activists. In order to achieve
leadership status, a gender ambiguous person had to develop the competence, cunning, agility
and resourcefulness required to survive a harsh and oppressive sociocultural environment. She
was expected to execute these skills effectively through games that were meant to protect her and
the communities she represented. Only senior activists who had mastered hijarpan were
successfully able to play with the world.
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Like most games, the strategic practices of gender ambiguous people involved two
opposing parties: the deceivers (i.e., khwaja siras) and the deceived (i.e., ordinary people). The
interactions between them reveal the “dialectic of disguise and surveillance that pervades
relations between the weak and the strong…” (Scott 1990, 4). Lieberman analyzed deception
from the perspective of both groups. From the viewpoint of the deceiver, Lieberman identified
“three kinds of deception: a situation in which a person believes a proposition to be true and
states the opposite of it [negation deception]; a situation in which a person believes a proposition
and states a variation of it [variant deception]; and a situation in which a person believes a
proposition but omits stating it [deception by omission]” (1977, 78). The examples that follow
involve all three forms of deception.
To what extent did the public trust the fabrications presented by khwaja sira leaders? The
recipients of deception interpret the act of duplicity in several different ways, which include
closed awareness, suspicious awareness, mutual pretense and open awareness (1977, 68). The
Pakistani public mostly had a closed or suspicious awareness that they were the subjects of
deception at the hands of khwaja siras105. Suspicious awareness produced a state of obscurity
about khwaja sira sex and sexuality among outsiders.

Technologies of Deceptive Activism
Khwaja sira stratagems relied on fabrications, fables, fantasy, fictions and falsity that produced
ambiguity about gender ambiguous people in the wider society. The larger public culture of
skepticism (Khan 2013, 12-4) and conspiracy theories in Pakistan was mirrored in the ambiguity
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A very small fraction of the wider society fell into the fourth category-- open awareness.
These included individuals who either had intimate relationships with gender ambiguous people
(e.g., lovers/clients, other sexual minorities) or those who worked closely with them (e.g., NGOs,
long-term researchers).
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perpetuated by such deceit. In the wake of Pakistan’s booming media industry, this climate of
conspiracies gained entertainment value among mass media consumers. For Pakistani news
channels, “conspiracy theories and value judgments often [took]…precedence over fact-based
reporting” (Yusuf 2011, 97). The speculative and indefinite nature of such reporting created an
environment of uncertainty and a lack of trust for local politicians, foreign powers, religious
sects and minority groups. Together the political environment, the internally fractured citizenry,
and media culture proliferated skepticism in the mainstream. Khwaja sira advocacy can be
located within this culture of skepticism, especially since it relied on the mass-media platform to
sustain the public’s uncertainty about gender ambiguous people.
In their attempts to maintain secrecy and confusion, khwaja sira activists deployed a
number of game-like strategies, including prevarication or evasion, circular and ambiguous
speech, the use of Farsi and metaphors, self-contradiction, blaming, etc. These techniques
allowed them to maintain ambiguity towards khwaja siras in the mainstream. The following
examples demonstrate how khwaja sira leaders tactfully managed to evade the truth.
In interacting with opponents, khwaja sira activists relied on hijraness in their struggle to
control the meaning of “khwaja sira.” Late one evening, I accompanied Payal and Shazia to
ARY digital’s studio in Karachi where they had been invited to participate in a television talk
show. Payal and Shazia accompanied the news anchor onto the studio set, while I observed the
live broadcast from behind the cameras. Activists, Noor Vicky and Banno Ali joined the
transmission from Islamabad and Lahore, respectively. In the first excerpt below, the activists
imply that khwaja siras were not men because they lacked the physical capacity to reproduce.
Host: Does your organization have any way of checking who is and who is not a khwaja
sira before they are issued an ID card?
Noor: Only he who is a khwaja sira will say that he is a khwaja sira. No man will ever
say that he is a khwaja sira.
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Host: But I have heard that a lot of men pose as khwaja siras.
Noor: But if a man says that he is a khwaja sira to get a khwaja sira ID card, and then
tomorrow he gets married and has children, then he will run into a lot of problems.
Host: But are you denying that these days some men do the getup of khwaja siras in
order to earn money?
Payal: I’m very happy to hear you say that there are some men who do our getup and
join our field. That means we must be doing something good if men are joining us.
Brother, if you have a problem with this, then you should put an end to unemployment in
this country…Those who are married and have children will obviously not get a khwaja
sira ID card made.
In the news anchor’s view, those who possessed male sexual organs were fake khwaja siras. The
activists deceive the host by suggesting that khwaja siras were not men, and that only the latter
were able to bear offspring. Although they do not explicitly state that gender ambiguous people
were unable to reproduce, this is implicit in their indirect responses.

Figure 16. Khwaja sira activists on the set of a television talk show.

Both Noor and Payal evade the talk show host’s questions by prevaricating and providing
vague responses. When the host inquires about ways of preventing ordinary men from registering
for khwaja sira ID cards, the activists highlight the irrelevance of the posed question by
suggesting that no man would voluntarily give up his privileged status as a man to register as a
third sex/gender person. Payal then refocuses attention away from the physicality of khwaja siras
by prevaricating on the larger structural problem of mass unemployment in the country, which
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was evidently driving men to scrape a living by adopting the appearance of khwaja siras. The
activists neither confirm nor contest the host’s suspicion that “normal” men tend to join the
“field.” Instead, they maintain the myth of fake khwaja siras.
The above discussion was grounded in the hegemonic belief that khwaja siras were
intersexual people, and that “normal” men joined khwaja sira communities. Although some
heterosexual and homosexual men were known to adopt the appearance of gender ambiguous
people (i.e., behrupīa) in order to earn through begging and sex work, such individuals were few
in number and they did not join khwaja sira communities. However, according to dominant
logic, the majority of the country’s gender variant population would be “normal” men since they
possessed functioning male genitals. The ideological understanding of khwaja sira and man was
rooted in physical constitution rather than interiorized gender. Khwaja sira activists respond to
this dominant view in their media campaigns by perpetuating doubt about the corporeal status of
gender ambiguous people. They drew from their audiences’ “repertoires of public culture and
popular knowledge” (Benei 2008, 22) in order to maintain cultural resonance irrespective of its
accuracy. It was precisely this ability to exploit relevant information about their sociocultural
environments (Ganz 2000, 1005) that enabled activists to control the public representation of
their communities.
In the next excerpt from show, Payal focuses on certain behaviors over corporeal features
as indicators of a child’s non-normativity.
Payal: We khwaja siras have certain habits and mannerisms that give away that we are
khwaja siras. Also parents know from the beginning that their child is a khwaja sira
especially if the child is not taking an interest in the work of men and is spending time in
the kitchen or is more into makeup.
Host: But do such parents easily give away their kids?
Payal: In the past, they did but nowadays such kids come to us on their own. Among our
lower classes, parents worry about what…neighbors will say if they find out that a
khwaja sira has been born in their house. Due to the fear of ridicule, parents don’t allow
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such children to leave the house. But when they come to us, we…accept them, so they
prefer to be around us.
Payal highlights involvement in women’s roles as one of the earliest signs of a child’s queerness.
The host then questions whether or not parents give away khwaja sira infants, and in keeping
with the myth, assumes that such children are born with ambiguous genitalia. Instead of
debunking the fable, Payal briefly engages in a form of variant deception by presenting it as an
outmoded practice. In stating that “a khwaja sira has been born in their house,” Payal perpetuates
the fable of intersexuality by misleading the audience into thinking that an infant can be
identified as a khwaja sira at birth. Payal artfully reinforces the myth of genital ambiguity while
emphasizing the true indicators of gender variance.
Circular speech is a specific genus among the khwaja sira games of deception. Below, all
three activists confound the host by speaking in circles about the sexual desires of khwaja siras.
Host: So who are khwaja siras attracted to more? Men or women?
(Noor laughs nervously)
Payal: See, we like whoever treats us nicely, whether they are men or women.
Host: But we were talking about the feelings of khwaja siras….
Payal: We feel for both men and women. It depends on how they treat us…If there is a
man who likes us…and if he’s a good friend of ours…then what’s wrong with that?
Noor: Loving is not a crime.
Host: But does this love happen with men or with women?
Noor: Our love is for men, for women, for everyone.
Host: This is a very confusing situation. Ms. Banno, what are your thoughts?
Banno: Obviously, we…too have a heart…so we too like someone or another…whether
it’s your mother, your father or some friend.
The host carefully articulates his questions on a taboo subject by using non-sexual, euphemistic
language. His inability to be verbally explicit on television enables the activists to deploy
circular speech patterns to stifle his line of questioning. The above statements about khwaja sira
object choice are safely couched in the idiom of “love” and “feelings,” whose polyvalence allow
the activists to digress about loving relationships between parents and children, siblings, and
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friends. Despite being from different parts of Pakistan, these activist leaders were unified in their
collective approach of publically representing khwaja siras as asexual beings who did not
endanger the moral foundation of Pakistani society. They shouldered the responsibility of
disguising the actual desires of khwaja siras and their romantic relationships with men.
Nonetheless, the anchor’s probing indicates his suspicious awareness that his guests were
attempting to deceive him.
In the final extract, Payal provides a convoluted description of khwaja sira identities.
Host: Can you discreetly explain to me the difference between male khwaja sira, female
khwaja sira and khunsa khwaja sira?
Payal: See, our relationship is with our soul. Often you hear that there was a girl but she
used to…behave like a boy. And then later on when they did her medical test, they
discovered that she was a boy from within. We have a similar condition. So a khwaja sira
will select the box [for his ID card] that applies to him. But we have been given several
options since we are neither complete men nor complete women.
Payal’s intentionally obscure response about khwaja sira typologies was likely to be
misinterpreted by many viewers to mean that gender ambiguous people were intersexual. In this
instance of variant deception, she begins with an honest description of gender ambiguous people
as individuals who possess a feminine soul, but then deliberately botches her explanation by
suggesting that their condition could be medically validated. It remains unclear in her
polysemous statement, “she was a boy from within,” whether Payal was commenting on gender,
genital or hormonal ambiguities. However, at no point does she explicitly state that khwaja siras
are intersexual. Through her artful deception, she manages to maintain ambiguity about the
corporeality and sexuality of gender variant individuals.
Importantly, Payal attempts to expand the contours of “khwaja sira” by emphasizing the
feminine soul over somatic irregularities as its defining characteristic. In line with the
Machiavellian approach to political transformation (Lieberman 1977, 66), she fuses a new idea

	
  

314	
  

with a normative one in order to circumvent the threat of public critique and reactionary action.
Payal introduces the notion of the feminine soul without disrupting the myth of intersexuality.
On our ride back from the studio, I questioned Payal about her roundabout manner of
answering pointed questions. “Pakistan is an Islamic country, and we cannot talk about these
things on television,” she said. “Yes, we have lovers, but that is something we do in hiding.
There is no need for us to talk about it in public.” Activists believed that open discussions about
sex and sexuality were inappropriate, and what khwaja siras did in the privacy of their homes did
not concern the public. Payal believed that it was premature to overwhelm mainstream society
with topics they were not prepared to process, especially ones that could be detrimental to
khwaja siras and to GSS’s goal of positively framing them. At the conjectural moment of this
study, khwaja sira activists did not feel safe in blatantly altering cultural meanings through the
process of resignification.
In order to demonstrate their hijraness to other khwaja siras, activists frequently
recounted incidents of personal triumph over and manipulation of opponents. One day after
lunch at Najma’s house, Payal described how she outmaneuvered a religious cleric on the set of a
television talk show right before the program went live on air.
The cleric was against khwaja siras. Before the show, he and I got into an argument. I
told him that I don’t know much Islam…But I can read the Kalmah106. He said, “Well,
what good will that do?”…I said, “Just tell me one thing: What does our religion teach
us? Does it tell us to do all the things that mullāḥs do with young boys?” He said no.
“Then why do all you mullāḥ have so many different parties? He is Sunni, he is Shia, he
is from Jamaat-e-Islami, and so on. And you all tell us different ways of doing things. Do
you want to make us mad?...Islam teaches us peace, brotherhood and love.” Then I told
him that I will make live calls on the show to mullāḥ who I know personally who will
admit on air that they are friends with khwaja siras, that they are in love with them.”
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Kalmah here refers to the declaration of faith in Islam, in the oneness of Allah and in the
belief that Prophet Muhammad is the last messenger of God. Those who wish to convert to Islam
must first recite the Kalmah. This declaration of faith is enough for the purpose of conversion.
	
  

315	
  

Then he said, “I’m getting a call, I have to go.” I said, “Go!” Right, so I blackmailed him.
He refused to sit on the show.
Payal’s punch line brought bouts of laughter to the room. In addition to proving her worthiness
as a leader, she conveyed precisely how she managed to overcome adversity. Payal diverted
attention away from khwaja siras by simultaneously raising a number of issues that were meant
to undermine the legitimacy of mullāḥs as credible figures of religious authority. She emphasized
the fundamental tenets of Islam, such as love and peace, which she argued, were lost among
Muslims due to the sectarian rifts incited by religious clerics. In her tirade, she threatened to
highlight the hypocrisy of mullāḥs by exposing their involvement in illegitimate sexual acts.
Words were a khwaja sira’s most effective weapon against adversity. Activist leaders
adopted the techniques that ordinary khwaja siras exercised in everyday efforts to combat
discrimination. In reference to her media advocacy, Soni claimed to be an expert in responding
to tough questions in a roundabout way (bāt ūpar se ghomānā). Importantly, this skill enabled
her and other activists to answer questions related to corporeality without alienating or vilifying
any khwaja sira identity groups. They were also able to turn delicate questions into opportunities
to positively represent gender ambiguous people. Through diplomatic equivocation, they
managed to reinforce positive ties with various stakeholder, including hijras, zennanas, and the
general public.
The use of Farsi, the secret code of khwaja siras, was another technique of concealing
knowledge from outsiders. During my initial months of fieldwork, the GSS team routinely
employed Farsi in everyday speech to encrypt sensitive information because they were uncertain
how I would react to it. One afternoon, I asked Payal to explain the meaning of the word
“murat.” During her explanation, Payal was suddenly interrupted mid-sentence by Nadia who
tried to relate murat, the Farsi word for gender variant youth, to murat, the Urdu word for idol.
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Nadia: But guru, Hindus also have murats.
Payal: Subhānallah107. Her answers are unbelievable. (everyone laughs) It’s because she
is a dunyādār!
Shazia: (in Farsi) Be quiet, Mother! Defamation! (Kaṛe, Ma! Kacī!)
Payal: Whenever she talks, she talks like a child.
Irritated by her comment, Payal ridiculed Nadia by calling her a dunyādār, a word used to
describe those who had children and belonged to the wider society. This statement was meant to
suggest that Nadia’s emphasis on the Urdu rather than the Farsi meaning of murat indicated her
status as a non-khwaja sira outsider, a notion that was further supported by the fact that she was
married with children. Put differently, Payal mocked Nadia due to her inability to relay insider
knowledge and cultural meanings in an intelligible manner.
Startled by her sudden “outing” of Nadia, Shazia reminded Payal not to disclose
potentially damaging information in my presence. At the time, I neither understood much Farsi
nor was I familiar with the unique appropriation of the word dunyādār by khwaja siras. I did not
comprehend the hidden meanings within the altercation and disregarded it as frivolous. Months
later, while revisiting this recorded conversation, I realized what I had missed. By employing
their clandestine code, the GSS team had succeeded in concealing the fact that Nadia was
married with children.
Khwaja sira games of secrecy and deception were instrumental in aiding community
activists to momentarily win arguments, resolve disputes, respond to critique, escape tricky
situations, and artfully represent khwaja siras in mainstream society. However, these public
transcripts failed to address structural inequality, to facilitate social acceptance of gender and
sexual diversity, and to demystify the confusion surrounding gender ambiguous people.
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Arabic for God is Glorious.
	
  

317	
  

Consequently, the same topics continually resurfaced in exchanges between khwaja siras and the
general public.

Diversity Among Activists
Although indigenous leaders demonstrated an overarching uniformity in public advocacy, a
closer analysis of their encounters with outsiders reveals subtle differences or “dissonances”
(Menon 2010) in their approach to deceptive gaming. These differences enhancing the
understanding of the games activists played with opponents. Compared to others, Payal was
more amenable to addressing thorny issues related to khwaja siras in a tactful manner. She
employed game-like strategies in answering difficult questions instead of misrepresenting
zennanas/akvās as male imposters or blatantly denying the involvement of khwaja siras in sex
work. For instance, instead of repudiating the existence of khwaja sira prostitutes, Payal
attributed their involvement in sex work to their exclusion from mainstream occupations. In
contrast, Noor Vicky publically denounced those who possessed male genitals as impersonators,
who she also blamed for engaging in sex work and ruining the reputation of authentic khwaja
siras. Noor explicitly asserted in several television appearances that real khwaja siras were
incapable of reproduction.
At the opposite extreme from Noor was Farah who openly supported sex work and
sought to expose the myth of intersexuality. Farah was among the few activists who wanted to
settle the confusion related to the somatic composition of khwaja siras. Both Payal and Noor
were firmly against Farah’s honest public advocacy. They believed it was tactless and that it
jeopardized the safety of khwaja siras. However, unlike Noor, both Farah and Payal refused to
publically declare khwaja siras as intersexuals. While Farah was explicit in her representation of
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gender variant individuals as gender dysphoric, Payal depicted them using deliberately elusive
speech that neither affirmed nor denied that they were intersexuals. Hence, Payal represented a
happy medium between the polarized views of indigenous leaders like Noor and Englishspeaking middle-class activists like Farah. Nonetheless, the differences in opinion among these
leaders resulted in an internal crisis of representation within the khwaja sira movement.
Younger middle-class activists were beginning to take carefully measured steps towards
fostering social change by shattering stereotypes about gender ambiguous people in mainstream
discourse. In the following example, Farah’s guru, Zara, and her guru-bhāī, Mehreen, both
members of MC, demonstrate that not all khwaja siras were opposed to baring the truth. The
excerpt below is from an ARY digital television talk show, Ba Khabar Sawera (2012). The
participants, who in addition to the members of MC included the show’s host and a doctor,
discuss sex-reassignment surgery, a topic that was rarely if ever broached in the public sphere.
Mehreen: Dr. Imrana…I have had surgeries, and I believe that they should be legalized
so that we can stop this thing (i.e., homosexuality)…I have also taken steps to stop
it…after surgeries we no longer have any sex appeal…
Doctor: …Feelings play a crucial role in sin…How will this world operate if we start
doing whatever we please…Should there be no concept of will power?
Zara: Isn’t it better to move away from bad deeds by getting surgeries instead of
continuing to engage in them? Also, do you consider Iran a Muslim country?
Doctor: Absolutely!
Zara: Then how come it is legal there for a man who does not consider himself a man
and wants to live life as a woman to have surgeries and live life as a woman?
Doctor:…It could be that after studying this matter they have allowed those who have a
biological defect to have surgeries.
Zara: Let me clarify…if a man in Iran wears women’s clothes, the government gives
them money for a sex-change….How is it that another Muslim country has allowed such
operations but we can’t accept them?
Doctor: Betā, that is only for situations where a doctor sees that a child is a male but his
organs are that of a female.
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Zara and Mehreen suggest that sex-reassignment should be permitted because it eradicates sexual
sensation108 and reduces propensity for illegitimate sexual contact (i.e., anal sex). In making their
argument, however, they vilify homosexuality. Dave describes this process as one through which
activists aim to realize each new possibility at the expense of others potentialities (2011, 3).
When Zara broaches the topic of SRS in Iran, the doctor refuses to believe that such
surgeries could be permitted for anything other than genital irregularities. The doctor’s views
were privileged over the facts presented by the activists, even though the topics covered were
beyond her area of medical expertise. Despite their best efforts, Zara and Mehreen failed to
stimulate a constructive dialogue given their perceived lack of subject matter expertise.
Nonetheless, their efforts illustrate the gradual but risky maneuvers that were being initiated by
an emerging generation of middle-class activists, who, instead of deceiving audiences through
game-like techniques, aimed at facilitating an open dialogue about issues affecting gender
ambiguous people.
Exploiting Cultural Ambiguity
In her youth, Payal played khwaja siras and ordinary people as an act of survival. As an adult,
Payal, the seasoned leader, utilized her hijraness on a bigger scale and in far more sophisticated
ways within the activist sphere. The following example demonstrates how she intended to
manipulate dominant beliefs and the lack of concrete public awareness about khwaja siras for
personal gain. Payal was visibly agitated after a meeting at MHS where she and Kareem had
argued over her potential employment at one of the organization’s CBOs.
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They suggest that SRS eliminates the desire for sex since it involves the removal of the penis
and testicles and the reconstruction of a vagina that is unresponsive to sexual stimulation. In
reality, however, the removal of external male genitalia is known to enhance the libido of
transsexual women instead of desexing them.
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Kareem said to me, “Payal you have an organization…and according to the rules, a
person working in one organization cannot be employed by MHS.” He said that I would
have to leave GSS, and I said that I'll leave it…Then he says that he needs educated
people like Shani and Shazia. So he’ll take all these educated people, and tell me to
leave? But I'm a hijra!...I will play such a “game” of hijras that you won't see a single
khwaja sira in their office. I’ll send a letter to the Home Department and the Chief
Minister's House, and then I’ll have their office raided. These people say they work for
khwaja siras, but then I'll ask them, “This is an office for hijras. Which one of them is a
hijra?”…Shani and Shazia are…zennanas…I'll tell him, I'm a hijra but you didn't give me
work. You have kept all of them here by making them pose as khwaja siras. That means
you're a fraud”…When we are khwaja siras and we won't benefit, especially a khwaja
sira who worked so hard…[then] I will…take morsels out of your mouth and say that this
is our morsel, put it here. We will eat this!
Payal’s remarks illustrate the role of ambiguity and misrepresentation in activist contexts. Payal
was aggravated because MHS’s stringent requirements made her ineligible for employment.
Moreover, she risked loosing some of GSS’s most qualified members to MHS.
Payal proudly attributes her dexterity in scheming to her hijraness, which is evident in her
choice of words: “…I am a hijra! I will play such a game of hijras...” Her use of the English
word game denotes her mindfulness of the game-like properties of her scheme. As retribution,
Payal planned on exploiting the myth of intersexuality by framing the organization for engaging
in fraudulent activity by hiring male imposters instead of authentic khwaja siras like herself. As a
hijra/nirbān, she could misrepresent her mutilated genitals as God-given, an option that
zennanas/akvās did not have. Such a game of deception relied on cultural misconceptions and
ambiguities surrounding khwaja siras. Though mostly used as a survival strategy, khwaja siras
sometimes abused their infinitesimal powers for personal gain.

Conclusion
Activist leaders fashioned virtual khwaja sira identities through transnormative framing
techniques and the games of deceptive representation. The media advocacy of activist
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organizations was crucial in the deployment of these identities. The virtual khwaja sira shaped
through activism was nonnormative yet normalized, indigent and helpless, detached from sexual
pursuits and immorality, shaped through biological forces and divine intervention, and was a
respectable and responsible Muslim and Pakistani citizen. In addition, activists represented
themselves as modern and accomplished subjects. These detached identities were meant to
conceal the corporeality and sexualized lifestyles of khwaja siras, and to foster their inclusion
into mainstream society. Rather than raising awareness of who khwaja siras really were, this
identity politics renewed the obscurity surrounding gender ambiguous people. This chapter has
also demonstrated that the games that ordinary khwaja siras played in everyday life, particularly
their skilled maneuvers to control and manage information, were replicated in the domain of
activism.
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Chapter 9:
Conclusion: Trodden Paths, New Directions
The identity politics of khwaja sira activists both undermined and facilitated the khwaja sira
movement in Pakistan. They assisted gender ambiguous people in short-term interactions with
the public, allowed them to settle disputes, win arguments, deflect negative attention, and
represent khwaja siras as respectable citizens. Their deceptive games helped to enhance their
security and ensured their survival in an oppressive social environment. However, khwaja sira
politics were provisional solutions that perpetuated ambiguity, and left the public in a state of
indeterminacy about who khwaja siras really were. At best, this kind of politics temporarily
grazed the surface of the problems faced by gender variant Pakistanis without resulting in longterm stigma reduction. Even as they served transient functions, they failed to address cultural
sources of oppression. Having demonstrated the merits of khwaja sira politics in earlier chapters,
I conclude this dissertation by considering the failures of the contemporary approach to khwaja
sira activism. I also speculate and suggest future directions that gender ambiguous people and
their allies might consider in dealing with inequality and oppression.
The Pitfalls of Ambiguity, Secrecy and Deception
Development programs founded on insufficient or erroneous knowledge of relevant subject
matter have a high propensity of failure. A serious drawback of activist deception was that it
played a part in obstructing the state’s plan to “mainstream” khwaja siras. This goal was impeded
at its most elemental level, that is, in registering khwaja siras for national identity cards. The
failure of this plan rested partly on the unwillingness of many gender ambiguous people to be
legally identified as khwaja siras.
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There were several reasons for low enrollment for new identity cards. First, hijras/nirbāns
feared that registering with the government would enable law enforcement to monitor and trace
them if ever a crackdown were ordered on physically emasculated people. Second, a legal
khwaja sira identity was problematic since most gender ambiguous people had dual identities
that were split between their biological and khwaja sira kin. In the case of zennanas/akvās, it
would eliminate the option to marry women since legally and religiously marriage was permitted
only between men and women. For those who were already married, a khwaja sira ID card would
become a source of shame at the time of their children’s school admission, for which proof of
parentage was required109. Third, many gender ambiguous people were reluctant to relinquish
their male ID cards, which they were required to do in order to obtain a new identity. NADRA
transferred key information (e.g., father’s name and family number) from the old to the new
card. This meant that applicants’ khwaja sira identities would become legally attached to their
biological families, thereby collapsing the separation they wished to maintain between both
spheres of their life.
When I returned to Pakistan in 2013, my sources informed me that only 50 khwaja siras
had registered in Karachi, another 50 in other parts of the Sindh province, and a mere 250 in
Lahore. This was a far cry from the estimated 80,000 khwaja siras in the country. Most of those
who had enrolled were either hijras/nirbāns or zennnas/akvās who had no intentions of marrying.
Aside from the state’s failure to make culturally informed policies about khwaja siras and the
resistance of gender ambiguous people to state surveillance, this ID card fiasco was an outcome
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Moti explained that when gender ambiguous people “try to get their kids admitted into a
school, and if their ID cards show that they are khwaja siras, then the first thing the child will be
asked is, ‘Your father is a hijra? How were you even born if he is a hijra.’”
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of khwaja sira ambiguity, secrecy and deception, which aimed to conceal the corporeal and
marital status of gender ambiguous people from the general public.
The misrepresentation of khwaja siras as impoverished people also led to the failure of
state-sponsored programs to uplift gender ambiguous people. In November 2011, the Health
Department of the Government of Sindh organized an “eye camp” in collaboration with GSS.
When Shazia and I arrived at the camp late in the afternoon, the optometrist on site made no
effort to hide his disappointment at the lack of participation in the camp. His goal was to provide
treatment to around 150-200 khwaja sira attendees, but barely ten had showed up all day. Payal
knew that khwaja siras earned enough to cover the cost of basic medical treatment, but during
the planning of the event, she deliberately withheld this information from the doctor who was
under the impression that gender ambiguous people could not afford proper health care. Payal
did not attempt to correct this presumption because she wanted to maintain an image of khwaja
siras as indigent people.
Although hijraness was essential in enabling khwaja siras to fight adversity in everyday
and activist contexts, it all too often stifled their growth within institutionalized domains.
Nadeem, the manager of AKS, for instance, was overwhelmed by the unruly behavior of his
khwaja sira employees, most of whom had little or no education and prior office experience.
[T]hey tend to argue a lot and they think that what they are saying is right. Sometimes
they argue not because they think that what they are saying is right, but because society
has never given them anything. I think it is due to the way society treats them on a
regular basis.
The aggressive and argumentative demeanor of khwaja siras was a product of stigma and
exclusion. The use of the tongue as a weapon against oppression was crucial to the survival of
khwaja siras in their daily experiences of marginalization. However, this very defense functioned
against them in the workplace where it was perceived as professional misconduct.
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Khwaja sira identity politics factored into the failure of development programs aimed at
gender ambiguous people. Their deceptive practices prevented the government and the NGO
sector from implementing effective rehabilitation programs for khwaja siras. The critics of such
politics tended to disregard the subjective experiences of gender variant people, which, I
contend, must be assessed in light of their daily experiences of stigma, structural inequality, and
insecurity. Activist leaders sought justice the only way they knew how, that is, by employing
conventional strategies of hijraness. However, these techniques were mere bandaid solutions,
limited and short-term in their impact.

Rights, Activism and Change
Legal transformations in their favor created a discourse around khwaja sira rights and gave some
the courage to challenge oppression and discrimination. Khwaja sira activists found a voice in
the public sphere that allowed them to garner media attention and to protest against incidents of
brutality. However, legal victories did not amount to marked improvements in social attitudes
towards khwaja siras or to positive changes in their everyday lives. Moreover, it remains to be
seen if the activism of gender ambiguous people will shift towards a more open and fruitful
exchange with stakeholders. Is there room in Pakistani society for productive dialogue about
gender/sexual diversity that does not privilege genital makeup? Will khwaja siras be able to
publically pose as anything other than intersexuals? Or will their prevailing cultural practices
persist as a result of their continuing subjugation?

Empowerment: Education, Self-Esteem and Knowledge
Culture change will rely partially on the government clarifying its stance on khwaja siras and
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publically recognizing them as individuals who possess a feminine soul110. In the absence of an
explanation by the state, khwaja siras will continue to live in fear and uncertainty about their
legal status, remain vulnerable to oppression, and will fear seeking justice in response to the
violence that it meted out on them. Knowing that the state gives them the right to selfdetermination regardless of corporeality will assure gender ambiguous people of their protection
under the law, give them the confidence to benefit unreservedly from the judicially conferred
rights, and propel their movement in productive directions. However, the state’s silence
surrounding nonnormatively gendered bodies is likely to persist until Pakistan decides its own
identity as either a secular or an Islamic state. Hence, the most significant effort will have to
come from khwaja sira activists and their allies who will benefit from focusing on three goals:
the provision of education, self-esteem building, and the dissemination of knowledge.
Lack of education was among the factors preventing gender ambiguous people from
fighting social stigma. In the absence of necessary skills and qualifications, they were unable to
secure donor funding to sustain their organizations, and access information that could empower
their activism. The few who were employed in the NGO sector had to take up junior clerical,
outreach and janitorial positions due to inadequate credentials and experience. NGOs working on
issues related to khwaja siras had done little in terms of providing training on issues of import.
However, in 2013, the Literacy and Non-Formal Basic Education (LNFBE) department of the
Punjab Government introduced a six-month training program for khwaja siras in Lahore and
Rawalpindi. LNBFE’s adult literacy curriculum included basic Urdu, English and mathematics
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I would advise against such a move had Aslam Khaki not informed me personally that the
legal understanding of khwaja sira was inclusive of various non-normatively gendered and sexed
individuals. Nevertheless, Khaki’s testimony, though crucial, maybe not representative of other
state interlocutors who might interpret “khwaja sira” differently. Importantly, regime changes
could also turn the government’s tide of approval for gender ambiguous people.
	
  

327	
  

along with a beauty course111. Among NGOs, MHS initiated a “transgender” literacy project in
June 2013. The program aimed to teach English, Urdu, basic arithmetic and topics on sexual
health by incorporating khwaja sira Farsi into its curriculum.
Although these initiatives are noteworthy, education programs for gender ambiguous
people may benefit from taking the following into consideration. First, the provision of education
for khwaja siras must be accompanied by social acceptance. Projects focused on educating and
empowering gender ambiguous people are unlikely to meet their objectives if khwaja sira
beneficiaries are unable to obtain and maintain employment due to social intolerance and
workplace harassment. Second, these projects are likely to be most successful among the
younger generation of khwaja siras. Those who are fully acculturated into the khwaja sira social
structure, and already enjoy high earnings through sex work will have the lowest motivation to
better their lives. In contrast, murats are likely to be more receptive to learning, and eager to
participate in the emerging fashion, entertainment, media and other industries. Third, khwaja sira
role models and success stories will play a crucial role in enabling gender ambiguous people to
imagine themselves in alternative careers and in encouraging them to pursue unconventional
paths. Khwaja sira literacy projects must be geared towards sustaining inspiration and
enthusiasm among beneficiaries. Fourth, innovative pedagogies will have to be developed to
manage the attention deficit of gender variant students since khwaja siras were known to get
easily distracted due to their lack of experience working in professional and formal
environments.
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LNBFE remunerated students as an incentive to attend classes. Project leaders believed that in
the absence of these stipends, gender ambiguous people would be inclined to skip lessons and to
use class time to earn through begging and sex work. LNBFE’s initiative suffered due to low
student attendance despite the provision of a stipend. Evidently, the department’s small
compensation was not enough to keep students motivated to attend class on a regular basis.
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Projects aimed at empowering gender ambiguous people will also benefit from building
their self-esteem. Egocentric behavior, which served to veil their insecurities and low self-worth,
was a source of conflict within khwaja sira social and activist networks. In their “behavior
change” initiatives, development programs will benefit from focusing greater attention on raising
the self-esteem of khwaja siras. This is essential in efforts to inspire them to bring about positive
change both in their personal lives and within their communities112.
Finally, khwaja sira activists were encumbered in their efforts to address social stigma
largely due to lack of relevant information. Their inability to harness the power of knowledge for
activism put them at an immense disadvantage113. Development initiatives can empower khwaja
siras by disseminating relevant information that can help them overcome their psychological
constraints and insecurities, respond to critique in a constructive manner, spread valuable
knowledge instead of merely perpetuating mythical discourse, and facilitate fruitful dialogue
with religious and legal authorities in order to influence public policies related to gender
ambiguous people. Knowledge is therefore indispensable in the production of reverse discourse
and in the acquisition and maintenance of power. Hence, along with public awareness raising,
khwaja sira social development and activism must focus on the provision of vital information,
educational training and self-esteem-building among constituents.

Sexual Rights, Islam and Legal Developments
Social stigma prevented activist leaders from addressing the sexual rights of khwaja siras.
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Community activists and NGOs will also have to make a dedicated effort to ‘sensitize’ the
general public about khwaja siras. For instance, educating the youth about gender ambiguous
people will positively impact the future generation’s perception and treatment of khwaja siras,
which in turn, will improve the self-esteem and quality of life of gender variant youth.
113
For instance, most khwaja siras were unaware that sex-reassignment surgeries were not illegal
in Pakistan and that they were sanctioned by an Islamic injunction in Iran.
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Activists distanced gender ambiguous people from sex and sexuality and represented them as
asexual ascetics. However, through future collaborations with legal and religious experts, such as
Aslam Khaki, activists may be able to facilitate dialogue on this thorny issue. As a SC advocate,
an Islamic jurist of the Federal Shariat Court, and a jurist consultant (fiqh-e-mushir), Khaki had
the power of issuing fatvās that were accepted as law both in the SC and the Federal Shariat
Court. During my meeting with him, Khaki described his views on khwaja sira sexuality and
highlighted possible future directions for their sexual rights.
Khaki: I think their sexual rights should be addressed because there is so much
confusion. Since they have a psychological tendency, there might be some who want to
live as husband and wife. [So]…we also have to think about their sexual satisfaction. For
this, surgery might be allowed, which it already is since there is no law against it. They
may opt for sex change and get married. A jurist like myself is in a position to do
scientific research on this matter.
Faris: So you’re saying that we do not have all the answers on this issue?
Khaki: Yes, because this matter has not be properly debated. Anything that is sex-based,
has not been debated completely.
Faris: A lot of people believe that changing the form in which God has created you is
against Islam.
Khaki: Islam does not say this…This is simply a misunderstanding of some ideas.
In contradiction to popular belief, Khaki highlights that sex-reassignment surgeries and other
forms of bodily modifications were not illegal by virtue of the absence of secular laws against
them. However, such procedures were deemed un-Islamic by religious authorities and were
widely believed to be against Islam. Khaki points out the lack of adequate dialogue and wellresearched religious jurisprudence on sensitive topics, such as sex and sexuality, and emphasizes
the potential of ijtihad114 on issues, such as sex-reassignment. Khaki had an intellectual outlook
on shariáh as a set of evolving laws that should develop in keeping with new research and
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In Islamic law, ijtihad refers to decision-making through personal effort. It is a process that
requires a thorough knowledge of theology, revealed texts, legal theory and an exceptional
capacity for legal reasoning through which scholars are expected to find solutions to problems.
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contemporary social problems. Through jurists like Khaki, policies related to the sexual rights of
khwaja siras have a chance of developing.
However, in order to avoid further stigmatizing sexual minorities, the implementation of
policies related to SRS must serve not as an antidote to sodomy but as an option for those who
voluntarily wish to change their sex. The religious endorsement of SRS should specifically
address the dissonance between the gender identity and assigned birth-sex of those who
experience gender dysphoria or possess a rūh. Hence, discussions about SRS should not be based
on sexual rights, which risks initiating a dialogue about the illegitimacy of anal sex, but on
recognizing the right to corporeal transformation by privileging internalized gender over external
genital makeup. These advancements will assist the state to clarify its stance on gender
ambiguous Muslims while legitimating the mismatch between sex and gender.

Final Note
Although their games of deception provided a degree of acceptance, safety and empowerment to
khwaja siras, they must be accompanied by gradual, long-term approaches if gender ambiguous
people expect greater inclusion and acceptance in mainstream society. Activists must develop
culturally informed approaches that address the origins of stigma if they wish to bring about
meaningful change to the lives of khwaja siras. This will involve conducting research, accessing
relevant religious and legal information, engaging in constructive dialogue with stakeholders,
etc. This approach may not have an immediate impact and may even pose security risks, but they
have the potential of generating meaningful change in the long run.
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Glossary
‘Ām log

Ordinary people

‘Abāaiya

A full body cloak worn by women in parts of the Muslim world.

Āche khāse mard

Normal men, reproductively capable men

‘Ashūrhā

The 10th of the Islamic month of Muharram, in which Shia Muslims mourn
the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad.

‘Aorat

Woman, female

Bādshāh

King

Bahu

Daughter-in-law

Bānṭhā

A homosexual man

Baṛī maṛī

A big, historic residence where hijra lineage chiefs reside.

Bāt ūpar se
Ghomānā

To twist logic from above, to respond in a roundabout manner

Bāt cīt

Chit-chat

Behrupīa

One who impersonates

Betā

Child or son

Betī

Daughter

Bhāī

Bother

Bhatījā

Paternal nephew

Bhatījī

Paternal niece

Bigārah

Ruin

Buḍhā bābā

Old man

Burāī

Vice, sin
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Caccā

Paternal uncle

Cālīsva

The fortieth day and last day of mourning after a person’s death.

Chāvā

Adolescent boys who have sex with men for smalls sums of money.

Dādā

Paternal grandfather

Dādī

Paternal grandmother

Dāīrah

Circle

Ḍānḍīā

Sticks used in folk dances

Desī

Native

Dost

Friend

Dūlhan

Bride

Dunyā

World

Eīd

The name of the two Muslim religious festivals.

Faqīr

Ascetics

Fatvā

An Islamic injunction

Filmī

Relating to films, film-like

Gāndū

A man who enjoys being anally penetrated

Guftagū

Conversation

Hadīth

Sayings and teachings ascribed to Prophet Mohammad.

Hājī

A form of address for someone who has performed hajj, the Muslim holy
pilgrimage to Ka’ba in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.

Hajj

The pilgrimage to Makkah that every Muslim is required to make at least
one in his/her lifetime.

Hamjins

Homosexual
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Izzat

Respect

Kalmah

Refers to the declaration of faith in Islam, in the oneness of Allah and in the
belief that Prophet Muhammad is the last messenger of God.

Khadṛā

A man who is impotent or sterile.

Khel

Game, play

Khelnā

To play

Khunthā /
khunsā mushkil

A person who is born with indeterminable genitalia.

Khusrah

The Punjabi term for hijra

Kurti

A short waist length shirt.

Lākh

One hundred thousand rupees

Lashkar

Army

Lorī

A lullaby for infants

Mālīshīah

Masseur

Mān

Mother

Marāsī

An indigenous singer or musician

Mard

Man, male

Māshaāllah

An Arabic term meaning “willed by God,” used to express appreciation for a
person or an occurrence.

Maut kā kunvāŋ/
Golā

The well/globe of death. This is a wooden trellised well/globe in which
stuntmen ride cars and motorcycles and khwaja siras dance at the bottom of
the structure.

Mehndī

A pre-wedding ceremony or a wedding procession in which guests carry
decorative henna trays.

Mohallah

Neighborhood
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Mun kālā karnā

To lower one’s respect, to blacken one’s face

Mukhannath

Effeminate men or sometimes transvestite men

Mullāḥ

A man educated in Islamic theology and law.

Murīd

Student or disciple

Nām

Name

Nānī

Maternal grandmother

Navāsī

Maternal granddaughter

Niāz

A religious offering involving the distribution of food.

Nikā’

Islamic marriage or the legal contract between a bride and a groom as part of
an Islamic marriage.

Niqāb

A headscarf that covers the entire face except the eyes.

Pāk ho jānā

To become purified

Pardesī

Non-native, foreigner

Pīr

Master or teacher

Potā

Paternal grandson

Potī

Paternal grand daughter

Paidāishī

By birth

Korān Khwāni

A religious gathering in which people recite parts of the Quran.

Ramzān

The holy month of fasting for Muslims

Rishte

Relationships

Rūh

Soul, spirit

Sās

Mother-in-law

Salām

A form of greeting among Muslims. Salām means peace in Arabic.
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Shalvār qamīz

A traditional South Asian dress consisting of loose, pleated trousers and a
long-shirt or tunic. Women’s salvar kameez differ from men’s in terms of
color, print and style.

Shariáh

Islamic law

Shehzādī

Princess

Shīshā

Hookah

Subhānallah

Arabic for God is Glorious.

Sunnah

Sunnah is the way of life prescribed as normative for Muslims on the basis
of the teachings and practices of Prophet Muhammad and the interpretations
of the Quran.

Takallufi

A man who pretends to be effeminate for ulterior motives.

Ummah

In Arabic, Ummah means nation or community, and it refers to the network
of Muslims the world over.

‘Umrah

Muslim pilgrimage to Makkah

‘Urs

The annual death anniversary festivals of Sufi saints.

Vālā

That, person

Vazīr

Minister or political advisor

Zaāt

Ethnicity

Zakāt

The Islamic practice of charitable giving based on accumulated wealth.

Zānkhā

A homosexual man

Farsi Terms
Aḍībāz

Pickpocket, extortionist

Akvā

A khwaja sira who has not undergone physical emasculation.

Bakhṛā

A share of money earned by conferring blessings.
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Barāpān

Seniority or seniority allowance

Bīlā

A cruel or ugly man

Cāmkā

Admirer

Capṭy

The flattened area with a urinary passage resulting from emasculation
surgery.

Caṭāī

A meeting in which important community matters are discussed and
conflicts are resolved.

Celā

Student, disciple

Codhry

A leader of a zennana circle

Dād-guru

The kinship term used by a khwaja sira for her guru’s mentor.

Dāgh dhulvāna

To get a stain washed

Ḍanḍ

Fine

Ḍeṛā

A khwaja sira’s residence

Dharonā

A man who enjoys being anally penetrated

Ḍhīngnā

To beg

Dunyādār

A person belonging to mainstream society; biological relatives; someone
who has children.

Fīrqā

Women’s attire

Giryā

Lover, partner, man

Girye kā joṛā
jalsah

The ritual celebration of a lover/partner

Girye valī murat

A partnered khwaja sira

Guptī

A man who hides his desire to be sexually penetrated out of shame.

Guru

Mentor, teacher, senior
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Guru-bhāī

The kinship term used by a khwaja sira’s disciples for one another.

Hijarpan

Hijraness; the body of hijra knowledge and practices.

Hukka-pāni
band karnā

To impose a ban on or to put one’s student on probation

Jhalaknā

To become nervous or confused

Kacī

Defamation, embarrassment

Kaṛe karājā

Shut up, be quiet

Khatam roṭī

The last mourning event for a deceased family member.

Khel

A khwaja sira social system or ethnic group.

Khoṭkī

Men’s attire

Khundak

Jealousy

M’ashūq

A young and beautiful khwaja sira, particularly one who demonstrates selfconfidence and an air of superiority.

Mīṭhe cāval

Adolescent and young men with whom khwaja siras had sex for pleasure. In
Urdu, mīṭhe cāval refers to a rice dessert.

Moṛā

Cash contributions made by khwaja sira guests on joyful occasions.

Nehāro

Woman

Nirbān

A khwaja sira who has undergone physical emasculation involving the
removal of the penis and testicles.

Pakī kā giryā

Permanent lover/partner

Pesha

The ritual transfer of a student; the fee for the transfer of a disciple from one
guru to another.

Potrā celā

The kinship term used by a khwaja sira for her disciple’s student.

Pun

Client or sex work

Pun valī murat

A khwaja sira sex worker
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Roṭī

An event organized to mourn the death of a khwaja sira.

Seepo

Vagina

Tamāshbenī

To create a spectacle by showering performers with cash.

Ṭolī

Begging and blessing

Us kī gandī ho
jānā

To be stained or sullied

Vadhāī

Blessing

Velā

The thirty-fifth day of mourning, organized by the mother of the deceased
khwaja sira.

Vīrat

Earning areas designed to specific hijra families.
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